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PREFACE
Lela P. Love
It is my great privilege to join Hal Abramson in ushering this
reference book into the literature about the Singapore Mediation
Convention.  We were privileged to have drafters of the Conven-
tion and notable scholars converge at Cardozo Law School on
March 18, 2019 for a symposium and to contribute to this book.
And then we were able to share the excitement of the signing of
the Convention by 46 countries in August 2019.  Now we celebrate
the publication of this reference book.
Cardozo and Touro Law Schools co-sponsored this event,
joined by notable sponsors that we deeply appreciate: Jed D. Mel-
nick, the sponsor of the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution
Annual Symposium, the International Academy of Mediators
(IAM), the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) of
the American Arbitration Association (AAA), JAMS, the New
York State Bar Association Dispute Resolution Section, the NJ
City University Institute for Dispute Resolution, and the Federal
Bar Association— Alternative Dispute Section, International Law
Section, and Litigation Section.  The depth and enthusiasm of our
sponsors marked the importance of the occasion.
For me, looking at the arc of Cardozo’s dispute resolution pro-
gram—and also the arc of my career—this event marks a coming of
age of mediation.  It is now on the world stage as a co-equal
(though different) process than arbitration.  We have two wide and
walked pathways for dispute resolution—that of crafting consen-
sual agreements with the help of a third party neutral and that of
third party decisions.
A few thanks are in order: to Nick Gliagias, the editor-in-chief
of the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, whose positive and
can-do attitude, ready smile, and hard and professional work made
the project a pleasure and who contributed greatly to its success.
To our sponsors, mentioned above.  Above all, to Hal Abramson,
whose enthusiasm and involvement with the drafting of the Con-
vention sparked my own interest and enthusiasm and willingness to
put a 100% effort into this venture.  He was the major driver be-
hind scoping the topics, inviting and spurring on various authors to
write the articles, and reviewing each draft article.
LELA P. LOVE
Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law
Director, Kukin Program for Conflict Resolution
August 2019
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• Tim Schnabel, Former Head of U.S. Delegation: Recognition
and Enforcement (Art. 3)
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ARTICLES
INTRODUCTION
Hal Abramson
OVERVIEW
This Reference Book focuses on the new Singapore Mediation
Convention for enforcing cross-border mediated settlement agree-
ments.  It is designed to deliver on its title—as a reference book.
We hope that it will inform discussions as states contemplate ratify-
ing the Singapore Convention and will aid users when interpreting
the Convention.
To serve as an accessible reference source, the book is organ-
ized into three parts.  As explained more fully below, Part I in-
cludes three articles that offer three perspectives on the
Convention and the process that produced it; Part II presents four
articles that supply evidence of the need for a cross-border en-
forcement instrument and its likely effectiveness; and Part III in-
cludes eight articles that examine key provisions in-depth,
explaining why particular choices were made and others rejected.
The articles in the book are expanded versions of presenta-
tions given at a symposium on the Singapore Convention.  The
symposium was co-sponsored by Cardozo and Touro Law Schools
in New York City on March 18, 2019, three months after the U.N.
General Assembly adopted the Convention.  Most of the authors
were delegates who were in the “room where it happened,” to
quote a well-known phrase from Lin-Manuel Miranda’s break-out
Broadway hit Hamilton.
The Singapore Convention is not perfect.  It is the product of a
complex negotiation involving  diverse parties from around the
world.  Parties brought to the room varied professional, cultural,
and political perspectives and experiences.  The result reflects
“compromises,” a word with mixed and not always positive mean-
ings, especially for me.  Compromise is often understood as an ane-
mic conclusion to a quarrel, where the parties exhaustedly offer to
“split the difference.”  In this book, I will define the word “com-
promise” based on what I observed during the UNCITRAL Work-
ing Group II deliberations, the U.N. group responsible for drafting
the Convention.  “Compromise” proposals were usually not the
1001
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uncreative “split the difference” variety.  Instead, they were fre-
quently quite inventive ones that addressed to some extent the dif-
ferent interests and concerns that were holding up reaching a
consensus (the criteria for agreement in a process with no voting).
This usage is consistent with best practices in negotiations and left
me with a more positive view of a “compromise.”
Realizing that the Convention reflects multiple compromises
designed to meet conflicting interests, it is not surprising that the
Convention may be viewed as imperfect from the perspective of
some delegates and user groups.  For this reason, each author that
focused on the Convention’s specific provisions in Part III was
asked to do more than explain the provisions that the author was
covering.  Each author was asked to highlight the rationale behind
key compromises and any risks when implementing the provisions.
By adopting this approach, I hope this book offers a realistic, not
idealized, assessment of key provisions.
This reference book offers answers and explanations to many
questions that will likely arise in any discussion of the new Conven-
tion.  Is there a need for an enforcement convention?  Given the
availability of so many Article 5 defenses, does the Convention im-
prove upon current enforcement mechanisms?  Does Article 4 on
proving a mediation and Article 5 on defenses against enforcement
based on mediator misbehavior offer an easy way for a party to
repudiate an agreement?  Do Article 8 reservations risk gutting the
Convention or offer a pathway for broader buy-in by states?  An-
swers to these questions and many others can be found in these
articles.
CONTENT
PART I: OVERVIEW OF THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION
The initial three articles provide an overview of the
Convention.
The article by Natalie Morris-Sharma from Singapore who
chaired UNCITRAL Working Group II that drafted the Conven-
tion provides what she describes as a “whirlwind tour of the Con-
vention.”  She explores the multilateral nature of the consensus-
building process and how the Convention responds to diverse legal
traditions while fashioning a simple, easy-to-use instrument that ac-
commodates flexible mediation processes.
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The article by Corinne Montineri, senior legal officer at UN-
CITRAL and Secretary of Working Group II for the enforcement
project, describes how the UNCITRAL drafting process functions
within the United Nations and the significance of the Convention
in promoting cross-border trade and investment.  She provides his-
torical context in explaining how the Convention fits within UNCI-
TRAL’s history of mediation-related and enforcement initiatives.
The third article, by me, explains the multiparty negotiation
process that produced the Convention and why a number of the
key substantive choices were made from the perspective of a per-
son who was present during much of the drafting process.
PART II: NEED FOR AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONVENTION
The first three articles describe empirical studies that can be
useful to states that are assessing whether a cross-border enforce-
ment instrument is needed.
In an article designed to open up the black box of the early
treaty making stages, Professor S.I. Strong, University of Missouri
School of Law and an American Society of International Law
Delegate, uses the Singapore Convention as a case study to illus-
trate how the combination of theoretical work and empirical stud-
ies can support the treaty-proposing process.  Her article includes a
summary of her original empirical study that can be useful to coun-
tries looking for evidence to support adopting an enforcement in-
strument.  Her full study, published separately, in an article
entitled Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of Interna-
tional Commercial Mediation, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1973 (2016),
identified existing difficulties enforcing mediated settlement agree-
ments, and concluded that “the international legal community
strongly supported the adoption” of an international enforcement
treaty.
Four other relevant empirical studies are summarized in an ar-
ticle by Deborah Masucci,  Co-chair of the International Mediation
Institute (IMI) and head of the IMI Delegation.  She summarizes
studies that were conducted by Queen Mary/White and Case, In-
ternational Mediation Institute (IMI) (2016 Survey), Institute for
Dispute Resolution of the New Jersey City University School of
Business, and the Global Pound Conference Series.
Two of these studies, the IMI and the Global Pound Series
surveys, are reported in greater detail in an article by Professor
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David Weiss, New Jersey City University Institute for Dispute Res-
olution (NJCU-IDR) and IMI Delegate.
The fourth and final article in Part II offers reassuring evi-
dence that if the U.S. mediation litigation experience reflects the
litigation experiences in other countries, the Singapore Convention
should be efficacious even with the conditions that must be met in
the Convention and the range of defenses that can be asserted in
an enforcement proceeding.  In an article by Professor James
Coben from Mitchell-Hamline Law School and the leading expert
on U.S. mediation-related litigation, the author reports on his em-
pirically-based studies and conclusions.
PART III: KEY PROVISIONS—IN-DEPTH CONSIDERATION
Part III scrutinizes Convention provisions central to states’ as-
sessment of the treaty’s effectiveness in establishing a cross-border
enforcement regime that serves their needs.  This part also pro-
vides guidance to mediation parties seeking to determine the ambit
and content of the Convention.
Part A offers two articles that cover the scope of the
Convention.
The first article explains why the Convention is limited to
commercial disputes and settlement agreements that only result
from mediation.  It also gives background on the long-overdue
change by UNCITRAL to replace the term “conciliation” with
“mediation,” in an article by Professor Ellen Deason, Ohio State
University Law School and American Society of International Law
Delegate.
The second article explains why the Convention only applies
to mediated settlements and how easy it is to prove a mediation
qualifies for enforcement under the Convention, in an article by
Allan Stitt, Canadian Delegate and experienced mediator.
Part B offers four articles that delve deeply into the Conven-
tion’s central features on enforcement and defenses.
The short and convoluted Article 3 that is simply titled “Gen-
eral Principles” is the essential  “player” in the enforcement Con-
vention according to Tim Schnabel, former head of the U.S.
Delegation.  He deciphers the Article while explaining why all the
other provisions are “supporting players.”
The other three articles cover the defenses.
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1005
The first defenses article considers claims of mediator miscon-
duct that can be asserted as a defense against enforcement, a provi-
sion that has generated alarm within the mediation community
because of how such defenses can be misused.  Michel Kallipetis,
IAM Delegate and experienced mediator, explains what triggered
inclusion of these defenses, parses the language, and suggests why
the fears of abuse are unwarranted due to the safeguards in the
carefully crafted language.
Two delegates were asked to analyze the same Article 5 de-
fenses because their implementation could be dispositive in deter-
mining the Convention’s success.  Each author also was asked to
answer independently whether the new enforcement convention is
better than the status quo (existing enforcement options)?  The an-
swer is not obvious as the Convention offers a wide range of de-
fenses that could generate the same sort of litigation that can arise
without the treaty.  In two lengthy articles, one by the Belgium
Delegate and lawyer, Jean-Christophe Boulet, and another by
Mexican delegate and lawyer, He´ctor Flores Sentı´es, the authors
offer their insights on this pivotal provision.
Part C offers two articles that cover Reservations and two
other significant provisions.
In a discerning analysis of Article 8 on Reservations, a com-
mon provision in treaties that can dilute their effectiveness, Israeli
delegate and lawyer, Itai Apter, with a colleague, explains the ra-
tionale for these reservations including their benefits for promoting
state buy-ins while preserving the Convention’s benefits.  He sug-
gests that the provision may induce more states to ratify the Con-
vention because states that are hesitant about the Convention’s
automatic application can file a reservation to reverse it so that the
Convention would apply only if a disputing party elects to opt-in.
Finally, in an article that addresses three narrow and signifi-
cant provisions, Norel Rosner, who represented the European
Union at the UNCITRAL negotiations, considers how the Con-
vention coordinates the Convention with other enforcement re-
gimes, illuminates further the opt-in provision, and explains the
Convention’s involvement of regional economic organizations like
the European Union as parties.
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STATUS OF CONVENTION AT TIME OF REFERENCE BOOK
PUBLICATION
On August 7, 2019, the Singapore Convention officially
opened for signature at an elegant ceremony hosted by Singapore
where 46 countries signed the convention.  The  official list of sig-
natories that will be updated in perpetuity can be found on the
UNCITRAL website by searching for “Singapore Convention on
Mediation.”
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When you check, you will find two columns.  The left one lists
the countries that have signed the Convention so far.  The right
column lists the countries that have deposited an instrument of rat-
ification, acceptance, approval, or accession in accordance with Ar-
ticle 14.1 of the Convention.  The Convention will become effective
six months after a third country shows up in the right column.  At
the time this book went to the publisher, there were no countries in
the right column.
When a third country deposits an instrument and this first in-
ternational treaty on cross-border commercial mediation becomes
effective, mediation will be available for parties on an even play-
ing-field with arbitration and its New York Convention.  We hope
that this book will help inform the discussions and decisions as
countries weigh whether to join the new Singapore Mediation Con-
vention.  We also hope the book will be valuable to users when it
comes time to implement this new Convention.
HAL ABRAMSON
Professor of Law, Touro Law Center
Faculty Editor of Reference Book and Co-Chair of Symposium
IMI and IAM Delegate at UNCITRAL Working Group II
Meetings on the Singapore Convention
August 2019

THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION IS LIVE, AND
MULTILATERALISM, ALIVE!*
Natalie Y. Morris-Sharma**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the same year of claims and consternation that multilateral-
ism may be dead,1 the text of a multilateral treaty was finalised
(alongside an amended model law) and adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly.2  This new treaty—the United Nations
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting
from Mediation, which will also be known as the Singapore Con-
vention on Mediation (hereinafter “the Singapore Conven-
tion”)3—will provide for the ability to enforce and invoke
international mediated settlement agreements reached to resolve
commercial disputes.  When UNCITRAL finalised its work on the
Singapore Convention and the amended Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Mediation and International Settlement Agree-
ments Resulting from Mediation (hereinafter “the Model Law”)
* The views expressed herein are the views of the author and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Government of Singapore. Please note that at the time of this writing, the signing
ceremony was some months away.
** Natalie Y. Morris-Sharma is Director of the International Legal Division in Singapore’s
Ministry of Law, which handles a variety of international law and policy concerns. Previously,
Natalie was legal advisor to Singapore’s Permanent Mission to the UN, and Deputy Senior State
Counsel in the international law department of the Attorney-General’s Chambers. Natalie has
participated in several bilateral and multilateral negotiations, including at UNCITRAL where
her recent roles have included Chairperson of UNCITRAL Working Group II (Dispute Settle-
ment), for its work on a Convention and draft amended model law on mediation; and Vice-
Chairperson of the 50th UNCITRAL Commission session, where she chaired the discussions
that led to the adoption of UNCITRAL’s mandate for ISDS reform.
1 See, e.g., Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Rising Nationalism Threatens Multilateral-
ism’s 70-Year ‘Proven Track Record’ of Saving Lives, Preventing Wars, Secretary-General Tells
Security Council, U.N. Meetings Coverage, SC/13570 (Nov. 9, 2018); Andreas Michaelis, Fare-
well to Multilateralism? Building a Strong Europe for a Strong World Order, Remarks at Singa-
pore Institute of International Affairs’ Seminar on “The EU and ASEAN in Uncertain Times:
Integration, Tensions, and Trade” (Sept. 13, 2018) (transcript available online at http://www.siia
online.org/the-eu-and-asean-in-uncertain-times-farewell-to-multilateralism/).
2 G.A. Res. 73/198, United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements
Resulting from Mediation (Dec. 20, 2018) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 73/198]. With respect to the
Model Law, see G. A. Res. 73/199, Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (Dec. 20, 2018).
3 G.A. Res. 73/198, OP3.
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during the 51st Commission session in June 2018, the negotiators
musically announced, through a song, composed to the tune of
Home on the Range, that “The Singapore Convention is live.”  In-
deed, the Singapore Convention will not only “go live” on 7 Au-
gust 2019, when it opens for signature in Singapore, but its
negotiation and adoption demonstrated that multilateralism is still
very much alive.
The Singapore Convention was inspired by the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(hereinafter “the New York Convention”).4  The Singapore Con-
vention will be to mediated settlement agreements what the New
York Convention is to arbitral awards.  The Singapore Convention
recognises that, with a mediated process, the settlement agreement
is not a mere contract, and can therefore be recognised and en-
forced (or enforced and invoked) in its own right, so long as the
requirements of the Singapore Convention are met.5
The Singapore Convention applies to (i) international, (ii)
commercial, (iii) settlement agreements, (iv) resulting from
mediation.6
4 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
5 The Singapore Convention does not use the term “recognition.” This is because of the
different understandings over what “recognition” means. As such, it was decided that the Con-
vention would instead describe the legal effects of “recognition.” The terms “enforce” and “in-
voke” are intended to encapsulate how a mediated settlement agreement can be used as a
“sword” as well as a “shield.” See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settle-
ment) on the work of its sixty-fifth session (Vienna, September 12–23, 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
896, at 15 (Sept. 30, 2016) [hereinafter UNCITRAL WG II September 2016 Report]; UNCI-
TRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-
fourth session (New York, February 1–5, 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, at 23 (Feb. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL WG II February 2016 Report]; UNCITRAL, Report of Working
Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-third session (Vienna, Septem-
ber 7–11, 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, at 14 (Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter UNCITRAL WG II
September 2015 Report]. See also Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on Mediation:
A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, 19
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 35–42 (2019) (more generally, this article provides a superb explana-
tion of the key provisions of the Convention, drawing in great detail from the records of the
negotiations and from the author’s key role in the negotiations).
6 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 1(1). In this chapter, the term “mediation” is
used with the intention that it be understood the same way as the term “conciliation” as used in
the context of UNCITRAL’s earlier work on conciliation. In the early stages of the discussions, a
view was expressed that the work of UNCITRAL in this area should refer to “mediation” in-
stead of “conciliation.” This was on the basis that “mediation” was the more widely used term.
There was some hesitation to do this, even towards the end of the negotiations. It was recognised
that these terms had been historically used in the relevant UNCITRAL texts. To address the
concern that there be an inadvertent substantive change in meaning, the text accompanying the
Convention will explain the historical developments of the terminology in the UNCITRAL texts
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An “international” settlement agreement is identified in rela-
tion to the places of business of the parties to the settlement agree-
ment.7  The Convention does not apply to consumer disputes, or to
agreements relating to consumer disputes or to family, inheritance,
or employment law.8  Unlike the Model Law, the Convention does
not address itself to agreements to mediate, recognising that such
agreements are not exclusive in nature unlike arbitration agree-
ments9 and that there may not always be such an agreement con-
cluded by the disputing parties as a basis for the mediation
process.10  In order to avoid overlaps (and gaps) with existing and
future Conventions which apply to arbitral awards and judg-
ments—including the Convention on Choice of Court Agree-
ments,11 the anticipated judgments convention being negotiated at
the Hague Conference, and the New York Convention—the Singa-
pore Convention does not apply to all settlement agreements.  It
does not apply to settlement agreements approved by a court or
concluded before a court in the course of proceedings and which
are enforceable as a judgment.  It also does not apply to settlement
agreements which are recorded and enforceable as an arbitral
award.12
This Chapter will explore the multilateral process and context
which led to the development of the Singapore Convention as well
as the amended Model Law.  This Chapter will then examine how,
as a product of multilateral consensus, the Singapore Convention
responds to the diverse legal traditions and legal realities by being
a treaty with requirements that are simple, easy to use, and accom-
modate the flexibilities inherent in mediation.
and emphasise that the term “mediation” is “intended to cover a broad range of activities that
would fall under the definition as provided in article 1(3) of the Model Law regardless of the
expressions used.” See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the
work of its sixty-seventh session (Vienna, October 2–6, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, at 16 (Oct.
11, 2017) [hereinafter UNCITRAL WG II October 2017 Report]; UNCITRAL WG II February
2016 Report, supra note 5, at 19.
7 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 1(1).
8 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 1(2).
9 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-second session (New York, February 2–6, 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, at 7 (Feb. 11,
2015) [hereinafter UNCITRAL WG II February 2015 Report].
10 UNCITRAL WG II October 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 7; UNCITRAL WG II Sep-
tember 2015 Report, supra note 5, at 6, 13.
11 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294.
12 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 1(3).
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II. THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS
The Singapore Convention was developed through a multilat-
eral process, and was developed by consensus.  Multilateral con-
sensus is a hallmark of the UNCITRAL tradition.  UNCITRAL
conducts processes that ensure that it is well-placed to identify
common ground for the building of harmonised approaches and
legal responses to a variety of issues in international trade law.13
Foremost of these are its convening power, which ensures input
from different legal cultures and traditions as well as the relevant
expertise.14  Its consensus-based decision-making enables the iden-
tification of points of convergence for viable options for
harmonisation.
These factors converged in the negotiations that led to the
adoption of the Singapore Convention and the amended Model
Law.  UNCITRAL’s convening power ensured that we typically
had at least a hundred delegations present at our meetings, with
technical experts hailing from backgrounds in fields such as gov-
ernment, the judiciary, arbitration, mediation, business, and
academia.15  The rich and varied experience that representatives
brought to the meetings ensured that the UNCITRAL delibera-
tions were rigorous and robust.16  That said, the road did not run
smoothly.  Not that this was a surprise.
The task of tackling an international mechanism for the en-
forcement of mediated settlement agreements was one that had
been taken up by UNCITRAL in the course of its work on the
13 See generally UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL rules of procedure and
methods of work, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/638 (Oct. 17, 2007), and its addenda 1–6.
14 See, e.g., UNCITRAL, A GUIDE TO UNICTRAL: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NA-
TIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 2 (2013) (“Members of UNCITRAL are
selected from among States Members of the United Nations and represent legal traditions and
levels of economic development”).
15 For example, the sixty-sixth session of the UNCITRAL Working Group II (Dispute Set-
tlement), that met from February 6–10, 2017 in New York, was attended by sixty State delega-
tions, two observer delegations, and forty-one intergovernmental and non-governmental
organisations. See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work
of its sixty-sixth session (New York, February 6–10, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, at 3 (Feb. 16,
2017) [hereinafter UNCITRAL WG II February 2017 Report].
16 S.I. Strong, Clash of Cultures: Epistemic Communities, Negotiation Theory, and Interna-
tional Lawmaking, 50 AKRON L. REV. 495, 511, 512, 518 (2016) (noting how “[t]he high propor-
tion of arbitration experts in Working Group II is troubling” but that “[i]f the mediation
community can provide experts in arbitration with a sufficiently compelling account of the need
for and benefits of a new treaty in this area of law, the two groups’ combined opinion will be
difficult for state actors to resist”).
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2002 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Con-
ciliation.17  The Model Law  identified “the smallest common de-
nominator between the various legal systems” for how to address
the enforcement of conciliated settlement agreements.18  The result
was to leave the question to individual States that chose to enact
the Model Law.19  In other words, no real agreement could be
reached at the time.20
It was almost 15 years later, in 2014, that UNCITRAL was
brought back to the question, owing to a proposal from the U.S.
delegation, led by Timothy Schnabel.21  However, the differences
in views in 2002 over the possibility of an international mechanism
for enforcement continued to persist in 2014.22  That we were able
to reach a consensus outcome on a Convention and amendments to
the Model Law is a testament to the negotiators (and members of
the UNCITRAL Secretariat) who worked tirelessly—come hell or
high water; or perhaps more aptly, come hail or snowy weather23—
to appreciate each other’s positions and interests, so that various
understandings could be reached and necessary compromises could
17 G.A. Res. 57/18, Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (Jan. 24, 2003).
18 UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the work of its thirty-fifth
session (Vienna, November 19–30, 2001), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/506 (Dec. 21, 2001).
19 Article 14 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation
states: “If the parties conclude an agreement settling a dispute, that settlement agreement is
binding and enforceable . . . [the enacting State may insert a description of the method of enforcing
settlement agreements or refer to provisions governing such enforcement].”
20 This fate is shared. See NADJA ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MEDIA-
TION: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 301 (2009) (noting that the Model Law and EU Mediation Direc-
tive, which Alexander describes as “the primary international legal instruments on mediation”,
“both fall short of establishing uniform standards in relation to the enforceability of mediated
agreements”). See also Edna Sussman, The Singapore Convention: Promoting the Enforcement
and Recognition of International Mediated Settlement Agreements, ICC DISP. RESOL. BULL., Nov.
2018, at 43–44.
21 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Planned and possible future work—Part III, Propo-
sal by the Government of the United States of America: future work for Working Group II, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/822 (June 2, 2014).
22 Schnabel, supra note 5, at 5; Natalie Y. Morris-Sharma, The Changing Landscape of Arbi-
tration: UNCITRAL’s Work On The Enforcement Of Conciliated Settlement Agreements, in AUS-
TRIAN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 123, 126–30 (2018).
23 This is in reference to the blizzard which led to meetings being cancelled on the Thursday
of the Working Group’s sixty-sixth session in New York in February 2017. This threatened the
momentum of the negotiations. However, pursuant to an invitation to all delegations to meet
informally at a location off-site, interested delegations were able to continue their discussions.
This enabled a number of key understandings to be reached. The five-issue packaged deal that
emerged from the sixty-sixth session enabled a breakthrough on a number of difficult issues in
the negotiations.
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be made.  A number of these negotiators are represented as au-
thors in this volume on the Singapore Convention.
III. THE CONVENTION IN CONTEXT
The benefits of mediation as a form of alternative dispute res-
olution are well-known, and are also appropriately acknowledged
in the preambular paragraphs of the Singapore Convention.24  In
gist, mediation offers the promise of cost-effective and time-effec-
tive dispute resolution, which translates into savings for commer-
cial parties as well as by States.  It allows parties to shape the way
their disputes are resolved in a way that suits them and their needs.
This better enables disputing parties to preserve their commercial
relationship.
However, the lack of a cross-border mechanism for giving le-
gal effect to international mediated settlement agreements has
been said to be a major obstacle to the use of mediation to resolve
disputes.25  Without a cross-border mechanism, in short, there
would be less certainty.26  In Carrie Menkel-Meadow’s recent Sin-
gapore Mediation Lecture in 2017, she had identified mediation’s
lack of an equivalent to the New York Convention as “one of the
very big problems for mediation.”27  An IMI survey conducted in
October and November 2014 found that 92.9% of those surveyed
would be either much more likely or probably more likely to medi-
ate a dispute with a party from another country if they knew that
their country had ratified a United Nations convention on the en-
forcement of mediated settlements.28  In another survey, the results
24 For instance, the third preambular paragraph states: “Considering that the use of media-
tion results in significant benefits, such as reducing the instances where a dispute leads to the
termination of a commercial relationship, facilitating the administration of international transac-
tions by commercial parties and producing savings in the administration of justice by States.”
25 Though by no means the only obstacle. Other reasons for the low uptake of international
commercial mediation include a lack of sensitivity to legal and cultural differences and the lack
of a track record for businesses to trust. In this regard, see Lucy Reed, Ultima Thule: Prospects
for International Commercial Mediation, Keynote Address at the Inaugural Schiefelbein Global
Dispute Resolution Conference (Jan. 18, 2019), video available online at https://
www.indisputably.org/?p=13752.
26 UNCITRAL WG II February 2015 Report, supra note 9, at 5–6. See also UNCITRAL
WG II September 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 24.
27 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mediation 3.0: Merging the Old and the New, ASIAN J. ON MEDI-
ATION 1, 7 (2018).
28 International Mediation Institute, IMI survey results overview: How Users View the Propo-
sal for a UN Convention on the Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, INTERNATIONAL MEDIA-
TION INSTITUTE (2014), https://www.imimediation.org/2017/01/16/users-view-proposal-un-
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of which were shared with the Working Group, 74% of respon-
dents indicated that they thought an international convention con-
cerning the enforcement of settlement agreements would
encourage mediation and conciliation.29  Both of these studies are
discussed in this Singapore Convention Reference Book.
Against this backdrop, by offering a cross-border mechanism
for giving legal effect to international mediated settlement agree-
ments, the Singapore Convention underscores the importance (and
legitimacy) of mediation as a form of dispute resolution, and
removes a significant barrier to the use of mediation  for resolving
disputes.30  As stated in an open letter to the United States’ Secre-
tary of State Michael Pompeo, a number of business associations
explained that the Singapore Convention will help “mitigate risk
when entering into a commercial relationship with businesses in
foreign markets and [raise] the standards of fair trade globally.”31
Notwithstanding that UNCITRAL did manage to finalise the
Singapore Convention, the outcome of a multilateral treaty was
never certain.
There was a chicken-and-egg conundrum that bedevilled the
negotiations.  In the different states, there was not the same level
of experience with mediation as there was with other methods of
dispute resolution such as litigation and arbitration.32  Did this mit-
igate in favour of those who were calling for a cross-border mecha-
nism of recognition and enforcement for mediated settlement
agreements?33  Or did this mitigate in favour of those who advised
caution in the choice of harmonization instrument by suggesting
convention-enforcement-mediated-settlements/. The Working Group was informed of this sur-
vey in UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes: enforceability of
settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation/mediation, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187, at 6 (Nov. 27, 2014) [hereinafter UNCITRAL WP 187].
29 S.I. Strong, Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation: A
Preliminary Report on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on International
Commercial Mediation and Conciliation 45 (University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 2014-28, 2014). The Working Group was similarly informed of this survey in
UNCITRAL WP 187, supra note 28, at 6.
30 UNCITRAL WG II September 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 24.
31 The open letter to United States’ Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, dated November 6,
2018, expressed strong support for the United States signing and ratifying the Singapore Con-
vention. It was signed by the Coalition of Service Industries, National Association of Manufac-
turers, National Foreign Trade Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and United States Council
for International Business. It is available online at https://www.uscib.org/uscib-content/uploads/
2018/11/Coalition_SingaporeConventiononMediation_11.6.18.pdf.
32 UNCITRAL WG II September 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 24; UNCITRAL WG II
February 2015 Report, supra note 9, at 6.
33 UNCITRAL WG II September 2015 Report, supra note 5, at 19–20.
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that the time was not yet ripe for the development of an interna-
tional convention on enforcement?34
Every time the Working Group met, we would tackle these
questions.  Each time a decision on the form of the instrument
would be postponed.  A suggestion to consider preparing two sepa-
rate but parallel instruments was made when the Working Group
convened in September 2016.35  It was said that the model legisla-
tive provisions could support states that are only ready for domes-
tic implementation of an enforcement process, and a Convention
would be available for states ready to join an international treaty.36
But then there was the question of whether to do so simultane-
ously, or if not then which instrument should be developed first.37
The decision on the form of the instrument to be developed
was taken only at the Working Group’s meeting in February
2017,38 as part of the five-issue packaged deal or “compromise pro-
posal” reached during that session.39
In an unprecedented step, the decision was made to develop
the Singapore Convention in parallel with an amended Model Law.
The decision was reached “in a spirit of compromise and to accom-
modate the different levels of experience with conciliation in dif-
ferent jurisdictions.”40
IV. A PRODUCT OF CONSENSUS
As a product of multilateral consensus, the Singapore Conven-
tion responds to the diverse legal traditions and legal realities in
the practice of mediation and relevant to the legal effects of medi-
ated settlement agreements.  The product?  A treaty with require-
ments that are simple, easy to use, and accommodates the
flexibilities inherent in mediation.41  Three aspects of the Singapore
34 UNCITRAL WG II February 2015 Report, supra note 9, at 9–11. See also UNCITRAL
WG II September 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 24–25.
35 UNCITRAL WG II September 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 25, 36–37.
36 Id. at 24.
37 Id. at 36–37.
38 UNCITRAL WG II February 2017 Report, supra note 15, at 17.
39 UNCITRAL WG II February 2017 Report, supra note 15, at 10–11.
40 UNCITRAL WG II February 2017 Report, supra note 15, at 17.
41 In the early part of the negotiations, it was suggested that the aim of UNCITRAL’s work
should be to provide “a simple mechanism” to enforce settlement agreements. Such a mecha-
nism should preserve the flexibility of the mediation process. See UNCITRAL WG II February
2015 Report, supra note 9, at 6.
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Convention, amongst others, illustrate these key features: (i) the
definition of “mediation”; (ii) the form requirements for evidence
that a settlement agreement resulted from mediation; and (iii) the
grounds for refusal.
A. The Definition of “Mediation”
The Convention defines “mediation” broadly.  Under the
Convention, “mediation” is defined to refer to instances where the
disputing parties sought to reach an amicable settlement with the
assistance of a third party who lacked the authority to impose a
solution at the time of the mediation.42  This broad definition was
adopted in recognition of mediation as a flexible process, and the
different techniques that are used in mediations.43  It is intended to
include mediations administered by, or undertaken under, the aus-
pices of an institution.44
It also acknowledges the practice of combined dispute resolu-
tion processes.  The phrase “at the time of mediation” does not
appear in the text of the Convention, as it was seen as unnecessary.
Nevertheless, the understanding is that the lack of authority to im-
pose a solution is confined to the time of the mediation.  In this
way, the Convention recognises hybrid processes such as med-
arb.45
Further, there is no limitation on the types of remedies that
can be reflected in the settlement agreement.  It can include mone-
tary or non-monetary elements.  This shows appreciation that, in a
mediation, disputing parties are able to design a settlement that
responds to their needs, and that takes a holistic view of the inter-
ests of the parties and their commercial relationship.  Such a settle-
ment often extends beyond pure monetary relief.46
42 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 2(3) states: ““Mediation” means a process, irre-
spective of the expression used or the basis upon which the process is carried out, whereby
parties attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute with the assistance of a third
person or persons (“the mediator”) lacking the authority to impose a solution upon the parties
to the dispute.”
43 See, e.g., UNCITRAL WG II February 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 18–19. For an elabo-
ration of the different models of and variations in mediation, see Laurence Boulle, International
Enforceability of Mediated Settlement Agreements: Developing the Conceptual Framework, 7
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 35, 48–56 (2014).
44 UNCITRAL WG II February 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 19.
45 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
eighth session (New York, February 5–9, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, at 6 (Feb. 19, 2018).
46 UNCITRAL WG II September 2015 Report, supra note 5, at 10.
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B. The Form Requirements
In terms of the form requirements in the Convention, these
have been tailored, without being overly prescriptive, to accommo-
date how mediation is practised internationally.47
There is a limited, exhaustive list of form requirements in the
Convention.  The only form requirements are that: (i) the settle-
ment agreement be in writing; (ii) the settlement agreement be
signed by the disputing parties (an exchange of emails could meet
the requirements); (iii) there must be evidence that the settlement
agreement resulted from mediation.48
Evidence that the settlement agreement resulted from media-
tion could be in the form of the mediator’s signature on the settle-
ment agreement, or an attestation in a separate document by the
mediator or administering institution that mediation had oc-
curred.49  When the Convention was being negotiated, it was
recognised that it would be incongruous with some legal cultures
and practices to have certain requirements, such as the mediator
signing the settlement agreement as the only acceptable proof.50
This is why the types of proof required under the Convention is
reflected in an illustrative list, rather than an exhaustive one or one
that establishes relative priorities between the different
requirements.51
C. The Grounds of Refusal
The grounds for a court to refuse the recognition or enforce-
ment of a mediated settlement agreement are limited to those set
out in the Convention, and are tailored to the practice of
mediation.52
47 UNCITRAL WG II September 2015 Report, supra note 5, at 12–13.
48 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 4(1).
49 Id.
50 UNCITRAL WG II September 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 13; UNCITRAL WG II
September 2015 Report, supra note 5, at 11.
51 It was the intention of the negotiators that Article 4(1)(b) of the Singapore Convention on
Mediation be an “illustrative and non-hierarchical list” of means to evidence that a settlement
agreement resulted from mediation. See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute
Settlement) on the work of its sixty-eighth session (New York, February 5–9, 2018), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/934, at 7 (Feb. 19, 2018). See also UNCITRAL WG II October 2017 Report, supra note
6, at 9–10.
52 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 5.
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The grounds retain the relevant elements of the formal and
mechanistic nature of the New York Convention, whilst responding
to the difficulties posed when disputing parties seek to leverage the
New York Convention to recognise and enforce their settlement
agreements.  For example, when disputing parties attempt to trans-
late the grounds of refusal in the New York Convention to the me-
diation context, such as excess authority in Article V(1)(c) of the
New York Convention and procedural irregularities in Article
V(1)(d),53 it becomes clear that “the fundamental characters and
processes of mediation and arbitration are different.”54  The
grounds for refusal do not translate directly or transfer easily from
the arbitration context to the mediation context.55  Bearing this in
mind, one can appreciate why these grounds for refusal, otherwise
found in the New York Convention, are not found in the Singapore
Convention on Mediation.
At the same time, there are grounds for refusal that have
drawn inspiration from the regime of the New York Convention, as
the negotiators assessed what would be appropriate to consider in
the context of mediated settlement agreements.  For instance, there
are grounds of refusal in the Singapore Convention such as where
there is incapacity of a party to the settlement agreement, which
was inspired by Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention;56 and
if the settlement agreement is null and void, for instance because of
fraud, misrepresentation, and mistake, for which inspiration was
drawn from Article II(3) of the New York Convention.57  Like Ar-
ticle V(2) of the New York Convention, enforcement can be re-
fused on grounds of public policy or if the subject matter was not
capable of settlement by mediation, and these grounds can be
raised sua sponte by a court before which relief is being sought.58
Additionally, there are grounds of refusal specific to mediator
misconduct.59  Such misconduct must have a causal effect on the
53 The negotiators specifically discussed whether or not to include a provision in the instru-
ment along the lines of Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention. See UNCITRAL WG II
February 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 27–28. It was highlighted that mediation is a voluntary
process from which the disputing parties may withdraw at any time and pursuant to which a
settlement cannot be imposed on the disputing parties.
54 Morris-Sharma, supra note 22, at 136–37.
55 Bobette Wolski, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs): Critical Questions
And Directions for Future Research, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 87, 98 (2014).
56 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 5(1)(a).
57 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 5(1)(b)(i). See also UNCITRAL WG II Septem-
ber 2016 Report, supra note 5, at 18.
58 Singapore Convention on Mediation art. 5(2).
59 Singapore Convention on Mediation arts. 5(1)(e) & 5(1)(f).
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disputing party entering into the settlement agreement, and in-
cludes misconduct such as a serious breach of applicable standards
or a failure to disclose.  It is up to the competent authority to deter-
mine the applicable standards, whether they be the applicable law
governing the mediation or codes of conduct.  Competent authori-
ties can seek guidance from the illustrative list of examples in the
text accompanying the Convention.60  Initially, there were sugges-
tions that the refusal grounds also address issues of fairness and
impartiality, but those grounds were seen by some as not necessary
and by others as not aligned with the realities of mediation
practice.61
V. CONCLUSION
From our whirlwind tour of the Convention—of the scope of
application, form requirements, and grounds for refusal—one can
appreciate that an international mechanism has been designed to
facilitate the efficient circulation of mediated settlement agree-
ments without overly burdensome requirements.  The Singapore
Convention will offer certainty of reliance on mediated settlement
agreements before Parties’ domestic courts, while preserving the
flexible nature of mediation.  Efforts were made to ensure that the
Convention  accommodates  different legal traditions.  There is
also an accompanying Model Law to accommodate the different
levels of experience with mediation in different jurisdictions.
After revisiting the multilateral process and context that led to
the development of the Singapore Convention and the amended
Model Law, we see how multilateralism is still alive.  But it takes
work.  Multilateral consensus does not come easy.  The UNCI-
TRAL process benefitted from having committed experts in the
room, who were ready to engage constructively, so that creative
compromises could be fashioned.   Some of these compromises
were part of the five-issue package referred to above, but there
were many others along the way.  There were earnest conversa-
tions and hardnosed discussions.  The work of the UNCITRAL
60 UNCITRAL WG II February 2017 Report, supra note 15, at 16. Dorcas Quek Anderson,
Supporting Party Autonomy in the Enforcement of Cross-Border Mediated Settlement Agree-
ments: A Brave New World or Unchartered Territory?, in PRIVATIZING DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND ITS LIMITS (studies of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg Summer School for Interna-
tional, European, and Regulatory Procedural Law) (Loic Cadiet & Burkhard Hess eds., forth-
coming 2019).
61 Schnabel, supra note 5, at 50–51.
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1021
Secretariat was of immense value.  Everyone brought something to
the table, and left as friends, with mutual respect and newfound
understandings between and amongst them.
Of course, the take up rate of the Singapore Convention will
define its utility.  Yet, in many ways, the Singapore Convention is
already an important statement in favour of rules-based
multilateralism.62
62 For example, in a joint statement issued during an official visit by Chinese Premier Li
Keqiang to Singapore in November 2018, it states (at paragraph 14): “Both sides reaffirmed their
shared commitment to rules-based multilateralism, support for the purposes and principles of
the United Nations Charter, adherence to international law, and would continue to maintain
close communication and cooperation at the United Nations and other multilateral organisa-
tions. In this vein, both countries agreed that instruments such as the United Nations Conven-
tion on Mediation are important to the multilateral rules-based order and will consider signing
it.” See Full Text: Joint statement between Chinese, Singaporean governments, XINHUA (Nov. 15,
2018), www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/15/c_129994460.htm.

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
(UNCITRAL) AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION
ON MEDIATION
Corinne Montineri*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper outlines how the UNCITRAL drafting process that
produced the Singapore Convention on Mediation functions within
the United Nations and explains the significance of the Singapore
Convention for the United Nations and for promoting cross-border
trade and investment.
Cross-border trade is considered an element of peace and sta-
bility for “friendly relations among nations,” as reflected in the
Charter of the United Nations.  The development of a harmonized
international trade law framework contributes to facilitating cross-
border trade and investment, which, in turn, contributes to the
wider objective of development and security.  Over the decades,
the powerful relation between trade and development has been
well-recognized and is now articulated in the UN 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development.
With these objectives in mind, the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established
more than fifty years ago as a Commission of the United Nations
General Assembly.  UNCITRAL performs a crucial role in the de-
velopment of the international trade law framework.  It does so,
first, by preparing legislative and non-legislative instruments in dif-
ferent key areas of commercial law; second, by promoting the use
and adoption of these instruments as well as their proper imple-
mentation; and, third, by coordinating and cooperating with other
standard formulating agencies.1  In the years since its establish-
ment, UNCITRAL has been recognized as the core legal body of
* Corinne Montineri is a senior legal officer at the International Trade Law Division of the
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, which also serves as the Secretariat of UNCITRAL. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Organization.
1 G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI) (Dec. 17, 1966).
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the United Nations system in the field of international trade law.
UNCITRAL’s contribution to the achievement of the Sustainable
Development Goals proceeds on several fronts and touches upon
different and interrelated areas.2
UNCITRAL has developed instruments in different fields of
international trade law, including sales of goods, public procure-
ment, privately financed infrastructure projects, legal environment
for small- and medium-sized enterprises, secured transactions, elec-
tronic commerce, and insolvency, as well as international dispute
settlement.3
This last field has been on the agenda of UNCITRAL since its
very first sessions.  Noteworthy is the fact that UNCITRAL’s ori-
gin and mandate partly resulted from the diplomatic process that
led to the adoption of the New York Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) (“New
York Convention”).  Indeed, the United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, which worked on the prep-
aration and adoption of the New York Convention from 20 May to
10 June 1958, highlighted in its final Act the relevance of measures
for increasing the effectiveness of arbitration.  The topics men-
tioned included collection and publication of information on ex-
isting arbitration laws and facilities, technical assistance in the
development of arbitral legislation and institutions, and the prepa-
ration of a model law on arbitration.  These topics found their way
into the legislative work programme of UNCITRAL, at its very
first sessions, and constituted a roadmap that has been followed
over the past decades.  Following a similar path, UNCITRAL has
also been active in developing instruments in the field of interna-
tional commercial mediation.
International mediation is a well-known alternative means for
solving disputes that may arise in many different areas.  In the field
of international trade, mediation is often cited as a flexible method
that is well-adapted to solving disputes among merchants who seek
to preserve long-term commercial and investment relations and
2 Sustainable Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/sdg (last visited July 3, 2019) (discussing informa-
tion on the contribution of UNCITRAL to the Sustainable Development Goals).
3 UNCITRAL currently has six working groups, dealing with: (1) The creation of a favour-
able environment for small and medium sized enterprises; (2) Issues relating to expedited arbi-
tration; (3) Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) reform; (4) Electronic commerce; (5)
Insolvency; and (6) Secured transactions. See Homepage, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/content/homepage (last visited Aug. 10,
2019).
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produce savings in the administration of justice by States.  As early
as 1980, UNCITRAL adopted Rules on Conciliation, which is one
of the first international instruments in the field.
Sixty years after the adoption of the New York Convention,
UNCITRAL finalized at its annual session, in July 2018, the prepa-
ration of an instrument akin to the New York Convention in the
area of mediation: the United Nations Convention on International
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (“the Singapore
Convention on Mediation” or “the Convention”), which was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December
2018.  In addition, UNCITRAL finalized and adopted the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation
(2018, amending the Model Law on International Commercial
Conciliation (2002)) (“the revised Model Law”).
II. HOW UNCITRAL FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE
UNITED NATIONS
A. UNCITRAL, an Organ of the UN General Assembly
According to the General Assembly resolution establishing
UNCITRAL, “divergences arising from the laws of different States
in matters relating to international trade constitute one of the ob-
stacles to the development of world trade.”4  Harmonisation and
modernization of trade law help reduce legal uncertainty.  A study,
authored by Professor Schmitthoff in the sixties, which was
presented to the United Nations at the time of the establishment of
UNCITRAL, outlined that reduction of these obstacles and uncer-
tainty can be achieved by developing either choice of laws rules or
substantive standards.  The report referred to the latter as “pro-
gressive harmonisation and unification” of the law of international
trade.5
Progressive harmonisation is the core activity of UNCITRAL.
The legal standards developed by UNCITRAL are meant to pro-
pose solutions that are widely acceptable.  That is the reason why
they are negotiated through an international process involving a
diversity of participants, including invited intergovernmental and
4 See supra note 1.
5 U.N. Secretary-General, Agenda Item 88: Progressive Development of the Law of Interna-
tional Trade, U.N. Doc. A/6396 (Sept. 23, 1966).
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non-governmental organizations.  As a result of this inclusive pro-
cess, these texts are widely accepted as offering solutions appropri-
ate to different legal traditions and to countries at different stages
of economic development.
UNCITRAL carries out its work at annual sessions held alter-
nately in New York and Vienna.6  The work at these UNCITRAL
sessions typically includes finalization and adoption of legal texts
referred to the Commission by the working groups; consideration
of progress reports of the working groups; selection of topics for
future work or further research; reporting on technical cooperation
and assistance activities and coordination of work with other inter-
national organizations; monitoring of developments in the CLOUT
system and the status and promotion of UNCITRAL legal texts;
consideration of General Assembly resolutions on the work of UN-
CITRAL; and administrative matters.  In addition to State mem-
bers of UNCITRAL, the meetings include other United Nations
Member States, as well as invited international and regional orga-
nizations as observers (both intergovernmental and non-govern-
mental) with expertise in the topics under discussion.7
The substantive preparatory work for topics on UNCITRAL’s
work programme is usually assigned to working groups, which gen-
erally hold one or two sessions per year and report on the progress
of their work to the Commission.  Once assigned a topic, a working
group is generally left to complete its substantive task without in-
tervention from the Commission, unless the working group asks for
guidance or requests the Commission to make certain decisions
with respect to its work, such as clarification of the working group’s
mandate on a topic or approval of the policy settings of a text.8
6 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/32, ¶ 32(e)(iii) (1979) (explaining that prior to
the relocation of the UNCITRAL secretariat from New York to Vienna, sessions of the Com-
mission alternated between New York and Geneva). See also G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), § II, ¶ 6;
G.A. Res. 31/140, § I, ¶ 4(c); G.A. Res. 40/243, § I, ¶ 4(c); G.A. Res. 66/94, ¶ 20. For information
on the composition of the Commission, see Frequently Asked Questions—Mandate and History,
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/
about/faq/mandate_composition/history (last visited Aug. 3, 2019).
7 For information on the participation of observers in UNCITRAL meetings, see Note by
the Secretariat, UNCITRAL rules of procedure and methods of work, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/638/
Add.5, § IV (Oct. 22, 2007).
8 See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/58/17, ¶¶ 172–197 (2002) (Working Group
V requested the Commission to, inter alia, approve in principle the draft of the Legislative Guide
on Insolvency Law). See also U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/61/17, ¶ 13 (2006) (a similar
approach was adopted in 2006 with respect to the recommendations of the Legislative Guide on
Secured Transactions).
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1027
Various means are available to keep abreast of deliberations.
For instance, reports of the sessions, prepared by the Secretariat,
seek to reflect the deliberations in depth and to provide an over-
view of the progress of the work undertaken by UNCITRAL and
its working groups.  All reports are considered to be part of UNCI-
TRAL’s institutional memory (which constitute the travaux
pre´paratoires of the UNCITRAL instruments) and are available to
the public.  Nowadays, recordings of the sessions are also available.
The documentation and recordings for annual UNCITRAL ses-
sions and working group sessions are posted on the UNCITRAL
website;9 the documentation is available in the six official lan-
guages of the United Nations.
The International Trade Law Division of the Office of Legal
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat provides the secretariat
for UNCITRAL.  To assist the work of UNCITRAL, the secreta-
riat undertakes a variety of tasks, which includes preparation of
studies, reports, and draft texts on topics that are being considered
as current work or for the possible future.
B. UNCITRAL’s Working Methods: Inclusiveness
and Consensus
The working methods of UNCITRAL are based on inclusive-
ness and consensus: from the identification of a topic until the
finalisation of a given instrument.  Decisions on the work pro-
gramme are made by UNCITRAL at its annual sessions.  Often a
State or a group of States, or an international organization, pro-
pose a topic.  Members of delegations then comment on the sug-
gestion, based on prior consultations with various stakeholders and
other States.  Sometimes the Secretariat is tasked with providing
further information based on relevant research regarding whether
the suggestions put forward are feasible and relevant.
The decision to work on the preparation of an instrument on
enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from international
mediation is an illustration of the decision-making process on the
work programme.  The decision originated with a suggestion by a
government to prepare a convention in the field of mediation, mir-
roring the New York Convention, with the aim to promote media-
tion.  The proposal was based on the findings that one obstacle to
9 See generally UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, https://un-
citral.un.org/en/content/homepage (last visited Aug. 3, 2019).
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greater use of mediation was that settlement agreements reached
through mediation might be more difficult to enforce than arbitral
awards; that settlement agreements reached through mediation are
already enforceable as contracts between the parties but that en-
forcement under contract law cross-border can be burdensome and
time-consuming; and that the lack of easy enforceability of such
contracts was a disincentive to commercial parties to mediate.10
Before deciding whether to embark on the preparation of such
an instrument, the Commission requested one of its Working
Groups to preliminarily consider  a number of issues, including: (a)
whether the new regime of enforcement envisaged would be op-
tional in nature; (b) whether the New York Convention was the
appropriate model for work in relation to mediated settlement
agreements; (c) whether formalizing enforcement of settlement
agreements would in fact diminish the value of mediation as result-
ing in contractual agreements; (d) whether complex contracts aris-
ing out of mediation were suitable for enforcement under such a
proposed treaty; (e) whether other means of converting mediated
settlement agreements into binding awards obviated the need for
such a treaty; and (f) what the legal implications for a regime akin
to the New York Convention in the field of mediation might be.11
The sixty-second session of UNCITRAL Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement) was partly devoted to that topic, and the
Working Group reported back to the Commission on its delibera-
tions.12  The Commission followed the recommendation of the
Working Group that a mandate be given to a Working Group to
identify the relevant issues and develop possible solutions, includ-
ing the preparation of a convention, model provisions, or guidance
texts.  Considering that differing views were expressed as to the
form and content, as well as the feasibility, of any particular instru-
ment, the Working Group also suggested that a mandate on the
topic be broad enough to take into account various approaches and
concerns.13
Decisions at UNCITRAL are usually made by consensus.  The
decision to work on the basis of consensus has been taken at the
10  Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law on its forty-seventh Session (7–18 July
2014), U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/69/17, ¶ 123; see also Note by the
Secretariat, Proposal by the Government of the United States of America: Future Work for Work-
ing Group II, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/822 (June 2, 2014).
11 U.N. Doc. A/69/17, supra note 10, ¶ 124.
12 Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-sec-
ond session (New York, 2–6 February 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832 (Feb. 11, 2015).
13 Id. ¶ 59.
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very first UNCITRAL session and has not been challenged since
then.14  Since UNCITRAL’s inception, consensus was considered
“conducive to achieving a larger cooperation among countries”
and thereby achieving a better result.  “Long and patient research
and discussion” might indeed not lead to a consensus in all cases.
Where no consensus can be reached, a vote would be explicitly
possible.  Reaching consensus is a rewarding process, even though
it may at times be a time-consuming endeavor.  It is notable that
the Singapore Convention on Mediation has been prepared and
finalized through a fully consensual process gathering more than
ninety States and forty international organizations.
The General Resolution establishing UNCITRAL outlines the
most common instruments that could serve to harmonize the inter-
national legal framework, such as conventions, uniform laws, stan-
dard contract provisions, and standard trade terms.  All these
options were considered during the Singapore Convention deliber-
ative process.  The instruments selected depend on the degree of
harmonization that is desirable at a certain point in time, such as a
convention that achieves unification whereas other instruments
such as model laws or guidance texts are more flexible.  Combina-
tions are possible, such as developing both a convention and a
model law on the same topic (as was done regarding enforcement
of international settlement agreements resulting from mediation)
or a step by step approach (for instance, developing a legislative
guide first, followed by a model law).  UNCITRAL has prepared a
number of conventions, which then have been adopted either
through a diplomatic conference organized by a State or, in line
with the prevailing practice in the recent years, have been
presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which
reviews and adopts the conventions acting as a conference of pleni-
potentiaries.15  Following this pattern, the Singapore Convention
on Mediation was prepared by UNCITRAL in the years
14 U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/41/17, ¶¶ 212, 213 (exemplifying a discussion in the
Commission on modalities of adopting a convention, and its decision that UNCITRAL would
proceed to finalize a text and to recommend its adoption in the General Assembly). See also
U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/42/P.V.17, ¶ 304 (providing the first example of the adop-
tion of a Convention through that mechanism).
15 U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/41/17, ¶¶ 212, 213 (for a discussion in the Commis-
sion on modalities of adopting a convention, and its decision that UNCITRAL would proceed to
finalize a text and to recommend its adoption in the General Assembly); U.N. GAOR, 42nd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/42/17, ¶ 304 (for the first example of the adoption of a Convention through
that mechanism).
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2015–2018, and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
in December 2018.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
MEDIATED INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS
A. UNCITRAL Instruments on Mediation Since 1980
UNCITRAL previously developed two instruments aimed at
harmonizing international commercial mediation: the Conciliation
Rules (1980) and the Model Law on Conciliation (2002), which
form the basis of an international framework for mediation.  It
should be noted that UNCITRAL does not differentiate between
the terms “mediation” or “conciliation” in its instruments, as both
terms are used to refer to a process where a neutral third party
assists the parties to solve their disputes, without having the possi-
bility to impose a decision.  In its recent instruments, UNCITRAL
decided to use the term “mediation” instead of “conciliation” in an
effort to adapt to what has become the more commonly used term
with the expectation that this change will facilitate the promotion
and heighten the visibility of the instruments.  This change in ter-
minology does not have any substantive or conceptual implications.
In the 70s, UNCITRAL noted that conciliation or mediation was
increasingly used to settle commercial disputes, that such a way for
settling disputes should be promoted further and that work on a
multilateral basis on the topic should be “geared to such promo-
tion.”16  At that time, the term “conciliation” was more commonly
used than the term mediation.  However, it was clarified that termi-
nology was not decisive: parties seeking an amicable settlement of
their dispute with the assistance of an independent and impartial
third party could agree on the application of the Conciliation
Rules.
The Conciliation Rules were the first international step taken
in harmonizing that field.  Mediation was considered as a “possible
and viable alternative.”17  The “value of conciliation as a method of
amicably settling disputes” has also been acknowledged by the
16 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on
the work of its thirty-second session (Vienna, 20–31 March 2000), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/468, ¶ 18
(Apr. 10, 2000).
17 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General: conciliation of international trade
disputes, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/167 (June 18–29, 1979).
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United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 35/52 which
recommended the use of the Conciliation Rules.  In that resolu-
tion, the General Assembly expressed its conviction that “the es-
tablishment of conciliation rules that are acceptable in countries
with different legal, social and economic systems would signifi-
cantly contribute to the development of harmonious international
economic relations.”
Going one step further, the Model Law on International Com-
mercial Conciliation was adopted in 2002 and provides for a sound
legislative framework regarding the main elements of the media-
tion proceedings, including a streamlined definition of conciliation/
mediation.  The Model Law, which addresses matters such as confi-
dentiality, party autonomy, and fair treatment seeks to strike a bal-
ance between protecting the integrity of the mediation process and
providing maximum flexibility.  The United Nations General As-
sembly, when recommending that States give due consideration to
the Model Law when enacting legislation on mediation, acknowl-
edged that the use of mediation “results in significant benefits, such
as reducing the instances where a dispute leads to the termination
of a commercial relationship, facilitating the administration of in-
ternational transactions by commercial parties and producing sav-
ings in the administration of justice by States.”18
B. The Question of Enforcement of Settlement Agreements,
So Far
UNCITRAL considered the progress that had taken place in
using mediation before deciding to undertake in 2015 the work on
international settlement agreements.  First, it noted that the use of
mediation for settling commercial disputes has increased consider-
ably since the adoption of the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules in
1980.  Legislation on mediation has been enacted in a growing
number of jurisdictions; conciliation and mediation institutes have
proliferated, and many institutions now offer specific training for
conciliators and mediators.
UNCITRAL also circulated a questionnaire to States in the
fall of 2014 in order to better understand how international settle-
ment agreements were actually enforced and to assess the feasibil-
18 G.A. Res. 57/18, at 1 (Jan. 24, 2003).
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ity of the proposed work.19  The replies to the questionnaire
showed a  diversity of approaches.20  Some states have no special
provisions on the enforceability of such settlements, with the result
being that general contract law applies.  Other states provide for
enforcement of settlement agreements as court judgments, where a
settlement agreement approved by a court is deemed an order of
the relevant court and may be enforced accordingly.  Such proce-
dure may or may not include specific expedited enforcement mech-
anisms.  The status of an agreement reached following mediation
sometimes depends on whether the mediation took place within
the court system as a legal proceeding.  The practice of requesting a
notary public to notarize the settlement agreement is adopted by a
number of jurisdictions as a means of enforcement.
So national legislation is diverse and, as in 2002 during the
preparation of the Model Law on Conciliation, no dominant trend
could be identified.  It was noteworthy that states with  legislation
on mediation provided for various solutions for enforcement of set-
tlement agreements.  The diversity of approaches with the objec-
tive of enforcing settlement agreements has militated in favour of
considering moving toward harmonization of the field.
UNCITRAL, when adopting the Model Law on Conciliation,
endorsed “the general policy that easy and fast enforcement of set-
tlement agreements should be promoted.”  Enforcement of settle-
ment agreements is often cited as one crucial aspect that would
make mediation a more efficient tool for resolving disputes.  When
preparing the Model Law in 2002, UNCITRAL discussed whether
it would be desirable and feasible to prepare a uniform model pro-
vision on enforcement of settlement agreements that would be uni-
versally acceptable and, if so, what the substance of the uniform
rule should be.  At that time in 2002, various options were
envisaged.21
19 See U.N. Secretariat, Promotion of ways and means of ensuring a uniform interpretation
and application of UNCITRAL legal texts, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/946 (May 15, 2018); see also ad-
denda 1–5.
20 See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/846/Add.1–Add.5 (Sept. 7–11, 2015).
21 One option considered by UNCITRAL was to provide that a settlement agreement
should be dealt with as a contract. That solution was not retained because it was considered that
a more effective enforcement regime should be established, through which a settlement agree-
ment would be accorded a higher degree of enforceability than any unspecified contract. See
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group II: Arbitration and Conciliation/Dispute Set-
tlement, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/506, ¶ 40 (Nov. 19–30, 2001). Another option was to prepare a model
legislative provision that would give recognition to a situation wherein the parties had appointed
an arbitral tribunal with the specific purpose of issuing an award based on the terms settled upon
by the parties. Such an award, envisaged in article 30 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
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In 2002, it finally adopted a model legislative provision that
stated the principle that settlement agreements are enforceable
without attempting to specify the method by which such settlement
agreements may be enforced.  That matter was left to each enact-
ing State.22  It is also noteworthy that the solution adopted in 2002
did not contain any form requirements and did not take a stand on
the nature of a settlement agreement.  It only expressed that a con-
tractual obligation, “binding” on the parties, is “enforceable” by
State courts.  In the preparation of the Model Law, UNCITRAL
was generally of the view that enforcement of settlement agree-
ments should be promoted.  However, it realized that methods for
achieving such expedited enforcement varied greatly between legal
systems and were dependent upon the technicalities of domestic
procedural law, which did not easily lend themselves to harmoniza-
tion by way of uniform legislation.  However, States were en-
couraged to adopt expedited enforcement mechanisms or
simplified procedures.  In order to assist States in that regard, the
UNCITRAL Secretariat illustrated various means for enforcing
settlement agreements in the Guide to Enactment and Use of the
Model Law.23
tional Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law on Arbitration”) would be capable of enforcement
as any arbitral award. That option was also rejected as it was considered inappropriate for a
model legislative provision to suggest generally that all conciliation proceedings leading to a
settlement agreement should result in the appointment of an arbitral tribunal. More generally, it
was considered that uncertainties might arise from the interplay of the two legal regimes that
might be applicable, namely the general law of contracts and the legal regime governing arbitral
awards. For example, reasons that might be invoked for challenging the binding and enforceable
character of a settlement agreement include the grounds listed in article V of the New York
Convention and in article 36 of the Model Law on Arbitration for refusing enforcement, as well
as the grounds listed under article 34 of that Model Law for setting aside an arbitral award. It
was concluded that these might be insufficient or inappropriate to deal with circumstances such
as fraud, mistake, duress, or any other grounds on which the validity of a contract might be
challenged. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group II: Arbitration and Concilia-
tion/Dispute Settlement, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/506, ¶ 43 (Nov. 19–30, 2001).
Another suggestion was that the legal regime of notarized acts in certain countries might
constitute a useful model. It was pointed out, however, that such a model might require the
establishment of form requirement for settlement agreements, thus introducing a level of formal-
ism that could contradict existing conciliation practice.
22 The provision reads as follows: “Article 14. Enforceability of settlement agreement—If
the parties conclude an agreement settling a dispute, that settlement agreement is binding and
enforceable . . . [the enacting State may insert a description of the method of enforcing settle-
ment agreements or refer to provisions governing such enforcement].” UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Conciliation, art. 14.
23 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to
Enactment and Use, ¶¶ 87–92 (2002).
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C. The Response by the Singapore Convention on Mediation
In light of that background, the Singapore Convention on Me-
diation was prepared by UNCITRAL over six sessions of its Work-
ing Group II, together with revisions to the Model Law.
The Convention applies to international commercial settle-
ment agreements resulting from mediation.  It provides for Parties’
obligations under the Convention regarding both enforcement of
settlement agreements covered by the Convention and the right for
a disputing party to invoke a settlement agreement out of a media-
tion.  Each Party may determine the procedural mechanisms to be
followed where the Convention does not prescribe any
requirement.
The Convention will not apply to international settlement
agreements that are concluded in the course of judicial or arbitral
proceedings and which are enforceable as a court judgment or arbi-
tral award.  The purpose of these exclusions is to avoid possible
overlap with existing and future conventions, namely the New
York Convention, the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
(2005), and the preliminary draft convention on judgments, under
preparation by The Hague Conference on Private International
Law.  The Convention will also not apply to settlement agreements
concluded for personal, family, or household purposes by one of
the parties (a consumer), as well as settlement agreements relating
to family, inheritance or employment law.  The courts of a con-
tracting party will be expected to handle applications to enforce an
international settlement agreement which falls within the scope of
the Convention in accordance with its rules of procedure and
under the conditions laid down in the Convention.
The Singapore Convention on Mediation provides a uniform
and efficient framework for the enforcement of international set-
tlement agreements resulting from mediation and for allowing par-
ties to invoke such agreements, akin to the framework that the
New York Convention provides for arbitral awards.
The Convention has been designed to become an essential in-
strument in the facilitation of international trade and in the promo-
tion of mediation as an alternative and effective method of
resolving trade disputes.  It ensures that a settlement reached by
parties becomes enforceable in accordance with a simplified and
streamlined procedure.  It thereby contributes to strengthening ac-
cess to justice.
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This new international framework is completed by a legislative
framework that states can adopt, either as a stand-alone law, or as
a piece of legislation implementing the Convention.  The revised
Model Law has been restructured and adjusted to be consistent
with the Convention.  It includes three sections.  The first section
provides for general principles; the second section focuses on the
mediation procedure and restates the provisions of the 2002 ver-
sion of the Model Law on procedural aspects, including appoint-
ment of conciliators, commencement and termination of
mediation, conduct of the mediation, communication between the
mediator and other parties, confidentiality and admissibility of evi-
dence in other proceedings as well as post-mediation issues, such as
the mediator acting; and the third and last section focuses on settle-
ment agreements, with its provisions reflecting the provisions of
the Convention.  The Model Law is a broader and more flexible
instrument than the Convention.  For instance, it permits states to
enact the Model Law to apply its provisions to enforcement of set-
tlement agreements regardless whether such settlement agree-
ments result from a mediation process.24
IV. CONCLUSION
Mediation, known for improving the efficiency of dispute reso-
lution, has several advantages.  Mediation is flexible.  Parties can
create their own process, discuss legal but also non-legal issues, and
find the most convenient solution to their dispute.  As the proce-
dure is tailored to the needs and concerns of the parties, it may be
less time and resource-consuming than adjudication.  Until the
adoption of the Singapore Convention, the often-cited challenge to
the use of mediation was the lack of an efficient and harmonized
framework for cross-border enforcement of settlement agreements.
It was in response to this need that the Singapore Convention has
been developed and adopted by the United Nations.
UNCITRAL texts are negotiated with universal participation
and are prepared with a view to ensure their compatibility with the
various legal traditions.  They may significantly contribute to build-
ing an open trading system that is rule-based, predictable and non-
discriminatory and that supports good governance and develop-
24 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (2018) (amending the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Conciliation, 2002).
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ment in accordance with the Sustainable Development Goals and
the 2030 Agenda for Development.  The ratification of the Con-
vention furthers the Sustainable Development Goal 16 “Peace, Jus-
tice and Strong Institutions.”  It is expected that the Convention
will contribute toward creating an attractive and stable investment
climate.  The hope is that the Convention and the revised Model
Law will be widely adopted by States and will become useful tools
for parties seeking to solve their disputes.  There is no doubt that
these instruments will become key indicators of a strong legal
framework for cross-border dispute settlement.
THE NEW SINGAPORE MEDIATION
CONVENTION: THE PROCESS AND
KEY CHOICES†*
Hal Abramson**
This article presents the backstory of the New Singapore Me-
diation Convention, which is really two stories: one on the multi-
party negotiation process that produced the Convention and one
on the substantive choices in the Convention.  The two stories also
illustrate the relationship between a well-designed process and
result.
The most important milestone of this story occurred on Febru-
ary 9, 2018 when Working Group II of the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) finished
almost three years of drafting the Convention.  On that day, Work-
ing Group II recommended a draft convention that would facilitate
cross-border compliance with settlement agreements that result
from qualifying mediations.  The purpose of the Convention would
be to offer a simpler and more expeditious alternative for enforc-
ing mediated settlement agreements than expensive and uncertain
breach of contract litigation.  In December 2018, the United Na-
† This article is based on a book chapter written by the author and published in MEDIATION
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Catharine Titi & Katia Fach-
Gomez eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2019).
* You will notice that the word “enforcement” is not used in the title of this article, in this
article (with a couple exceptions), or in the title of the Convention. The Convention is formally
entitled “United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from
Mediation” and will be known as the “Singapore Convention on Mediation.” For more
information, see U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
Law, Fifty-first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex I (2018) [hereinafter Singapore Convention].
Common law attorneys will likely be surprised by this language choice even though the
Convention fashions a process for “enforcing” cross-border mediated settlement agreements.
Civil law lawyers also are likely to be surprised that the familiar phrase “recognition” is omitted
in the Convention and replaced by a functional definition in the Convention. The background on
this language choice is explained under Section III where the five-point compromise called “The
Compromise” is described.
** Professor of Law, Touro Law Center, New York. Served as a delegate for International
Mediation Institute (IMI) and International Academy of Mediators (IAM) at the UNCITRAL
Working Group II drafting meetings on the Singapore Mediation Convention. He has written
extensively on mediation and negotiations and serves as a commercial mediator. For biography,
see www.tourolaw.edu/faculty/abramson. The author wants to recognize the valuable comments
on earlier drafts by Corinne Montineri and Tim Schnabel. The author also wants to thank Car-
dozo Law School research assistant, Nicholas Gliagias, for diligent work checking and formatting
footnotes.
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tions General Assembly formally adopted the Singapore Mediation
Convention.
What is UNCITRAL?
For those less familiar with UNCITRAL, you might find help-
ful this brief description before reading anything else.  UNCI-
TRAL was established by the UN General Assembly to help
harmonize and modernize the law of international trade and com-
mercial law.  UNCITRAL’s sixty state members are elected by the
General Assembly and selected to ensure representation by geo-
graphic regions and principal economic and legal systems.  As an
organ of the General Assembly, UNCITRAL follows the General
Assembly’s rules of procedures for its sessions and working groups.
UNCITRAL determines its work program based on proposals re-
ceived from States or organizations.  It sets its own agenda, reviews
the work of its various working groups to which the Commission
assigns projects, and prepares reports, models laws, and conven-
tions for the UN.
This mediation settlement initiative was assigned by the Com-
mission to Working Group II, which formerly focused on “Arbitra-
tion,” then was expanded to cover “Arbitration and Conciliation,”
and currently is named “Dispute Settlement.”  Any recommenda-
tions from Working Group II are sent to UNCITRAL for its adop-
tion, and any proposed conventions, as occurred in this case, are
first sent to UNCITRAL and then to the General Assembly for
consideration and adoption.1
This article focuses primarily on the deliberations of Working
Group II when drafting the mediation settlement convention.
My Vantage Point
At the outset, I should explain my vantage point.  I present
these two stories from the perspective of an active “observer,” not
as a member of a country delegation.  I represented two NGOs
(non-governmental organizations) with observer status, Interna-
tional Mediation Institute (“IMI”) and International Academy of
1 UNCITRAL, A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 6, para. 48 (2013).
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Mediators (“IAM”),2 attended most of the drafting meetings over
the three-year process, and participated in multiple discussions.  I
also served as an “expert consultant.”  In that capacity, I organized
and moderated three mediation education programs for delegates
and the public under the auspice of UNCITRAL.3  Finally, I also
bring the perspective of an arbitrator, mediator, and full-time aca-
demic in the field of dispute resolution for over 25 years and au-
thor of multiple publications on negotiations, mediation, and
international conflict resolution.
I feel a need to explain the writing style that includes a dispro-
portionate use of pronouns and passive voice over my preference
for active voice and acknowledging the contributions of others.
The writing style respects the norms of the UNCITRAL delibera-
tive process where reports are written with pronouns, in passive
tense, and with few references to individuals or organizations in
order to promote candid discussions.4  Even though the public doc-
uments omit names, I will mention some key players and unre-
ported exchanges thanks to the permission that I was given.
Nevertheless, many of the heroes in these stories are sadly omitted
although they are known to people who participated in the drafting
process.
With these writing guidelines in mind, I will discuss the negoti-
ation process and some of the illuminating stories on how key pro-
visions came together.
I. INITIATING THE MEDIATED SETTLEMENT PROJECT
This Project officially started on Friday, March 21, 2014 at 3:54
p.m., at least for me, when I received an email from a Tim Schnabel
with the U.S. Department of State.  He introduced himself as the
U.S. representative to UNCITRAL’s Arbitration and Conciliation
Working Group.  His office, he indicated, was considering propos-
2 IMI is an international organization that develops global standards for mediators, advo-
cates, and others in dispute resolution. See About IMI, IMI, imimediation.org (last visited Aug.
10, 2019). IAM is an organization of peer-selected top commercial mediators from around the
world. See About the IAM, IAM, iamed.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2019).
3 See Part II.C (The three programs are briefly described in note 10).
4 When preparing this article, I was advised that I could safely discuss any information that
is publicly available, but asked not to refer to any discussions that were not expected to be
public. Consultations and informal discussions during breaks are productive in part because par-
ticipants can speak freely without public attribution and need to anticipate reactions of constitu-
encies as they are working through problems.
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ing a project on the enforcement of mediated settlement agree-
ments.  He was interested in my thoughts on whether such a
project would be desirable to pursue.  In our telephone call, he
mentioned that the project idea was initially raised at a State De-
partment’s advisory committee meeting by Professor Stacie
Strong.5  I learned that Mr. Schnabel was systematically reaching
out to various people to figure out whether the enforcement pro-
ject was worth proposing to UNCITRAL.
After several months of consulting with various interest
groups and experts, Tim Schnabel prepared a proposal for future
work to UNCITRAL for its July 2014 Session.  The proposal, for-
mally submitted on behalf of the U.S., was referred by UNCI-
TRAL to Working Group II for evaluation.6
At the Working Group II Session in New York in February
2015, the Delegates along with NGOs and other observer groups
engaged in a thorough review of the U.S. proposal.  The week-long
session was conducted by Michael Schneider, the Swiss Delegate
who served as a diligent and disciplined Chair.  I sat in the room in
awe as a first-time observer.  The Chair tightly managed the sub-
stantive discussions among more than a hundred people represent-
ing 91 States and organizations.  I was especially impressed by his
skill in summarizing what he heard to be sure he understood each
point and his incisive follow-up questions.  He usually posed one or
two probing questions to test the depth of understanding of the
speaker and to delve deeper, although I was less enamored with his
technique when I was in the hot seat.
Mr. Schneider seemed skeptical about the wisdom of this pro-
ject as he engaged with speakers from topic to topic.  For those of
us favoring the project, the meeting was a cliff hanger.  I recall us
trying to guess whether the Chair was inclined toward or against
the project by the questions he asked, his tone, and his body lan-
guage—variables that those of us in the dispute resolution field
5 The idea for the convention was generated at a public meeting of the Department of
State’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law in February 2014. At that meeting,
Professor S.I. Strong of the University of Missouri Law School presented her article comparing
the legal environment surrounding international commercial arbitration with the legal environ-
ment surrounding international commercial mediation and suggested creating a new convention
in the area of international mediated settlements. See S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commer-
cial Arbitration? The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 11 (2014).
6 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Planned and Possible Future
Work—Part III, Proposal by the Government of the United States of America: Future Work for
Working Group II, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/822 (June 2, 2014).
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think we are pretty good at reading.  During the breaks, we shared
our guesses and tried to read the tea leaves, rarely confident about
each of our predictions.  We were acutely aware of how the meet-
ing would end: Depending on how the Chair reads the group, he
would declare a consensus to proceed or not.  We were pleased
that the week ended with a recommendation that the project be
adopted by the Commission.
You can gain an understanding of the thoroughness and range
of discussion by reviewing the detailed Working Group II report
after the session.  It neatly divides the discussion into General Re-
marks, Legal and Practical Questions, Feasibility and Possible
Form of Future Work, and Recommendation to the Commission.7
Working Group II concluded that:
After discussion, the Working Group agreed to suggest to the
Commission that it be given a mandate to work on the topic of
enforcement of settlement agreements, to identify the relevant
issues and develop possible solutions, including the preparation
of a convention, model provisions or guidance texts.  Consider-
ing that differing views were expressed as to the form and con-
tent, as well as the feasibility, of any particular instrument, it was
also agreed to suggest that a mandate on the topic be broad
enough to take into account the various approaches and con-
cerns.  (See the Recommendation to the Commission after Feb-
ruary Working Group II Session at U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, IV.
D. Paragraph 59 (February 11, 2015)).
II. PROCESS STORY: WORKING GROUP II’S MULTI-PARTY
NEGOTIATIONS
Before exploring the next section on the substantive choices in
the Convention, you might find informative this brief description
of the underlying multi-party process that produced the result.  It
was well-designed, in my view, to fully engage participants in a ro-
bust deliberative process.
Working Group II selected as Chair of this project, Natalie
Morris-Sharma, a member of the Singapore delegation.  Under her
watchful and skillful supervision, she chaired this almost three-year
deliberative process, in collaboration with the expert assistance of
7 Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-sec-
ond session (New York, 2–6 February 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, paras. 57–59 (Feb. 11,
2015).
1042CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1037
UNCITRAL’s Secretary to Working Group II, Corinne Montineri.
Ms. Morris-Sharma proved to be an impressive Chair due to her
thoughtful use of “consultations” discussed below and active listen-
ing skills.  I was astonished to learn afterwards that she had no for-
mal mediation or facilitation training.  She was a natural.  She
summarized comments succinctly, checked-in with speakers to ver-
ify that she accurately understood what she heard, and proficiently
used open and closed questions to promote sharing and clarifying
information among participants.  She also effectively used instinc-
tive humor that helped lubricate the serious deliberations.  For ex-
ample, when the discussions were moving too quickly at one point,
she triggered collective laughter when apologizing for her hyperac-
tivity while proclaiming that she had not even drank her first cup of
coffee that day.
The Working Group met twice a year for one- to two-week
sessions to deliberate issue-by-issue and draft section-by-section
with input from the EU Commission and various NGOs in the
room.
The consensus-building process featured six methods that
were each employed to produce a productive process.  I thought it
illustrated best practices for managing a large multi-party
negotiation.
A. Whole Group Meetings
Working Group II members primarily met together to deliber-
ate in a General Assembly-style room.  The Chair guided the dis-
cussions for each session by following an agenda and the numbered
paragraphs in a report that was published in advance of each ses-
sion.  She piloted the Working Group with an attentive ear for any
emerging consensus, opportune moments to break for a “consulta-
tion,” and differences that may warrant deferring a topic for later
discussion.
The room set-up placed the State Delegations in the front half
at their delegation tables while the NGOs, regional representa-
tives, and international organizations sat at their tables in the sec-
ond half of the room.  Each seat included an electronic or plastic
placard that displayed the name of the country or organization
along with headsets to connect with one of five simultaneous trans-
lators.  Behind each seat were other chairs with headsets to accom-
modate other members of a delegation or organization.  Some of
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the State Delegations included two to six members so that the
number of people in the front of the room could sometimes reach a
hundred, and the number of NGOs and regional representatives
could add another fifty to seventy-five participants.
The procedure for contributing was simple.  Anyone wishing
to speak could press a speaker button in NYC or turn the plastic
placard upright in Vienna and wait to be called by the Chair.  In
NYC, where there was no screen that listed speakers waiting for
their turn, a speaker did not know how many speakers were in the
queue.  In Vienna, speakers could gauge when they would be called
by seeing the number of placards upright.  Speakers were by and
large savvy in diplomatic language, respectful, substantive, and
worked at maintaining the deliberative thread by referring to prior
presenters’ remarks.  This approach left me feeling that speakers
were mostly listening to each other and not just giving speeches.
B. Consultations
The Chair strategically adjourned meetings for a “consulta-
tion” when she thought that no consensus was emerging on a sig-
nificant issue and informal discussions might help.  She would
frame the issue and invite delegates to meet for thirty or more min-
utes in small groups to develop proposals for the full group.  These
consultations, that were used several times for each session, would
lead to small group meetings, mini-negotiations, and draft propos-
als.  The Chair would move around the floor listening unobtru-
sively to small group discussions and gently offer prompts to help
keep the consultations on track.  The method was exceptionally ef-
fective in resolving some of the most contentious issues.  I think the
consultations succeeded in part because key participants ap-
proached these opportunities with a mindset to learn from each
other and reconcile differences.
C. Educational Programs for the Delegates and Public
Mediation programs were conducted to educate delegates and
the public about issues relevant to key stages of the drafting pro-
cess.  UNCITRAL hosted or co-sponsored three mediation educa-
tion programs that were organized at the initiative of experts in
mediation.  I was asked to organize each of the three programs that
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were each scheduled to coincide with a concurrent Working Group
II session.8  Like other UNCITRAL educational programs, the
goal was to help inform the ongoing deliberative process.  These
programs appeared valuable because most of the state delegates
were more expert on arbitration than mediation.  I leave to others
who attended to judge the programs’ benefits.
D. Contributions by NGOs and EU
UNCITRAL encourages NGOs to attend, participate, and
contribute to working group meetings.  UNCITRAL values the ex-
perience and expertise of NGOs because they reflect the audience
that will ultimately use the texts.  When this new mediation project
was announced, many mediation-related groups registered with
UNCITRAL for observer status and sent representatives to the
meetings.  The format at the sessions made it easy for NGOs to
contribute.  They had full access to documents, were assigned seats
with microphones and headsets, and could offer remarks during
8 After the first Working Group Session in Vienna in September 2015, the Executive Direc-
tor of IMI, Irena Vanenkova, offered to put together a mediation education program for dele-
gates who might be interested in gaining more background on mediation to help inform their
contributions. UNCITRAL responded positively to the offer. IMI asked me to put together a
program and recruited Professor Janet Martinez at Stanford Law School to participate. We de-
signed the first program for the second working group session on February 2, 2016 at the U.N. in
NYC. It compared mediation with the more familiar arbitration process.
After the NYC meeting, there was a sense that another program might be helpful. The
second educational program was held during the next session at the U.N. in Vienna on Septem-
ber 21, 2016. That program was well-timed personally because I went to Vienna on the way to
my son’s wedding in Cyprus the following week! The program was hosted by the Vienna Interna-
tional Arbitral Center and co-sponsored with IMI and IAM. It included the following panelists:
Eileen Carroll, QC (Mediator, Co-founder, CEDR, London), Birgit Sambeth Glasner (Media-
tor, Geneva), Michel Kallipetis (Mediator, London), Allan Stitt (Mediator, Member of Cana-
dian Delegation, Toronto), Josephine Wan-Wen Hadikusumo (Senior Counsel, Asia, Texas
Instruments, Singapore), Norris Yang (Mediator, Former Chair of Hong Kong Mediation Coun-
cil, Hong Kong). I moderated the program that was entitled an opportunity to ask questions of
mediators and users.
After the Vienna meeting, some felt that one more program might be useful. The third
program was held at the next session at the U.N. in NYC on February 8, 2017. It was hosted by
JAMS, and co-sponsored by IMI and IAM. The panel included: Michel Kallipetis (Mediator,
London), Louise Otis (Mediator, retired justice of the Quebec Court of Appeals, President of
the Administrative Tribunal of OECD, Montreal), Dr. Karl Mackie (Mediator, President, Co-
founder, CEDR, London), Pedro Ribeiro (MCIArb, Arbitrator and Mediator, Vice President of
CAMARB—Caˆmara de Arbitragem Empresarial, Brazil), Roland Schroeder (General Electric
Global Litigation Counsel, United States), and Allan Stitt (Mediator, Member of Canadian Del-
egation, Toronto). Similar to the previous program, I moderated it, and we invited participants
to ask questions of mediators and users.
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the formal meetings and freely talk with State delegates on the
floor during breaks and consultations.  NGO representatives par-
ticipated in formal and informal ways as issues emerged.  I will cite
several examples in this section as illustrations although there were
numerous other significant interactions.
An early issue was whether a mediation settlement instrument
was even needed when Working Group II was assessing whether to
recommend proceeding with the mediation project.  At the first
session in February 2015, Professor S.I. Strong of the University of
Missouri Law School, representing the American Society of Inter-
national Law, helped bolster the case for the initiative when she
presented an empirical study she conducted as evidence of the
need for the instrument.9
A second original supporting study was conducted by the In-
stitute for Dispute Resolution at New Jersey City University.  It
was undertaken for IMI and presented at the September 2016 Vi-
enna Session.  The study found that the majority of users and
stakeholders in the survey and at the Global Pound Conference
believed that a global mechanism to enforce mediation settlements
would improve commercial dispute resolution in international busi-
ness transactions.10
Another issue that got my personal attention was whether the
enforcement instrument should apply to only monetary terms in a
settlement.  At the first Working Group II meeting in February
2015, several delegations and at least one NGO representative as-
serted that any instrument should be limited because of the practi-
cal difficulties of enforcing non-monetary terms.  This suggestion
9 The delegates were provided with a preliminary report that was subsequently published as
a law review article. S.I. Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International
Commercial Mediation, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973 (2016). See also S.I. Strong, Use and
Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation: A Preliminary Report on
Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on International Commercial Mediation
and Conciliation (University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2014-
28). Preliminary findings from the study had previously been reviewed by the UNCITRAL Sec-
retariat and the United States and were referenced in documents circulated prior to the Febru-
ary 2015 meeting. See UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes:
enforceability of settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation/medi-
ation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187, at 6 n.16 (Nov. 27, 2014). See also Comments Received
From States, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Re-
sulting From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation—Revision of the UNCITRAL
Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.188, at 6 n.7 (Dec. 23,
2014).
10 SING. REF. BK., David S. Weiss & Michael R. Griffith, Report on Empirical Study of Busi-
ness Users Regarding International Mediation and Enforcement Mechanisms, 20 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 1133 (2019).
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was alarming, in my view.  If an international treaty restricted en-
forcement to only monetary terms, parties may view mediation pri-
marily for resolving this narrow class of disputes.  This view would
foreclose the full benefits of mediation for uncovering other terms
that may better meet parties’ interests.  After researching whether
enforcement was so limited for enforcing arbitration awards under
the New York Convention (United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New
York, 10 June 1958), I presented to the working group the NY
Convention  precedent and its successful experience with a broader
instrument and the substantive and policy reasons favoring that ap-
proach.  Fortunately, a broader view was ultimately adopted by
Working Group II, and the final convention covers compliance
with all settlement terms.11
Mediation-related NGOs especially rallied at the Vienna
meetings in September 2016 when several difficult questions con-
verged for discussion: Would the convention apply to private par-
ties on an opt-in or opt-out basis?  Should an enforceable
agreement be certified as one that was the product of a private
mediation, and if so, how would it be certified?  And, would a de-
fense to enforcement include certain types of misbehavior by the
mediator, and if so, how narrow would the defense be framed?
These questions fell clearly within the bailiwick of the mediation-
related NGOs, and their representatives offered much formal and
informal input into various proposals.  These questions were ulti-
mately resolved as part of the break-through “compromise” dis-
cussed in the next section.12
As these several examples illustrate, NGOs contributed in va-
rious ways during the drafting process.  They were welcomed by
many State delegations, in my experience.  However, like any
multi-party process, it is difficult to assess the impact of most indi-
vidual contributions.  Nevertheless, I think NGOs can safely claim
that their participation enriched the discussion and understanding
of a number of key issues.
In addition to various NGOs participating, the European
Union (“EU”), as a regional economic integration organization
represented by the European Commission, participated actively
throughout the three years.  EU member states made up more than
11 One delegation, in an effort to find a solution that may appeal to all sides, proposed that
the convention cover non-monetary features with the option for a State to file a reservation to
exclude enforcement of long-term or complex obligations.
12 See Section III.
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25 percent of the delegates on the floor at any meeting.13  They
were ably represented by Norel Rosner, Legislative Officer, who
contributed much to the whole group meetings, during consulta-
tions, and in informal discussions.
E. The Travaux Preparatoires (Official Record
of the Negotiation)
The travaux preparatoires, known as travaux, reports, and sec-
retariat notes, were prepared before each session and at the end of
each meeting day.  These various documents aided the delibera-
tions as they unfolded by creating a record so that participants
could track where they have been and where they were going.
These documents standout for two reasons.  First, they offered
a detailed contemporaneous record of what transpired (issues that
were considered and what was discussed).  Second, there were no
personal names, countries or NGOs associated with the remarks
and exchanges.  The entire written record was anonymous in order
to promote candid exchanges and reduce the need to grandstand
for constituencies back home.
Corrinne Montineri, as the secretary of UNCITRAL Working
Group II, performed the herculean task of preparing the numerous
lengthy documents that aided the working group’s deliberations.
Ms. Montineri, with help from her colleague, Jae Sung Lee, pre-
pared before each upcoming session a provisional agenda, a Re-
port of Working Group II that covered what happened at the prior
session, and a Note by the Secretariat as background and guide for
the session.  Then Ms. Montineri with her colleague prepared daily
“draft” reports of what transpired each day and distributed them
before the next day of meetings.  At the end of each day, she would
return to her office to meticulously prepare the draft report for the
next day while the delegates and other representatives took a
13 UNCITRAL membership of 60 States included 13 members from the EU (21.6%). For
the Working Group II meetings, attendance varied. For the February 2017 Session in NY, for
example, 12 out of the 41 members in attendance were members of the EU (29%) plus 9 more
EU countries as observers. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on
the work of its sixty-sixth session (New York, February 6–10, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901 (Feb.
16, 2017). In the last meeting in February 2018, when the final draft was adopted, 12 out of the 33
members in attendance were members of the EU (36%) plus 4 more countries as observers. See
UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-eighth
session (New York, February 5–9, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934 (Feb. 19, 2018).
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break for the evening to socialize and meet informally before re-
turning for another work day.
These travaux preparatoires are posted on the UNCITRAL
website, making them a widely available source for clarifying and
interpreting the final model law and convention.  You will see
many references to these sources in this article.
F. Voting
Decisions were made by consensus.  No formal voting took
place as a general rule, so I was surprised to learn at my first meet-
ing.  The Chair, Ms. Morris-Sharma, had the responsibility of rec-
ognizing when the working group reached a consensus.  She used
various techniques to test for one.  For example, she would declare
“that not hearing any more comments or disagreements she will
move on.”  That comment would ferret out further concerns if
there were any.  Or, she would invite other comments with the re-
mark that “if there are no more, she will declare a consensus.”
These types of prompts helped surface an emerging consensus or
an occasion for consultation or deferring an issue.  This form of
decision making imposed a heavy responsibility on the Chair to
listen attentively, astutely read the group, and proactively build
consensus.14
These six methods to engage participants were used through-
out the week-long sessions over the almost three years of
deliberations.
III. SUBSTANTIVE STORY: KEY ISSUES AND HOW RESOLVED
This section explains key provisions of the Convention includ-
ing the five-point compromise that likely will be of interest to me-
diation-savvy readers and states that are contemplating adopting
the Convention.  For states that might not be ready to ratify the
Convention, the working group prepared, as an alternative, an
amendment to the Model Law on International Commercial Con-
ciliation.  The Model Law will not be discussed.
14 UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at 6, para. 14.
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A. Article 1. Scope of Application
Article 1 frames the narrow scope of the Convention.
Article 1.1 limits its application to disputes that are interna-
tional, presumably to little surprise, and includes a definition of
international that focuses on the place of a party’s business, where
a “substantial part of the obligations under the agreement is per-
formed,” or where the subject matter is “mostly closely
connected.”
Article 1.2 and 1.3 further limits the scope by specifying what
disputes and settlement agreements are not covered, with limits
that will surprise and disappoint some.
Article 1.2 states that the Convention does not apply to settle-
ment agreements that arise out of consumer transactions or relate
to family, inheritance, and employment law.
Article 1.3 tries to avoid overlap with other enforcement re-
gimes that might apply to mediated settlement agreements.  Some
delegations wanted to avoid duplicating regimes such as the Hague
Conference instrument, while others were fine with states provid-
ing multiple avenues for relief under different instruments.  They
were less concerned with overlap and more concerned about avoid-
ing gaps by other instruments imposing ceilings, not floors.
The Working Group ultimately decided to restrict the scope so
that the Convention would not apply to settlement agreements that
have been approved by a court or concluded in the course of a
court proceeding and would be enforceable as a State court judg-
ment.  Also, it would not apply to settlement agreements enforcea-
ble as an arbitral award.
B. Article 2. Definitions
Article 2.3 offers a definitions section with a surprise that I
suspect will be embraced by much of the contemporary mediation
world.  It replaced the word “conciliation” with the word “media-
tion.”  After UNCITRAL has used the word “conciliation” in the
Conciliation Rules (1980) and in the Model Law on International
Conciliation (2002), Working Group II made this long overdue
word change.  It then labeled the Convention as “United Nations
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting
from Mediation (italics added).”
The Working Group offered the following explanation:
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. . . the Commission decided to use the term ‘mediation’ instead
in an effort to adapt to the actual and practical use of the terms
and with the expectation that this change will facilitate the pro-
motion and heighten the visibility of the instruments.  This
change in terminology does not have any substantive or concep-
tual implications.15
Although some might object because they think there is a
worthwhile distinction to maintain between mediation as a more
facilitative process and conciliation as a more evaluative process, I
would expect most of the mediation audience will welcome this
change in terminology.
C. Article 4. Requirements for Reliance on Settlement
Agreements
Parties must supply evidence of a “settlement agreement that
resulted from mediation.”  This unexpected proof requirement was
subject to considerable discussion and reflects what the drafting
group characterized as a “balance between, on the one hand, the
formalities that are required to ascertain that a settlement agree-
ment result from mediation and, on the other hand, the need for
the draft convention to preserve the flexible nature of the media-
tion process.”16  It is in this spirit that this proof requirement
should be interpreted.
This requirement was born out of the fear that the Convention
might be used for illegitimate purposes.  Some delegates wanted to
be sure that the treaty would not be used for an illegal scheme like
money laundering or for mediations that are not genuine in the
view of some delegates such as when a couple of friends in a dis-
pute meet in a pub.  It is for these reasons that the Convention not
only requires that the agreement be signed by the parties but also
that there is “evidence that the settlement agreement resulted from
mediation” by one of four ways: the mediator’s signature on the
settlement agreement, the mediator’s signature on a separate docu-
ment indicating a mediation was carried out, an attestation by an
15 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Dis-
putes, International Commercial Mediation: Draft Convention on International Settlement Agree-
ments Resulting from Mediation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, at II.B(1) (Mar. 2, 2018).
16 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, supra note 15, at II.B(7).
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administering institution, or “any other evidence acceptable to the
competent authority.”17
D. Article 5. Grounds for Refusing to Grant Relief
Article 5 on defenses posed the risk of crippling the Conven-
tion by establishing facially sound grounds for refusing relief that
could be abused.  Some delegates argued that preserving defenses
was vital for protecting parties with a valid reason for not comply-
ing with a settlement agreement.  At the policy level, they offered a
persuasive argument.  But if all or most possible defenses were pre-
served, the Convention would fail to serve its primary purpose of
expediting compliance.  This Article was subject to multiple rounds
of discussion at different meetings including a gallant effort in the
final session to regroup and refine the grounds to avoid overlap.
As this last effort unfolded, I was hoping it would lead to changes
that would reduce the risk of misuse.  The failure to gain consensus
was due to the “need to accommodate the concerns of different
domestic legal systems”18 and left disconcerting space for abuse, in
my view.
Preserving several limited defenses made sense like the oppor-
tunity to present proof that the party “was under some incapacity”
or that the settlement agreement was not binding, was subse-
quently modified, or has been performed.  Other defenses, how-
ever, leave space to ferment trouble by defendants who want to
avoid compliance.
Two troublesome defenses stand out.  One is the defense that
an agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed under the law to which the parties have validly sub-
jected it. . . .”19  Another is the defense that the obligations in the
agreement are “not clear or comprehensible.”20  By asserting these
defenses, defendants may be able to transform this new expedited
process into a more protracted and expensive one similar to the
one before the Convention.  Courts should construe narrowly these
defenses21 and others in view of the purpose of the Convention.
17 Id. at II.A, art. 4.1(a) & (b).
18 Id. at II.B, para. 8.
19 Id. at II.A, art. 5(1)(b)(i).
20 Id. at II.A, art. 5(1)(c)(ii).
21 For the “null and void,” etc. defense, Working Group II specifically states that it intends a
narrow interpretation based on adopting language from the New York Convention. See U.N.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes, Inter-
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E. “The Compromise”
As the deliberations progressed from semi-annual meeting to
semi-annual meeting, Working Group II resolved the easier issues
while deferring the harder ones.  Among those favoring a Conven-
tion, we feared that when deliberations reached the remaining
more controversial and complex issues, the resolutions risked gut-
ting the instrument.  The fears were palpable in the hallways.  Sev-
eral worrisome questions occupied me: Would the Convention
include a large hole for a stream of legal claims based on mediator
misconduct that would be difficult to prove and would prolong the
compliance process?  Would the benefits be limited to only parties
that elect to opt-in to the Convention?  If so, only diligent parties
who overcome the status quo bias will likely elect an enforcement
process that is supposed to be the better one.  Would the entire
enterprise for a convention be derailed by the argument that for-
mulating global standards is premature for what some viewed as an
incipient field?
These sort of questions among others moved different sides
toward a “compromise proposal.”  The compromise was the result
of numerous discussions among delegates, NGO representatives,
and the EU in full working group meetings, consultations, informal
gatherings, hallways, and over meals.  The five elements of the
compromise were initially “cobbled” together by about a dozen
delegates during lunch on Tuesday, February 7, 2017 and presented
after lunch to the full Working Group.  The timing left the remain-
ing three days of the session to flesh out the details.  And then a
snow blizzard on Thursday closed down the island of Manhattan,
including the UN for the day.  This lost day turned into an opportu-
nity.  Instead of enjoying the freshly fallen snow in Central Park, a
number of delegates and NGOs met at a private law office near the
UN.  They worked together to overcome some final hurdles and
solidify details that could be presented to the full Working
Group.22  The five-point “compromise,” which it became known as,
created a pathway for resolving the remaining most contentious
issues.
national Commercial Conciliation: Preparation of an Instrument on Enforcement of International
Commercial Settlement Agreements Resulting from Conciliation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/
WP.202, para. 43 (July 14, 2017).
22 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, supra note 13, paras. 51–93.
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1. Opt-out Provision (Convention, Article 8.1(a) & (b))
Should the Convention apply automatically with an opt-out
provision?  Those favoring opt-out argued that the instrument
should apply automatically like the New York Convention applies
to enforcement of arbitral awards.  This approach also would be
consistent with the objective of the instrument to make it easier to
secure compliance with settlement agreements.  Others argued for
party autonomy.  Parties should opt-in only after they understood
how the Convention operates and made an informed choice to do
so.
This party autonomy argument appealed to several mediation
experts, so I learned when preparing for the Vienna expert panel
program in September 2016.  During the evening before the pro-
gram as the panelists were conferring, some panelists expressed
concern that an opt-out provision ran counter to the principle of
party self-determination that forms the foundation for the media-
tion process.  Parties should make an informed choice to use the
Convention, so they argued as some state delegates did during the
meetings.  I was stunned by the resistance because the benefits of
an opt-out provision seemed so obvious.  Instead of the after-din-
ner meeting offering a congenial opportunity to get acquainted
over drinks and prepare for the next day, it turned into an intense
and lively discussion.  We met late into the night as we explored the
pros and cons of opt-in and opt-out and the foundational principle
of party self-determination.
By the end of the evening, I struggled to succinctly frame the
issue as: Would the new instrument offer a better default process
for enforcement than the one now in place without the instrument?
If so, that process should apply subject an opt-out provision.  If not,
I suggested that we should not be supporting the new instrument.
When we reconvened our planning meeting over lunch the next
day, the panel unanimously favored the opt-out approach.  It be-
came apparent to all of us that opt-out favored the default process,
and this enterprise was aiming to fashion a better process for en-
forcing mediated settlement agreements.
Ultimately, the Drafting Group adopted the policy of auto-
matically applying the Convention with an opt-out option for a
party to the settlement agreement.23  Even though the Convention
23 Art. 8 distinguishes between “parties to the convention,” which are Contracting States,
and “parties to the settlement agreement,” which are private parties. For further explanation, see
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, supra note 15, at II.B(3).
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omits explicitly authorizing private opt-outs, the understanding is
that parties to a settlement agreement can agree to exclude the
application of the Convention, and the clause will be upheld under
Article 5.1(d) as a defense based on complying with the settlement
terms.24
However, Article 8.1(b) authorizes a State party to the Con-
vention to opt-out of the Convention’s automatic application in a
declaration.  If a State opts-out, private parties can still opt-in to
the Convention by private agreement (such as in the settlement
agreement or the agreement to mediate).
2. Grounds for Refusing to Grant Relief Based on Mediator
Behavior (Convention, Article 5.1(e) & (f))
Some delegates wanted to include a defense to enforcement
based on bad mediator behavior.  They saw a need to protect par-
ties against unfair treatment by a mediator or failure of a mediator
to disclose information that calls into question his or her impartial-
ity.  Initial concerns related to the impact of a mediator’s non-com-
pliance with professional conduct standards or domestic law.
For people in the mediation field, this defense roused fears of
abuse by parties who are looking for an excuse to get out of an
agreement.  Although it is rare that these mediator misbehaviors
occur and have an impact, the claims are theoretically possible, and
some delegates thought should be guarded against.  For many in
the mediation field as advocates or mediators, these claims are fa-
miliar ones that can be asserted by a party trying to avoid a com-
mitment.  These claims also can be used by a party to protract the
compliance process and make it costlier as leverage for re-negotiat-
ing a settlement.
When discussing these concerns at the February 2016 New
York session, it was considered how mediation is different than ar-
bitration.  It was recognized that parties voluntarily use mediation,
a mediator lacked authority to impose a settlement, any resulting
agreement is voluntarily entered into, and parties are free to with-
draw from the process at any time.  At the end of the discussions,
delegates were encouraged to consider before the next meetings in
Vienna whether these mediator misconduct risks might be covered
24 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 13, para. 78; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report
of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first session (25 June–13 July 2018), U.N. Doc. A/
73/17, at III C.2., para. 68 (2018); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n
on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first session (25 June–13 July 2018), U.N. Doc. A/73/17, at III B.1.,
paras. 37–40 (2018).
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by other defenses like the public policy defense in the instrument
and to review the practical and judicial experiences in their
jurisdictions.25
At the following Vienna session in September 2016, a drafting
process began with the goal of protecting against these risks of me-
diator misbehavior while limiting the opportunity for abuse and
leverage to renegotiate settlements.  One of the early drafts that
stimulated an energetic drafting process stated:
Draft provision 8 (Grounds for refusing [recognition] and en-
forcement) (key language in italics)26
(1) [Recognition and] enforcement may be refused . . . if that
party furnishes . . . proof that:
(e) The conciliator failed to maintain fair treatment of the parties,
or did not disclose circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable
doubts as to its impartiality or independence.
After much discussion of divergent views, exchange of multi-
ple drafts, and parsing of language that included active participa-
tion by NGOs, the emerging view was that serious mediator
misconduct could probably be covered by other defenses in the in-
strument.  The delegates that wanted additional protections em-
phasized the significant role of the mediator and the need to retain
a defense even if it is difficult to prove a party has been treated
unfairly.  Unlike arbitration, it was asserted by those favoring a
protective provision, there was no means to challenge the media-
tion process or the conduct of the conciliator.
As delegates searched for a proposal that met everyone’s con-
cerns, it was suggested that the scope of challengeable behavior be
limited to when it has a “direct impact on the settlement agree-
ment,” to “exceptional circumstances,” or when the conduct has a
“material impact” or “undue influence.”  It also was suggested that
subparagraph (e) above be divided into two separate subpara-
graphs: one on fair treatment and the other on disclosure.27
25 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-fourth session (New York, February 1–5, 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, paras. 170–75
(Feb. 10, 2016).
26 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Dis-
putes, International Commercial Conciliation: Preparation of an Instrument on Enforcement of
International Commercial Settlement Agreements Resulting from Conciliation, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9WG.II/WP.198, at II.D, para. 35 (June 30, 2016). The final draft became art. 5 in the
Convention.
27 See U.N.G.A., Daily Minutes, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/LXV/CRP.1/Add.4, paras. 5–11
(Sept. 16, 2016) (Draft report, addendum, distributed day after discussions); U.N.G.A., Daily
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The final version approved by Working Group II adopted the
two subparagraphs approach and retained narrow defenses that ad-
dressed the underlying goal of protecting parties from a badly be-
having mediator while fashioning language that reduced the risk of
parties exploiting defenses to evade commitments.  The final lan-
guage of Article 5, with italics to highlight safeguards against
abuse, are:28
Section 1(e) There was a serious breach by the mediator of stan-
dards applicable to the mediator or the mediation without which
breach that party would not have entered into the settlement
agreement; or
(f) There was a failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties
circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s
impartiality or independence and such failure to disclose has a
material impact or undue influence on a party without which fail-
ure that party would not have entered into the settlement
agreement.
3.  Avoid Overlap with Other Enforcement Regimes
(Convention, Article 1.3)
Another issue was whether the compliance mechanism in the
Convention should avoid overlap with other compliance regimes.
As discussed under Article 1.3 on Scope of Application above, the
Working Group decided to try to minimize overlap by not applying
the Convention to settlement agreements enforceable as a court
judgment or arbitration awards.29
4. Defining “Recognition and Enforcement”
(Convention, Article 3)
Another issue was whether to use the language “recognition
and enforcement” of settlement agreements in the Convention, a
phrase that figures prominently and frequently in the New York
Convention on arbitral awards including in its title.30  Because part
of the phrase, “recognition,” has a different meaning in civil law
Minutes, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/LXV/CRP.1/Add.7, paras. 15–18 (para. 18 refers to compro-
mise solution) (Sept. 21, 2016) (distributed day after discussions).
28 For a more complete analysis of this section on mediator misbehavior, including the hur-
dles to proving the defense, see SING. REF. BK., Michel Kallipetis, Singapore Convention
Defences Based on Mediator’s Misconduct: Articles 5.1(e) & (f), 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1197 (2019).
29 See Singapore Convention art. 1.3(a) & (b).
30 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. I–VII.
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jurisdictions than in common law jurisdictions, delegates wanted to
draft a convention that would reduce the risk of confusion.  It was
not easy at the meetings for me as a common law trained lawyer to
understand the explanations and reconcile the different interpreta-
tions.  The solution fashioned by the delegates was to omit the term
“recognition” and design a separate article, that became the short
and significant Article 3.
Article 3 separated the two concepts.  Article 3.1 covers “en-
forcement” by giving each party to the Convention the right to en-
force a settlement agreement in accordance with the Convention.31
Article 3.2 covers “recognition” without using the term.  Instead,
the “recognition” concept is replaced with a functional definition
that uses other words to address key aspects of recognition such as
the ability to assert a mediated settlement as a complete defense if
another party tries to raise the underlying settled claims.
Other articles in the Convention do not repeat Article 3’s me-
ticulously negotiated and somewhat convoluted language.  Instead,
the other articles use the blanket term “relief” when referring col-
lectively to the concept of “enforcement” in Article 3.1 and the
functional “recognition” description in Article 3.2.32
For a full understanding of this two-paragraph, complex provi-
sion, read Recognition by Any Other Name: Article 3 of the Singa-
pore Convention on Mediation by Timothy Schnabel in the
Singapore Mediation Convention Reference Book.33  In the article,
Tim Schnabel emphasizes the central importance of this Article to
the entire Convention when he points out that: “Yet only Article 3
imposes affirmative obligations on Parties to the Convention.  All
other articles merely play supporting roles, such as placing bounda-
ries on the Convention’s application, setting forth procedural rules
or exceptions, and providing the mechanics for the Convention to
operate as a treaty.  In other words, all the other articles are used
to determine whether and how the Article 3 obligations apply, but
only Article 3 itself imposes substantive duties on states that join
the Convention.”  Those duties are to enforce a settlement agree-
ment in accordance with the terms of the Convention.
31 The term “enforcement” shows up in a few other places but for other purposes. See Singa-
pore Convention arts. 1(3)(a)(ii) & (b), art. 12(4).
32 See the use of the term “relief” in Singapore Convention arts. 4, 5, 6, & 12.
33 See SING. REF. BK., Timothy Schnabel, Recognition by Any Other Name: Article 3 of the
Singapore Convention on Mediation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1181 (2019).
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5. Two Options for States: Convention or Model Law
Central to the five-point compromise was the dual instruments
proposal.  It resolved a distributive choice that was blocking pro-
gress: Would there be a convention or model law?  The proposal
avoided a choice that would have produced a winner and loser.  It
offered something to both sides.  For those states that opposed a
convention because they wanted more time to gain experience with
mediation and compliance issues, they could adopt the model text
in their domestic law and join the convention later.  For those
states that favored a convention because they are ready for its ben-
efits, they could ratify it under the dual instruments resolution.
The General Assembly, it also was suggested, should not express
any preference between the two options.34
The Working Group formulated this formal resolution to en-
capsulate its goals for adoption by the Commission and for the
General Assembly:
Recalling that the decision of the Commission to concurrently
prepare a convention on international settlement agreements re-
sulting from mediation and an amendment to the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation was in-
tended to accommodate the different levels of experience with
mediation in different jurisdictions, and to provide States with
consistent standards on cross-border enforcement of interna-
tional settlement agreements resulting from mediation, without
creating any expectation that interested States may adopt either
instrument. See A/CN.9/942, II.B Annotations, Paragraph 12 (2
March 2018).
After the five-point compromise was reached, the delegates
wrapped up the drafting process by addressing some standard and
not particularly controversial provisions, although one routine pro-
vision provoked an entertaining exchange with substantive implica-
tions.  It was proposed in the draft provision that the Convention
become effective six months after the third state ratifies it.  During
the discussions, a delegate suggested that the Convention should
not be effective until ten states ratify it, followed by other dele-
gates suggesting other numbers ranging from three and ten ratify-
ing states.  The Chair, using her instinctive humor to make a point,
remarked that this is starting to sound like a bingo game or hag-
gling at a bazaar.  She then asked delegates to support any pro-
posed number with a rationale.  In a very short time, the discussion
34 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, supra note 13, paras. 89–93; U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, supra note 15,
at II.B Annotations, para. 12.
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returned to the original number of three ratifying states and
reached a consensus.35
This last discussion highlighted another feature of the Conven-
tion mentioned by a delegate that is worth noting as a final point.
The Convention is not a bilateral treaty.  It is not limited to compli-
ance with settlements “from” a State that is also a party.  This
means that settlements are subject to the Convention in any coun-
try that is a Party even if the person or entity suing is not from a
country that ratified the Convention.
IV. CONCLUSION—WHAT HAPPENED NEXT?
The recommendations of Working Group II were adopted by
UNCITRAL on June 25, 2018.  On that warm day at the UN in
NYC, delegates and representatives sang a celebratory song com-
posed for the occasion.36  It was entitled “Good Memories” and
was sung to the melody of Home on the Range.  It also paid tribute
to Tim Schnabel’s leadership for moving this initiative forward and
to Singapore for offering to host opening the Convention for
signature.
Oh give me a forum
Where mediation is at home
Where debate and amendments flow free
Where seldom is heard, a discouraging word
And results are here for us to see
Ohhhhh forum to engage, where each of us wrote a page, where
Tim took the lead and we followed with speed—mediation con-
vention hurray
When the work first begun
And the quorum was found
With the New York Convention as guide
We all shared our views
And now we share the news
The Singapore convention is live ohhhh forum to engage . . . .
35 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/942, supra note 15, at II, art. 14.
36 The song was composed by three UNCITRAL members who are too modest to be pub-
licly recognized for their authorship of this original composition for the 51st Commission of
UNCITRAL—New York—25 June 2018.
1060CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1037
At the June 25th Commission meeting, the Commission
adopted by consensus the following decision and recommendation
for the General Assembly:37
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
Recalling its mandate under General Assembly resolution
2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966 to further the progressive har-
monization and unification of the law of international trade and
in that respect to bear in mind the interests of all peoples, in
particular those of developing countries, in the extensive devel-
opment of international trade,
Recognizing the value of mediation as a method of amica-
bly settling disputes arising in the context of international com-
mercial relations,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 57/18 of 19 Novem-
ber 2002 noting the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Conciliation and expressing the con-
viction that the Model Law, together with the UNCITRAL
Conciliation Rules recommended by the General Assembly in
its resolution 35/52 of 4 December 1980, contributes significantly
to the establishment of a harmonized legal framework for the
fair and efficient settlement of disputes arising in international
commercial relations,
Convinced that the adoption of a convention on interna-
tional settlement agreements resulting from mediation that is
acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic
systems would complement the existing legal framework on in-
ternational mediation and contribute to the development of har-
monious international economic relations,
Recalling that the decision of the Commission to concur-
rently prepare a convention on international settlement agree-
ments resulting from mediation and an amendment to the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Concili-
ation was intended to accommodate the different levels of expe-
rience with mediation in different jurisdictions, and to provide
States with consistent standards on cross-border enforcement of
international settlement agreements resulting from mediation,
without creating any expectation that interested States may
adopt either instrument,38
Noting that the preparation of the draft convention on in-
ternational settlement agreements resulting from mediation was
the subject of due deliberation in the Commission and that the
37 U.N. Doc. A/73/17, supra note 24, at III C.2, para. 68.
38 U.N. GAOR, 72nd Sess., supplement no. 17, U.N. Doc. A/72/17, paras. 238 & 239 (2017).
See also U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, supra note 13, para. 93.
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draft convention benefited from consultations with Govern-
ments and interested intergovernmental and international non-
governmental organizations,
Having considered the draft convention at its fifty-first ses-
sion, in 2018,
Drawing attention to the fact that the text of the draft con-
vention was circulated for comment before the fifty-first session
of the Commission to all Governments invited to attend the
meetings of the Commission and the Working Group as mem-
bers and observers,
Considering that the draft convention has received suffi-
cient consideration and has reached the level of maturity for it
to be generally acceptable to States:
1. Submits to the General Assembly the draft convention
on international settlement agreements resulting from media-
tion, as it appears in annex I to the report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its fifty-
first session;
2. Recommends that the General Assembly, taking into
account the extensive consideration given to the draft conven-
tion by the Commission and its Working Group II (Dispute Set-
tlement), consider the draft convention with a view to
(a) adopting, at its seventy-third session, on the basis of the draft
convention approved by the Commission, a United Nations
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting
from Mediation; (b) authorizing a signing ceremony to be held
as soon as practicable in 2019 in Singapore, upon which the
Convention would be open for signature; and (c) recommending
that the Convention be known as the “Singapore Convention on
Mediation”;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to publish the Conven-
tion, upon adoption, including electronically and in the six offi-
cial languages of the United Nations, and to disseminate it
broadly to Governments and other interested bodies.
The General Assembly approved the Convention and the title
as the Singapore Convention on Mediation on December 20, 2018.
The last step started on August 7, 2019 when the Convention
opened for signature in Singapore and 46 countries signed it.39  The
opening ceremony launched the final stage of “ratification, accept-
39 See Singapore Convention art. 11. The official list of signatories that will be updated in
perpetuity can be found on the UNCITRAL website by searching for “Singapore Convention on
Mediation.” See Status: United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Re-
sulting from Mediation, UNCITRAL, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/mediation/conventions/in-
ternational_settlement_agreements/status (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
1062CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1037
ance, approval, or accession” by the states.40  The Convention be-
comes effective six months after the third state proceeds from
signing to adopting the Convention.  Each state has its own re-
quirements for ratification.
I hope that this article will help inform discussions and choices
as states study the Convention, assess its benefits, and decide
whether to adopt it.  I also hope that this article will be of value
after the Convention becomes effective for when parties are imple-
menting and interpreting the Convention.
40 See Singapore Convention art. 14.
EVALUATING THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION
THROUGH A U.S.-CENTRIC LITIGATION
LENS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
NEARLY TWO DECADES OF
MEDIATION DISPUTES IN AMERICAN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
James R. Coben*
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter assesses the likely efficaciousness of the Singa-
pore Mediation Convention1 based on nearly two decades experi-
ence of systematically tracking and studying mediation litigation in
the U.S. federal and state courts.
In the Spring of 2006, my colleague Peter N. Thompson and I
authored our first study analyzing our comprehensive five-year
dataset documenting mediation litigation trends from 1999–2003.
The article, entitled Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litiga-
tion About Mediation,2 made a number of findings relevant to the
Convention, including among others:
• Litigation involving mediation issues increased 95% from
1999 to 2003.3
• Nearly half of all court opinions about mediation ad-
dressed enforcement of settlement agreements.  Tradi-
tional contract defenses, although frequently raised in
enforcement cases, were rarely successful.4
• Very few opinions raised the issue of mediator miscon-
duct;5 in fact, only seventeen times in five years did parties
assert a contract defense based on mediator conduct.6
* Professor of Law and Senior Fellow in the Dispute Resolution Institute, Mitchell Hamline
School of Law. The author thanks Caleb Gerbitz, a student at Mitchell Hamline for his thought-
ful advice and top-notch technical expertise offered at all stages of this project.
1 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-
first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex I (2018) [hereinafter Singapore Convention].
2 James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation
About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43 (2006).
3 Id. at 47–48.
4 Id. at 48–49.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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• Courts are inclined to order mediation on their own initia-
tive and will generally enforce a pre-existing obligation to
participate in mediation, whether the obligation was judi-
cially created, mandated by statute, or stipulated in the
parties’ pre-dispute contract.7
• Courts frequently consider evidence of what occurs in me-
diation; indeed, in over three hundred opinions courts ad-
dressed mediation communications without any mention of
privilege or mediation confidentiality.8
A year later, we published a follow-up article detailing two
additional years of data analysis (2004–2005) and speculating about
future trends.9  Although we then stopped systematically coding
every mediation case for inclusion in a master database, we contin-
ued to monitor gross annual counts and squib the years’ most sig-
nificant cases for continuing legal education presentations and a
variety of publications,10 including most significantly since 2011, for
our work as co-authors (together with Sarah Cole, Nancy Rogers,
Craig McEwen, and Nadja Alexander) of Mediation: Law, Policy
& Practice, a Thomsen Reuters Trial Practice Series Treatise.11
As Professor Thompson and I wrote back in 2007, “[w]e, of
course, found it ironic and unfortunate that mediation, a process
designed as an alternative to litigation, can, in some circumstances,
encourage rather than eliminate additional litigation.”12 That dis-
puting irony continues to the present day, and I continue to believe
that valuable lessons can be learned from mining the data.
The run-up to the December 2018 General Assembly’s ap-
proval of the Singapore Convention inspired me to put my mining
7 Id. at 105.
8 Id. at 58–59.
9 James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, 1 WORLD
ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 395 (2007).
10 See, e.g., James R. Coben, My Change of Mind on the Uniform Mediation Act, 23 DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2017, at 6; James R. Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial:
Three Not So Beautiful Aspects of Contemporary Mediation, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
779 (2015); Sarah R. Cole, Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers, James R. Coben & Peter N.
Thompson, Where Mediation is Concerned, Sometimes ‘There Ought Not to Be a Law’!, 20 DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2014, at 34; James R. Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy: Judicial
Abdication to Class Action Mediators, 5 PENN. ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 162 (2013); Peter N.
Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 363
(2011).
11 SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE (2018–2019). The treatise,
updated annually and available online in Westlaw, contains detailed analysis of case law, as well
as statutes and court rules on all of the topics addressed in this article.
12 Coben & Thompson, supra note 9, at 395.
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gear back on in earnest.  With the assistance of my extremely tal-
ented research assistant Caleb Gerbitz, I constructed a new dataset
analyzing litigation about mediation for cases decided in
2013–2017.  This article compares the new five-year dataset with
the original 1999–2003 dataset to make some general observations
about mediation litigation trends over the last nineteen years, with
a specific focus on enforcement of mediated settlements, the topic
addressed by the Singapore Convention.
Part II of this article provides a general overview of U.S. medi-
ation litigation trends, including a detailed description of how the
databases were created and caveats about their use, a summary of
raw numbers, and a review of the common mediation issues liti-
gated in U.S. Courts. Principal conclusions include the fact that liti-
gation about mediation has steadily increased between 1999 and
2017, a time period when new civil filings in state and federal
courts have been more or less constant, or in some years declined.
Disputes about enforcement of mediated settlements remain the
most commonly litigated topic; however, disputing about enforce-
ment has significantly declined overall in proportion to all litigated
mediation disputes.
Part III offers a detailed examination of mediated settlement
enforcement litigation, including types of enforcement disputes,
defenses to enforcement, the enforcement-confidentiality connec-
tion, and significance of the subject matter of the underlying dis-
pute.  Principal conclusions include the fact that mediated
settlements continue to be enforced at a very high rate—68% on
average for the 2013–2017 time period.  The frequency with which
parties raise “traditional” contract defenses such as whether there
was a meeting of the minds or mistake, as well as challenges to
fundamental fairness of the process through fraud or duress, have
declined.  In their place are a panoply of procedural and jurisdic-
tional defenses which have increased in number as mediation gets
institutionalized in statutes and court rules.  As was true in the
original 1999–2003 dataset, cases involving mediator malfeasance
are exceedingly rare, and with a 95% settlement enforcement rate,
virtually always a loser for the challenging party.  Surprisingly,
cases raising both enforcement defenses and confidentiality issues
were far less common in 2013–2017 compared to 1999–2003, and
settlement enforcement far more likely in such cases in the more
recent time period.
Part IV applies lessons gleaned from the litigation data to
evaluate the choices made by the drafters of the Singapore Con-
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vention.  From my perspective as a chronicler of “mediations gone
bad,” there is much to praise in the drafters’ efforts.
First, the U.S. litigation experience strongly supports the Con-
vention’s singular focus on enforcement, as well as having minimal
formalities necessary to trigger treaty application.  Second, the
drafters’ choice to permit only an opt-out from treaty coverage and
to generally assume that parties will want their agreements to be
enforceable, arguably will maximize application of the treaty and
in turn meet the drafters’ primary goal of promoting the use of
mediation.  More important, in light of the recent U.S. litigation
experience showing that procedural and jurisdictional defenses are
becoming more common, the decision not to use an opt-in ap-
proach holds promise for significantly reducing post-mediation dis-
puting.  Third, limiting treaty coverage to cross-border commercial
disputes and explicitly excluding family and consumer matters is
certainly understandable, given an oft-cited concern for power im-
balances outside the business-to-business context.  However, per-
haps somewhat surprisingly, there is no evidence in the U.S.
datasets to suggest that enforcement defenses are generally more
common, or more successful outside the commercial context.
Fourth, the grounds for refusal contained in Article 5 of the Con-
vention will most certainly permit the wide range of “traditional”
contract enforcement defenses parties typically raise post-media-
tion, but will wisely limit challenges based on domestic law proce-
dural arguments and filing formalities, which given the recent U.S.
experience, are an increasing share of enforcement litigation.  That
said, there is little in the litigation track record from the United
States to suggest that the grounds for refusal based on mediation
misconduct will be commonly invoked and even if invoked ever
successful.  Finally, the drafters made a defensible choice to decline
to legislate mediation confidentiality.  While I have in the past
made a strong argument praising the merits of uniformity in confi-
dentiality regulation,13 the political reality is that getting agreement
on a single approach to this complex topic (which depending on
jurisdiction and legal culture might involve statutes, court rules, ju-
dicial decisions, ethical codes, ADR institutional provider policies,
and/or party contract), would likely take many more years of nego-
tiation than the three the drafters devoted to the Singapore
Convention.
13 See Coben, My Change of Mind on the Uniform Mediation Act, supra note 10.
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II. THE BIG PICTURE: OVERALL U.S. MEDIATION
LITIGATION TRENDS
A. Building Datasets and Caveats About Their Use
Both datasets14 were derived by searching for cases on
Westlaw in the “ALLSTATES” and “ALLFEDS” databases that
include the term “mediat!”.  As you might imagine, this search
brings up a large number of “hits” on opinions that include some
mention of mediation (most commonly, the fact that mediation at
some point occurred before or during litigation).  The number of
total hits per year on the search term has increased from 1,176 in
1999 to 5,137 in 2017 (by itself, a statistic implying considerable
increased use of mediation in American courts).
We then read each of the case “hits” to determine which opin-
ions arguably involved a judicial decision on some disputed media-
tion issue.  Only those cases are included in the datasets.15
Admittedly, we made judgment calls about inclusion.  For example,
we excluded class action cases where the court merely acknowl-
edged that a settlement resulted from mediation, but included class
action cases where the court explicitly cited the fact the case was
14 The datasets are searchable Excel files, which can be viewed at the Mediation Case Law
Project website I maintain at Mitchell Hamline School of Law (https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/
dri_mcldata/). Cross-tab functions within the Excel program (available as “Filter” options in the
Excel “Data” toolbar) allow you to quickly tailor searches and combine variables (e.g., generate
a list of state supreme court decisions where a mediated settlement was enforced despite an
allegation of mutual mistake; or create a list of federal trial court decisions in a specific year
where a judge enforced a contractual obligation to mediate). Both datasets capture case infor-
mation such as citation, year, jurisdiction, and level of court. Both datasets also identify the
subject matter of the mediation disputing (e.g., enforcement, confidentiality, sanctions, duty to
mediate, etc.). With respect to enforcement, the primary focus of this article, both datasets cap-
ture with specificity the nature of enforcement issues or defenses presented and their resolution
(i.e., agreement enforced, not enforced, remanded, or modified or decided on other grounds).
Due to time and workload limitations, the newer dataset has slightly fewer case variables. Also,
unlike the initial dataset, the 2013–2017 compilation is organized by chapter sub-section of ME-
DIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE, the mediation treatise I co-author for Thomson Reuters.
See COLE ET AL., supra note 11. The revised organizational structure, while making it slightly
more difficult to compare and contrast results between the datasets, greatly facilitates our work
with annual treatise updates. I encourage researchers to use the datasets and ask only in return
that you attribute them to me and Professor Thompson in any published work.
15 It is important to keep in mind that some lawsuits involved multiple reported opinions.
Because we wanted to study the extent to which mediation issues were being litigated and ad-
dressed by the courts, we treated each opinion involving a mediation issue as a separate entry.
Consequently, the total number of opinions/entries is greater than the number of lawsuits. More-
over, a significant percentage of the cases involve more than one disputed mediation issue.
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mediated as a reason to approve the mediated settlement.16  We
included cases where the court referred to a “mediation” process
involving a judge or court personnel unless we could clearly deter-
mine from the opinion text that the “neutral” did not act as a medi-
ator.  Conversely, we excluded cases the court labeled as judicial
settlement conferences.17
There are several caveats about the datasets.  First, we discov-
ered that Westlaw continuously adds (and in some circumstances
deletes) cases to its databases many months after case decisions
occur.  Our final cut-off date for the 1999–2003 dataset was January
31, 2005.  The cut-off date for the 2013–2017 dataset varied slightly
from year to year but usually was in May or June of the following
year.  Westlaw searches after these dates may likely reveal some
additional cases and perhaps delete some we originally captured.
Given the total number of potential dataset hits in these two five-
year periods (23,812),18 I readily acknowledge our review process
may not have succeeded in reporting every single case deciding a
disputed mediation topic.  Suffice it to say, we tried our best to be
consistent in our inclusion/exclusion decisions.
Second, case opinions published on Westlaw by no means cap-
ture the full range of disputing in American courts.  In many juris-
dictions, jurists have discretion regarding which cases to publish.
While a steadily increasing number of federal trial court decisions
are on Westlaw, far fewer state court trial decisions make it into
the online database.  Presumably, a huge number of mediation dis-
putes of all types are resolved at the trial court level with unre-
ported decisions that are not appealed by any party to the dispute.
Accordingly, it is quite possible that the big picture trends I report
here could differ considerably from the reality of work in nation’s
courthouses.
Third, even for those judicial decisions published on Westlaw,
readers know only the facts about the case that a judicial author
decided to include in the opinion to support the ultimate ruling on
16 See, e.g., Gallucci v. Gonzales, 603 Fed. Appx. 533, 534 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that the
court’s conclusion that party bargaining occurred without collusion “is bolstered by the fact that
the settlement was negotiated with the aid of a retired magistrate judge and experienced media-
tor, who reported no evidence of collusion”). See also infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Cornell v. Delco Elecs. Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1117 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (address-
ing an agreement arrived at in a “settlement conference” where the Magistrate Judge acted as a
“go-between during negotiations.”).
18 Over the entire seventeen years, “hits” on the search term yielded 63,078 opinions (which
might partially explain why I am disinclined to create any future datasets on this particular
topic)!
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the merits.  The legally relevant facts from the court’s perspective
may vary considerably from the parties’ (or mediator’s) perspec-
tive on what actually transpired during a mediation.
Fourth, the trends reported here, which arguably can be char-
acterized as the maturation of mediation litigation over two de-
cades of institutionalization, might not, in the end, be at all
predictive of the experience of other countries and disputing cul-
tures.  That, of course, remains to be seen.
B. Raw Numbers
The number of judicial opinions actually deciding a disputed
mediation issue has risen from 172 in 1999 to 891 in 2017, as illus-
trated in Tables 1 and 2.  That more than five-fold increase in dis-
puting has occurred over a time period when civil filings in U.S.
federal and state courts have been more or less constant,19 or dur-
ing the 2008 recession, in decline.20  The increase in cases was par-
ticularly steep in the 1999–2006 timeframe, with growth steady but
at a slower rate in more recent years.  The total relevant number of
opinions, 11,216 over nineteen years, might seem insignificant on a
national scale, especially when it seems safe to assume the total
number of mediations throughout the country has increased sub-
stantially over the same time period.  Unfortunately, since many
mediations are private matters, it is virtually impossible to deter-
mine with any accuracy the total number of mediations conducted
in the United States on an annual basis.  Even court-annexed medi-
ations are difficult to quantify because court programs vary dra-
19 For example, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, new civil case
filings in the federal district courts numbered 260,271 in 1999: see Judicial Business 1999, US-
COURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-1999 (last visited Apr.
10, 2019); declined to 252,962 in 2003: see Judicial Business 2003, USCOURTS.GOV, https://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2003 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); increased
to 267,257 five years later in 2008: see Judicial Business 2008, USCOURTS.GOV, https://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2008 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); rose again
in 2013 to 284,604: see Judicial Business 2013, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statis-
tics-reports/judicial-business-2013 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); and in 2017 declined to 267,769:
see Judicial Business 2017, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-
business-2017 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
20 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TOTAL INCOMING CIVIL CASES IN STATE
COURT TRIALS, 2007–2016, http://www.courtstatistics.org/NCSC-Analysis/Civil/Civil-Caseloads-
2016.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (documenting 16% decline in civil filings between 2007 and
2016).
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matically from state to state, and there is no single source of
national data for use of mediation.21
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF MEDIATION CASES PER YEAR, 1999–2017
MEDIATION CASES IN U.S. FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS: 1999-2017
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One particularly interesting trend in the data is the shift from
a majority of mediation disputes coming from state courts (true
from 1999–2006) to a majority coming from federal courts (com-
mencing in 2007 and continuing to the current day).  This increase
is most likely attributable to the 2005 Congressional enactment of
the Class Action Fairness Act,22 designed to “federalize” class ac-
tions.23  Indeed, according to a 2008 report of the Federal Judicial
Center, federal class action diversity filings increased nearly three-
21 Even in the more unified federal court system, ADR data has been hard to come by. Just
by way of example, it was not until 2018 that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts specif-
ically referenced the extent of federal courts’ use of ADR in its annual report of court business.
See U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2018, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/sta-
tistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2018 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (noting that
“56 districts operated ADR programs of some form, and 53 of these districts provided mediation
or judge-hosted settlement conferences. More than 25,500 civil cases were included in ADR
programs.”).
22 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (now codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)).
23 See generally Patricia Hatamyar Moore, Confronting the Myth of “State Court Class Action
Abuses” Through an Understanding of Heuristics and a Plea for More Statistics, 82 UMKC L.
REV. 133 (2013) (describing CAFA goals and providing a detailed critique of the “mythology” of
state class action abuses so routinely cited in support of the Act).
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fold in 2006–2007.24  As described in more detail in Part III, this
increase in federal court caseload has in turn significantly increased
the number of mediation disputes in the datasets, given the degree
to which federal  judges now routinely invoke the involvement of a
private mediator as evidence that bargaining in a class action case
was conducted at arms-length and without collusion between the
parties.25
TABLE 2: NUMBER OF MEDIATION CASES PER YEAR, 1999–2017
DETAILED CASE COUNTS
Year Federal Cases State Cases Total Cases
1999 63 109 172 
2000 70 129 200 
2001 76 139 215 
2002 96 209 301 
2003 88 248 335 
2004 143 332 475 
2005 218 303 523 
2006 325 352 677 
2007 359 250 609 
2008 353 292 645 
2009 316 277 593 
2010 458 311 769 
2011 377 271 648 
2012 449 286 735 
2013 441 351 792 
2014 543 317 860 
2015 570 295 865 
2016 580 331 911 
2017 600 291 891 
24 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 6–9 (2008).
25 See infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text. I have written extensively about this phe-
nomenon elsewhere, believing it to be an unjustifiable form of judicial deference to the opinions
of class action mediators. See Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy, supra note 10; Coben,
Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 790–95.
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For the balance of this article, I will focus on two five-year
time periods: 1999–2003 and 2013–2017.  Why?  First, while I
tracked the total number of mediation cases throughout the
nineteen-year period, I systematically coded case details only in
twelve of those years (including the two five-periods).  Second,
comparing two five-year periods a decade apart strikes me as an
effective way to evaluate big picture trends in disputing.26
As illustrated in Table 3, there were 1,223 reported opinions
involving significant mediation issues in the 1999–2003 five-year
period.  The number of opinions increased from 172 in 1999 to 335
in 2003, reflecting a 95% increase.  State court opinions constituted
68% of the overall total, and more than doubled in number over
five years.  Federal court opinions constituted just 32% of the over-
all total, with the number of opinions issued each year remaining
relatively constant over the five-year period.
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF MEDIATION CASES PER YEAR IN EACH
5-YEAR PERIOD
Mediation Cases Per Year
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 Total 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003    Total 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Total 1223 172 200 215 301 335  Total 4319 792 860 865 911 891 
Federal 387 63 70 75 92 87  Federal 2731 441 543 570 580 600 
State 836 109 130 140 209 248  State 1588 351 317 295 331 291 
Quite a different picture emerges a decade later.  While the
total number of cases significantly increased (from 1,223 in
1999–2003 to 4,319 in 2013–2017), the pace in annual increases
over the five-year period slowed substantially.  In 2013, courts is-
sued opinions about mediation disputes 792 times; in 2017, there
26 For detailed reporting on the two years (2004 and 2005) left out of this comparison, see
Coben & Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends, supra note 9.
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were 881 decisions, an overall caseload increase of just 12.5%.
State court opinions constituted just 37% of the overall total and
declined in number from 351 in 2013 to 291 in 2017.  Federal court
opinions constituted 63% of the overall total, with the number of
federal court opinions increasing each year, from 441 in 2013 to 600
in 2017.
C. Disputed Mediation Issues
As illustrated in Tables 4 and 5, the disputes about mediation
are quite diverse.  Disputes about enforcement of mediated settle-
ments constituted close to half of all mediation disputing in
1999–2003.27  That percentage dropped to 39% in 2013–2017.  In
both five-year periods, disputes about fees and costs of mediation28
were the second largest category of mediation litigation: 20% of all
disputed cases in 1999–2003; 13% of all disputed cases in
2013–2017.
In 1999–2003, the third most frequent dispute was about court
power to compel mediation,29 occurring in 13% of the cases, fol-
lowed by confidentiality disputes,30 which occurred in 12% of the
cases.  Sanctions were a topic of disputing 10% of the time,31 as
was condition precedent, most commonly whether a statutory or
contract obligation to mediate before litigation or arbitration was
satisfied.32  Ethics issues, including both alleged failures of
mediators and judicial officers adjudicating mediated cases oc-
27 For detailed analysis, see Part III infra, notes 46–72 and accompanying text.
28 For a detailed analysis of mediation fee and cost cases, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11,
§§ 9:17–9:20. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 112–19.
29 For a detailed analysis of cases addressing court power to compel mediation, see COLE ET
AL., supra note 11, § 9:2 (noting “[s]uccessful challenges to judicially compelled mediation are
rare.”). See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 105–08.
30 Confidentiality disputes were wide-ranging, including among many other things: applica-
bility of evidentiary exclusions and privilege law, waiver of privilege, discovery challenges, limi-
tations on mediator reports, public right of access, court sanction for wrongful disclosure, as well
as complex choice of law problems. For a detailed analysis of mediation confidentiality law, see
COLE ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 8:1–8:49. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 57–73.
31 For a detailed analysis of sanctions cases, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 9:3–9:16. See
also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 119–23.
32 For a detailed analysis of condition precedent cases, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 6:4.
See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 105 (“[c]ollectively, the . . . opinions support a
simple principle: courts are inclined to order mediation on their own initiative, and will generally
enforce a pre-existing obligation to participate in mediation, whether the obligation was judi-
cially created, mandated by statute or stipulated in the parties’ pre-dispute contract.”).
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curred in 6% of the cases.33  Procedural implications of a mediation
request or participation constituted 4% of the disputing,34 followed
by lawyer malpractice at 3%,35 and other acts and omissions as the
basis for independent claims at 2%.36
TABLE 4: DISPUTED MEDIATION ISSUE
(DETAILED BREAKDOWN)37
1999–2003 
(1223 total cases) 
DISPUTED ISSUE 2013–2017 
(4319 total cases) 
569 47% Enforcement 1668 39% 
243 20% Fees/Costs  566 13% 
157 13% Court Power to Compel Mediation  238  6% 
152 12% Confidentiality  358  8% 
123 10% Condition Precedent  404  9% 
117 10% Sanctions  172  4% 
 68  6% Ethics (Judicial and Mediator)   96  2% 
 50  4% Procedural Implications of  
Mediation Request or Participation 
 498 12% 
 31  3% Lawyer Malpractice   65  2% 
 20  2% Act or Omission as Basis for  
Independent Claims 
 207  5% 
 6  1% Arbitration-Mediation Waiver   59  1% 
By 2013–2017 the relative frequency of disputed issues shifted
in some interesting ways.  Most relevant to the Singapore Conven-
33 For a detailed analysis of ethics cases involving judicial officers, see COLE ET AL., supra
note 11, § 10:16. For detailed analysis of ethical claims against mediators, see COLE ET AL., supra
note 11, §§ 10:5–10:14. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 95–105.
34 See COLE ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 5:12–5:16, where my treatise co-authors and I have
grouped this wide array of case disputing into four broad categories: 1) cases raising tolling,
laches, and failure to prosecute issues (§ 5:13); 2) cases where parties used mediation participa-
tion (or failure to participate) to influence litigation timelines and/or excuse rule violations
(§ 5:14); 3) cases where mediation was used to establish waiver of rights, notice of claims, and
exhaustion of administrative remedies (§ 5:15); and 4) cases where mediation participation im-
pacted jurisdiction, venue, and transfer issues (§ 5:16).
35 For a detailed analysis of lawyer malpractice issues, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 12:4.
See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 90–94.
36 For a detailed analysis of acts and omissions leading to other claims, see COLE ET AL.,
supra note 11, §§ 15:17–15:19. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 90–94.
37 The total number of issues raised exceeds the number of total cases because opinions
often address more than a single disputed mediation issue.
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1075
tion, the percentage of cases raising enforcement issues declined
17% (from 47% of all cases in 1999–2003, down to 39% in
2013–2017).38  Disputes about confidentiality also showed marked
decline, down 33%;39 as did fee/cost disputes, down 35%;40 dis-
putes about court power to compel mediation, down 54%;41 dis-
putes about sanctions, down 60%;42 and disputes raising ethical
concerns about mediators or the judges deciding disputed media-
tion issues, down 66%.43
The frequency of disputing about enforcing statutory or con-
tractual obligations to mediate before litigation or arbitration re-
mained more or less constant, with the issue being litigated in 10%
of the cases in 1999–2003 and 9% of the cases in 2013–2017.44  The
same pattern held for disputes alleging waiver of arbitration rights
by virtue of mediation participation, with the issue addressed in
1% of the cases in both five-year periods.
The growth area in mediation litigation are disputes about
procedural implications of mediation request or participation.
These disputes have increased three-fold, increasing from 4% of all
cases in the 1999–2003 dataset to 12% of the cases in 2013–2017.45
Cases alleging acts or omissions in mediation as a basis for new
38 And, as detailed infra at notes 62–72 and accompanying text, the percentage of those
enforcement cases raising “traditional” enforcement defenses (such as whether there was a
meeting of the minds or mutual or unilateral mistake, as well as challenges to fundamental fair-
ness of the process through fraud or duress) declined even more.
39 Confidentiality disputes were raised in 12% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 8% of cases
in 2013–2017.
40 Attorney’s fees and mediation costs were raised in 20% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only
13% of cases in 2013–2017.
41 Dispute about court power to compel mediation were raised in 13% of all cases in
1999–2003 but only 6% of cases in 2013–2017.
42 Sanctions disputes were raised in 10% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 4% of cases in
2013–2017.
43 Ethics issues were raised in 6% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 2% of cases in
2013–2017.
44 However, it should be noted that in this time period more than a third of the 404 cases
(156 or 39%) came from a single state—Nevada, and involved that state’s foreclosure mediation
statute. Without the disputing attributed to this single statute, the frequency of disputing about
statutory obligations to mediate would have been closer to 6% of all cases, rather than 9%.
45 As I wrote in the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2015, “[r]oughly a decade ago,
I first began to joke that it might be possible for me to teach my first year civil procedure course
using only case law decisions about disputed mediation issues. That is no longer a hypothetical.”
Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 783 (following up the observa-
tion with a long list of case citations and parentheticals detailing disputes about mediation rais-
ing issues addressing, among other things, subject matter jurisdiction, venue, transfer, service of
process, attachment, choice of law, discovery relevance, work-product, failure to state a claim,
waiver of defenses, joinder, summary judgment, dismissals, appeals, and res judicata).
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claims also have become more common, rising from just 2% of all
cases in 1999–2003 to 5% of all cases in 2013–2017.
TABLE 5: DISPUTED MEDIATION ISSUE
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Enforcement
Attorney’s Fees/Mediation Costs
Court Power to Compel
Confidentiality
Condition Precedent
Sanctions
Ethics (Mediator and Judicial)
Procedural Implications of Mediation
Lawyer Malpractice
Acts or Omissions as Basis of New Claims
Arbitration/Mediation Waiver
1999-2003 Cases (percentage frequency) 2013-2017 Cases (percentage frequency)
Given that the Singapore Convention focuses exclusively on
enforcement of mediated settlements, the next section explores in
detail the data relevant to that topic.
III. DISPUTING MEDIATION SETTLEMENT ENFORCEMENT IN
U.S. FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
A. Types of Enforcement Disputes
As a threshold matter, it is helpful to divide enforcement dis-
putes into three distinct categories.  First, a considerable amount of
litigation (29% in the 1999–2003 dataset; 23% in the 2013–2017
dataset) are disputes about interpretation and/or alleged breach of
mediated settlements.46  This is distinct from cases where a party
46 See, e.g., Lester v. Percudani, 511 Fed. Appx. 174 (3d Cir. 2013) (interpreting the scope of
a release); Reilly v. Carpenter, No. 14–1260, 2015 WL 6143382, *4 (W. Va. Oct. 16, 2015) (con-
cluding that failure of both parties to timely perform the “contingencies” found in their medi-
ated settlement agreement did not preclude the trial court’s conclusion that the agreement was
binding and enforceable); Butler v. Caldwell, No. 48931-3-I, 622 WL 554952, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2002) (determining that a delivery of an appraisal by fax started the three day
period for rejection set forth in the mediated settlement agreement); Caswell v. Anderson, 527
S.E.2d 582, 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (interpreting clause in mediated settlement agreement set-
ting forth compensation for withdrawing partner).
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raises a defense to settlement enforcement, the topic specifically
addressed in Article 5 of the Singapore Convention.47  Enforce-
ment defenses, discussed in more detail below,48 were raised in
65% of the cases in the 1999–2003 dataset, but only in 37% of the
cases in the 2013–2017 dataset—a 43% reduction in disputing
about defenses.  Finally, a third category of enforcement cases in
the datasets involve class action litigation or other contexts where
courts exercise settlement approval authority, such as settlements
on behalf of minors or Fair Labor Standards Act disputes, where
the relevant statute requires judicial approval.  Here, there is a dra-
matic change in case counts between the datasets, with virtually all
the increase attributable to class action litigation.  In 1999–2003,
just 34 (31 federal and 3 state) or 6% of the enforcement cases
involved judicial approval of class actions or other contexts de-
manding judicial approval of mediated settlements.  In the more
recent dataset, 2013–2017, there are 601 class action cases (595 fed-
eral and 6 state) constituting 36% of all enforcement disputes.49
That is a rather remarkable six-fold increase in frequency, worth
just a bit of explication here, despite the fact that the Singapore
Convention excludes from its scope settlements, like court-ap-
proved class action settlements, that are enforceable as
judgments.50
47 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5 (Grounds for Refusing to Grant Relief).
48 See Part III.B, infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text.
49 The balance of 661 cases in this category are predominantly Fair Labor Standards Act
cases, where courts approved mediated settlements and specifically referenced the mediation
effort as an indicia of fairness. There were also in this category a handful of minor settlement
approval cases.
50 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3)(a). See generally Timothy Schnabel, The
Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and En-
forcement of Mediated Settlements, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 25–27 (2019).
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TABLE 6: TYPE OF ENFORCEMENT DISPUTE
1999-2003 Enforcement Cases
(569 cases total)
Interpretation and Breach (29%) 165 cases
Enforcement Defense (65%) 372 cases
Class Action (or other settlements requiring
judicial approval) (6%) 34 cases
2013-2017 Enforcement Cases
(1668 cases total)
Interpretation and Breach (23%) 387 cases
Enforcement Defense (37%) 620 cases
Class Action (or other settlements requiring
judicial approval) (40%) 661 cases
In the vast majority of civil disputes resolved by mediation in
the United States, the parties’ settlement ends any ongoing litiga-
tion without judicial review or approval of the settlement agree-
ment.51  Most typically, the underlying lawsuit (assuming there was
one) is dismissed with prejudice, and the parties’ mediated settle-
ment agreement is a new contract that, if breached, becomes the
subject of an entirely new legal proceeding—a contract action for
enforcement or breach.52  Class action settlements, in contrast, fol-
low a different path to finality.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e) mandates that class actions may be settled “only with court
approval.”53  While the precise factors vary from federal circuit to
federal circuit, the general objective of court review is to protect
class members “whose rights may not have been given due regard
by the negotiation parties.”54  As I have documented elsewhere in
51 See Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy, supra note 10, at 163. See generally COLE
ET AL., supra note 11, § 7:19 nn.50–51 and accompanying text.
52 Id.
53 FED R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class
may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”).
54 Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir.
1982) (noting that “[t]he class action device, while capable of the fair and efficient adjudication
of a large number of claims, is also susceptible to abuse and carries with it certain inherent
structural risks.”).
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great detail,55 judges increasingly discharge this oversight duty by
invoking mediation evidence, all the more so in federal courts since
the 2005 passage of the Class Action Fairness Act.56  Specifically,
judges cite the involvement of a private mediator as evidence that
bargaining in a class action case was conducted at arms-length and
without collusion between the parties.57  Courts not only cite medi-
ator testimony on process fairness, they often go further to recite
and credit mediator evidence on substantive merits of the very set-
tlement the mediator brokered,58 a development that has always
55 Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 790–93; Coben, Creat-
ing a 21st Century Oligarchy, supra note 10, at 167–74. See also COLE ET AL., supra note 11,
§ 7:17 nn.24–34 and accompanying text.
56 See supra notes 37–39.
57 See, e.g., Jones v. Singing River Health Servs. Found., 865 F.3d 285, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied sub nom. Almond v. Singing River Health Sys., 138 S. Ct. 1000, 200 L. Ed. 2d 252
(2018) (concluding that “objectors failed to show that, even if a conflict of interest existed, the
settlement negotiations themselves were unfair or collusive” where “[t]o the contrary, the dis-
trict court relied heavily on the fact that a well-recognized neutral mediator oversaw settlement
negotiations of the federal cases to ensure they were conducted at arms’ length”); In re Fab
Universal Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating that
“[t]he Proposed Settlement was the product of extensive formal mediation aided by a neutral
JAMS mediator, hallmarks of a non-collusive, arm’s-length settlement process”); ABF Freight
Systems, Inc. v. U.S., Nos. C 10–05188 SI, 11–04663, 2013 WL 3244804 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013)
(citing the fact that the agreement was reached in mediation with a neutral mediator as evidence
that there was no collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct connected with obtaining the settlement);
In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 965 F.Supp.2d 369, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (observing that “[f]rom
his front row seat, the mediator concluded that “negotiations in this case were hard fought and at
arm’s-length at all times”); In re LivingSocial Mktg. and Sales Practice Litig., 298 F.R.D. 1, 11
(D. D.C. 2013) (reciting mediator testimony that “[t]here was never any type of collusion be-
tween the Parties in any of the negotiations,” and that the parties’ negotiations “were intense at
every step of the way, and the Parties vigorously advocated for their respective positions”). For
historical documentation of this practice and many more case citations and parentheticals, see
supra note 55.
58 See, e.g., In re MGM Mirage Sec. Litig., 708 F. App’x 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasiz-
ing that “the parties reached a settlement after extensive negotiations before a nationally recog-
nized mediator, retired U.S. District Judge Layn R. Phillips” and “the district court properly
relied on Judge Phillips’s declaration stating that the settlement ‘represent[ed] a well-reasoned
and sound resolution of highly uncertain litigation’ and was ‘the product of vigorous and inde-
pendent advocacy and arm’s-length negotiation conducted in good faith.’”); Johansson-Dohr-
mann v. CBR Sys., Inc., No. 12-cv-1115-MMA (BGS), 2013 WL 3864341, *8 (S.D. Cal. July 24,
2013) (citing mediator testimony that “the settlement reached between the parties was the prod-
uct of arm’s-length and good faith negotiations . . .” [and] “is non-collusive, fair and reasonable
to all parties and provides significant benefits to the Settlement Class.”) (emphasis added); In re
Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F.Supp.2d 503, 509–10 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
mediator testimony that “it is my opinion that the [S]ettlement[s] w[ere] achieved through a fair
and reasonable process and [are] in the best interest of the class . . . the court system and the
mediation process worked exactly as they are supposed to work at their best; a consensual resolu-
tion was achieved based on full information and honest negotiation between well-represented and
evenly balanced parties”) (emphasis added).
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struck me as a particularly unwarranted judicial abdication of
power, not to mention the posing of a rather obvious conflict of
interest.59
Only a very small minority of judicial officers have resisted the
trend, most notably the Honorable William Alsup, who in Kakani
v. Oracle Corp.,60 rejected the parties’ joint motion for preliminary
approval of a mediated class action settlement, and pointedly
opined:
[i]t is . . . no answer to say that a private mediator helped frame
the proposal.  Such a mediator is paid to help the immediate
parties reach a deal.  Mediators do not adjudicate the merits.
They are masters in the art of what is negotiable.  It matters
little to the mediator whether a deal is collusive as long as a deal
is reached.  Such a mediator has no fiduciary duty to anyone,
much less those not at the table.61
B. Defenses to Enforcement
1. Overall Enforcement Rates
While the relative frequency of enforcement defense disputes
has declined, as shown in Table 7 below, the likelihood that a set-
tlement will be enforced in the face of an alleged contract defense
has increased from 57% of the time to 69%.
59 See Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy, and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 175–87.
60 Kakani v. Oracle Corp., No. C 06-06493 WHA, 2007 WL 2221073 (N.D. Cal. June 19,
2007). See also In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 948 (9th Cir. 2011)
(observing that “the mere presence of a neutral mediator, though a factor weighing in favor of a
finding of non-collusiveness, is not on its own dispositive of whether the end product is a fair,
adequate, and reasonable settlement agreement”); Martin v. Cargill, Inc., 295 F.R.D. 380, 86
Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1593 (D. Minn. 2013) (stating that applying the presumption that a settlement
reached through mediation was an arm’s length, fair settlement was highly doubtful where no
formal discovery had taken place and the nature of any informal exchange of information was
not presented to the court); Lusby v. Gamestop, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 400, 413 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(expressing a concern when the mediation was conducted privately and not subject to court
oversight).
61 Kakani v. Oracle Corp., 2007 WL 2221073, *11.
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TABLE 7: HOW OFTEN SETTLEMENTS ENFORCED WHEN
DEFENSE RAISED (AS PERCENTAGE)
ENFORCEMENT RATE (AS PERCENTAGE)
0
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Enforced Not Enforced Remanded Modified
1999-2003 2013-2017
1999–2003 (372 cases) DISPOSITION 2013–2017 (620 cases) 
Number  
of Cases 
Percentage  
of Cases 
Number 
of Cases 
Percentage  
of Cases 
210 57% Enforced 426 69% 
 77 21% Not Enforced 118 19% 
 47 13% Remanded  50  8% 
 38 10% Modified or decided  
on other grounds 
 26  4% 
2. Specific Enforcement Defenses: Frequency and Success Rates
Table 8 shows the frequency of particular defenses in each
dataset.  In 1999–2003, the six most common defenses raised—
those adjudicated in 10% or more of the enforcement cases—were
(in declining order of frequency): no meeting of minds; lack of for-
mality;62 fraud; mistake (mutual or unilateral); agreement to agree;
and duress.
62 Lack of formality includes such things as lack of a required writing or signature, or failure
to include statutorily required language. See, e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting
Co., 173 F.3d 1086, 1087–88 (8th Cir. 1999); Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co.,
945 F. Supp. 1233, 1234–35 (D. Minn. 1996), certified question answered, 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn.
1998), rev’d, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce an otherwise fair mediation
agreement signed by the parties that stated it was a “Full and Final Mutual Release of All
Claims” but did not include the magic words required by relevant state statute that the parties
intended the agreement to be binding). See generally James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson,
The Haghighi Trilogy and the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act: Exposing a Phantom Menace Cast-
ing a Pall Over the Development of ADR in Minnesota, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 299, 324
(1999) (arguing that the insistence on technical terms in mediated settlement agreements con-
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TABLE 8: ENFORCEMENT DEFENSE FREQUENCY
1999–2003 (372 opinions) 2013–2017 (620 opinions) 
Number of 
Opinions 
Percentage of Total 
Enforcement 
Opinions63 
Enforcement Defense Number of 
Opinions 
Percentage of Total 
Enforcement 
Opinions64 
78 21% No Meeting of Minds 78 13% 
62 17% Lack of Formality 76 12% 
54 15% Fraud 63 10% 
52 14% Mistake 43 7% 
47 12% Agreement to Agree 38 6% 
36 10% Duress 65 10% 
20 5% Attorney Lack of 
Authority 
36 6% 
17 5% Mediator Misconduct 16 3% 
15 4% Procedural/
Jurisdictional 
Challenges 
148 24% 
13 3% Public Policy 26 4% 
12 3% Undue Influence 6 1% 
11 3% Unconscionability 15 2% 
3 1% Incapacity 23 4% 
61 16% Miscellaneous 69 11% 
In the 2013–2017 dataset, the relative frequency of many of
these “traditional” defenses declined, with procedural or jurisdic-
tional challenges taking over a larger share of the overall disput-
ing—24% of the cases, compared to only 4% of the cases in the
earlier dataset.  This most rapidly expanding category of disputing,
which we did not even include in the original case coding question-
naire in 1999–2003 because so infrequent in that time frame, in-
volves such things as whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the
matter,65 whether the parties had exhausted administrative reme-
trary to community expectations creates uncertainty in whether mediation settlements are en-
forceable “casting a pall over the development of ADR in Minnesota”).
63 Since opinions often evaluate more than a single enforcement defense, the total exceeds
100%.
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., Melchor v. Eisen & Son Inc., No. 15CV00113 (DF), 2016 WL 3443649, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2016) (finding no independent basis for federal jurisdiction for the enforce-
ment of a mediated settlement agreement where the court had not expressly retained jurisdiction
to enforce the settlement, but nonetheless granting relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) because
the court’s premature dismissal was a “mistake” removing any incentive for compliance with the
agreement); In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d 879, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (declaring the
trial court’s order for the parties to conduct mediation, the resulting mediated agreement grant-
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1083
dies,66 or had taken the necessary steps in the prior proceeding or
in this proceeding to raise the issue or preserve the issue for
review.67
Duress cases constituted 10% of the disputing in both
datasets.  Disputing about attorney lack of authority and incapacity
increased ever so slightly, the former increasing from 5% to 6%,
the latter from 1% to 3%.  Defenses based on public policy were
also slightly more common, rising for 3% of cases in 1999–2003 to
4% of cases in 2013–2017.
The overall frequency of the miscellaneous category of de-
fenses—admittedly a catch-all for a wide variety of attacks on en-
forcement ranging from allegations of general unfairness,68 to
assertion of “traditional” but rarely invoked contract theories,69 to
use of arguably creative but ultimately failed avenues of attack70—
fell slightly, with such cases representing 16% of all enforcement
disputes in 1999–2003 but only 13% of disputes in 2013–2017.
And what do the datasets show about success of these various
defenses?  Table 9 shows how often agreements were enforced de-
spite a particular defense being raised.  In both datasets, defenses
ing visitation rights, and the trial court’s order approving the agreement all void ab initio because
the father lacked standing to bring the underlying paternity action).
66 See, e.g., Furlough v. Spherion Atl. Workforce, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tenn. 2013)
(holding that the plaintiff employee did not have to again exhaust administrative remedies
before petitioning the trial court to set aside his mediated worker’s compensation settlement).
67 See, e.g., Boyd v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 697 F. App’x 397, 398 (5th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that where no stipulation of dismissal had been filed and the trial court had not yet
issued a final judgment, a party’s challenge to the validity of a mediated settlement agreement
was premature); Krechuniak v. Noorzoy, 11 Cal. App. 5th 713, 726–27, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740,
751–52 (Ct. App. 2017) (precluding party from arguing on appeal that a mediated settlement
included an invalid penalty provision where the issue was not presented to the trial court).
68 See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, No. 2150124, 2016 WL 3568725, at *9 (Ala. Civ. App. July 1, 2016)
(rejecting the argument that financial hardship posed by imminent retirement made a mediated
alimony agreement inequitable); Peterson v. Peterson, 765 N.E.2d 827 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002),
rev. denied, 772 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. June 27, 2002) (rejecting theory that mediation process was so
devoid of procedural safeguards “as to deprive the husband of due process”).
69 See, e.g., Nelson v. Levy Ctr., LLC, No. CV 9:11-1184-SB-BHH, 2016 WL 1276414, at *5
(D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2016) (rejecting applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel where de-
fendant failed to establish, among other things, any injury sustained in relying on alleged
promises in the agreement); Cook v. Hughston Clinic, P.C, No. 3:14-CV-296-WKW [WO], 2015
WL 6082397, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 15, 2015) (deeming both parties’ words and actions as incon-
sistent with the continued existence of the settlement agreement and applying the doctrine of
rescission to find the otherwise valid and binding agreement no longer enforceable); Gray v.
Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 62408, 2014 WL 504605 (Nev. Jan. 21, 2014) (finding ade-
quate consideration to support enforcement of a mediated settlement).
70 See, e.g., Edney v. Edney, No. S.CT.CIV. 2015-0051, 2016 WL 3188938, at *3 (V.I. June 7,
2016) (confirming that a party’s misunderstanding of the law is not a valid ground to set aside a
contractual obligation).
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related to fundamental fairness of the process such as mediator
misconduct, duress, undue influence, fraud, unconscionability, and
incapacity were all rejected at a higher rate than the average for
the respective five-year period.  This rejection of fairness defenses
is particularly robust in the more recent dataset.  In 2013–2017,
where the overall average enforcement rate was 69%: alleging me-
diator misconduct as a defense to enforcement failed 100% of the
time; unconscionability claims were rejected 93% of the time; du-
ress defenses were rejected 88% of the time; incapacity claims were
rejected 87% of the time; and fraud defenses were only marginally
more successful, with an enforcement rate of 86%.
The lowest enforcement rate is where parties raised procedu-
ral or jurisdictional arguments.  In 1999–2003, such defenses were
rejected outright only 33% of the time, with an additional 27% of
the cases being remanded for additional proceedings.  In
2013–2017, procedural/jurisdictional arguments continued to be the
most successful attacks on mediated settlements, with an enforce-
ment rate of just 53%, well below the 69% average rate.  And as in
1999–2003, these defenses were also more likely than average to
result in remand (11% when compared to the average remand rate
of 8%).
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TABLE 9: HOW OFTEN AGREEMENTS ENFORCED DESPITE
DEFENSE ASSERTED
1999–2003 (372 opinions) 
57% Overall Enforcement Rate 
2013–2017 (620 opinions) 
69% Overall Enforcement Rate 
How Often 
Agreement Enforced 
Despite Defense 
Raised 
Enforcement Defense How Often 
Agreement Enforced 
Despite Defense 
Raised 
75% Undue Influence 83% 
71% Mediator Misconduct 100% 
69% Fraud 86% 
69% Mistake 74% 
66% Incapacity 87% 
64% Duress 88% 
64% Unconscionability 93% 
60% Attorney Lack of Authority 75% 
59% Miscellaneous 74% 
57% No Meeting of Minds 60% 
55% Agreement to Agree 68% 
50% Lack of Formality 67% 
46% Public Policy 69% 
33% Procedural/Jurisdictional Challenges 53% 
3. The Enforcement-Confidentiality Connection
The common wisdom is that enforcement and confidentiality
are closely linked.71  The datasets, in contrast, suggest litigation
only relatively rarely involves both issues.  As shown in Table 10,
between 1999 and 2003, courts considered both enforcement de-
fenses and confidentiality challenges in thirty-eight cases (just 10%
of all enforcement defense cases in that time period).
71 See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Enforcement of Settlement Agreements in International Com-
mercial Mediation: A New Legal Framework?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2015, at 32, 36 (noting
that “presenting evidence of contract defenses often spawns tensions with confidentiality protec-
tions.”); Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation—Ten-
sion Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public
Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 515 (2004) (observing that “the
penchant for confidentiality and secrecy, resulting in overlapping privilege rules, makes it diffi-
cult for parties to litigate claims of unfairness in the mediation process.”).
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TABLE 10: THE ENFORCEMENT-CONFIDENTIALITY CONNECTION
1999–2003 (38 cases where a 
court considered both 
enforcement and 
confidentiality issues) 10% of 
all enforcement defense cases 
DISPOSITION 2013–2017 (29 cases where a 
court considered both 
enforcement and 
confidentiality issues) 5% of all 
enforcement defense cases 
Number of 
Cases 
Percentage  
of Cases 
 Number of 
Cases 
Percentage  
of Cases 
11 29% Enforced 19 66% 
13 34% Not Enforced 8 28% 
7 18% Remanded 2 7% 
7 18% Modified or 
decided on other 
grounds 
0 0% 
In the more recent 2013–2017 time period, courts grappled
with both enforcement defenses and confidentiality issues only
twenty-nine times, just 4% of all cases raising an enforcement de-
fense.  The sharp decline in this issue-linking is somewhat surpris-
ing given that combining these issues together during the
1999–2003 time period significantly increased the likelihood that an
agreement would not be enforced.  Indeed, while the overall settle-
ment enforcement rate in that time period was 57%, it dropped
dramatically to 29% when parties disputed both enforcement and
confidentiality.  In 2013–2017, not only did the frequency of linking
those issues substantially decline, but the dramatic differential in
enforcement rates when the issues were linked virtually disap-
peared altogether (a 66% enforcement rate when linked, compared
to a 69% enforcement rate when not).  Together with the overall
decline in litigation about confidentiality issues,72 these statistics
suggest that confidentiality frameworks for mediation are working
relatively efficiently and predictably for parties.
4. Significance of the Subject Matter of the Underlying Dispute
The underlying subject matter of the disputes involving en-
forcement defenses has been remarkably stable.  As shown in Ta-
ble 11, enforcement-defense disputing in the commercial context
increased ever so slightly, from 54% of the cases in 1999–2003 to
56% of the cases in 2013–2017.  Very slight increases also occurred
72 See Table 5, supra notes 27–45 and accompanying text (noting that confidentiality disputes
constituted 12% of all mediation litigation in 1999–2003, but only 8% of all mediation litigation
in 2013–2017).
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in the family law and employment contexts.  Family law cases were
30% of enforcement defense cases in 1999–2003 and 31% of the
cases in 2013–2017.  Employment law cases were 10% of enforce-
ment defense cases in 1999–2003 and 11% of cases in 2013–2017.
In contrast, estate/probate enforcement-defense disputes declined,
dropping from 6% of all cases in 1999–2003 to only 2% in
2013–2017.
TABLE 11: SUBJECT MATTER OF CASES WHERE ENFORCEMENT
DEFENSES RAISED
1999-2003 Cases Raising an Enforcement
Defense (372 cases total)
General Civil (54%) [200 cases]
Family (30%) [112 cases]
Employment (10%) [37 cases]
Estate/Probate (6%) [23 cases]
2013-2017 Cases Raising an Enforcement
Defense (620 cases total)
General Civil (56%) [347 cases]
Family (31%) [190 cases]
Employment (11%) [69 cases]
Estate/Probate (2%) [14 cases]
Do enforcement rates vary based on subject matter context?
Table 12 shows the enforcement rates for the four categories of
cases: general civil, family, employment, and estate/probate.  In the
1999–2003 dataset, the enforcement rates were virtually identical
for all four case types, with the exception that defenses raised in
the estate/probate context were slightly less likely to fail (52% en-
forcement when contrasted with the overall 57% average enforce-
ment rate).  In the 2013–2017 dataset, employment disputes were
the most likely to be enforced despite defenses (71% enforcement
rate), with general civil and family law cases both being enforced at
a 69% rate.  Once again, enforcement defenses were most success-
fully adjudicated in the estate/probate context, where agreements
were enforced against challenges only 50% of the time.
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TABLE 12: ENFORCEMENT RATE BY SUBJECT MATTER
OF DISPUTING
1999–2003 (372 opinions) 
57% Overall Enforcement Rate 
2013–2017 (620 opinions) 
69% Overall Enforcement Rate 
How Often Agreement 
Enforced Despite Defense 
Raised 
Subject Matter of 
Underlying Dispute 
How Often Agreement 
Enforced Despite Defense 
Raised 
57% General Civil 69% 
56% Family 69% 
57% Employment 71% 
52% Estate/Probate 50% 
IV. EVALUATING THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION IN LIGHT OF
THE U.S. LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
As noted above, there is certainly no guarantee that the U.S.
litigation experience with mediation will be replicated in other ju-
risdictions.  Nonetheless, these litigation trends provide at least
some empirical data against which to evaluate decisions, both polit-
ical and practical, made by the drafters of the Singapore Conven-
tion.  In particular, I will focus on six things: 1) the choice to focus
on enforcement; 2) the wisdom of minimal formalities and an opt-
out approach; 3) subject matter treaty exclusions for vulnerable
parties; 4) grounds for refusing to grant relief; 5) concerns about
mediator malfeasance; and 6) confidentiality.
A. A Sensible Focus on Enforcement
The Singapore Convention creates a legal framework for rec-
ognition and enforcement of mediated settlement agreements
made in the context of international commercial business disputes.
As Timothy Schnabel, former head of the U.S. delegation to the
Convention Working Group puts it, mediated settlements qualify-
ing for enforcement under the Convention will “be able to circu-
late across borders in their own right, without the need to rely on
domestic contract law or being transformed into an arbitral award
on agreed terms.”73
73 Timothy Schnabel, Implementation of the Singapore Convention: Federalism, Self-Execu-
tion, and Private Law Treaties, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2019), available at https://
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Why elect to focus on enforcement?  Perhaps most important
is the perspective of international commercial mediation users.
Recent empirical surveys suggest strong support for a global en-
forcement framework, akin to what the New York Convention ac-
complished for arbitration.74  In a perfect world, since mediation is
based on consent and self-determination, one might be excused for
thinking that parties using the process would live up to their obliga-
tions.  But the reality is that they do not always do so, as aptly
demonstrated by the U.S. mediation litigation experience docu-
mented in Part III infra, which shows that disputing about enforce-
ment of mediated settlement agreements has always been the most
common issue addressed in mediation litigation.
The Convention drafters initially discussed whether to include
enforcement of agreements to mediate in addition to enforcement
of mediated settlement agreements.75  That dual-track approach
would have mirrored the New York Convention, which provides
for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,76 as well as arbitral
ssrn.com/abstract=3320823, at 2. According to the Convention’s Preamble, the enforcement
framework will “contribute to the development of harmonious international economic rela-
tions.” Singapore Convention, supra note 1, at Preamble.
74 See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Con-
ciliation: A Preliminary Report on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on
International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation (University of Missouri School of Law Le-
gal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-28, Nov. 17, 2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526302 (reporting that 74% of survey respondents believe a Conven-
tion on enforcement would encourage increased use of mediation and conciliation in their coun-
tries, “with only 8% of respondents taking the contrary view.”). See also Schnabel, supra note
50, at 3 (noting that “UNCITRAL was presented with evidence that mediated settlements are
seen as harder to enforce internationally than domestically, which was said to disincentivize the
use of mediation to resolve disputes” and further noting that “[m]any companies find it hard to
convince their business partners in some jurisdictions to engage in mediation based on views that
it lacks a stamp of international legitimacy like the New York Convention has given to arbitra-
tion since 1958.”).
75 See generally S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of
International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 32–34 (2014) (recom-
mending that a Convention address enforcement of agreements to mediate and suggesting that
drafters could turn to the UNCITRAL Model Conciliation Law “for inspiration, since that in-
strument includes some very good language concerning the enforcement of an agreement to
mediate as well as provisions relating to the rejection or termination of an offer to mediate”).
76 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, art. II(1) (providing that “[e]ach Con-
tracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to sub-
mit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration.”).
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awards.77  The drafters ultimately declined to legislate enforcement
of agreements to mediate, primarily out of concern the issue would
overcomplicate the drafting effort.78  The U.S. litigation experience
would suggest this choice should be relatively non-controversial.
As noted above in Part II(C), disputes about court power to com-
pel mediation were just 6% of all cases in 2013–2017 (down from
13% in 1999–2003), while disputes about contractual or statutory
obligations to mediate were 9% of all cases in 2013–2017 (down
from 10% in 1999–2003).79  Regardless of the overall frequency of
disputing, successful challenges to court-compelled mediation are
rare,80 and courts “will generally enforce a pre-existing obligation
to participate in mediation, whether the obligation was judicially
created, mandated by statute or stipulated in the parties’ pre-dis-
pute contract.”81
B. The Wisdom of Minimal Formalities and Opt-out Approach
The Singapore Convention requires only minimal formalities
as a condition of providing enforcement relief82 and permits opt-
out from treaty coverage only by declaration83—in other words, a
default approach that generally assumes that parties want their
agreements to be enforceable.  Both were wise drafting choices
that will limit the type of litigation about formalities and party in-
77 Id. art. I(1) (providing that “[t]his Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recogni-
tion and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons,
whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic
awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.”).
78 See generally Schnabel, supra note 50, at 14. See also Edna Sussman, The Singapore Con-
vention: Promoting the Enforcement and Recognition of International Mediated Settlement Agree-
ments, 3 ICC DISP. RESOL. BULL. 42, 49 (2018) (noting that “[w]hether or not agreements to
mediate are enforceable and whether they are considered conditions precedent that preclude the
progression to employing other dispute resolution modalities varies across jurisdictions.”); Dea-
son, supra note 71, at 34 (calling it sensible to separate enforcement of settlements from enforce-
ment of agreements to mediate, noting that “as a practical matter, garnering support for a less
ambitious legal instrument would probably be easier” and questioning whether enforcement is
needed to initiate mediation).
79 But see supra note 44 (emphasizing that more than a third of the condition precedent cases
in 2013–2017 addressed the foreclosure mediation statute of a single state, Nevada).
80 COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 9:2.
81 Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 105.
82 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4.
83 Id. art. 8(1)(b).
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tention to be bound that regularly appears in the U.S. mediation
litigation datasets, both old and new.84
Under the Convention, a settlement must be signed by the
parties,85 with an authorized option for electronic signature.86  The
party seeking relief under the Convention must offer evidence that
mediation has occurred,87 including among other easy to prove op-
tions, the mediator’s signature on the agreement.88  While a num-
ber of delegations expressed concerns about the mediator being
the source of such evidence,89 it is a common exception to confi-
dentiality in a number of U.S. statutory frameworks, including the
Uniform Mediation Act,90 which expressly authorizes a mediator
to report whether mediation occurred, as well as party attendance
and whether a settlement was reached.91  The 2005 AAA/ABA/
ACR Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, the
most widely cited ethical code of conduct for mediators in the
United States, also expressly authorizes mediator reports regarding
84 See COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 7:19 (observing that “[i]ncreased formality requirements
are intended to guard against surprise and uncertainty, to protect confidentiality, and to reduce
litigation” but often end up “creat[ing] the surprise, uncertainty, and increased litigation”). See,
e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233, discussed supra note
62; In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6326707 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding it
insufficient that the parties intended, at the time of contract formation, to be bound by the
mediated settlement terms, where their agreement did not include a statement to the effect that
their settlement was intended to be enforceable or binding).
85 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(a).
86 Id. art. 4(2)(a).
87 Id. art. 4(1)(b). See Schnabel, supra note 50, at 30–31 (noting that “[t]he stated reason for
imposing this requirement was to reduce the risk of fraud and to make it easier for competent
authorities to ensure that the settlement was indeed mediated”).
88 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(b)(i). Other options for such evidence in-
clude the mediators’ separate written attestation that mediation occurred, a written statement
from the institution administering the mediation, or in the absence of those listed methods, “any
other evidence acceptable to the competent authority.” See Singapore Convention, supra note 1,
art. 4(1)(b)(ii)–(iv). For a more complete analysis of Article 4 proof, see SING. REF. BK., Allan J.
Stitt, The Singapore Convention: When has a Mediation Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 1173 (2019).
89 See generally Schnabel, supra note 50, at 31–32 (noting, among other things, the concern
that mediators in some jurisdictions are trained not to sign a settlement).
90 For detailed information about the Act, including full text as adopted (with or without
reporter’s notes), superseded drafts, and legislative fact sheet, see Mediation Act, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=4556
5a5f-0c57-4bba-bbab-fc7de9a59110w (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
91 See Unif. Mediation Act § 7(b)(1) (“A mediator may disclose . . . whether the mediation
occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was reached, and attendance”). For additional
statutory and court rules addressing mediator reports, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8:40.
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attendance and whether or not a settlement was reached.92  The
European Code of Conduct for Mediators likewise authorizes me-
diator disclosure when “compelled by law or grounds of public pol-
icy.”93  The bottom line: the Convention requirement for minimal
formality will do little to chill mediator performance, is consistent
with many jurisdictions’ existing approach to confidentiality, and
will avoid a particularly robust category of litigation—disputing
about enforcement of oral agreements94 and “magic word” require-
ments like those in my home state of Minnesota95 or California.96
The Convention’s “opt-out” approach is also likely to signifi-
cantly reduce overall litigation.  Signing states may exercise a reser-
vation right to declare that the Convention applies only if parties
have agreed to its application,97 but absent that reservation or ex-
press contractual agreement of parties to negate Convention appli-
cation,98 the Convention applies without the necessity of private
party contracting on the topic.  This seems best aligned with the
common understanding of disputing parties.99
92 See 2005 AAA/ABA/ACR REVISED MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS
Standard V(A)(2) (permitting mediator to report “if required, whether parties appeared at a
scheduled mediation and whether or not the parties reached a resolution.”).
93 See EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS § 4 (“The mediator must keep con-
fidential all information arising out of or in connection with the mediation, including the fact
that the mediation is to take place or has taken place, unless compelled by law or grounds of
public policy to disclose it.”).
94 COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 7:5 (cataloguing dozens of oral enforcement disputes, in-
cluding seventeen state supreme court decisions).
95 Under Minnesota’s Civil Mediation Act, a mediated settlement agreement must state spe-
cifically that the agreement is binding, that the parties were advised in writing that the mediator
has no duty to protect the parties’ interests or to inform them about their legal rights, that
signing the settlement agreement might adversely affect their rights, and that they should consult
with an attorney before signing or if the parties are uncertain of their rights. See Minn. Stat.
§ 572.35(1).
96 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1123 (providing that a written mediated settlement agreement can
be admissible only if the “agreement provides it is admissible,” “enforceable,” or contains
“words to that effect.”).
97 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(1)(b) (“A Party to the Convention may declare
that: . . . (b) It shall apply this Convention only to the extent that the parties to the settlement
agreement have agreed to the application of the Convention.”).
98 Parties who affirmatively by agreement opt-out of Convention application would satisfy
the refusal ground in Convention, art. 5(1)(d) (“granting relief would be contrary to the terms of
the settlement agreement.”).
99 See Eunice Chua, The Singapore Convention on Mediation—A Brighter Future for Asian
Dispute Resolution, ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 5–6 (2019) (noting that requiring affirmative opt-in
could be contrary to the expectations of the parties as they would generally expect the other
party to comply with the settlement agreement and thus its possible enforcement, citing Report
of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the Work of its Sixty-sixth Session, UNCITRAL,
UN Doc. A/CN.9/901 (2017), para. 36.); Deason, supra note 71, at 36 (noting that “[a]n opt-out
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C. Justifiable Exclusions?
The Convention applies to agreements resulting from media-
tion to resolve international commercial disputes.100  Disputes aris-
ing from transactions involving consumers, as well as family,
inheritance, and employment law are specifically excluded from
coverage.101  A primary motivation for these exclusions is the per-
ception that in these contexts parties are more likely to be victims
of unequal bargaining power.102  As one commentator has opined,
“crafting desirable protections for relatively unsophisticated par-
ties subject to adhesion agreements would overly complicate a con-
vention.  Furthermore, absent this exclusion, a convention would
run afoul of mandatory laws protecting such parties, which fre-
quently are stronger outside the United States.”103
Does the litigation track record in the United States provide
any evidence to support the assumption that parties might be more
“at risk” when mediating in certain subject matter categories?  Sur-
prisingly, there is very little in the datasets to justify this concern.
framework makes sense from the perspective of maximizing use of the convention’s enforcement
mechanisms” as “[r]esearch has shown that default rules are ‘sticky,’ meaning that parties tend
not to alter them.”). That said, the opt-in, opt-out choice was hotly debated. See Schnabel, supra
note 50, at 57–59. See also Sussman, supra note 78, at 49 (summarizing the underlying policy
conundrum as offering contrasting views of self-determination and party autonomy, with one
perspective positing these prime values would be best served by convention application only
where the parties have expressly consented to be bound, whereas others emphasize the counter-
intuitiveness of requiring parties “to confirm their consent to enforce their obligations under a
settlement agreement.”).
100 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (“This Convention applies to an agreement
resulting from mediation and concluded in writing by parties to resolve a commercial dispute
(‘settlement agreement’) which, at the time of its conclusion, is international . . .”).
101 Id. art. 1(2) (“This Convention does not apply to settlement agreements: (a) concluded to
resolve a dispute arising from transactions engaged in by one of the parties (a consumer) for
personal, family, or household purposes; (b) relating to family, inheritance or employment
law.”).
102 See generally Schnabel, supra note 50, at 23–24.
103 Deason, supra note 71, at 33–34; SING. REF. BK., Ellen E. Deason, What’s in a Name? The
Terms “Commercial” and “Mediation” in the Singapore Convention on Mediation, 20 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1149 (2019). See also Dorkas Quek Anderson, Supporting Party Autonomy
in the Enforcement of Cross-Border Mediated Settlement Agreements: A Brave New World or
Unchartered Territory? in MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE LUXEMBOURG SUMMER SCHOOL-INTERNA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROCEDURAL LAW SUMMER SCHOOL 2018: PRIVATIZING DISPUTE RES-
OLUTION AND ITS LIMITS para. 43 (Nomos, 3d ed. 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3304587 (noting it is “common practice in commercial mediations to have legal repre-
sentation to protect parties against any pressure exerted by the mediator. Hence, the assumption
of arms-length negotiations within contract law may not be too far from the reality in cross-
border commercial mediations.”).
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As noted supra in Table 12, the percentage at which agreements in
a particular subject matter context are enforced despite an enforce-
ment defense tend not to vary from the overall enforcement aver-
ages.  Estate/probate cases are a clear exception, with enforcement
defenses succeeding in that context at a relatively higher rate when
compared to the average (52% settlement enforcement rate in
1999–2003 dataset compared to the average rate in that time period
of 57%; 50% settlement enforcement rate in 2013–2017 dataset
compared to the average rate of 69%).  On the one hand, this dis-
parity might well be attributable to the vulnerability of parties in
that particular bargaining context, exactly as the Convention draft-
ers feared.  It is also possible, however, that the relative paucity of
estate/probate cases in the datasets simply skews the numbers.
D. Striking the Right Balance on Contract Defenses
(for the most part)
Article 5 of the Convention lays out an exclusive list of
grounds on which a court may refuse enforcement or block a
party’s ability to invoke a mediated settlement agreement in de-
fense of an attempt to relitigate the underlying dispute (what many
jurisdictions would refer to as “recognition”).104  A detailed expli-
cation of the grounds for refusal is beyond the scope of this short
article.  Comprehensive summaries are available elsewhere, includ-
ing essays published in the chapters in this Singapore Reference
Book105  The chart below authored and recently published by Edna
Sussman offers a beautifully succinct summary106:
104 For a detailed explication of the complex negotiations regarding the absence of the word
“recognition” from the Convention, see Schnabel, supra note 50, at 35–42.
105 See SING. REF. BK., Michel Kallipetis, Singapore Convention Defences Based on Media-
tor’s Misconduct: Articles 5.1(e) & (f), 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1197 (2019); SING. REF.
BK., Jean-Christophe Boulet, The Singapore Convention and the Metamorphosis of Contractual
Litigation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1209 (2019); SING. REF. BK., He´ctor Flores Sentı´es,
Grounds to Refuse the Enforcement of Settlement Agreements Under the Singapore Convention
on Mediation: Purpose, Scope, and Their Importance for the Success of the Convention, 20 CAR-
DOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1235 (2019). See also Schnabel, supra note 50, at 42–56.
106 Sussman, supra note 78, at 52 (noting that “[t]he grounds track many, but not all, of the
defenses available in resisting enforcement of a contract and include issues related to mediator
conduct.”).
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Substantive grounds Incapacity of a party to the settlement agreement,107 or
Settlement agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed under the law to which the
parties have subjected it, or failing any indication, under
the law applicable by the competent authority where
relief is sought.108
Grounds relating to the The settlement agreement is not binding, or is not final,
terms of the settlement according to its terms,109 or
agreement
The settlement agreement has been subsequently
modified,110 or
Obligations in the settlement agreement have been
performed111 or are not clear or comprehensible,112 or
Granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the
settlement agreement.113
Grounds relating to the Serious breach by the mediator of standards applicable
mediator’s conduct and the to the mediator or the mediation without which breach
process the party would not have entered into the settlement
agreement,114 or
Failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties
circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the
mediator’s impartiality or independence.115
Sua moto/sua sponte Granting relief would be contrary to the public policy of
grounds invokable by the that Party,116 or
competent authority of the
Party to the Convention The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of
where relief is sought or a settlement by mediation under the law of that Party.117
requesting party
During the March 2019 symposium, more than one speaker
emphasized the necessity to interpret these Convention grounds
for refusal language with particular policy objectives in mind.
Allan Stitt, the Canadian Delegate to the UNCITRAL Working
Group, offered two very helpful framing questions: 1) Who are we
trying to help? and 2) What are we protecting them from?  His
answers: “We are trying to help the person who wants to enforce a
107 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(a).
108 Id. art. 5(1)(b)(i).
109 Id. art. 5(1)(b)(ii).
110 Id. art. 5(1)(b)(iii).
111 Id. art. 5(1)(c)(i).
112 Id. art. 5(1)(c)(ii).
113 Id. art. 5(1)(d).
114 Id. art. 5(1)(e).
115 Id. art. 5(1)(f).
116 Id. art. 5(2)(a).
117 Id. art. 5(2)(b).
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mediated settlement agreement.  We are protecting that person
from the other contracting party who wants to renege on the
agreement.”118
Michal Kallipetis, the IAM Delegate to the UNCITRAL
Working Group, noted that the entire purpose of drafting the
Convention was to avoid litigation, not encourage it.119  And he
urged attendees to remain cognizant of three key words
(highlighted in bold in his impressive memorable PowerPoint
presentation) which govern all of the defenses outlined in Article 5:
1) the word “may”, which refers to the fact that all of the
grounds for refusal of relief are permissive, rather than
mandatory;120
2) the word “only”, which mandates that this permissive refusal
authority is conditioned on the party challenging enforce-
ment meeting its burden of proof to establish entitlement to
a refusal ground;121 and
3) the word “proof”, which is what a party opposing enforce-
ment must offer with respect to any of the grounds.122
Eric Tuchman, General Counsel for the American Arbitration
Association, reminded symposium participants to remember the
treaty’s primary promise: to give legitimacy to mediation, an ami-
cable process based on consent and self-determination that in the-
ory should not result in significant amounts of litigation.  The
assumption that litigation would be the exception rather than the
rule came early in the Working Group deliberations, where it was
noted that “very few settlement agreements required enforcement
as most parties would abide by the terms of the settlement
agreement.”123
118 See SING. REF. BK., Allan J. Stitt, The Singapore Convention: When has a Mediation
Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1173 (2019).
119 See Kallipetis, supra note 105.
120 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1) (“The competent authority of the Party to
the Convention where relief is sought under article 4 may refuse to grant relief at the request of
the party against whom the relief is sought only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
proof that . . .) (emphasis added). In other words, a court could exercise discretion to enforce an
agreement even if a particular ground for refusal might apply.
121 Id.
122 Id. Moreover, the party challenging enforcement carries the burden of proof to establish
the ground.
123 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-third session (Vienna, 7-11 September 2015), U.N. Doc A/CN.9/861, at 8, para. 33 (Sept.
17, 2015). See also Quek Anderson, supra note 103, para. 42 (characterizing Article 5 as “a safety
valve to deal with instances when autonomy is compromised, but ideally one that is not fre-
quently utilized.”); Schnabel, supra note 50, at 4 (“Ideally, the Convention will rarely need to be
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1097
As the co-author of Disputing Irony124 and compiler of the
two massive mediation litigation datasets described in Part II
above, please forgive me if I take a somewhat skeptical view of the
anticipated minimal use for the “grounds for refusal.”  That said,
all in all, with my U.S. litigation experience in mind, I feel like the
drafters mostly got it right.125  The grounds are certainly broad
enough to permit the wide range of “traditional” contract defenses
parties typically raise post-mediation.  As documented in Part III
above, disputing about those defenses has substantially declined
over time in the United States.  That may well be the pattern under
the Convention as well.
More important, the grounds for refusal are intended to fore-
close defenses based on unique domestic law requirements, “such
as any requirements that mediators be licensed in a particular juris-
diction or that mediations must be conducted under certain rules
or by certain institutions, or that mediated settlements must be no-
tarized or meet other (extra-Convention) formal requirements.”126
The U.S. litigation experience shows that these technical formali-
ties and procedural hoops have become the growth sector in the
mediation litigation industry.  Cutting them off from the very be-
ginning is a very wise choice.
E. Much Ado About Nothing: Overblown Concerns About
Mediator Malfeasance?
As noted in the previous section, Article 5 provides for refusal
based on mediator malfeasance.127  Specifically, Article 5(1)(e) au-
thorizes discretionary refusal to grant enforcement relief if there is
proof of a serious breach by the mediator “of standards applicable
to the mediator or the mediation without which breach that party
would not have entered into the settlement agreement.”128  Article
5(1)(f) authorizes discretionary refusal to grant enforcement relief
based on proof the mediator failed “to disclose to the parties cir-
invoked in court, as in most cases, parties will abide by the mediated settlements they
conclude.”).
124 Coben & Thompson, supra note 1.
125 See Part IV.E infra for an important caveat.
126 Schnabel, supra note 50, at 45.
127 Id. at 50 (characterizing these grounds for refusal as relating “less to the agreement
reached by the disputing parties than to the conduct of the third party who helped them resolve
the dispute, and the consequences of such conduct.”).
128 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(e).
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cumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s impar-
tiality or independence” but only if “such failure to disclose had a
material impact or undue influence on a party without which fail-
ure that party would not have entered into the settlement
agreement.”129
Whether to include any defenses premised on third-party con-
duct was a topic of hot debate, with the compromise solution being
inclusion but only in a very narrow set of circumstances.130  As suc-
cinctly summarized at the March 18, 2019 Cardozo Symposium by
speaker Michel  Kallipetis,131 the Article 5(1)(e) defense premised
on mediator breach of standards is significantly cabined by the re-
quirement that any alleged breach of standards be “serious” and
proven to effectively vitiate party consent—a but/for standard that
will be extremely difficult to prove in practice.132  Kallipetis also
forcefully argued that the Article 5(1)(f) defense based on failure
to make disclosures about conflicts was similarly restricted in scope
129 Id. art. 5(1)(f).
130 See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 78, at 49:
There was a particularly vigorous debate as to whether there should be any defenses
based on the conduct of the mediator or a mediator’s failure to make disclosures
related to independence and impartiality, since that would open the door to some of
the gamesmanship that has become problematic in the context of enforcement under
the New York Convention. Others felt that it was crucial that these grounds be in-
cluded in order to ensure the fairness of the mediation process. As part of the pack-
age of compromises, it was agreed that grounds related to the conduct of mediators
would be included as grounds for refusing to grant relief but that they would only
apply in narrow circumstances.
See also Chua, supra note 99, at 8 (describing the provisions as reflecting compromise in three
key ways):
First, it limits the scope of the defences to instances where the mediator’s misconduct
or failure to disclose had a direct impact on the settlement agreement in that the
“party would not have entered into the settlement agreement”. Second, it adjusts the
language of the defences to highlight the exceptional circumstances that can be
raised by using adjectives such as “serious” and “material”. Third, by having the text
accompanying the instrument, it provides an illustrative list of examples of applicable
standards. Although it would take the development of a substantial body of case-law
or other pronouncements by enforcing authorities before it can be said with any cer-
tainty what types of conduct would cross the line, the words used in the defences are
sufficient to establish that the threshold should be high. Whether or not the miscon-
duct of the mediator was such that a party would not have entered into the settle-
ment agreement without it would be a finding of fact that courts and other enforcing
authorities are in a position to make based on available evidence.
131 Mr. Kallipetis was the International  Academy of Mediators Delegate to the Convention
Working Group.
132 See also Schnabel, supra note 50, at 51–52 (highlighting, among other things, that alleged
breaches of standards must be serious, “not just questionable conduct or a minor breach,” and
the authority considering refusal cannot “apply standards on a post hoc basis (e.g., . . . cannot
deny relief based on an argument that the mediator should have followed certain best practices
or other jurisdictions’ requirements.”).
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because of the necessity that doubts about mediator impartiality/
independence be “justifiable,” and even if justifiable, would only
be actionable if those justifiable doubts had such material impact
that without the failure to disclose the party would not have en-
tered the agreement.133
In short, this compromised focus on mediator behavior is in
large part likely to be entirely symbolic in practice, which is exactly
what the track record from U.S. litigation suggests (despite the fact
that the defense is not nearly as circumscribed under common law
in the United States as it is in the Convention).  As Professor
Thompson and I wrote in 2006 with respect to the 1999–2003
dataset which, as noted above in Part III(B)(2), included just sev-
enteen cases where parties asserted mediator misconduct as a de-
fense to enforcement:
[d]espite considerable academic ink devoted to the subject of
mediator liability and ongoing debates about quasi-judicial and
statutory immunity, there is a surprising dearth of cases alleging
mediator misconduct or ethical violations.  As other authors
have observed, the chance of a mediator being successfully sued
is remote.  Nor is mediator misconduct commonly used as an
enforcement defense.134
In the 2013–2017 dataset, the total number of cases alleging a me-
diator misconduct defense was even smaller (sixteen total), with
not a single one being successful.  In other words, much ado about
nothing in a practical sense.
F. A Defensible Choice to Decline Legislating Mediation
Confidentiality
The Singapore Convention does not address confidentiality,
instead leaving this topic to be determined by applicable domestic
law.135  In the past, I have praised the merits of uniformity in confi-
133 Id. at 53–54 (highlighting, among other things, that “‘[j]ustifiable doubts’” is intended to
establish an objective standard, not affected by whether the party in question subjectively doubts
the mediator’s independence and impartiality.”).
134 Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 95.
135 See Schnabel, supra note 50, at 18. While the Convention is silent on confidentiality, the
newly approved UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and Interna-
tional Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation (2018) expressly authorizes disclosure
of mediation information “for the purposes of implementation or enforcement of a settlement
agreement.” See Article 10 Confidentiality (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, all informa-
tion relating to the mediation proceedings shall be kept confidential, except where disclosure is
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dentiality regulation,136 and specifically endorsed the Uniform Me-
diation Act (“UMA”) as a statutory framework where reasonable
exceptions to confidentiality permit parties to sensibly litigate
about enforcement disputes.137  That said, getting global agreement
on a single approach to this complex topic (which depending on
jurisdiction and legal culture might involve statutes, court rules, ju-
dicial decisions, ethical codes, ADR institutional provider policies,
and/or party contract) would likely take many more years of nego-
tiation than the three the Singapore drafters devoted to the Con-
vention.  Indeed, the drafting history of the UMA in the United
States was a case study in the difficulty of herding cats, which in the
end has resulted in adoption of the end product in only twelve U.S.
jurisdictions.138
Moreover, the U.S. litigation data suggests that confidentiality,
an issue that impacts many aspects of mediation litigation beyond
just enforcement, may be far less critical in the context of enforce-
ment disputes than one might assume.  Indeed, in our 2006 report
on the 1999–2003 dataset, Professor Thompson and I highlighted a
surprising phenomenon:
The large volume of opinions in which courts considered de-
tailed evidence of what transpired in mediations without a confi-
required under the law or for the purposes of implementation or enforcement of a settlement
agreement.”). U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
Law, Fifty-first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/, annex II (2018) (emphasis added). This confidentiality
provision, albeit renumbered and with the word “mediation” replacing the word “conciliation,”
is identical to Article 9 of the 2002 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Con-
ciliation. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on Its
Thirty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 17, annex 1, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/57/17
(2002). See also Draft Guide to Enactment and Use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Conciliation, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 35th Sess., at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/514 (2002) (noting that “[a]lthough the Working Group that prepared the
Model Law initially considered including a list of specific exceptions, it was strongly felt that
listing exceptions in the text of the Model Law might raise difficult questions of interpretation, in
particular as to whether the list should be regarded as exhaustive.”).
136 See Coben, My Change of Mind on the Uniform Mediation Act, supra note 10.
137 Id. See also COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8:15 (detailing the rather limited litigation his-
tory for the Uniform Mediation Act, now adopted in twelve U.S. jurisdictions) and § 8:28 (de-
tailing the litigation perils of California’s more absolute approach to mediation confidentiality
protection).
138 See generally COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8:13 and multiple secondary sources cited
therein (noting that negotiating the Act’s confidentiality provisions “proved to be the most con-
tentious part of the Act because many interested commentators had strong but conflicting beliefs
about the need for confidentiality in mediation and the tension among privacy, fairness and
access to the courts” and that “[d]rafting was also difficult because over 250 state mediation
privilege statutes existed at the time the UMA was drafted and mediators from those states
sometimes advocated for their state’s statute.”).
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dentiality issue being raised—either by the parties, or sua sponte
by the court.  Indeed, uncontested mediation disclosures oc-
curred in thirty percent of all decisions in the database, cutting
across jurisdiction, level of court, underlying subject matter, and
litigated mediation issues.  Included are forty-five opinions in
which mediators offered testimony, sixty-five opinions where
others offered evidence about mediators’ statements or actions,
and 266 opinions where parties or lawyers offered evidence of
their own mediation communications and conduct—all without
objection or comment.  In sum, the walls of the mediation room
are remarkably transparent.139
I did not code the 2013–2017 dataset with equal specificity regard-
ing source of disclosure and whether disclosure occurred without
objection or comment.  But as detailed above in Table 12, in the
more recent 2013–2017 dataset, litigating parties only relatively
rarely joined enforcement and confidentiality issues in the same
dispute.  Indeed, parties joined those two issues in enforcement de-
fense cases only 5% of the time.  And even when the issues were
joined, the enforcement rate changed only marginally.140
V. CONCLUSION
If the U.S. mediation litigation experience tells us anything, it
is that disputing about mediation is an inevitable part of institu-
tionalization of the mediation process.  As statutes, rules, and other
regulations are created and applied, lawyers inevitably learn to ex-
ploit the rules universe on behalf of their clients.  That said, with
institutionalization has also come evolution in disputing trends.
Perhaps most relevant to the Singapore Convention effort, the U.S.
litigation experience suggests that party disputing about enforce-
ment will decline over time, especially challenges to mediation set-
tlement enforcement based on contract formation or fairness
concerns.  In that respect, the drafters might take comfort in the
hope that the primary goal of the Convention—to promote the use
of mediation and confidence in its use—will in fact be its primary
legacy, as opposed to ramping up the global count of mediation
enforcement disputes.
139 Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 58–59.
140 In cases where parties disputed both confidentiality and an enforcement defense, the over-
all enforcement rate dropped from 66%, as opposed to 69% when enforcement defenses were
raised without also litigating confidentiality.

THE ROLE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND
DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN IN PROPOSING
AND DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES: A CASE STUDY OF THE
SINGAPORE CONVENTION
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although specialists in international law are well-versed with
the formalities associated with negotiating an international treaty,
little if anything is known or written about how national and inter-
national actors decide to develop and pursue particular proposals
for new international instruments.1  Indeed, the initial process of
determining which ideas to develop is almost entirely hidden from
public view, even though these choices are critical to international
law and policy, “since whoever controls the agenda has control
over the scope of the governance system and its ability to change
over time.”2
* D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.); J.D.,
Duke University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Da-
vis. The author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York, Illinois, and Missouri
and as a solicitor in Ireland and in England and Wales, is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of
Law at the University of Missouri and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown Law Center. The au-
thor would like to thank Tim Schnabel and Maria Strong for their insights into the informal
aspects of the international lawmaking process. Although the author was involved with the pro-
cess of proposing and negotiating the Singapore Convention as both a private individual and as
an NGO representative, the views reflected herein are the author’s own and not those of any
particular organization.
1 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 609–11 (7th ed. 2008).
Although international treaties are not the only type of instrument that can be promulgated by
international actors, they are often considered the “quintessential” type of international law pro-
ject and therefore form the basis of the current analysis. Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing Interna-
tional Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1575, 1595 (2011); see also A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL:  BASIC
FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 13 (2013), http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf [hereinafter
UNCITRAL GUIDE] (discussing international treaties (conventions) as well as model laws, legis-
lative guides, and model provisions).
2 Eric B. Bluemel, Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International Governance,
31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 139, 162 (2005) (noting that “[s]elf-interest may dominate such agenda-
setting formulations, as actors with an interest in the status quo may reject change through the
formulation of the agenda”).
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This Article seeks to provide insights into the “black box” of
early treaty-making processes by undertaking a case study of the
development of the United Nations Convention on International
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, known collo-
quially as the Singapore Convention on Mediation (Singapore
Convention).3  The discussion focuses on several issues that have
seldom been addressed in the legal literature, including the way in
which a proposal for an international treaty makes its way to the
relevant decision-makers and how those decision-makers deter-
mine which of the various alternatives to pursue.4  The analysis also
considers how interested individuals can assist the treaty-proposing
process, particularly if they are not a member of a non-governmen-
tal organization (“NGO”).
When considering these issues, this Article contemplates the
role that dispute system design (Section II) and empirical research
(Section III) played in the early development of the Singapore
Convention before turning to questions relating to how interested
individuals can assist the development of international instruments,
using the Singapore Convention as a case study (Section IV).5  The
Article then ties together the various strands of analysis and pro-
vides some observations about how the various techniques de-
scribed herein can be applied to future projects (Section V).
II. DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN AND THE
TREATY-MAKING PROCESS
The discussion begins by applying dispute system design
(“DSD”) theory to the development of the Singapore Convention.6
DSD “is not a dispute resolution methodology itself” but instead
reflects “the intentional and systematic creation of an effective, ef-
ficient, and fair dispute resolution process based upon the unique
3 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law,
Fifty-first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex I (2018) [hereinafter Singapore Convention]. Black-
box decision-making involves analytical processes that are largely or entirely hidden from public
view. See Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1124–25
(2015); Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 429–30 (2008).
4 In this context, the relevant decision-maker may be a national government or an intergov-
ernmental organization such as the United Nations (U.N.).
5 See Singapore Convention, supra note 3.
6 See id.; see also S.I. Strong, Applying the Lessons of International Commercial Arbitration
to International Commercial Mediation: A Dispute System Design Analysis, in MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES 39, 39–60 (Catharine Titi & Katia
Fach Go´mez eds., 2019).
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needs of a particular system.”7  DSD has been used to analyze law-
making efforts in both domestic and international settings,8 and,
according to Professors Stephanie Smith and Janet Martinez, is
useful in
three contexts: 1) Analyzing a system historically to understand
its evolution, functioning, and impacts . . . ; 2) Advising on the
best process to create the design, or more likely redesign, mech-
anism for a system; and 3) Designing (or redesigning) a system
itself.9
All three of these elements were reflected in a 2014 law review
article that triggered the development and adoption of the Singa-
pore Convention.10  That article, which was written by Professor
S.I. Strong and which consciously applied DSD to questions involv-
ing international commercial mediation, fulfilled Professor Smith
and Professor Martinez’s first criterion by providing a historical
overview of the development and legal status of international com-
mercial mediation in the twentieth and early twenty-first century.11
In particular, the article discussed how the legal environment sur-
rounding international commercial mediation compared to that of
international commercial arbitration and international commercial
litigation, two other means of resolving cross-border commercial
disputes.12  In so doing, the article sought to determine whether
there was a need for systemic reform of the legal framework sur-
rounding international commercial mediation, ultimately conclud-
ing that such reform was required if mediation was to exist on an
7 Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92
MINN. L. REV. 161, 177–78 (2007); see also NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND
PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DISPUTES 4–5 (2d ed. 2018).
8 See, e.g., Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Reflections on Designing Governance to Produce the
Rule of Law, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 76–78 (2011); Francis E. McGovern, Dispute System De-
sign: The United Nations Compensation Commission, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 176 (2009);
Jennifer W. Reynolds, The Activist Plus: Dispute Systems Design and Social Activism, 13 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 334, 337 (2017); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 23, 130
(2011); Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute
Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 46–47 (2010).
9 Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute System Design, 14
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 124 (2009).
10 See Singapore Convention, supra note 3; S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commercial
Arbitration? The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11
(2014) [hereinafter Strong, Promise]; see also Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on
Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settle-
ments, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 4 n.17 (2019) [hereinafter Schnabel, Convention] (noting
Professor Strong’s article as the genesis of the Singapore Convention).
11 See Smith & Martinez, supra note 9, at 124; Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 19–28.
12 See Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 19–28.
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equal playing field with arbitration, which had become the primary
means of resolving international commercial disputes in the latter
part of the twentieth century.13
The article also reflected the second type of DSD analysis,
which focuses on suggesting possible means of redesigning existing
systems.14  For example, Professor Strong focused on the need to
engage in reform at the level of public international law, stating
that:
businesses may be more likely to choose international commer-
cial mediation over international commercial arbitration and lit-
igation if mediation agreements and settlement agreements
were as easily enforceable as arbitration agreements and arbitral
awards.  If this hypothesis is correct, then it may be necessary to
adopt an international enforcement regime similar to that which
applies in international arbitration [meaning the system based
on the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more commonly known
as the New York Convention].15
The 2014 article met Professor Smith and Professor Martinez’s
third criterion by providing early proposals regarding the way the
law relating to international commercial mediation might be rede-
signed so as to achieve the system’s enunciated goals.16  In particu-
lar, Professor Strong offered specific guidance on how a new
convention in the area of international commercial mediation
could and should be shaped.17
Although Professor Strong’s 2014 article complied with best
practices in DSD, academics routinely call for the adoption of new
treaties,18 which raises questions about why and how this particular
13 See id. at 12–13, 31–32.
14 See Smith & Martinez, supra note 9, at 124; Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 38.
15 Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 38; see also United Nations Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter New York Convention].
16 See Smith & Martinez, supra note 9, at 124; Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 38.
17 See Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 16–32. The proposals in the 2014 article did not
match the Singapore Convention in all particulars. See Singapore Convention, supra note 3. For
example, Professor Strong called for a convention that addressed recognition and enforcement
of both mediation agreements and settlement agreements, noting that the success of the New
York Convention was due, at least in part, to the fact that it addressed both the front end and the
back end of the arbitration process. See New York Convention, supra note 15, arts. I–II; Strong,
Promise, supra note 10, at 32. The Singapore Convention only addresses settlement agreements
at the back end of the process. See Singapore Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
18 Though legal academics routinely call for new international instruments as part of their
scholarship, non-academics have also been known to suggest new treaties in various areas of law.
See Draft Model Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/
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proposal gained sufficient traction to trigger development of a new
international instrument.19  Interestingly, the answer can again be
found by recourse to the field of DSD.20
As it turns out, the deciding factor involved a public meeting
of the U.S. Department of State’s Advisory Committee on Private
International Law (“ACPIL”), when Professor Strong presented a
pre-publication draft of the 2014 article to Tim Schnabel, then an
Attorney-Adviser in the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Pri-
vate International Law.21  According to the official notice of the
February 2014 meeting published in the Federal Register, the pur-
pose of the ACPIL meeting was “to discuss possible topics for fu-
ture work related to arbitration or conciliation in the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).”22
Shared_Content/Editorial/News/Documents/Draft-Model-BAT.pdf; Gary Born, BITS, BATS,
and Buts: Reflections on International Dispute Resolution, Speech at the University of Penn-
sylvania (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/
News/Documents/BITs-BATs-and-Buts.pdf; Sebastian Perry, BITS, BATS and Buts, GLOBAL
ARB. REV., Jan. 28, 2013; Lauren Walker, Snowden, Greenwald, Miranda to Introduce U.N.
Treaty to End Mass Surveillance and Protect Whistleblowers, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 24, 2015), https://
www.newsweek.com/snowden-greenwald-miranda-introduce-un-treaty-end-mass-surveillance-
and-376386.
19 For example, scholars elsewhere in the world were making similar suggestions about a
convention on mediation at about the same time as Professor Strong. See Laurence Boule, Inter-
national Enforceability for Mediated Settlement Agreements: Developing the Conceptual Frame-
work, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 35, 65 (2014); Chang-Fa Lo, Desirability of a New International
Legal Framework for Cross-Border Enforcement of Certain Mediated Settlement Agreements, 7
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 119, 135 (2014); Bobette Wolski, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agree-
ments (MSAs): Critical Questions and Directions for Future Research, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J.
87, 110 (2014); see also Schnabel, Convention, supra note 10, at 4 n.17. However, these works do
not appear to have had quite the same amount of practical impact, likely because those individu-
als do not appear to have had the same opportunity to present their ideas to someone with the
authority and inclination to pursue the proposals.
20 See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
21 See Schnabel, Convention, supra note 10, at 4 n.17 (noting Professor Strong’s article as the
genesis of the proposal that led to the Singapore Convention).
22 79 Fed. Reg. 7497-02 (Feb. 7, 2014). The Federal Register notice of the meeting further
stated that:
UNCITRAL’s Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) is currently working
on the development of a convention on transparency in treaty-based investor-state
arbitration. Once this negotiation is completed, however, it is unclear what the Work-
ing Group should address next. One project that has been suggested is updating the
UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings.
The purpose of the public meeting is to obtain the views of concerned stakeholders
on two topics: (1) Whether updating the Notes would be a worthwhile project for the
Working Group and, if so, what areas should be addressed in such an update, and (2)
which other projects, if any, related to international arbitration and conciliation UN-
CITRAL should undertake.
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Several ideas were discussed at the meeting, but Professor
Strong’s call for a new convention involving international commer-
cial mediation caught Mr. Schnabel’s attention, likely as a result of
the strong theoretical foundation that had been laid for such an
instrument in the 2014 article.23  Following the ACPIL meeting,
Mr. Schnabel and the Office of Private International Law further
refined the suggestion by conferring with U.S. stakeholders and
other national governments, and in June 2014, the U.S. Govern-
ment submitted a formal proposal to UNCITRAL for a new con-
vention on the recognition and enforcement of settlement
agreements arising out of international commercial mediation.24
The Commission supported the proposal and directed UNCI-
TRAL Working Group II on Arbitration and Conciliation/Dispute
Settlement to consider the matter further.25  Deliberations ensued
over the next four years, eventually producing the final draft of the
Singapore Convention and the 2018 revisions to the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Mediation.26
While this series of events can be analyzed from a variety of
perspectives,27 a DSD-oriented paradigm appears particularly ap-
propriate, given the subject matter of the convention.  Authors of
one of the leading texts in the field claim that DSD includes four
stages: “(1) taking design initiative, (2) assessing or diagnosing the
current situation, (3) creating systems and processes, and (4) imple-
menting the design, including evaluation and process or system
Id.
23 See Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 19–38.
24 See UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Proposal by the Government of the United
States of America: Future Work for Working Group II, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/822 (June 2, 2014)
[hereinafter U.S. Proposal].
25 Documents memorializing deliberations can be found at the Working Group II website.
See Working Group II, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/work-
ing_groups/2Arbitration.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
26 See Singapore Convention, supra note 3; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex II (2018) [herein-
after Model Mediation Law] (amending the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commer-
cial Conciliation from 2002).
27 See Ryan M. Scoville, International Law in National Schools, 92 IND. L.J. 1449, 1450–51
(2017) (suggesting various theories regarding the efficacy of international law are incomplete
and that the extent to which international law is taught has significant bearing on compliance
with and efficacy of international law); Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Eco-
nomics, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 421, 423 (2014) (adopting a law and economics approach to interna-
tional lawmaking).
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modification.”28  Under this rubric, Professor Strong, Mr. Schna-
bel, and the U.S. Department of State29 all took the design initia-
tive, albeit in slightly different ways, consistent with their
individual areas of expertise and authority.30  For example, Profes-
sor Strong took the initiative by conducting the underlying theoret-
ical research and DSD analysis, charting a preliminary course of
action, and presenting the idea to the State Department through
ACPIL’s public consultation process.  Mr. Schnabel took the initia-
tive by shepherding the idea through the State Department, con-
vening follow-up meetings with U.S. stakeholders and other
governments to identify the depth of support for an international
convention in this area of law, and developing a detailed proposal
that would be acceptable to a wide national and international audi-
ence.  Finally, the U.S. Department of State took the initiative by
convening the ACPIL meeting in February 2014 and submitting the
proposal to UNCITRAL in June 2014.
Taking the design initiative is only the first step in the DSD
process.31  The second step of the DSD analysis—i.e., assessment
of the field in question—is of at least equal importance, particu-
larly in international matters, and is discussed in the next section.32
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND THE TREATY-MAKING PROCESS
DSD assessments can involve a variety of different methodol-
ogies, both theoretical and practical.33  The historical development
28 ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 16. Other commentators suggest a seven-step process. See
Hallie Falder, Designing the Forum to Fit the Fuss: Dispute System Design for the State Trial
Courts, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 481, 486–87 (2008).
29 Although the U.S. Department of State is often conceived of as a singular unit, the work
of developing the proposal was carried out by specific individuals who saw the benefit of a con-
vention in this field. Thus, Tim Schnabel has recognized the work of John Kim, then an Assistant
Legal Adviser for Private International Law, as instrumental to the process. See Timothy Schna-
bel, Implementation of the Singapore Convention: Federalism, Self-Execution, and Private Law
Treaties, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Schnabel, Self-Execution].
30 To some extent, UNCITRAL can also be considered to have taken the design initiative in
the sense that it indicated that it was open to new projects on which to work, but that is a
somewhat more passive role than that exhibited by Professor Strong, Mr. Schnabel, and the U.S.
Department of State. See 79 Fed. Reg. 7497-02 (Feb. 7, 2014) (noting that UNCITRAL was
ready to consider a new project in the area of international arbitration and mediation).
31 See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
32 See id.
33 See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for
Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5–9 (2008) (discussing theoretical assess-
ments); Falder, supra note 28, at 486 (discussing practical assessments).
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of the Singapore Convention demonstrates how each type of evalu-
ation contributes to the treaty-making process.34
The theoretical assessment of the field of international com-
mercial mediation began with Professor Strong’s 2014 article,
which focused on describing the legal environment in which inter-
national commercial mediation operated, historically and in the
current day.35  While this study was sufficient to trigger the interest
of Mr. Schnabel and the U.S. Department of State in pursuing a
new convention, it was not enough to convince all of the members
of UNCITRAL Working Group II of the merits of the U.S. propo-
sal.36  Indeed, early reception of the U.S. proposal was mixed.37  In-
stead, when faced with the U.S. proposal, a number of state
delegates at the first Working Group II meeting called for empiri-
cal data regarding the use of mediation in national and interna-
tional commercial disputes so as to be in a better position to
evaluate and develop the U.S. proposal.38
At the point the request was made, no such data existed, and
the UNCITRAL Secretariat was not in a position to undertake
that type of time-intensive research within the relevant time
frame.39  Fortunately, scholars and non-governmental organiza-
tions stepped in to fill the gap.40
34 See Singapore Convention, supra note 3.
35 See Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 16.
36 See Schnabel, Convention, supra note 10, at 4 n.17.
37 See U.S. Proposal, supra note 24; Schnabel, Convention, supra note 10, at 5.
38 See Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-
second session (New York, 2–6 February 2015), ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832 (Feb. 11, 2015)
(noting the need for empirical information in this field); Report of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law on its forty-seventh Session (7–18 July 2014), U.N. GAOR 69th
Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/69/17.
39 See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 1, at 9–10 (discussing the role of the Secretariat); S.I.
Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International Commercial Mediation,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973, 1990 (2016) [hereinafter Strong, Empirical]. However, the UN-
CITRAL Secretariat did compile comments from various state delegates regarding the enforce-
ability of settlement agreements in their individual jurisdictions. See Comments Received From
States, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Resulting
From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation—Revision of UNCITRAL Notes on
Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WP.II/WP.188, at 6 n.7 (Dec. 23, 2014)
[hereinafter States’ Comments].
40 See Strong, Empirical, supra note 39, at 1989–90; see also IMI, How Users View the Pro-
posal for a UN Convention on the Enforcement of Mediated Settlements (Nov. 27, 2014) [here-
inafter IMI, Users], https://www.imimediation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/IMI-UN-
Convention-on-Enforcement-Survey-Summary-final-27.11.14.pdf; IMI, Survey–UN Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements (Oct. 16, 2014) [here-
inafter IMI, Convention], https://www.imimediation.org/research/surveys/survey-enforceability-
mediated-settlement/.
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The most detailed analysis was conducted by Professor Strong
in late 2014 and involved a mixed qualitative-quantitative study fo-
cusing on the use and perception of international commercial me-
diation in the international legal and business communities.41  The
analysis was based on an electronic survey with thirty-four differ-
ent questions, although the use of conditional branching (skip
logic) meant that not every participant answered each of the thirty-
four questions.42  The survey generated randomized responses
from 221 participants in 51 countries and included private practi-
tioners and neutrals (arbitrators, mediators, conciliators, and
judges) as well as those who worked as in-house counsel or in gov-
ernmental or institutional settings, such as arbitral institutions.43
The study had two goals.44  First, the survey was designed to
discover and describe current behaviors and attitudes relating to
international commercial mediation.45  This information was
sought through questions concerning: (1) the extent to which medi-
ation is currently used in the international commercial context; (2)
the means by which mediation is initiated in the international com-
mercial context; (3) the reasons why parties do or do not use medi-
ation in international commercial disputes; (4) the methods of
encouraging parties to use mediation in the international commer-
cial context; and (5) the types of international commercial disputes
that either are or are not amenable to mediation.46
This data was extremely useful in that it provided a baseline
understanding of current practices and beliefs relating to interna-
tional commercial mediation, something that had never before
been investigated in detail.47  This aspect of the study also provided
dispute system designers (in this case, state delegates to UNCI-
TRAL) with a broad understanding of the legal and social environ-
ment surrounding international commercial mediation, a necessary
41 See Strong, Empirical, supra note 39, at 1998. The other studies conducted at that time
were somewhat problematic in that they were very brief and not sufficiently randomized. See
IMI, Convention, supra note 40, at 4–5 (noting the study was conducted at an IMI conference);
IMI, Users, supra note 40 (reflecting a survey that was directed on to those who already sup-
ported the idea of a convention on international commercial mediation).
42 See Strong, Empirical, supra note 39, at 2001.
43 See id. at 2017, 2019–20.
44 See id. at 1998.
45 See id. at 1998–99.
46 See id.
47 See id. at 1999.
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step given that delegates to UNCITRAL meetings are not always
expert in every matter that arises.48
However, the survey was not only descriptive in nature.  In-
stead, Professor Strong included questions relating to normative is-
sues such as: (1) the future of international commercial mediation;
(2) the need for an international convention addressing interna-
tional commercial mediation; and (3) the shape of any future con-
vention addressing international commercial mediation.49  This line
of inquiry not only identified the difficulties associated with enforc-
ing settlement agreements arising from international commercial
mediation in the then-existing legal regime,50 it also provided evi-
dence indicating that the international legal community strongly
supported the adoption of an international treaty concerning the
enforcement of settlement agreements arising out of commercial
mediation.51
It is impossible to summarize the findings of the empirical
study in the space available here, particularly given that the re-
search both confirmed and questioned a number of long-held theo-
ries about the nature, purpose, and function of mediation in
international commercial settings.52  Instead, the important feature
48 See id. Delegates to UNCITRAL meetings are not always expert in every matter that
arises. See S.I. Strong, Clash of Cultures: Epistemic Communities, Negotiation Theory, and Inter-
national Lawmaking, 50 AKRON L. REV. 495, 503 (2017) [hereinafter Strong, Epistemic
Communities].
49 See Strong, Empirical, supra note 39, at 1999.
50 See id. at 2053–55. For example, only 4% of respondents indicated that enforcement of a
purely domestic settlement agreement would be impossible or very difficult in their home juris-
diction, while 18% indicated that it would be somewhat difficult. See id. Most respondents
(62%) indicated that enforcement of domestic settlement agreements was easy in their home
jurisdiction. See id. However, 9% of respondents indicated that it would be impossible or very
difficult to enforce an agreement to mediate an international commercial dispute in the respon-
dent’s home jurisdiction. See id. Approximately 28% of respondents indicated that enforcement
would be somewhat difficult, while only 35% of the respondents thought that it would be easy.
See id. When the question involved enforcement of a settlement agreement arising out of an
international commercial mediation when the mediation took place elsewhere, 15% of respon-
dents indicated that it would be impossible or very difficult to enforce these types of agreements,
while 36% of the respondents stated that enforcement would be somewhat difficult. See id. Only
14% of the respondents thought it would be easy to enforce a settlement agreement in their
home jurisdiction when the settlement agreement arose out of an international commercial me-
diation seated in another country. See id.
51 See id. at 2055 (noting 74% of respondents supported a convention to enforce mediated
settlement agreements, with only 8% of respondents taking a contrary view). The open com-
ments section of the survey demonstrated the intensity of support for a convention in this area of
law. See id. at 2061–63.
52 See id. at 2010–11, 2026–27, 2031–32, 2034–35, 2067.
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to note here involves the role that the research played in the devel-
opment of the Singapore Convention.53
While empirical legal research is nothing new, numerous stud-
ies fail to generate any real change in their relevant fields.54  What
was different about this particular project?  Again, the answer lies
in the way in which the material was conveyed to individuals and
institutions with the power to move the proposal forward.55  In this
case, a preliminary report containing findings from the research
study was posted on the Social Sciences Research Network (SSRN)
in November 2014 and provided to the UNCITRAL Secretariat
and various governments in advance of the February 2015 Working
Group II meeting.56  The preliminary report was subsequently cited
by the Secretariat and various governments in their submissions to
state delegates.57  The preliminary report was also discussed orally
during the UNCITRAL Working Group II meeting in February
2015.58
While the empirical study was by no means the only reason
that the Singapore Convention was ultimately promulgated by UN-
CITRAL,59 it nevertheless complied with best practices in DSD by
providing dispute system designers (in this case, state delegates to
UNCITRAL) with robust and objective data about the current
state of national and international commercial mediation around
53 See Singapore Convention, supra note 3.
54 Some fields, such as international law, would benefit from more empirical work. See
Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173, 180 (2013). Other specialties have a sufficient number of empiri-
cal studies but suffer from a lack of receptiveness on the part of the relevant decision-makers.
See Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of Jus-
tice, 51 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 13, 13 (1988) (discussing “an old truth: Lawyers are suspicious or
fearful or both when they confront the methods and findings of the social sciences”).
55 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (discussing how relevant theoretical re-
search made its way into the hands of decision-makers).
56 See S.I. Strong, Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Concilia-
tion: A Preliminary Report on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on Inter-
national Commercial Mediation and Conciliation (University of Missouri School of Law Legal
Studies, Research Paper No. 2014-28), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=25263
02.
57 See UNCITRAL, Note by Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability
of Settlement Agreements Resulting From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187, at 6 n.16 (Nov. 27, 2014); States’ Comments, supra note 39, at 6
n.7.
58 See UNCITRAL, Working Group II, Sound Recordings of Meetings, http://www.uncitral
.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html; Schnabel, Convention, supra
note 10, at 4 n.17. Professor Strong attended the Working Group II meeting as a non-govern-
mental observer and provided an oral report of the research findings.
59 Indeed, early deliberations almost stalled. See Schnabel, Convention, supra note 10, at 5.
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the world60 as well as the extent to which end users supported the
proposed project.61  Notably, while the latter type of information
can be very useful in bolstering political will regarding a particular
international lawmaking initiative, mere opinion polls are not
enough; instead, the persuasiveness of any empirical research is
tied directly to the scientific rigor of the project and the absence of
bias associated with the author(s) of the study.62
IV. FINDING AND CONNECTING WITH THE APPROPRIATE
DECISION-MAKERS
As the preceding paragraphs suggest, individuals seeking to
assist with the international lawmaking process must not only com-
ply with best practices in DSD, they must also cultivate connec-
tions with individuals and institutions with the skills, knowledge,
and desire to take and sustain the design initiative.63  Because in-
ternational lawmaking is for the most part a state-centric process,64
prospective reformers are therefore advised to find a way to con-
nect with representatives in their national governments.
Although international lawyers often speak of states and inter-
governmental organizations as independent entities, the reality is
that such institutions are actually made up of individual people and
agencies who may have conflicting priorities and agendas.65  As a
result, it is necessary for those who want to take the design initia-
tive to find a way to gain access to those particular persons who can
60 See Strong, Empirical, supra note 39, at 2022–44.
61 See id. at 2044–63.
62 See id. at 1994–2005 (discussing methodological issues); id. at 2016–21 (discussing
demographics of respondents). For example, so-called “research studies” that simply seek to
promote a particular perspective cannot provide a suitable basis for designing or redesigning a
dispute system or for assisting in the development of an international treaty. See GERALD M.
STEINBERG ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NGO FACT-
FINDING 30 (2012) (discussing a document known as the Guidelines on International Human
Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports, which emphasizes “objectivity, transparency, and proper
sourcing to ensure that a report . . . ‘can be reasonably relied upon, thus enhancing the efficacy
and credibility of the report’”).
63 See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 60–61.
64 See Cedric Ryngaert, Non-State Actors: Carving Out a Space in a State-Centered Interna-
tional Legal System, 63 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 183, §§ 1, 6 (2016).
65 See Broude, supra note 2, at 1126, 1129; Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law
Compliance: The Executive Branch is a “They,” Not an “It”, 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 197 (2011).
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and will champion the idea both within the relevant organization
and with external audiences.66
The experience with the Singapore Convention demonstrates
several possible routes.67  First, prospective dispute system design-
ers can offer their assistance directly to their national governments,
as Professor Strong did when she presented her 2014 article to the
U.S. Department of State at a public meeting of ACPIL.68  Individ-
uals who are based in the United States are fortunate, in that the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”) requires the U.S. De-
partment of State to establish Advisory Committees in a number of
different fields, thereby providing interested individuals with an es-
tablished route to first-level decision-makers.69  Notice of these
meetings is provided through the U.S. Federal Register.70  How-
ever, there is no guarantee that the Department of State will adopt
any particular proposal.  Indeed, some ideas languish for years
without any forward movement, thereby underscoring the need to
conduct proper research and analysis before presenting the idea to
the relevant decision-makers.71
The United States is not the only country with a public consul-
tation process.  Other nations have adopted similar mechanisms to
66 See Strong, Epistemic Communities, supra note 48, at 508–09 (discussing internal and ex-
ternal audiences in the international lawmaking process). This concept of finding support within
the hierarchical line of authority is evident in the history of the Singapore Convention. See
Schnabel, Self-Execution, supra note 29 (noting the support of John Kim, then Assistant Legal
Adviser for Private International Law, in the proposal process).
67 See Singapore Convention, supra note 3.
68 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. ACPIL confers regularly with stakeholders
on issues relating to the development of private international law. See, e.g., 82 Fed. Reg. 43068-
01 (Sept. 13, 2017) (giving notice of a meeting to discuss upcoming work at UNCITRAL involv-
ing arbitration and mediation); 81 Fed. Reg. 72639-01 (Oct. 20, 2016) (giving notice of a meeting
to discuss ongoing projects involving private international law); 81 Fed. Reg. 50591-01 (Aug. 1,
2016) (giving notice of a meeting to discuss the work of UNCITRAL on international settlement
agreements); 80 Fed. Reg. 51864-01 (Aug. 26, 2015) (giving notice of a meeting to discuss ongo-
ing projects involving private international law, including those involving mediation and concilia-
tion); 79 Fed. Reg. 60229-01 (Oct. 6, 2014) (providing notice of a meeting to discuss ongoing
projects at UNCITRAL); 79 Fed. Reg. 38642-01 (July 8, 2014) (providing notice of a meeting to
discuss the U.S. proposal to UNCITRAL prior to the UNCITRAL Working Group II meeting).
69 See FACA Database, https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/FACAPublicPage (last visited
Jan. 21, 2019). ACPIL and other State Department Advisory Committees not only allow the
State Department to gauge stakeholder support for various international initiatives but also to
obtain ideas from the public about areas where law reform is necessary or useful.
70 See supra note 68.
71 See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text (discussing the various elements of Profes-
sor Strong’s initial research in the area of international commercial mediation). Indeed, the au-
thor attended several ACPIL meetings where it was noted that certain ideas for future work of
UNCITRAL had been raised unsuccessfully a number of times in the past.
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allow interested individuals and organizations to provide input on
proposed actions.  For example, Australia engages in public consul-
tations in a number of fields, including the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade.72  However, not all public consultation proce-
dures are the same.  While ACPIL appears open to receiving new
ideas for international initiatives from members of the public,
other advisory committees in both the United States and elsewhere
may limit the type of assistance that is sought.73  For example, Ca-
nada’s Department of Justice has stated in its Policy Statement and
Guidelines for Public Participation that
[r]ather than a broad commitment to public participation on
every issue, the Policy Statement supports participation activi-
ties only where the issues and timelines are such that public in-
put will make a contribution to the policy development
process. . . . Determining the policy areas that will include a pub-
lic participation component is the responsibility of the appropri-
ate departmental authority.74
While these types of restrictions undoubtedly appear reasona-
ble from the perspective of a government agency seeking to
streamline its operations and focus on its own policy priorities,
mechanisms that limit the ability of individuals and groups to pro-
pose new projects involving international law can pose problems as
a matter of both practice and principle.75  Fortunately, individuals
seeking to take the design initiative have other ways of conveying
their ideas and research to the appropriate authorities.
One way that individuals interested in helping the interna-
tional lawmaking process can become engaged is through direct
communications with supranational organizations responsible for
promulgating international law.  Perhaps the most forward-looking
body in this regard is the European Union, which has created the
European Citizens’ Initiative (“ECI”) to provide “a unique and in-
novative way for citizens to shape Europe by calling on the Euro-
72 See Business Consultation, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, https://consultation.business.gov.au/Con-
sultation/Common/Search/ConsultationAdvancedSearch.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
73 See supra notes 22, 69 and accompanying text.
74 Policy Statement and Guidelines for Public Participation—Department of Justice, GOV’T
OF CANADA, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/pol.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
75 For example, Professor Diane Desierto has argued that recent initiatives regarding trans-
parency and public consultations in international law have done little to increase the diversity of
voices in the realm of international lawmaking. See Diane Desierto, Are “Transparency” Proce-
dures and Local Community “Consultations” Enough? A Human Rights “Feedback Loop” to
International Economic Law Reforms of 2018, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk
.org/are-transparency-procedures-and-local-community-consultations-enough-a-human-rights-
postscript-to-2018-reforms-in-international-economic-law/.
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pean Commission to make a legislative proposal.”76  Although this
initiative has a number of problems, most notably with respect to
the level of discretion exercised by the Commission in deciding
whether to pursue a citizen proposal, the ECI at least provides
people with no formal connection to government agencies with an
opportunity to shape international law.77
Another model is seen at UNCITRAL, which occasionally is-
sues open calls for interested individuals and organizations to en-
gage in discussions about possible future works.78  However, this
type of direct communication is relatively infrequent.79  Instead,
UNCITRAL, like many other U.N. and international bodies, typi-
cally obtains the views of non-state-affiliated individuals and
groups through recognized NGOs.80  While this process is meant to
foster transparency and public participation in the international
lawmaking process, there can be significant discrepancies in how
and when NGOs can participate in international discourse.81  For
example, NGOs may be allowed to observe proceedings freely but
76 See Take the Initiative, OFFICIAL REGISTER, THE EUROPEAN CITIZENS’ INITIATIVE, http://
ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (noting that the pro-
cess is initiated through a petition with one million signatures).
77 See Nikos Vogiatzis, Between Discretion and Control: Reflections on the Institutional Posi-
tion of the Commission Within the European Citizens’ Initiative Process, 23 EUR. L.J. 250, 250–51
(2017).
78 See, e.g., Events, UNCITRAL, https://uncitral.un.org/en/events/25-26.03.2019 (last visited
Jan. 21, 2019) (advertising an open public meeting for “experts from governments, private sector,
academic and the non-profit sector” to assist UNCITRAL Working Group I on Micro, Small,
and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) regarding possible work involving multiparty
contracts).
79 See FAQ—Methods of Work, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/
methods_faq.html (discussing whether individuals can take part in UNCITRAL and Working
Group sessions). However, such interactions may be on the rise. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Forty-third session, U.N. Doc. A/65/
17, annex III, ¶¶ 11, 15 (2010) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Working Procedures] (encouraging
increased contact between the Secretariat and outside experts, including through the convening
of colloquia).
80 See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 1, at 8; Strong, Epistemic Communities, supra note
48, at 507.
81 See Alexander Gillespie, Transparency in International Environmental Law: A Case Study
of the International Whaling Commission, 14 GEO. INT’L ENVIRON. L. REV. 333, 337 (2001).
Some of the most detailed guidance on NGO participation at the U.N. is found in a 1996 docu-
ment adopted by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which gives effect to Article 71
of the United Nations Charter regarding NGO participation in international lawmaking at the
United Nations. See ECOSOC Res. 996/31, Consultative Relationship Between The United Na-
tions And Non-Governmental Organizations, 49th plen. mtg. (July 25, 1996); see also U.N. Char-
ter, art. 71 (giving NGOs status in ECOSOC); UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat,
UNCITRAL Rules of Procedure and Methods of Work, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/638/Add.5 (2007) at
12 [hereinafter UNCITRAL Methods of Work] (discussing the rights of observers).
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may be limited with respect to the extent to which they can con-
tribute to floor debate, provide materials for the consideration of
delegates and/or propose new initiatives.82  This latter feature is
particularly important since, as has been previously stated, the abil-
ity to control the agenda of a particular group or meeting has a
significant impact on the lawmaking process.83
While some differences in the treatment of NGOs can be
found in the rules of procedure governing the relevant body, other
protocols are less transparent, since they may be due to unwritten
discretionary norms such as the preferences of the chair of the
group in question.84  Although UNCITRAL has tried to minimize
these types of differences by instituting a standardized work pro-
cess for chairs to follow, discretion is of course necessary when
managing complex multiparty deliberations.85  Nevertheless, the
lack of transparency can be problematic, particularly for those who
are new to the system.  Indeed, the effectiveness of new and di-
verse voices in international lawmaking can be severely hindered
by disparities involving funding, sophistication, and institutional
knowledge.86
82 See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1, 8, 11–12; UNCITRAL Working Procedures,
supra note 79, at annex III (outlining the working methods of UNCITRAL); UNCITRAL Meth-
ods of Work, supra note 81, at 11–18; Gillespie, supra note 81, at 337, 339–40. At UNCITRAL
and particularly Working Group II, the norm has been to allow NGOs to contribute in the de-
bate concurrently with state delegates. However, there is no way to know how the chair priori-
tizes interventions that are pending, since he or she has broad discretion to decide how to control
the course of discussion. See UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL Rules of Proce-
dure and Methods of Work, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/638/Add.3 (2007) at 2–3 [hereinafter UNCI-
TRAL Presiding Officer]. Furthermore, NGOs at UNCITRAL do not appear able to
independently propose new work projects. See UNCITRAL Working Procedures, supra note 79,
at annex III, ¶¶ 5, 7.
83 See Bluemel, supra note 2, at 162.
84 Potentially significant variations arise across different fields of substantive expertise. See,
e.g., Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental
Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579, 591–92 (1999); see
also supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
85 See UNCITRAL Presiding Officer, supra note 82, at 3–6 (discussing the duties of the
presiding officer).
86 See Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264, 267–68 (2016)
(noting that businesses can experience a marked advantage over other groups in terms of access
to and influence over the international lawmaking process); Genevieve Tung, International Trade
Law and Information Policy, 42 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 241, 251–52 (2014) (noting the U.S. Trade
Act of 1974 gave corporate NGOs a preferential role in advising on international treaties). The
persuasiveness of a particular NGO can also vary depending on the field of endeavor (since
some issues may be considered more suitable for NGO participation than others) or on the
reputation of the NGO itself, in that those organizations that have relevant technical expertise
and that demonstrate unbiased analysis will likely be more influential than those that appear
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Perhaps the best way to overcome the advantages associated
with historically powerful NGOs is to provide more information
about the process to prospective participants through case studies
and other guides to the international lawmaking process.87  Indeed,
that is precisely what this Article has attempted to do.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite increased transparency in the field of international
law, the international treaty-making process is something of a
black box, particularly during the early stages of the process, when
governments and intergovernmental organizations are deciding
which projects to pursue.88  The preceding paragraphs have sought
to cure this lacuna by providing some insight into those procedures,
using the Singapore Convention, one of the newest treaties in the
area of private international law, as a case study.89
In so doing, this Article has adopted a dispute system design
perspective, focusing particularly on how the design initiative was
taken and how various theoretical and empirical assessments of in-
ternational commercial mediation helped decision-makers at UN-
CITRAL develop an appropriate instrument.90  With respect to the
first of these steps, taking the design initiative, the Article dis-
cussed how interested individuals might find the “right” person to
hear a proposal, meaning someone who has the authority—or ac-
cess to the authority—to move the proposal forward.91  However,
the discussion also described the importance of making the “right”
proposal, meaning one that is based on sound empirical and theo-
retical research.92
Because international treaties are adopted through consen-
sus,93 they must appeal to a broad range of public and private inter-
largely or entirely self-interested. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 1, at 11; Strong, Epistemic
Communities, supra note 48, at 507.
87 See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 81, at 333 (providing a case study of the International Whal-
ing Commission); Strong, Epistemic Communities, supra note 48, at 495 (providing a case study
of UNCITRAL Working Group II).
88 See Broude, supra note 2, at 1124–25.
89 See Singapore Convention, supra note 3.
90 See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 49–99.
91 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
93 See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 1, at 6 (noting UNCITRAL works through consensus
rather than through voting processes).
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ests in the signatory states.94  This requirement underscores the
need for dispute system designers to undertake objective, compre-
hensive, comparative research when developing their recommen-
dations, since proposals that are biased or ill-informed will
generally not be taken up by champions who must sell those ideas
to national or international constituencies.95  Instead, it is prefera-
ble to consider the needs of all relevant stakeholders through a
broad, interest-based analysis.96
Although the current analysis has focused on the first two
steps of the DSD process,97 that approach does not seek to mini-
mize the importance of other aspects of DSD.  Instead, the meth-
odology was chosen because the second two stages of the DSD
four-step process are better understood by international lawyers
than the first two elements.  For example, the third step in the DSD
process involves “creating systems and processes,” which in the
case of an international treaty involves the deliberation and negoti-
ation of the treaty language.98  Not only have the negotiations sur-
rounding the Singapore Convention been discussed at length
elsewhere,99 but an extensive amount of commentary exists about
how states negotiate and deliberate international treaties as a prac-
tical and theoretical matter.100  As a result, it is not necessary to
address those issues here.
The fourth step of the DSD process involves “implementing
the design, including evaluation and process or system modifica-
tion.”101  Implementation of an international treaty begins with the
initial signing of the instrument (occured with the Singapore Con-
vention on August 7, 2019, when an unprecedented 46 nations
signed the instrument),102 the subsequent ratification, accession,
94 See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 73–83; Strong, Epistemic Communities, supra note 48,
at 507.
95 See STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 62, at 30 (discussing how NGOs can undertake objec-
tive, transparent, and properly constructed social science research that can be relied upon by
decision-makers).
96 See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 70–80 (discussing interest-based negotiation and iden-
tification of stakeholders).
97 See id. at 17–26.
98 Id. at 16.
99 See Singapore Convention, supra note 3; Schnabel, Convention, supra note 10, at 4–8;
Strong, Epistemic Communities, supra note 48, at 495.
100 See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 609–11.
101 ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
102 See Status, Singapore Convention on Mediation, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails
.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-4&chapter=22&clang=_en; BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at
610–11; ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 261; Schnabel, Convention, supra note 10, at 8.
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approval, acceptance and/or integration of the treaty into domestic
law,103 and adoption or revision of various ancillary instruments
necessary to facilitate the proper operation of the system in ques-
tion.104  Again, these processes have been well-discussed both in
general terms and in the context of the Singapore Convention and
do not require additional analysis here.105
This last step includes the periodic re-evaluation and, if neces-
sary, revision of the system to ensure that the goals of the system
are being met.106  In many ways, it can be said that the Singapore
Convention is itself a result of the re-evaluation and revision of a
pre-existing system, since many people initially believed that the
international regime relating to international commercial media-
tion (traditionally referred to as international commercial concilia-
tion) was both complete and effective prior to Professor Strong’s
2014 article.107  However, now that the Singapore Convention has
been promulgated, it will need to be reviewed at some point in the
future, just as other international treaties are.108  However, it is
hoped that the Singapore Convention—like the New York Con-
vention that inspired its creation—will endure for decades to come,
103 See Schnabel, Self-Execution, supra note 29 (discussing how the Singapore Convention
might be implemented into domestic U.S. law); S.I. Strong, Monism and Dualism in International
Commercial Arbitration: Overcoming Barriers to Consistent Application of Principles of Public
International Law, in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: MONISM & DUALISM
547 (Marko Novakovic ed., 2013) (noting challenges to implementation in matters involving
cross-border procedural law).
104 See, e.g., Model Mediation Law, supra note 26 (amending the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Conciliation from 2002).
105 See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 610–11; ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 261; Schnabel,
Self-Execution, supra note 29.
106 See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 313.
107 See Strong, Empirical, supra note 39, at 1986; Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 31–32.
108 For example, there is an ongoing debate about whether the New York Convention should
be revisited and perhaps revised. See New York Convention, supra note 15; Emmanuel Gaillard,
Is There A Need to Revise the New York Convention?, 2 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 187, 187 (2008); V.V.
Veeder, Is There A Need to Revise the New York Convention?, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 499,
499 (2010). Some people believe that it is more important to increase adoption of existing instru-
ments and/or improve compliance with the terms of international laws that are already in effect
than it is to draft more international treaties, since many international agreements are ineffec-
tive, either as a result of sub-optimal compliance levels or because they have not yet come into
force due to a failure to obtain the necessary number of signatory parties. See Martin Ko¨ppel,
The Effectiveness of Soft Law: First Insights From Comparing Legally Binding Agreements With
Flexible Action Programs, 21 GEO. INT’L ENV. L. REV. 821, 824–25 (2009); Lawrence Susskind,
Strengthening the Global Environmental Treaty System, 25 ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Fall 2008, https:/
/issues.org/susskind/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
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providing parties and states with a reliable and effective means of
resolving international commercial disputes.109
Process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead once said that
“[t]he tragedy of the world is that those who are imaginative have
but slight experience, and those who are experienced have feeble
imaginations.  Fools act on imagination without knowledge, and
pedants act on knowledge without imagination.”110  Hopefully this
Article has provided those with imagination a bit more insight into
the black box of international treaty-making so that innovation and
experience can come together and produce international instru-
ments that are both useful and beneficial to all.
109 See New York Convention, supra note 15; Singapore Convention, supra note 3; U.S. Pro-
posal, supra note 24, at 3; Strong, Promise, supra note 10, at 32.
110 Alfred North Whitehead, Universities and Their Function, in THE AIMS OF EDUCATION
AND OTHER ESSAYS 93 (1967).
FROM SKEPTICISM TO REALITY—THE PATH
TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MEDIATED
SETTLEMENTS
Deborah Masucci*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Delegation1 to the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Working
Group II submitted a proposal for the Convention for the Enforce-
ment of Mediated Settlements (“Convention”) in May 2014.  The
proposal was met with skepticism.  Delegates questioned the ne-
cessity of a convention citing past discussions where similar propos-
als were tabled.  Some commentators went so far as to call the
proposal the “Mediators Full Employment Act.”  Despite the
pushback, the Working Group II decided to proceed with discus-
sions to determine what a convention would look like while gather-
ing more information from business users about the need for a
convention.  What followed can only be described as multi-party
cross-border mediation.
Clearly the mediation community supported a convention.
The real interest was to find out whether there is a business interest
for a convention.  Surveys were scoured to examine viewpoints and
new surveys were launched to measure interest including the
Global Pound Conference Series.  So what information was gath-
ered and how did the process unfold, and what impact will the
Convention have on the practice of mediation globally?
* Deborah Masucci is an arbitrator and mediator who is also co-Chair of the Board of the
International Mediation Institute. She is a global expert on dispute management and resolution
with over thirty years of experience in the field and an adjunct at Fordham Law School. For
more information about her background, see MASUCCI DISPUTE MANAGEMENT AND RESOLU-
TION SERVICES, www.debmasucciadr.com.
1 The United States is one of sixty member States that consider proposals for recommenda-
tion and adoption by UNCITRAL.
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II. IS THERE BUSINESS INTEREST FOR A CONVENTION AND
WILL ADOPTION IMPACT MEDIATION USE?
There were several surveys or studies undertaken during the
Working Group II deliberations.  These included: the 2015 Interna-
tional Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in Inter-
national Arbitration conducted by Queen Mary, University of
London and White and Case2 (Queen Mary/White and Case); the
International Mediation Institute3 (IMI) 2016 International Media-
tion & ADR Survey;4 Report on International Mediation and En-
forcement Mechanisms: Issued by the Institute for Dispute
Resolution (IDR) New Jersey City University (NJCU) School of
Business;5 and the global and local reports from the Global Pound
Conference Series.6  What did they say?
In 2015, Queen Mary/White and Case published its Interna-
tional Arbitration Survey.  There were 763 questionnaires received
and 105 interviews.7  After reviewing the data, the survey reports
that a convention on enforcement of mediation agreements and
settlement agreements resulting from mediations may or may not
have any effect on the practice of mediation, particularly in terms
of encouraging the use of mediation.  The reason for this lack of a
conclusion was because of the large number of “not applicable”
2 WHITE & CASE, QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, 2015 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION SURVEY: IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2015),
https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/qmul-international-
arbitration-survey-2015_0.pdf [hereinafter WHITE & CASE SURVEY].
3 IMI is a not-for-profit charitable organization established under Netherlands law. IMI
promotes high standards for the practice of mediation and offers certification criteria for
mediators, mediation advocates, inter-cultural, and training. For more information, see INTERNA-
TIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, www.imimediation.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
4 Results Published—IMI 2016 International Mediation & ADR Survey, IMI, https://www
.imimediation.org/2016/10/16/results-published-imi-2016-international-mediation-adr-survey/
(last visited Mar. 24, 2019); see also INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, 2016 INTERNA-
TIONAL MEDIATION & ADR SURVEY (2016), https://www.imimediation.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/02/2016_Biennial_Census_Survey_Report_Results.pdf [hereinafter IMI SURVEY].
5 Survey on the Enforceability of Mediated Settlement, IMI, https://www.imimediation.org/
research/surveys/survey-enforceability-mediated-settlement/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019); see also
SING. REF. BK., David S. Weiss & Michael R. Griffith, Report on Empirical Study of Business
Users Regarding International Mediation and Enforcement Mechanisms, 20 CARDOZO J. CON-
FLICT RESOL. 1133 (2019) [hereinafter IDR REPORT].
6 Global Pound, IMI, https://www.imimediation.org/research/gpc/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2019); see also GLOBAL POUND CONFERENCE SERIES: GLOBAL DATA TRENDS AND REGIONAL
DIFFERENCES (2017), Global-Data-Trends-and-Regional-Differences.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL
DATA TRENDS AND REGIONAL DIFFERENCES].
7 Respondents included in-house counsel, private practitioners, arbitrators, academics, ex-
perts, institutional staff, and third-party funders.
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answers given when respondents were asked whether, over the past
five years, they had experienced difficulties enforcing agreements
to mediate or whether they had experienced difficulties enforcing
settlement agreements resulting from a mediation.
Since the focus of the survey was international arbitration, it
was unsurprising that less than half of the respondents (44%) indi-
cated they used mediation to resolve cross-border disputes when
asked about their experience with different types of alternative dis-
pute resolution (ADR) processes.  Despite the lack of experience,
54% of respondents stated that a convention on the enforcement
of settlements resulting from mediation would encourage them to
use mediation more frequently.
There were both positives and negatives gathered from inter-
views about attitudes toward a convention.  Proponents believed
that a convention similar to the New York Convention for Arbitra-
tion Awards as well as any initiative that would give mediation
more “teeth” would increase its popularity among users.8  Some
interviewees went further, believing that the limited use of media-
tion is a result of a deficient understanding of the benefits.  Fur-
ther, they thought that the demystification of “mediation voodoo”
could increase its popularity.9  Education through the adoption of a
convention might go a long way to address this barrier to the use of
mediation.  On the opposite side, some interviewees already be-
lieve they are strong proponents of mediation and a convention
would not increase their use of mediation.  Others simply resisted
enforcement of mediation agreements.  Still, some interviewees be-
lieved that a convention is a solution looking for a problem.10
The IMI 2016 International Mediation and ADR Survey gath-
ered statistics from 813 respondents11 providing insights of stake-
holders regarding Mediation and Appropriate Dispute Resolution
Awareness globally.  A majority of all stakeholders except
mediators and educators stated that the enforcement of mediation
outcomes is extremely important.12  This was the first time regional
disparity was uncovered on the importance of enforcement of me-
diation settlements.  Enforcement of mediations constituted the
8 See WHITE & CASE SURVEY, supra note 2, at 31.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 32.
11 Respondents included users, advisors, service providers, educators, students, and govern-
ment/non-governmental organization (NGO) stakeholders and mediators. Respondents also
represented 67 countries speaking 49 different languages. See IMI SURVEY, supra note 4, at 5
(discussing further details).
12 See IMI SURVEY, supra note 4, at 25.
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lowest level of extreme importance in North America and Austra-
lia/NZ, compared to higher levels in other regions.13  This result
may reflect a greater experience with the mediation process in
North America and Australia/NZ and support of mediation
through judicial enforcement of settlement agreements.
The Report on International Mediation and Enforcement
Mechanisms: Issued by the IDR of the NJCU School of Business
sought responses particularly from users about the effect of a con-
vention on their attitudes towards mediation of cross-border dis-
putes.  Users/respondents answered (80%) that they would be
more likely to include a mediation clause into their agreements if
there was a global mechanism to enforce cross-border mediated
settlements.14  Similarly, users (84%) responded that they were
more likely to increase their use of mediation to resolve cross-bor-
der disputes if there was a mechanism to enforce settlements se-
cured through mediation.
The final survey was accomplished under the umbrella of
Global Pound Conference events.  Between March 2016 and June
2017, 28 such events were held in 24 countries with more than
3,00015 participants.  The same 20 questions were posed at each
event to attendees who voted their opinions before discussing the
different views.  Towards the end of the series, there was an oppor-
tunity for interested persons not able to physically attend an event
to participate in an on-line survey covering the same questions.
Approximately 750 people participated in this on-line survey.
Participants were divided into 5 categories16: 1) Parties that
are end-users of dispute resolution, generally in-house counsel and
executives (15%); 2) Advisors, private practice lawyers, and other
external consultants (25%); 3) Adjudicative Providers such as
judges, arbitrators, and their supporting institutions (13%); 4) Non-
Adjudicative Providers such as mediators, conciliators, and their
supporting institutions (32%); 5) Influencers such as academics,
government officers, and policy makers (15%).  The category was
self-selected by the respondents after being asked in which pocket
they spend most of their time.
The twenty questions were divided into 4 categories: 1) Access
to Justice & Dispute Resolution Systems: What do users want,
need, and expect?; 2) How is the market currently addressing par-
13 Id.
14 See IDR REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.
15 See GLOBAL DATA TRENDS AND REGIONAL DIFFERENCES, supra note 6, at 2.
16 See id. at 6.
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ties’ wants, needs, and expectations?; 3) How can dispute resolu-
tion be improved?  Overcoming obstacles and challenges; 4)
Promoting better access to justice: What action items should be
considered and by whom?17
Two questions provided insight into business interest for a
convention.  First, Session 3 Question 3 asked which areas would
improve commercial dispute resolution?  The global results reflect-
ing all events and on-line voting reflect that the adoption of a con-
vention would most improve commercial dispute resolution.  This
was the first choice for all stakeholders (over 50% for each of the
stakeholder groups) except mediation providers who selected use
of protocols.  The second choice selected is the use of protocols
promoting mediation before litigation or similar adjudicative
processes.  Here, mediation providers selected adoption of a con-
vention as their second choice.  Clearly the adoption of a conven-
tion was seen as a priority to improve commercial dispute
resolution.  When looking at local results, in 15 events including
the on-line reporting, users selected adoption of a convention as
their first choice.  In 10 events users included the adoption of a
convention in their top 3 choices.18  Second, Session 4 Question 3
asked where policy makers should focus their attention to promote
better access to justice for those involved in commercial disputes.
Users and advisors believe that policy makers should focus their
attention on a convention and legislation in their top 3 choices in
22 events including the on-line voting.
Two questions provided interest about how mediation will be
used in the future and who is best positioned to bring about
change.  First, Session 3 Question 2 asked what processes and tools
should be prioritized to improve the future of commercial dispute
resolution.  Overwhelmingly, the responses in all events indicated
an interest in combining binding and non-binding processes.  This
result evidences that mediation is gaining support not only as a
stand-alone process but also in case management approaches.  As
the data is analyzed, it is clear that users have the most interest in
combining processes.  They are willing to test the timing to meet
the needs of the individual case and are flexible about integrating
mediation whether as a preliminary step to other adjudicative
processes or at key milestones as a matter moves through the dis-
17 See id. at 7.
18 In two events, adoption of a convention was the fourth choice and in two events no users
responded to this question.
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pute resolution spectrum.19  Surely, a convention will compliment
this increased use in mediation processes by strengthening enforce-
ment of settlements without having to rely on arbitration or litiga-
tion.  Second, Session 3 Question 5 asked which stakeholders have
the potential to be most influential in bringing about change in
commercial dispute resolution.  Governments and ministries of jus-
tice, as well as courts and adjudicators, are seen as having a pivotal
role in influencing future change.  However, in terms of sustaining
change, respondents rely on in-house counsel, advisors, and par-
ties.  Here is where regional and cultural differences in approach
may have a hand in change.  In Asia, roll-up responses reflect the
importance of governments and ministries of justice having a pri-
mary role in creating change.  In North America and other parts of
the world, courts’ active promotion of mediation through court an-
nexed programs, including the establishment of court ADR pro-
grams, are driving greater use of mediation and enforcement of
pre-dispute resolution agreements.
III. HOW DID THE WORKING GROUP II PROCESS UNFOLD?
For many who participated as delegates or observers, the
Working Group II deliberations proceeded very much like a multi-
party mediation.  The Chair of each session served as the lead me-
diator, framing questions, feeding back commentary by delegations
and observers by reframing and synthesizing, summarizing conclu-
sions and next steps, and providing homework during breaks be-
tween sessions.  The member state delegations might be seen as the
mediation parties.  When discussions started, the member state
delegations included arbitrators in their ranks.  It quickly became
clear that mediation experts were also needed so the composition
of the delegations either changed or were expanded to include
them.  The mediation experts in each of the delegations and the
observer groups served as co-mediators, especially during consulta-
tion breaks.  When the Working Group was in session, convening
all delegates, it served as a joint session with the consultation
breaks operating as private caucuses.  The Secretariat was the
19 IMI, the College of Commercial Arbitrators, and the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolu-
tion, Pepperdine School of Law established a Mixed Mode Task Force to develop practical gui-
dance for mixed mode processes including ethical considerations. See Mixed Mode Task Force,
IMI, https://www.imimediation.org/about-imi/who-are-imi/mixed-mode-task-force/ (last visited
Mar. 24, 2019).
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1129
Chair’s expert arm.  They provided information on previous delib-
erations or rules and decisions as well as drafting advice to reduce
internal conflict among previously adopted UNCITRAL Conven-
tions.  During and between sessions, educational programs were
conducted to ensure a constant flow of information supporting de-
cision-making.  Between sessions, member state delegations con-
ferred with their ministries of justice and governments because
outcomes would ultimately have to be considered for adoption by
them.  It was up to the member delegations to explain delibera-
tions and decisions as well as bring concerns back to the next
Working Group session.  In the end the Secretariat provided advice
as to a way forward by recommending the adoption of both a con-
vention and uniform law.  As in any mediation involving govern-
ments or boards of directors, it is not up to the member state
delegations to convince the member states to adopt the Conven-
tion or model law.  Here’s where the real work starts.
IV. WHAT IMPACT WILL THE CONVENTION HAVE ON THE
PRACTICE OF MEDIATION GLOBALLY?
In 2014, a comment was published in the Kluwer Arbitration
Blog opining that mediation growth has stalled.20  While the com-
ment was published to provide rationale for the Global Pound
Conference, the reasoning is equally relevant to the impact the
Convention will have on the practice of mediation globally.  While
mediation is established in a number of countries there is still an
opportunity for huge expansion.  The surveys described herein all
focus on cross-border commercial dispute resolution, where a con-
vention would have a greater impact rather than disputes that are
local or national in nature.  When these surveys were launched me-
diation was almost never used in investor-state cases, international
trade disputes, class actions, or other cross-border commercial dis-
putes.  Mediation is available under international arbitration rules
but too often parties don’t take advantage of the process.
The Queen Mary/White and Case study found it was inconclu-
sive whether the adoption of a convention would have an impact
on the future growth of mediation.  But as stated above, 54% of
20 See Deborah Masucci, Time for Another Big Bang in Alternative Dispute Resolution: The
World Needs a Global Pound Conference, KLUWER MEDIATION BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), http://
mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/02/18/time-for-another-big-bang-in-alternative-dis-
pute-resolution-the-world-needs-a-global-pound-conference/.
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respondents replied that a convention on the enforcement of medi-
ation settlements would encourage them to use mediation more
frequently.  The IDR survey reported that users were more likely
to include pre-dispute clauses and use mediation for cross-border
disputes if a convention for enforcement of mediation settlements
was available.  The Global Pound Conference series results were
the strongest in naming a convention a priority to improve dispute
resolution of commercial disputes in the future.  These results fore-
shadow a future increase in the use of mediation for cross-border
commercial disputes.
One area where we already have seen interest is in the use of
mediation to resolve investor-state disputes.  Since 2014, IMI has
been working with the investor-state community to advance the
use of mediation through training and rulemaking conducted by its
Investor-State Task Force.21  This work includes delivering training
to interested parties and mediators, developing standards, and
commenting on rule making and protocols offered by the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the En-
ergy Charter Secretariat, UNCITRAL, the European Union, and
others.  A convention will only push interest and action further.
However, a convention alone is not the final answer.  Since its
establishment in 2007, IMI has promoted global standards for me-
diation practice.  Part and parcel of these standards is ensuring the
quality of mediators and the practice of mediation through certifi-
cation and quality control.  This infrastructure needs to be rein-
forced to ensure confidence and trust.
While a convention is seen as the priority to improve commer-
cial dispute resolution in the future, certification systems22 (29%)
and quality control (28%) were high on the list of options that re-
spondents sought.  However, certification has been resisted.  Pro-
ponents of certification believe it is a process to ensure quality by
providing objective, measurable criteria for the performance of
mediation.  Opponents believe certification is unnecessary because
the market self-regulates when users select mediators who they or
someone they respect trusts mediators with a proven track record.
To begin with, there needs to be clarification of terms.23  An
individual who takes a mediation course receives a diploma ac-
21 See Investor-State Mediation Task Force, IMI, https://www.imimediation.org/about-imi/
who-are-imi/ism-tf/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
22 See Deborah Masucci, Moving Mediation Practice Forward—Is It Time for Certification?,
N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW., Spring 2019, at 40–42 (discussing the pros and cons to certification).
23 See Thierry Garby, What is a Good Mediator?, CORP. MEDIATION J. (2018).
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knowledging that the person understood the course material.  The
real test comes as the person secures case appointments.  After re-
ceiving a diploma, the person may or may not be eligible to be
placed on provider rosters.  Inclusion on a roster is a form of attes-
tation that the person has what it takes to be a mediator.  The in-
formation provided to parties considering mediators on a list is
basically biographical information.  Feedback about the mediator’s
style or process skills or other expertise is shared by word of
mouth.  Being certified, however, should be the highest form of
acknowledgement for mediators who are experienced and have se-
cured feedback from people who experienced the mediator’s per-
formance firsthand.  IMI and the Singapore International
Mediation Institute24 publish feedback digests consolidating the
feedback so future users can have access to the information.  The
digests are compiled by independent reviewers and are publicly
available at no cost.
Certification standards include criteria covering knowledge,
training, and performance that establish quality.  A Code of Ethics
followed by certified mediators ensures professionalism and engen-
ders trust.
The expansion of mediation that is expected from a conven-
tion will reinforce the need for a mediator quality assurance system
and a mechanism to share information about the performance and
competency of mediators to resolve complex cases especially in-
volving cross-border or investor-state disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
The results are in.  There is interest in and a need for the Con-
vention for the Enforcement of Mediated Settlements.  More work
is necessary and will be undertaken through education and training
so that potential users will understand the benefits of mediation
and tear down the impediments to the effective use of the process.
A signing ceremony was held on August 7, 2019 in Singapore.25
Substantial support for the Convention was shown with 46 coun-
tries signing the document during the proceedings.  Now member
24 For more information, see SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, http://
www.simi.org.sg/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
25 For a list of countries that have signed the Convention in Singapore, see Singapore Con-
vention Signed, IMI, https://www.imimediation.org/2019/08/07/singapore-convention-signed/ (last
visited Aug. 20, 2019).
1132CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1123
states must ratify the Convention to ensure meaningful implemen-
tation and use.  At least three member states must ratify for the
Convention to activate.  The big bang generating interest in media-
tion has commenced.  Now let’s see it accelerate.
REPORT ON EMPIRICAL STUDY OF BUSINESS
USERS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION AND ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS
Issued by the Institute for Dispute Resolution (IDR) NJCU
School of Business to the International Mediation Institute for the
benefit of delegates attending the UNCITRAL Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement) 67th Session
Professor David S. Weiss, Esq.* & Michael R. Griffith, Esq.**
I. INTRODUCTION
This report seeks to present the research gathered by an inter-
national quantitative-qualitative study of users’ assessments of the
enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements
* Professor David S. Weiss, Esq., is the Founder and Director of the Institute for Dispute
Resolution (IDR) and Assistant Professor at the Business School of New Jersey City University.
He recently was awarded the James B. Boskey Award, the highest honor in New Jersey for his
contributions in mediation policy. He received his Juris Doctor at New York Law School, studied
international arbitration law at Cornell Law School Paris Summer Institute, and transformative
mediation at the Institute for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (ICP), Bern, Switzer-
land. David is IMI Certified Mediator and has held appointments at The United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). He has lectured and has hosted
international conferences on mediation both in the United States and in Europe. Professor Weiss
has extensive publications in the field of mediation and policy to address risk and conflict
through mediation. He is the author of the “New Jersey Arbitration, Conciliation and Mediation
Act” addressing enforcement of international settlement agreements as awards.
** Michael R. Griffith, Esq. clerked for the Honorable Robert P. Contillo, P.J. Ch. and the
Honorable Menelaos W. Toskos, J.S.C. in the Chancery Division—General Equity Part in Ber-
gen County. He graduated from Rutgers School of Law in 2016, where he was the Senior Notes
Editor of the Women’s Rights Law Reporter. He founded the Rutgers Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution Society and coached the Rutgers-Newark Team for the 2016 ABA Mediation Competi-
tion. He previously competed in the ICC Paris Mediation Competition, the CDRC Vienna IBA-
VIAC with the NJCU team, and the AAA/NYSBA Arbitration Team.
The authors would like to thank Deborah Masucci, Chair and Board Member of IMI, Jer-
emy Lack, Global Coordinator of the GPC Series, Michael McIlwrath, Chair of the GPC Series,
Director of IMI and Global Chief Litigation Counsel, GE Oil & Gas, and Irena Vanenkova,
Executive Director of IMI & the IMI Committee that diligently worked on the NJCU IDR
survey questionnaire for their support and feedback. The authors would also like to thank Mansi
Karol, LL.M. Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 2017 and LL.M. Queen Mary University of
London 2011, for her commentary on data and her contributions to the analysis of the GPC
survey results. Further, the authors would like to thank Bhaumil Patel for his assistance with
creating the graphical representations of the IMI/NJCU IDR survey results.
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resulting from conciliation.1  This report found that the majority of
users and stakeholders in this survey and the GPC believe that a
uniform global mechanism to enforce mediation settlements would
improve commercial dispute resolution.  This study was created by
the International Mediation Institute (“IMI”)2 and the New Jersey
City University Institute for Dispute Resolution (“NJCU IDR”)3
in order to assist the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) and UNCITRAL Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement), in particular, to address questions raised in
the Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work
of its sixty-sixth session.4  This report will additionally analyze re-
sponses on the desirability for a Convention for the enforcement of
mediated settlements from the Global Pound Conference Survey
Data Results from March 2016 to September 2017 (“GPC Sur-
vey”).5  This report seeks to further the objectives of the research
conducted by Dr. S.I. Strong on the use and perception of interna-
tional commercial mediation and conciliation in the international
legal and business communities.6
This report will proceed as follows.  Part II describes the meth-
odology of the IMI and NJCU IDR study in conjunction with ana-
lyzing the GPC Survey.  Part III provides basic information of the
demographics of the users, their sectors of business, and other per-
tinent data that can be useful for further academic scholarly re-
view.  Part IV analyzes the user’s response to the surveys.  Part V
will analyze pertinent questions from the GPC Survey.  Finally,
Part VI provides concluding thoughts on the results of this report.
1 The use of conciliation in this report is mutually inclusive with mediation.
2 See INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, https://imimediation.org/ (last visited Aug. 3,
2019).
3 See NJCU SCHOOL OF BUSINESS INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, http://www.njcu
.edu/academics/institute-dispute-resolution-idr (last visited Aug. 3, 2019).
4 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement)
on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901 (Feb. 16, 2017).
5 GLOBAL POUND CONFERENCE SERIES 2016–2017, CUMULATED DATA RESULTS MARCH
2016–SEPTEMBER 2017, https://www.globalpound.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017-09-18-
Final-GPC-Series-Results-Cumulated-Votes-from-the-GPC-App-Mar.-2016-Sep.-2017.pdf. For
the most recent data from the GPC, please visit the website at http://globalpoundconference
.org/.
6 S.I. Strong, Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation: A
Preliminary Report on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on International
Commercial Mediation and Conciliation (University of Missouri School of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 2014–28, 2014) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2526302).
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The responses to the survey questions will be provided if re-
quested with personal identifying information removed for confi-
dentiality purposes.7
II. METHODOLOGY
This report follows the pedagogical and methodological pro-
cess as reflected in the report issued by Dr. S.I. Strong, titled Use
and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Concili-
ation: A Preliminary Report on Issues Relating to the Proposed UN-
CITRAL Convention on International Commercial Mediation and
Conciliation (November 17, 2014), which this report adopts.8  Em-
pirical studies concerning international law is an emerging field
which creates and records valuable information allowing for in-
formed assessments and advocacy by interested parties.  Past stud-
ies have established that international commercial mediation and
conciliation can form the basis of an empirical study when the
study’s methodology is in compliance with the social science re-
search norms.9  This report has used prior international law empiri-
cal research and the guiding principles of social science research as
the foundation for the drafting of survey questions more fully ex-
plored infra.
This report will reflect the increase in mediation interest from
the business sector and a need for policy stakeholders to provide
support to foster growth and clarity of process in this field.  One of
the key elements for adopting mediation for the business commu-
nity is enforceability of international commercial settlement agree-
ments.10  This report seeks to gather the opinions of those who
would most likely be affected by the adoption of any prospective
drafts or proposals by Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) with
emphasis on the users.  This report seeks to extract the views of the
wider business community, their advisors, providers, and those that
may influence the mediation space because there currently is no
7 The NJCU IDR/IMI Survey was launched online between June 2016 and up until March 4,
2017. The data was collected using Survey Monkey Analytics and was disseminated through the
International Mediation Institute platform, various international chambers of commerce, and
targeted stakeholders through the IDR platform.
8 For a complete review of methodology concerning gathering data from a survey, please
see id.
9 See id. at 4–5 and note 6.
10 See David Weiss & Brian Hodgkinson, Adoptive Arbitration: An Alternative Approach to
Enforcing Cross-Border Mediation Settlement Agreements, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 275 (2014).
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convention for the enforcement of cross border mediated settle-
ments by seeking responses to questions concerning:
• The extent commercial users use or were advised to use
mediation in a cross-border dispute.
• The reasoning as to why parties do not seek to solve cross-
border disputes through mediation.
• The consideration of including a mediation clause in a
cross-border contract.
• Potential methods which would increase the use of media-
tion clauses in cross-border contracts, and mediation in
cross-border disputes.
• The user’s experience finding qualified mediators.
• Opt In/Opt Out opinion of a universal mediation
instrument.
• Negative effects of including various types of defenses
under such mediation instruments.
• Whether legislation or conventions that promote recogni-
tion and enforcement of settlements reached in mediation
would improve the future of commercial dispute
resolution.
• Where should policy makers, governments, and adminis-
trators focus their attention to promote better access to
justice for those involved in commercial disputes?
The GPC provided twenty “Core Questions”11 that were
asked to stakeholders during the conference with five core ques-
tions asked in the beginning of each session.12  The “Core Ques-
tions” were created with input from representatives of all
stakeholders’ groups and members of the GPC’s Academic
Committee.13
11 GPC Series 2016–17 Core Questions For Commercial Disputes To Be Used At All GPC
Events, GLOBAL POUND CONFERENCE SERIES 2016–17, http://www.globalpoundconference.org/
Documents/GPC%20Series%202016-17%20—%20Core%20Questions%20—%20Publication%
20Copy%20(March%206%202016).pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2017). GPC defines commercial
disputes in its introduction to the core questions, “For the purposes of the GPC Series, ‘commer-
cial disputes’ includes disputes between business entities, business partners, or business entities
and public sector entities, whether arising from contract, tort or any other grounds. They include
disputes between individual entrepreneurs, small and medium-size enterprises, multinationals
and state-owned enterprises.”
12 For a complete overview of the GPC methodology, see JEREMY LACK, A SUMMARY OF
THE PRELIMINARY GLOBAL POUND CONFERENCE (GPC) DATA IN 2016: TRENDS AND THEMES,
https://www.attorney-mediators.org/resources/Documents/GPC%20Series%20-%20A%20Pre
liminary%20Summary%20%20of%20the%20GPC%20Results%20in%202016%20by%20Jere
my%20Lack.pdf.
13 Id.
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III. DEMOGRAPHICS
The IMI and NJCU IDR survey was composed of a wide vari-
ety of users from the international arena.  Of those users who
chose to identify their location, the IMI and NJCU IDR survey
received responses from users from Ghana(1), Australia (3), Mex-
ico (1), Italy (3), Luxembourg (1), Ireland (6), United Kingdom
(4), China (9), USA (6), Switzerland (7), Spain (1), Afghanistan
(1), Germany (4), Jordan (6), Turkey (2), Kenya (1), Portugal (3),
Austria (2), Guyana (1), Sweden (1), France (2), Slovenia (4), Ser-
bia (2), and Slovakia(1).
Users represented various fields and professions such as law,
construction, energy, architecture, international business, health-
care, food and beverage service, water and waste management,
tourism, trading, education, and finance.
Twenty-eight GPC events were held across 22 countries in Af-
rica, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and addi-
tional votes were also collected by online voting.14  Approximately
2,500 stakeholders having a wide range of expertise involved in the
prevention and resolution of commercial disputes shared their
votes to explore possible ways of shaping the future of dispute res-
olution and improving access to justice in the 21st century who
worked both domestically and internationally.155
The mix of voters varied slightly from session to session, but
on average was comprised of: 15% users; 26% advisors; 14% adju-
dicative providers; 30% non-adjudicative providers; and 15%
influencers.16
Users (also referred to as “Parties” in the GPC Series) are
defined as those who are involved in disputes and benefit from
commercial dispute resolution services.17  Advisors are defined as
those who assist users/parties in managing their disputes, such as
lawyers, experts, and forensic accountants.18  Adjudicative provid-
ers are defined as those who provide adjudicative commercial or
civil dispute resolution services or organizations providing such
services (e.g., judges or arbitrators).19  Non-adjudicative providers
are defined as those who provide non-adjudicative commercial or
14 See supra note 5, at slide 2.
15 See supra note 5, at slides 9–11.
16 Id. These numbers are taken from the demographic results for Session 1 at slide 15.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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civil dispute resolution such as conciliators, mediators, or
ombudsmen.200  Influencers are defined as people who do not par-
ticipate but are influential in commercial disputes, such as academ-
ics, government officials, educators, and policy advisors.21
IV. USERS’ RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS
This section of the Report will more fully analyze the ques-
tions and answers to the IMI and NJCU IDR Survey.  Subsections
A–K focus on the IMI and NJCU IDR Survey.
a. As a Commercial User, how often have you used or
were advised to use mediation in a cross-border dis-
pute as a best practice in business?
Of the 103 possible responses, 99 users answered the question
with 4 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option of
answering: “Always,” “Frequently,” “Infrequently,” or “Not at
all.”  The most commonly selected answer was “Infrequently” with
40% (40 responses) of users selecting this option.  The second and
third most popular selections were “Frequently” with 26% (26 re-
sponses) and “Not at all” with 24% (24 responses), a narrow mar-
gin.  The least chosen answer was “Always” with 9% (9 responses)
of users selecting this option.
A surprisingly low number of users are being advised to use
mediation in a cross-border dispute.  Perhaps even more eye-open-
ing is that 24% of respondents selected “not at all,” meaning they
have received no advisement about using mediation.  Further, in
the GPC data we find that advisors are the primary stakeholders
responsible for ensuring parties involved in commercial disputes
understand their process options and the possible consequences of
each process before deciding which process to adopt.22  This may
be a failure of both educating lawyers and business leaders about
the mediation process.
b. Please rank the reasons why you believe parties do
not try to solve their commercial cross-border dispute
through mediation? (1 is the most frequent reason, 4
is the least frequent experience).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Session 2 Question 4 of the GPC Survey, where “external lawyers” and “in-house
lawyers” were the parties primarily responsible for educating parties about dispute resolution.
See supra note 5, at slide 34.
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Of the 103 possible responses, 99 users answered the question
with 4 users choosing to skip this question.  Each answer could be
ranked by the users by selecting a number between 1 and 4, with 1
representing the most frequent reason and 4 representing the least
frequent reason.  The following answers were available to be
ranked: “They are unfamiliar with mediation,” “They had a bad
experience previously with mediation,” “They had a bad experi-
ence previously with arbitration,” and “There is no universal mech-
anism to enforce a mediated settlement.”  The results of this survey
are given in the table below.
  1 2 3 4 TOTAL SCORE 
They are 
unfamiliar with 
mediation 
57.14%
48 
17.86%
15 
10.71%
9 
14.29%
12 84 
 
3.18 
They had a bad 
experience 
previously with 
mediation 
10.81%
8 
27.03%
20 
29.73%
22 
32.43%
24 74 
 
2.16 
They had a bad 
experience 
previously with 
arbitration 
7.89%
6 
21.05%
16 
34.21%
26 
36.84%
28 76 
 
2.00 
There is no 
universal 
mechanism to 
enforce a 
mediated 
settlement 
28.09%
25 
32.58%
29 
20.22%
18 
19.10%
17 89 
 
2.70 
This question further solidifies the conclusion that there is a
surprising lack of knowledge about mediation amongst users, with
57.14% of users responding that being unfamiliar with mediation
was the most frequent reason that they believed parties do not try
to solve their commercial cross-border dispute through mediation.
As knowledge about mediation expands, we would expect to see
this number rise.  Also of note is the second-highest ranked reason
that respondents listed, which was that there is no universal mecha-
nism to enforce a mediated settlement.  A lack of a universal en-
forcement mechanism may drive parties to other dispute resolution
processes that users know have a guaranteed enforcement manner,
providing certainty to the outcome of the dispute.
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c. How often does your business consider including a
mediation clause in a cross-border contract between
you and a counterparty?
Of the 103 possible responses, 99 users answered the question
with 4 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option of
answering: “Always,” “Sometimes,” and “Never.”  The most com-
mon answer was “Sometimes” with 49% (49 responses) of users
selecting this option.  The second most common answer was “Al-
ways” with 27% (27 responses) of users selecting this choice and
the least selected answer was “never” with 23% (23 responses) of
users selecting this choice.
This survey shows a general positive direction of users to in-
corporate mediation clauses into cross-border contracts, though as
time progresses and parties become more knowledgeable about
mediation this number should increase.  If there was a universal
enforcement mechanism, one would expect the numbers to shift
towards an increase in “always” answers, because more certainty of
outcome would be provided, though more research should be con-
ducted into why 23% of respondents never consider including a
mediation clause in a cross-border contract.
d. Would you be more likely to include a mediation
clause if there was a uniform global mechanism to en-
force mediation settlements, i.e. similar to the 1958
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”)?
Of the 103 possible responses, 98 users answered the question
with 5 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option of
answering: “Yes,” “No,” “No opinion,” or “Comment.”  By far the
most common choice was an answer of “Yes” with 80% (79 re-
sponses) of users selecting this choice.  The second most common
choice was “No opinion” with 8% (8 responses) of users selecting
this choice.  “No” was selected by 7% (7 responses) of users, and 4
users commented on the question.  Comments appear to synchro-
nize with the possible selected answers with three comments align-
ing with a “yes” answer and four comments aligning with a “no” or
“no opinion” answer.
Two comments stood out, with a user commenting “Lack of
uniform enforcement mechanism is a problem” and another com-
menting that a global enforcement mechanism would not increase
their use of mediation clauses because “Clients are afraid because
of corruption, influence, etc. . . .”  Ensuring users have faith and
trust in the process is critical for parties to be able to engage in
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good-faith mediation.  It may be that as more countries adopt me-
diation as a viable dispute resolution process, there is a growing
period where confidence in the process needs to be built, which
will come with time as more users engage in mediation.
The high majority response of “yes” to this question strongly
supports the proposition that a uniform global mechanism to en-
force mediation settlements will increase the number of mediation
clauses included in contracts.  This may be because of the added
certainty of being able to enforce a mediated settlement agreement
where currently there is no such guarantee.
e. How often is the inability of the parties to find a qual-
ified mediator an impediment to mediation?
Of the 103 possible responses, 98 users answered the question
with 5 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option of
answering: “Frequently,” “Infrequently,” or “Never.”  The most
common answer was “Infrequently” with 41% (41 responses) of
users selecting this answer, by a narrow margin compared to the
39% (39 responses) of users who selected “Frequently.”  The least
common answer was “never” with 18% (18 responses) of users se-
lecting this option.
The question reflects a lack of available qualified mediators as
39% of users responded that they are frequently unable to find a
qualified mediator.  While it is generally positive that 61% of users
are generally able to find qualified mediators, there is a vast
amount of room for improvement.  The inability to find a qualified
mediator has an impact on the use of mediation, and guaranteeing
a level of “quality control” of mediators will likely help to promote
mediation and increase its advancement.
f. Would you be more likely to use or increase your use
of mediation in a cross border dispute with another
party or multiple parties of different jurisdictions if a
uniform global mechanism was in place similar to the
New York Convention to enforce a settlement agree-
ment reached in the mediation process?
Of the 103 possible responses, 94 users answered the question
with 9 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option of
answering: “More Likely,” “Less Likely,” “No difference,” or
“Comment.”  By far the most selected answer was “More likely”
with 84% (79 responses) of users selecting this option.  The second
highest selected answer was “No difference” with 6% (6 responses)
of users selecting this choice.  Two percent (2 responses) of users
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chose “Less likely”; and seven percent (7 responses) of users chose
to leave a comment.
Much like question 4, the overwhelming majority of users an-
swered that a global enforcement mechanism would increase their
use of mediation.  A global mediation enforcement agreement
would promote and increase the use of mediation in cross-border
disputes.
g. If there was a uniform global mechanism for enforce-
ment of a mediated settlement should the parties
have the chance to: opt-in, opt-out, comment?
Of the 103 possible responses, 93 users answered the question
with 10 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option
of answering: “Opt-in,” “Opt-out,” or “Comment.”  The most se-
lected answer was “Opt-in” with 60% (56 responses) of users
choosing this selection.  Thirty percent (28 responses) of users
chose the selection of “Opt-out.”  Nine users chose to comment on
this question.  Four users commented, in favor of an opt-out provi-
sion, while one user believes it should be an “opt-in” system.
Here the majority of users support creating an “opt-in” sys-
tem.  This could be because parties would like to use this as a bar-
gaining chip or a negotiation tactic as parties draft contracts.
h. How often do you face post-mediation challenges to a
mediated settlement agreement in a cross-border dis-
pute on the grounds of capacity, duress, or fraud?
Of the 103 possible responses, 92 users answered the question
with 11 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option
of answering, “Often,” “Sometimes,” “Never,” or “Comment.”
The most common answer was “Never” which 47% (44 responses)
of users selected.  The second most common answer was “Some-
times” which 36% (34 responses) of users selected.  Only 2% (2
responses) of users selected “Often” while 13% (12 responses) of
users chose to comment on this question.
One user commented, “I haven’t come across this personally,
but I know it exists, as with arbitrary awards.”  Four users com-
mented a variation of, “I have not experienced that situation.”  An-
other user echoed a similar sentiment with, “Very rarely.”
It appears from the answers provided in the comment section
as well as the majority of responses to the survey that parties are
not facing the challenges of fraud, duress, or lack of capacity when
a mediated settlement agreement is challenged.  As mediation
grows it is possible or more probable for more users to face an
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increase of challenges of these defenses to their mediated settle-
ment agreements.
i. Would you be less likely to use mediation if a Uniform
Global Mechanism of Enforcement of mediation set-
tlements included any defenses?
Of the 103 possible responses, 93 users answered the question
with 10 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option
of answering, “Yes,” “No,” “No opinion,” or “Comment.”  The
most common selected answer was “No” with 44% (41 responses)
of users selecting this option.  The second most commonly selected
answer was “Yes” with 27% (26 responses) of users selecting this
choice.  Twenty percent (19 responses) of users had no opinion.
7.5% (7 responses) of users chose to comment on this question.
Three users commented no, so long as the defenses were lim-
ited to the New York Convention, while another user provided that
it depends on how the relevant rules are structured.  Another user
commented, “Everything helps which encourages the parties to
find a negotiated/mediated settlement of their dispute.”
The user comment seems to be crucial here, as ultimately the
goal is to help parties resolve their disputes.  Defenses do not ap-
pear to particularly limit the willingness of users to engage in
mediation.
j. Have you ever reached a mediated settlement agree-
ment that was not honored therefore requiring you to
re-litigate the enforcement of the agreement in na-
tional court based on general contract defenses?
Of the 103 possible responses, 92 users answered the question
with 11 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option
of answering, “Frequently,” “Infrequently,” “Never,” or “Com-
ment.”  The most frequently selected answer was “Never” with
48% (44 responses) of users selecting this option.  The second most
selected choice was “Infrequently” with 35% (32 responses) of
users selecting this choice.  Nine percent (8 responses) of users se-
lected “Frequently” and 9% (8 responses) commented on this
question.  All eight comments expressed that this event had not
occurred to them personally.
Surprisingly, 35% of users selected “Infrequently,” which pro-
vides that this is an occurrence that is impacting users.  This means
that 44% of users have had a mediated settlement agreement that
was not honored and they were required to re-litigate the enforce-
ment of the agreement in a national court.  If this was not a prob-
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lem, we would expect to see users answering “Infrequently” at a
much lower percentage.
k. Would you prefer that a Uniform Global Mechanism
for Enforcement of mediation settlement include lim-
ited defenses similar to Article V of the New York
Convention such as invalidity of the award under the
law or incapacity?
Of the 103 possible responses, 92 users answered the question
with 11 users choosing to skip this question.  Users had the option
of answering, “Yes,” “No,” “No Opinion,” or “Comment.”  The
most common selected answer was “Yes” with 54% (50 responses)
from users.  The second most common selection was “No” with
22% (21 responses) of users selecting this choice.  Seventeen per-
cent (16 responses) of users had no opinion on this question, while
five users commented on the question.
Here it is expected that users would support similar defenses
as to that of the New York Convention as the users’ experience
with the New York Convention allows them to be familiar with
process, and would provide a degree of familiarity to a global me-
diation enforcement convention.
A uniform global mechanism to enforce mediation settlements
would provide a strong increase in the use of mediation in cross
border disputes and an increase of mediation clauses in contracts.
In the questions asked about a uniform global mechanism to en-
force mediation settlements, users overwhelmingly answered that
such a mechanism would encourage users to mediate.  Further, this
result can be seen in the GPC survey as well.
V. GPC SERIES QUESTIONS
l. GPC Session 3 Question 3: Which of the following ar-
eas would most improve commercial dispute resolu-
tion? (Please rank your three preferred answers in
order of priority: “1st choice” = 3 points, “2nd choice”
= 2 points, “3rd choice” = 1 point)
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Stakeholders had seven choices to select: (1) accreditation or
certification systems for dispute resolution providers; (2) cost sanc-
tions against parties for failing to try non-adjudicative processes
(e.g., mediation or conciliation) before litigation/arbitration; (3)
legislation or conventions that promote recognition and enforce-
ment of settlements; (4) including those reached in mediation; (5)
quality control and complaint mechanisms applicable to dispute
resolution providers; (6) rules governing third party funding; and
(7) other.  The most common first choice was Answer option 1 with
a 51% average popularity ranking (3322/6477 possible points):
“legislation or conventions that promote recognition and enforce-
ment of settlements, including those reached in mediation.”  The
second most popular choice was Answer option 5, with a 47% av-
erage popularity ranking (3033/6477 possible points): “use of pro-
tocols promoting non-adjudicative processes before adjudicative
processes (e.g., opt-out).  The third most common choice was An-
swer option 2, with a 36% average popularity ranking (2354/6477
possible points): “cost sanctions against parties for failing to try
non-adjudicative processes (e.g., mediation or conciliation) before
litigation/arbitration.”  The next most common selection was An-
swer option 1: “Accreditation or certification systems for dispute
resolution providers” (with a 29% popularity ranking); followed by
Answer option 4: “quality control and complaint mechanisms ap-
plicable to dispute solution providers” (with a 28% popularity
ranking).  Answer option 6: “Rules governing third party funding,”
received a 5% ranking (321/6477 possible points).  Answer option 7
“Other” received 3% (208 points).
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The majority of the stakeholders in the GPC believe that a
uniform global mechanism to enforce mediation settlements would
improve commercial dispute resolution, with 51% of users clearly
supporting a uniform global mechanism to enforce mediation set-
tlements as their first preference.  This is consistent with the find-
ings of the IMI and NJCU IDR survey where users
overwhelmingly voted that such an agreement would increase their
use of mediation.
m. Session 4 Question 3: To promote better access to
justice for those involved in commercial disputes,
where should policy makers, governments, and ad-
ministrators focus their attention?  (Please rank your
three preferred answers in order of priority: “1st
choice” = 3 points, “2nd choice” = 2 points, “3rd
choice” = 1 point)
Stakeholders had six options to select: (1) legislation or con-
ventions promoting recognition and enforcement of settlements in-
cluding those reached in mediation; (2) making non-adjudicative
processes (mediation or conciliation) compulsory and/or a process
parties can “opt-out” of before adjudicative processes can be initi-
ated; (3) pre-dispute or early stage case evaluation or assessment
systems using third party advisors who will not be involved in sub-
sequent proceedings; (4) reducing pressures on the courts to make
them more efficient and accessible; (5) use of protocols promoting
non-adjudicative processes (mediation or conciliation) before adju-
dicative processes; and (6) other: (please specify).  Interestingly,
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Answer options 3, 2, 1, and 5 scored almost equally.  Answer op-
tion 3 “Pre-dispute or early stage case evaluation or assessment
systems using third party advisors who will not be involved in sub-
sequent proceedings” was the most popular with 47% percent of
possible votes (2798/5916 points).  Answer option 2 “Making non-
adjudicative processes (mediation or conciliation) compulsory and/
or a process parties can “opt-out” of before adjudicative processes
can be initiated” received 46% (2734/59916 possible points).  An-
swer option 1, with a 43% popularity ranking (2552/5916 points)
came in third place for “Legislation or conventions promoting rec-
ognition and enforcement of settlements including those reached in
mediation.”  The fourth most popular choice was Answer option 5
“Use of protocols promoting non-adjudicative processes (media-
tion or conciliation) before adjudicative processes” with a 42%
ranking (2514/5916 points).  Answer option 4 was distinctly less
popular, with a 17% popularity ranking (1031/5916 possible
points).  Answer option 6 “Other” received 3% (166/5916 points).
While the global results ranked Answer option 1 in third place
with an average 43% popularity ranking, this choice was the sec-
ond most popular option for Parties and Advisors.  The average
was interestingly brought down by the votes of non-adjudicative
providers (e.g., conciliators and mediators) and influencers (e.g.,
academics), who only ranked this option in fourth place.  A break-
down of the cross-sorted results for the answers to this question are
given below.
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This supports the proposition that Parties want legislation that
allows for the enforcement of mediated settlements.
VI. CONCLUSION
The global enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement is
not just visionary, but a necessary tool for encouraging mediation,
as this report reflects.  Leadership promulgated by policy stake-
holders providing for practical certainty of mediated settlement
agreements will improve access to justice and increase efficiency
for the wider international business community.  Mediation is now
a modernization and advancement feature in the field of law as
much as it is an important asset for global trade.
In order to advance trading systems and aide businesses, cer-
tainty and predictability are important factors for both risk mitiga-
tion and dispute resolution.  Users need an international
mechanism congruent with the methodological approach that was
adopted by the arbitration community through the New York Con-
vention.  This enforcement treaty of arbitral awards is an interna-
tionally recognized enforcement mechanism aiding global trade for
more than sixty years.
The pioneering field of dispute resolution now expands in the
direction of non-adversarial modalities, inclusive of mediation
which necessitates a similar measure for enforcement purposes.
This report is an attempt to aid the business community through
empirical research to find solutions and policy to improve media-
tion.  As the mediation field continues to develop, more scholarly
work will necessitate further evaluation of mediation as a tool for
advancement and promotion of international commerce.
WHAT’S IN A NAME?
THE TERMS “COMMERCIAL” AND
“MEDIATION” IN THE SINGAPORE
CONVENTION ON MEDIATION
Ellen E. Deason*
“What’s in a name?  That which we call a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet.”
—William Shakespeare†
The terms “commercial” and “mediation” are central to defin-
ing the scope for the application of the new United Nations Con-
vention on International Agreements Resulting from Mediation,1
which has been christened, for short, the Singapore Convention on
Mediation.  The Convention, along with an accompanying instru-
ment—the revised United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Mediation Model Law2—provide a
method for the enforcement of international settlements of com-
mercial disputes that are reached in mediation.  The goal, in brief,
is to encourage growth in the use of mediation as an efficient
method for resolving cross-border disputes that can help preserve
* Joanne Wharton Murphy/Classes of 1965 and 1973 Professor of Law, Moritz College of
Law, The Ohio State University. I thank the American Society of International Law for creden-
tialing me as an observer to several of the deliberations of UNCITRAL Working Group II in
New York that led to the Convention. This article was improved by discussions with participants
at the March 2019 symposium on The New Singapore Convention: Compliance with Cross-Bor-
der Mediated Settlement Agreements sponsored by the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution
and Touro Law Center. I would like to especially acknowledge the contributions of Hal Abram-
son, Corinne Montineri, Tim Schnabel, and the staff of the Cardozo Journal of Conflict
Resolution.
† WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, Act II, Scene II (OUP Oxford 2008) (1599).
1 G.A. Res. 73/198, annex (Dec. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Singapore Convention]. For an ac-
count of the negotiation of the Convention, which was approved by the General Assembly in
December 2018 and was opened for signature in August 2019, see generally SING. REF. BK., Hal
Abramson, The New Singapore Mediation Convention: The Process and Key Choices, 20 CAR-
DOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1037 (2019). For a detailed explication of its provisions, see Timothy
Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2019).
2 The full name of the Model Law is the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018
(amending the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, 2002). UN-
CITRAL, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17,
annex II (2018) [hereinafter Mediation Model Law].
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business relationships.  The Convention creates a legal framework
that signals the importance of mediation internationally and pro-
vides a mechanism that allows mediated settlements to be relied
upon and readily enforced.3
One could interpret Shakespeare’s famous quote as standing
for the proposition that labels do not alter the essence of the thing
named.  In this article I draw inspiration from the quote to provide
a foil for examining the use of the terms “commercial” and “media-
tion” in the Singapore Convention and Mediation Model Law.  I
will consider how the terms are framed and defined, the extent to
which the names and their associated meanings introduce new
ideas, and how their use might matter for the interpretation of im-
portant concepts in these instruments.  Part I of the article dis-
cusses the term “commercial” and compares the way UNCITRAL
treats the concept in the Convention and the Mediation Model
Law.  Part II considers UNCITRAL’s introduction of the term
“mediation” as a substitute for “conciliation.”
I. WHAT DOES “COMMERCIAL” MEAN FOR THE SCOPE OF THE
CONVENTION AND MEDIATION MODEL LAW?
UNCITRAL deals primarily with commercial relationships.
Its mandate is to further “the progressive harmonization and mod-
ernization of the law of international trade.”4  Within that frame-
work, its work primarily concerns commercial law, and it has
prepared instruments involving “international contract practices,
transport, insolvency, electronic commerce, international pay-
ments, secured transactions, procurement and sale of goods,” as
well as dispute resolution.5  While UNCITRAL’s initial focus in
dispute resolution was on arbitration, it soon broadened its efforts
to include mediation/conciliation and other forms of dispute reso-
lution.6  Prior to the deliberations that led to the Singapore Con-
vention and the Mediation Model Law, UNCITRAL adopted the
3 See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Enforcement of Settlement Agreements in International Com-
mercial Mediation: A New Legal Framework?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2015, at 32, 33; Schnabel,
supra note 1, at 2–4.
4 UNCITRAL, A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ¶ 1 (2013), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un
.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/12-57491-guide-to-uncitral-e.pdf.
5 Id.
6 In 1980, UNCITRAL provided rules that parties can use to govern their conciliations: the
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. See G.A. Res. 35/52 (Dec. 4, 1980). The course of UNCI-
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1151
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (Concilia-
tion Model Law) in 2002.7  The central purpose of the Conciliation
Model Law was to provide legal mechanisms to protect the confi-
dentiality of the process;8 it left the method for enforcing agree-
ments reached in conciliation to each enacting State.9  As of 2019,
thirty-three jurisdictions have adopted the Conciliation Model Law
or used it as the model for their legislation.10
The Conciliation Model Law followed the example of the pre-
viously prepared Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration (Arbitration Model Law)11 in explaining the concept
“commercial.”  Both instruments are limited to commercial mat-
ters,12 but neither Model Law defines the term explicitly.  Instead,
both rely on a footnote with an open-ended list of illustrations to
convey the types of relationships that constitute “commercial”
transactions.  The provision from the 2002 Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Conciliation13 reads in relevant part:
TRAL’s expanding focus is indicated by the changes in the designation of Working Group II’s
subject area from Arbitration, to Arbitration and Conciliation, to Dispute Settlement.
7 G.A. Res. 57/18, annex (Nov. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Conciliation Model Law].
8 See Jernej Sekolec & Michael B. Getty, The UMA and the UNCITRAL Model Law: An
Emerging Consensus on Mediation and Conciliation, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 175, 189 (2003)
(“[Confidentiality] safeguards are ‘the centerpiece of the conciliation regime’ and the single
most important reason why legislation on conciliation is needed.”).
9 G.A. Res. 57/18, supra note 7, art. 14.
10 Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002), UNITED
NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitra-
tion/modellaw/commercial_conciliation/status (last visited Aug. 3, 2019).
11 The Arbitration Model Law was adopted in 1985 and amended most recently in 2006.
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law on the work
of its eighteenth session, 3–21 June 1985, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex I (1985), & U.N. Comm’n on
Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law on the work of its thirty-ninth
session, 19 June–7 July 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/17, annex I (2006).
12 In contrast, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter the New York Convention], is not limited to
commercial disputes. However, States may introduce this limitation by making a reservation.
Art. I(3) of the New York Convention provides: “When signing, ratifying, or acceding to this
Convention . . . any State may . . . declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commer-
cial under the national laws of the State making such declaration.” Of the 159 parties to the New
York Convention as of 2019, the table with the status of adoptions indicates that 45 have limited
its application to commercial relationships. See Status of Treaties, Chapter XXII, UNITED NA-
TIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en (last visited Aug. 3, 2019).
13 Conciliation Model Law, supra note 7, art. 1(1).
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Art. 1. Scope of application and definitions
1. This law applies to international commercial2 conciliation.
2 The term “commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so as to
cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature,
whether contractual or not.  Relationships of a commercial nature include,
but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade transaction for
the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; com-
mercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works,
consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insur-
ance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms
of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by
air, sea, rail, or road.
As stressed in the text of footnote 2, and reiterated in the
Guide to Enactment and Use that accompanied the Conciliation
Model Law,14 the purpose of this approach is to provide for a
broad application of the concept “commercial” to conciliation.
This emphasis on an expansive reach was designed to make clear
that the scope of “commercial” is not limited to what might qualify
as commercial under national law.  Transcending national law was
seen as important in order to avoid technical difficulties that might
otherwise arise in determining which transactions are commercial
under a particular law.15  The Guide to Enactment explained that
the limitation to commercial matters was both a reflection of UN-
CITRAL’s traditional mandate and based on the “realization that
conciliation of non-commercial matters touches upon policy issues
that do not readily lend themselves to universal harmonization.”16
Yet UNCITRAL also considered the Conciliation Model Law to
be appropriate for a more general application.  It invited nations to
broaden the scope of the law even further by entirely eliminating
its restriction to commercial matters.  The Guide to Enactment
states: “[N]othing in the Model Law should prevent an enacting
State from extending the scope of the Model Law to cover concilia-
tion outside the commercial sphere.”17
The Singapore Convention takes a very different approach.
Like the 2002 Conciliation Model Law, it specifies that it applies to
14 UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONCILIA-
TION WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND USE 2002 (2002) [hereinafter GUIDE TO ENACTMENT].
15 Id. ¶ 29. This approach was different from that of the New York Convention, which allows
States to make reservations limiting the application of that Convention to commercial relation-
ships, as defined by the law of that nation. See supra note 12.
16 GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 14, ¶ 29.
17 Id. (emphasis added).
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commercial disputes.18  And, like the 2002 Conciliation Model
Law, it does not define the term “commercial.”  But the Conven-
tion eschews the expansive interpretive footnote found in the Con-
ciliation Model Law.  In fact, instead of embracing a broad
interpretation of “commercial,” it takes steps to ensure that the
scope of this concept is narrow.  However, rather than achieving
this goal with a definition or illustrations, the Convention instead
explicitly excludes from its coverage settlement agreements on cer-
tain subjects: consumer transactions and matters of family, inheri-
tance, or employment law.  Article 1(2) of the Convention
provides:
2. This Convention does not apply to settlement agreements:
(a) Concluded to resolve a dispute arising from transactions
engaged in by one of the parties (a consumer) for personal,
family or household purposes;
(b) Relating to family, inheritance, or employment law.19
In essence, it places these subjects outside the sphere of “commer-
cial” relationships for purposes of the Convention’s mediated set-
tlement agreement enforcement process.
Why did UNCITRAL Working Group II take such a different
approach in the Singapore Convention?  Although consumer, em-
ployment, family, and probate disputes are a significant source of
litigation about the enforcement of mediated settlements in the
United States,20 the original proposal for a convention from the
United States did not include coverage for these disputes,21 and it
was observed that “[s]uch limitations to the scope of the proposed
convention are likely to reinforce its acceptability.”22  There was a
desire to avoid the experience of UNCITRAL Working Group III,
18 See Singapore Convention, supra note 1, at annex, art. 1(1):
“Article 1. Scope of application.
1. This Convention applies to an agreement resulting from mediation and concluded
in writing by parties to resolve a commercial dispute (“settlement agreement”)
which, at the time of its conclusion, is international . . . .”
19 Id. art. 1(2).
20 See SING. REF. BK., James R. Coben, Evaluating the Singapore Convention Through a
U.S.-centric Litigation Lens: Lessons Learned From Nearly Two Decades of Mediation Disputes
in American Federal and State Courts, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1063 (2019) (these
categories constitute 46–47% of U.S. court cases about enforcement of mediated agreements).
21 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Planned and possible future work—Part III, Propo-
sal by the Government of the United States of America: future work for Working Group II, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/822, annex at 3 (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal].
22 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes: enforceability of
settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation/mediation, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187, ¶ 33 (Nov. 27, 2014).
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which had attempted to draft an instrument for online dispute res-
olution of cross border electronic transactions but ran into dis-
agreements over how to treat pre-dispute arbitration agreements
with consumers.23  The acceptance of such pre-dispute agreements
differs under national law, and this ultimately blocked progress on
a convention and led UNCITRAL to instead merely adopt techni-
cal notes on the subject.24  An additional consideration that sup-
ported narrowing the scope of the Singapore Convention was
avoiding overlap with the work of the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law, which had a legislative project on the en-
forcement of voluntary agreements in the family law context.25
Perhaps the most crucial consideration, however, was that
consumer, employment, family, and probate disputes can involve
parties with unequal bargaining power and less sophistication with
legal proceedings.  Thus, there was a danger that a broad scope for
the concept “commercial” would create barriers to consensus on an
efficient procedure and make the instrument less attractive to
States considering its ratification.  These issues were summarized
cogently in comments submitted by the Government of Germany
at the start of the deliberations.26  Germany maintained that the
basis for any enforcement of a mediated agreement must be “full
party autonomy” and concluded, “[c]onsequently, the scope must
be limited to commercial agreements between businesses only.”27
It advocated for excluding consumer, labor, and housing (rental)
contracts and expressed the following concerns about the outcome
of the process in the absence of these limitations:
Otherwise, serous conflicts will arise out of the need to take ac-
count of mandatory laws aimed at protecting the interests of
weaker parties.  If those problems had to be tackled (and it is
23 See Ronald A. Brand, Party Autonomy and Access to Justice in the UNCITRAL Online
Dispute Resolution Project, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 11 (2012); Schnabel, supra note 1, at
24.
24 UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL TECHNICAL NOTES ON ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2017),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/v1700382_english_
technical_notes_on_odr.pdf; see also U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., Supplement No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/
71/17, ¶ 257 (2016).
25 See Family Agreements Involving Children, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legis-
lative-projects/recognition-and-enforcement-of-agreements (last visited Aug. 3, 2019).
26 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes: Enforceability of
settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation/mediation, Comments
received from States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.188, at 2 (Dec. 23, 2014).
27 Id. at 3.
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unclear whether any solution would be possible), the instrument
might become overly complex and difficult to use.28
Germany’s warnings about potential complexity and the risk
of difficulty in reaching consensus on an instrument that would ap-
ply to consumers, employment, and family matters had actually
been borne out by the earlier experience of the drafters of the Uni-
form Mediation Act (“UMA”) in the United States.  The UMA
covers a broader swath of mediations than the Singapore Conven-
tion in that it is not limited to international or commercial subject
matter.29  When the UMA drafting committees tried to formulate a
provision for expedited enforcement of mediated settlement agree-
ments, they concluded that adding protections sufficient to protect
weaker parties would result in onerous procedures that would not
improve on the status quo of contract litigation.30  As a result, the
Uniform Mediation Act was adopted without an enforcement pro-
vision.  For the Singapore Convention, which is focused on en-
forcement, restricting its reach to the least controversial
application—business disputes that are less likely to raise difficult
issues of imbalances of power—avoided such problems.  In doing
so, the exclusions were also a practical step designed to encourage
acceptance of the instrument by States that might be reluctant to
embrace it.
The principle that the instrument would exclude consumer,
employment, and family disputes took shape early in the delibera-
tion process.  After preliminary consideration of the potential for
developing an instrument on the enforcement of mediated settle-
ment agreements, Working Group II suggested to the Commission
that it be given a mandate to work on the topic.31  The Commission
agreed in its July 2015 meeting that this was an appropriate project
for the Working Group,32 and work began in earnest.  At their fall
2015 meeting, the delegates reached “general agreement to exclude
settlement agreements involving consumers from the scope of the
instrument,” and it was also “generally felt” that settlement agree-
ments dealing with family and labor law matters “and other areas
28 Id.
29 Uniform Mediation Act § 3 (2003).
30 Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Media-
tion–Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 584–85 (2005).
31 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-second session (New York, 2–6 February 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, ¶ 59 (Feb. 11,
2015) [hereinafter 62nd Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2015)].
32 U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., Supplement No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/69/17, ¶ 142 (2014).
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where party autonomy was limited due to overriding mandatory
rules or public policy” should be excluded.33
There were, of course, details that remained to be worked out.
Some delegations felt that limiting the instrument to “commercial”
matters would eliminate any need to specifically exclude family
and employment law matters because those subjects do not fall
within the scope of the term “commercial.”34  There were also dif-
fering opinions on whether to specify the subjects excluded from
the scope of the instrument or, given the risk that a list of exclu-
sions might not be exhaustive, to list those included within the con-
cept of “commercial.”35  Over the course of the subsequent
meetings, the Working Group discussed the concept of “commer-
cial,”36 decided in favor of an explicit and exhaustive list of exclu-
sions to be included in the scope section of the Convention,37 and
worked through drafts with specific phrasing.
Many of the drafting issues tended to arise due to variations in
concepts among legal systems.  For example, the word “consumer,”
without more elaboration, was problematic for some delegations in
that it was seen as too generic and thus susceptible to different
understandings in different jurisdictions.38  To solve this issue, the
phrase “for personal, family, or household purposes” was bor-
rowed from the formulation of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”),39 where it
is used to provide objective criteria for excluding sales of goods for
consumer purposes.40  There were also concerns that the scope of
33 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-third session (Vienna, 7–11 September 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, ¶¶ 41–42 (Sept.
17, 2015) [hereinafter 63rd Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2015)].
34 Id. ¶ 42.
35 Id. ¶ 43.
36 See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the
work of its sixty-fourth session (New York, 1–5 February 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, ¶¶
102–105 (Feb. 10, 2016) [hereinafter 64th Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2016)].
37 Id. at ¶ 106; UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work
of its sixty-fifth session (Vienna, 12–23 September 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, ¶¶ 55–56 (Sept.
30, 2016) [hereinafter 65th Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2016)]; UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-seventh session (Vienna, 1–6 October 2017), U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/929, ¶ 16 (Oct. 11, 2017) [hereinafter 67th Sess. Rep. (Oct. 2017)].
38 64th Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2016), supra note 36, ¶ 107.
39 CISG art. 2(a), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
40 65th Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2016), supra note 37, ¶¶ 57–58. The use of parentheses to refer to
“consumers” in article I(2)(a) of the Singapore Convention follows the example of the Choice of
Court Convention. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 2(1)(a), June 30,
2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. See 65th Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2016), supra note 37, ¶ 59.
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what is considered family law differs among jurisdictions.41  To
clarify, and to accommodate different national approaches, the list
of exclusions was expanded to explicitly include settlement agree-
ments relating to inheritance.42
During Working Group II’s early deliberations, there was no
consensus on the appropriate form of the instrument, leading to a
view that further consideration was needed in order to decide
whether to prepare a convention, a model law, or a guidance docu-
ment.43  The issue was ultimately resolved in favor of preparing
both a convention and a model law.44  As stated in the General
Assembly resolution approving the Convention, this dual approach
has the advantage of providing States with a choice of instruments
that accommodates “different levels of expertise with mediation in
different jurisdictions.”45  It thus encourages as many States as pos-
sible to use consistent standards for cross-border enforcement, in-
cluding those who might hesitate to join the Convention until they
have a more-fully developed domestic legal framework for
mediation.46
For the new Model Law, the Working Group amended the
2002 Conciliation Model Law to include a section on enforcement
drawn from the Convention,47 and renamed the Model Law using
the term “Mediation.”48  Overall, the new Mediation Model Law’s
approach to the concept “commercial” is a new hybrid of the origi-
nal Conciliation Model Law and the Singapore Convention.  It did
not, in general, alter the broad commercial scope of the original
Conciliation Model Law.  The revision retains, in a provision that
applies to the entire instrument, the footnote from the Conciliation
Model Law with expansive illustrations of commercial activities.49
But although the Mediation Model Law as a whole endorses a
41 64th Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2016), supra note 36, ¶ 108.
42 65th Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2016), supra note 37, ¶ 60.
43 See, e.g., 63rd Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2015), supra note 33, ¶¶ 108–09.
44 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-sixth session (New York, 6–10 February 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, ¶ 93 (Feb. 16,
2017). The agreement to prepare two instruments simultaneously was part of a five-point com-
promise that provided a breakthrough in the deliberations. See Abramson, supra note 1, at Part
III(E)(5).
45 G.A. Res. 73/198, supra note 1, at 2.
46 Id. See also Schnabel, supra note 1, at 8–9.
47 Mediation Model Law, supra note 2, arts. 16–20.
48 See supra note 2.
49 UNCITRAL, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first session, U.N.
Doc. A/73/17, annex II, art. 1(1) n.1 (2018). The language is quoted supra in the text accompany-
ing note 13.
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broad concept of commercial relationships, its section on settle-
ment agreements imports from the Singapore Convention the ex-
clusion of consumer transactions and employment, family, and
inheritance law disputes.50
Will this hybrid approach to scope in the Mediation Model
Law create problems?  I think not, but there is some potential for
confusion in the fact that the law’s expansive conception of “com-
mercial” applies to the entire instrument, including the portion on
enforcement of settlement agreements.  Section 3, which is titled
“International settlement agreements,” governs “international
agreements resulting from mediation and concluded in writing by
parties to resolve a commercial dispute (‘settlement agree-
ment’).”51  Under the terms of the Mediation Model Law, “com-
mercial” is to be understood broadly in the sense inherited from
the Conciliation Model Law, including “matters arising from all re-
lationships of a commercial nature” as illustrated in footnote 1.52
Those illustrations encompass several categories that could include
consumer transactions, such as banking, insurance, and carriage of
goods or passengers by air, sea, rail, or road.53
The wide conception of “commercial” was appropriate for the
Conciliation Model Law, which sought to cover mediations—and
protect confidentiality—comprehensively within the scope of com-
mercial arrangements.  It is still appropriate for Section 2 of the
Mediation Model Law, which has the same purpose and retains
most of the original provisions from the Conciliation Model Law,
thus covering international commercial mediation generally.  For
the reasons discussed above, however, UNCITRAL decided that
this broad scope was not appropriate for the provisions on enforce-
ment of mediated settlement agreements.  It could have narrowed
the concept of commercial relationships subject to the section on
enforcement with a limited definition of “commercial” or by pro-
viding a more restricted set of illustrations.  Instead, UNCITRAL
limited the reach of enforcement for mediated settlement agree-
ments by using the Convention’s exclusions.  This avoided the
problems that would have been created by using one term (“com-
mercial”) with two different meanings in the same instrument.  At
the same time, the instruments manage to convey two very differ-
ent conceptions of the appropriate scope of “commercial” and pro-
50 Id. art. 16(2).
51 Mediation Model Law, supra note 2, art. 16(1) (emphasis added).
52 Id. art. 1(1).
53 Id. art. 1(1) n.1. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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vide coverage that is tailored to the goals of their provisions.  This
also has practical benefits.  The way UNCITRAL structured the
scope of the instruments should allow a State that enacted the Con-
ciliation Model Law—with its broad application through expansive
illustrations of “commercial”—to seamlessly ratify the Conven-
tion—with its exclusions that narrow its application for the en-
forcement of mediated settlement agreements.54
II. “MEDIATION”—A NEW TERMINOLOGY FOR UNCITRAL
The substitution of the term “mediation” for “conciliation”
presents a different situation from the shift in the idea behind
“commercial.”  The key to understanding the meaning of the term
“commercial” is that, while the name stayed the same (and its illus-
trations stayed the same in the Model Law), UNCITRAL changed
the scope of the concept—in both the Convention and in the sec-
tion on enforcement in the Mediation Model Law—through the
use of exclusions.  In contrast, with “mediation” UNCITRAL in-
troduced a new term, but it drew its meaning from the prior defini-
tion of “conciliation” in the Conciliation Model Law.55  This left
the notion of what is entailed in the process underlying the name
largely unchanged in both the Convention and the Mediation
Model Law.  This Part of the article examines UNCITRAL’s
choice to change the name of the process, the definition and in-
tended meaning of the new term, and the instruments’ limitation of
enforcement procedures to “mediated” settlement agreements.
A. Substituting “Mediation” for “Conciliation”
Throughout its proposal for UNCITRAL to develop a conven-
tion, the United States used the word “conciliation,”56 which was,
of course, consistent with the terminology of the 2002 Conciliation
54 Even if a State had accepted the invitation to adopt the Conciliation Model Law without
its limitation to “commercial” conciliation, see supra text accompanying note 17, it could now
adopt the Singapore Convention or the section on enforcement in the Mediation Model Law
without confusion about its narrower scope.
55 Unlike the Conciliation Model Law, the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules do not define
“conciliation.” They do, however, include an article on the role of the conciliator, which can be
interpreted as delineating boundaries and essential ingredients for the process. See UNCITRAL
Conciliation Rules art. 7.
56 U.S. Proposal, supra note 21.
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Model Law.  Fairly early in the UNCITRAL deliberation process,
however, one of the delegations expressed the view that the instru-
ment should use the term “mediation” rather than “conciliation.”
The reasoning was the perception that “mediation” is more widely
used in national legal systems.57  This led to an objection by some
delegations who maintained that in their countries “conciliation” is
the recognized term.  Interestingly, when the governments submit-
ted information to the Secretariat on their legislative frameworks
for enforcing international commercial settlement agreements,
they used widely-varying terminology.58  A few referred to the pro-
cess as “conciliation” in their comments.59  A far greater number of
States used the term “mediation.”60  Many used both names, often
in the compound form of “mediation/conciliation” or “conciliation/
mediation,”61 and some used a mixture of labels.62  The names for
57 64th Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2016), supra note 36, ¶ 120.
58 This information was submitted in response to a questionnaire circulated to States by the
UNCITRAL Secretariat to collect information on whether States had already adopted legisla-
tion on enforcement of settlement agreements. The questionnaire used the term “conciliation/
mediation” with a footnote emphasizing that the names were used interchangeably and with
broad meaning. See UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes,
Enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation/media-
tion, Compilation of comments by Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/846, at 3 & n.2 (Mar. 27,
2015) [hereinafter Compilation].
59 See UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes, Enforcement
of settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation/mediation, Compila-
tion of comments by Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/846/Add.1, at 17 (Apr. 15, 2015) (U.S.)
[hereinafter Compilation Add.1]; UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commer-
cial disputes, Enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from international commercial con-
ciliation/mediation, Compilation of comments by Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/846/Add.2, at
5 (Apr. 22, 2015) (China) [hereinafter Compilation Add.2]; UNCITRAL, Note by the Secreta-
riat, Settlement of commercial disputes, Enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from inter-
national commercial conciliation/mediation, Compilation of comments by Governments, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/846/Add.3, at 5 (June 4, 2015) (Mex.) [hereinafter Compilation Add.3].
60 See Compilation, supra note 58, at 12, 19 (Ecuador, Hung.); Compilation Add.1, supra
note 59, at 3, 8, 13, 14 (Isr., Nor., Slovk., Swed.); Compilation Add.2, supra note 59, at 2, 11
(Austl., Port.); Compilation Add.3, supra note 59, at 9, 12, 16 (Phil., Spain, Viet.); UNCITRAL,
Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes, Enforcement of settlement agreements
resulting from international commercial conciliation/mediation, Compilation of comments by
Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/846/Add.5, at 2 (June 30, 2015) (Czech).
61 See Compilation, supra note 58, at 4, 5, 16 (Arm., Austria, Ger.); Compilation Add.1,
supra note 59, at 2, 9, 15 (Indon., Congo, Thai.); Compilation Add.2, supra note 59, at 7 (Geor.);
Compilation Add.3, supra note 59, at 2, 3, 11 (Alg., Cameroon, Qatar).
62 See Compilation, supra note 58, at 8 (Can.); Compilation Add.1, supra note 59, at 11
(Sing.); Compilation Add.2, supra note 59, at 10 (Pol.); UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat,
Settlement of commercial disputes, Enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from interna-
tional commercial conciliation/mediation, Compilation of comments by Governments, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/846/Add.4, at 2 (June 12, 2015) (Russ.). The most distinctive term was “reconciliation/
mediation,” which was used by Turkey. See Compilation Add.1, supra note 59, at 16.
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relevant domestic legislation and court rules varied similarly,63 and
some States reported that they use different terms for court-con-
nected and private processes.64  The Working Group itself, in its
first report to the Commission on the subject, varied from past
practice by using the compound form when it titled its agenda item
as “Enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from interna-
tional commercial conciliation/mediation.”65
In addition to the question of the most prevalent usage, there
was also a complicating factor regarding the effect of any change in
terminology on the existing UNCITRAL texts that used the word
“conciliation.”66  At the relatively early point in the deliberations
when the suggestion to switch to “mediation” was first raised, it
was assumed that the Working Group would produce either a con-
vention or a model law.  If the instrument were a convention, then
a change in its terminology to “mediation” would conflict with the
language used in the 2002 Conciliation Model Law, which argued
against a change.
Later in the drafting process, after the decision had been made
to prepare both a convention and a model law,67 the question of
nomenclature was raised again.68  There was some hesitation to
change the terminology that had historically been used in UNCI-
TRAL texts and a concern that a change might be interpreted as
signaling a substantive change in meaning.69  But there was impe-
tus for the change based on the Working Group’s judgment that
the terms “mediation” and “mediator” are now more widely used
and recognized on a global basis than “conciliation.”  Therefore,
changing terminology would make the new instruments more visi-
ble and understandable, and thus easier to promote.70  Concerns
that the substitution of “mediation” for “conciliation” would lead
63 See Compilation, supra note 58, at 6 (Mediation Act of the Republic of Belarus); Compi-
lation Add.1, supra note 59, at 5, 7 (Japan: Civil Conciliation Act, Mauritius Supreme Court
(Mediation) Rules); Compilation Add.3, supra note 59, at 12 (Spain: Act on mediation in civil
and commercial matters).
64 See Compilation Add.1, supra note 59, at 10 (S. Kor.); Compilation Add.2, supra note 59,
at 8 (Para.); Compilation Add.3, supra note 59, at 4 (Chile).
65 62nd Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2015), supra note 31, at 4.
66 See UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes, International
commercial conciliation: preparation of an instrument on enforcement of international commercial
settlement agreements resulting from conciliation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.198, ¶ 17 (June
30, 2016).
67 See supra text accompanying notes 43–46.
68 67th Sess. Rep. (Oct. 2017), supra note 37, ¶¶ 102–104.
69 Id. ¶ 102.
70 Id. ¶ 103.
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to confusion about the nature of the process could be allayed by
adding text clarifying that the “change in terminology does not
have any substantive or conceptual implications” and emphasizing
that the terms are interchangeable.71  The desire to create interest
in adopting the instruments won out, and the Working Group
reached a shared understanding in favor of the substitution of “me-
diation” for “conciliation” in the Singapore Convention, the Medi-
ation Model Law, and also in the UNCITRAL Conciliation
Rules.72
B. The Meaning of “Mediation”
Although UNCITRAL changed the terminology from “concil-
iation” to “mediation,” in both cases the names are actually used as
terms of art, and the core meaning did not change.  The definition
of mediation in the Singapore Convention reads as follows:
3. “Mediation” means a process, irrespective of the expression
used or the basis upon which the process is carried out, whereby
parties attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute
with the assistance of a third person or persons (“the mediator”)
lacking the authority to impose a solution upon the parties to
the dispute.73
This definition is drawn, with some rewording, from two provisions
in the 2002 Conciliation Model Law: its definition of “conciliation”
and its provision designating a wide range of acceptable bases for
engaging in conciliation.74  The Conciliation Model Law defined
“conciliation” in Article 1(3) as:
3. For the purposes of this Law, “conciliation” means a process
whether referred to by the expression conciliation, mediation, or
an expression of similar import, whereby parties request a third
person or persons (“the conciliator”) to assist them in their at-
tempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute arising
71 Mediation Model Law, supra note 2, art. 1(1) n.1.
72 67th Sess. Rep. (Oct. 2017), supra note 37, ¶ 104; see also UNCITRAL, Note by the Secre-
tariat, Settlement of commercial disputes, International commercial mediation: preparation of in-
struments on enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements resulting from
mediation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.205, ¶¶ 4–6 (Nov. 23, 2017); UNCITRAL, Report of
Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-eighth session (New York, 5–9
February 2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, ¶ 16 (Feb. 19, 2018) [hereinafter 68th Sess. Rep. (Feb.
2018)].
73 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, at annex art. 2(3).
74 67th Sess. Rep. (Oct. 2017), supra note 37, ¶ 28.
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out of or relating to a contractual or other legal relationship.
The conciliator does not have the authority to impose upon the
parties a solution to the dispute.75
Then it added in Article 1(8) a provision that makes the source of
the impetus to conciliate irrelevant:
8. . . . this Law applies irrespective of the basis upon which the
conciliation is carried out, including agreement between the par-
ties whether reached before or after a dispute has arisen, an ob-
ligation established by law, or a direction or suggestion of a
court, arbitral tribunal or competent governmental entity.76
The Singapore Convention’s definition of “mediation” retains
the four core concepts that were expressed in these two Concilia-
tion Model Law provisions.  First, whatever terminology the parties
use to describe their process is not definitive.  “Mediation” is being
used as an umbrella concept that includes processes under various
names and thus accommodates variations in regional and national
practice.  Second, the Convention’s definition stresses that the pro-
cess can be mediation regardless of the basis for carrying it out.  It
can stem from a contract, a legal obligation, a court order, or a
spontaneous decision of the parties.  The basis for engaging in me-
diation does not matter.  Third, the reason the parties are using the
mediation process is for the purpose of settling a dispute.  And
fourth, the disputants are aided in this effort by a third-party who
does not have the authority to decide the outcome.
There is a minor difference between the definition of media-
tion in the Convention and in the Mediation Model Law.  Whereas
the Convention definition blends and rewords two Conciliation
Model Law provisions, the Mediation Model law retains the origi-
nal language exactly, except for substituting in the term “media-
tion.”77  The Model Law’s definition of “mediation” applies to the
entire instrument.78  But the provision applying the law irrespective
of the basis for conducting the mediation applies only to the gen-
eral treatment of mediation in section 2, not the settlement agree-
ment enforcement provisions in section 3.79  These slightly different
definitions of mediation for the enforcement provisions of the Con-
vention and section 3 of the Model Law will be a problem only if a
party tries to argue against enforcement of a settlement agreement
75 Conciliation Model Law, supra note 7, at annex art. 1(3).
76 Id. art. 1(8).
77 Mediation Model Law, supra note 2, arts. 1(3), 3(6).
78 Id. art. 1(3) (stating “For the purposes of this Law . . .”).
79 Id. art. 3(6) (stating “this section applies . . .”).
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under the Model Law on the ground that the different definition
has significance.  In addition, the party would have to show that the
basis under which the mediation was conducted disqualifies the set-
tlement agreement from enforcement.  It will be up to the courts to
interpret the instruments consistently to avoid any anomaly.  This
should not be difficult, as there are many references in the travaux
pre´paratoires to UNCITRAL’s intention that the basis for media-
tion, and whether or not an institution was involved in administer-
ing it, is not meant to restrict enforcement of mediated settlement
agreements.80
There was a suggestion from some delegations to narrow the
Convention definition to specify that mediation must be a “struc-
tured” or “organized” process.  They thought this addition was nec-
essary in order to emphasize the role of the third party, distinguish
the process from negotiation, and rule out agreements made in an
informal setting.81  The delegations framed their concerns with a
hypothetical about three people in a pub reaching an agreement,
calling it mediation, and seeking to enforce it.82  After much discus-
sion, eventually the Working Group decided against using this pro-
posed limitation.83  In my view, this was a wise decision.  First, it
would have created a discrepancy in the scope of the concept of
“mediation” and “conciliation” for those States that have adopted
the Conciliation Model Law.  Second, specifying a structured pro-
cedure would have gone too far in restricting the flexibility of me-
diation.  Third, it would also have ignored global experience with a
wide range of processes and settings that are suitable for third-
party interventions in disputes.84  Unless the judgment of the pub-
goers was impaired by drink to the extent that they lacked capacity
80 See, e.g., 63rd Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2015), supra note 33, ¶ 24; 64th Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2016),
supra note 36, ¶¶ 119, 122–131; 65th Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2016), supra note 37, ¶¶ 48–54, 169–176,
205–210; see also Schnabel, supra note 1, at 17 (citing specific interventions).
81 64th Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2016), supra note 36, ¶ 117; 65th Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2016), supra note
37, ¶¶ 42–44, 164–167.
82 See Schnabel, supra note 1, at 15–17.
83 67th Sess. Rep. (Oct. 2017), supra note 37, ¶ 42; see also Schnabel, supra note 1, at 16–17.
This rejection was consistent with decisions made during the course of drafting the 2002 Concili-
ation Model Law. That earlier Working Group rejected a phrase that, if included in the defini-
tion of “conciliation,” would have limited it to a process in which a third person assisted the
parties “in an independent and impartial manner.” See UNCITRAL, Report of the Working
Group on Arbitration on the work of its thirty-fifth session (Vienna, 19–30 November 2001),
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/506, ¶¶ 28–29 (Dec. 21, 2001). In both situations, the rejected language would
have narrowed the definition of the dispute resolution processes the instruments cover, and ex-
cluded some useful formats.
84 Cf. Paul F. Kirgis, Status and Contract in an Emerging Democracy: The Evolution of Dis-
pute Resolution in Ghana, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 101, 104–07 (2014) (describing a
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to decide, there is nothing objectionable about settling a dispute in
an environment that encourages discussion, compromise, and pos-
sibly reconciliation, even if it is informal.
A key aspect of the Convention’s definition of “mediation” is
that it is a term of art.  It retains the umbrella concept from Concil-
iation Model Law, meaning that in both instruments the terms
“conciliation” and “mediation” are defined to include the other,
and also any dispute resolution mechanism that falls within the pa-
rameters of the definition without regard to its label.85  The under-
standing underlying UNCITRAL’s terminology (using the term
“conciliation”) is summarized as follows:
In conciliation, the conciliator assists the parties in negotiating a
settlement that is designed to meet the needs and interests of
the parties in dispute.  The conciliation process is an entirely
consensual one in which parties that are in dispute determine
how to resolve the dispute, with the assistance of a neutral third
party.  The neutral third party has no authority to impose on the
parties a solution to the dispute.86
This, in essence, is a general description of many forms of non-
binding dispute resolution processes that use a third party or par-
ties.  The Guide to Enactment for the Conciliation Model Law
stressed that the “methods may differ as regards the technique, the
degree to which the third person is involved in the process and the
kind of involvement (e.g. whether just by facilitating the dialogue
or also by making substantive proposals as to possible settle-
ment).”87  Unfortunately, there is no term in general usage that
represents the collection of processes under this umbrella.  “Alter-
native Dispute Resolution” (“ADR”) does not capture the concept
because in many legal systems it is not limited to consensual
processes; the notion of ADR often includes arbitration, a process
that entails a binding adjudicatory decision.88  So UNCITRAL
chose “conciliation,” and now “mediation,” as the term of art to
represent a range of processes.
The downside of using “mediation” as a specifically-defined
term, especially when coupled with changing that term from “con-
ciliation,” is that it appears to endorse the idea that the processes
legal proceeding held in a gazebo in a courtyard that led to the settlement of a commercial
dispute).
85 See supra text accompanying note 72 (“irrespective of the expression used”).
86 GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 14, ¶ 6 (citation omitted).
87 Id. ¶ 32.
88 See id. ¶ 7.
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of mediation and conciliation are indistinguishable, or at least in-
terchangeable.  Unfortunately, using a label that is typically associ-
ated with one process to represent another does not contribute to
overall clarity or understanding in the world of dispute resolution.
Although the differences may not be important for the purposes of
the UNCITRAL instruments, in practical experience conciliation
often is a different process from mediation, although neither label
is used consistently around the world.89  Both processes are con-
sensual, and many understand the differences to center on the role
of the neutral in applying the law and suggesting remedies.90
The comments that States submitted to the Commission
describing their domestic procedures for enforcing mediated/con-
ciliated settlement agreements illustrate some of the distinctions
between the two processes.91  In India, for example, a conciliator
has a “greater role than a mediator” and may make proposals for
settlement and formulate the terms of a possible agreement.92  In
both processes the neutral may be appointed by either the parties
or a court, but conciliators and mediators operate under different
authorities.  Conciliation is governed by the Arbitration and Con-
ciliation Act of 1996, which defines a conciliator’s powers.  There is
no specific law dealing with mediation, but a mediator applies the
provisions of the Mediation Rules of 2003.93  The distinction be-
tween the processes also has consequences for enforcement of a
resulting settlement agreement: with conciliation, the settlement
agreement has the same status and effect as an arbitral award on
agreed terms.94
89 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TULANE L. REV. 1401, 1406 n.7 (2004) (“the
terms ‘mediation’ and ‘conciliation’ often have different meanings as one crosses jurisdictional
lines”).
90 See, e.g., id. (describing examples from Australia and New Zealand); Linda C. Reif, Con-
ciliation as a Mechanism for the Resolution of International Economic and Business Disputes, 14
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 578, 584 (2014) (characterizing conciliation as more formal than mediation
with the conciliator typically submitting written proposals for resolution); Jeremy Lack & Fran-
c¸ois Bogacz, The Neurophysiology of ADR and Process Design: A New Approach to Conflict
Prevention and Resolution, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 33, 63 (2012) (describing the con-
ciliation process as procedurally facilitative but substantively evaluative because the conciliator
identifies possible outcomes and objective norms and criteria).
91 See supra note 58.
92 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes, Enforcement of
settlement agreements, Compilation of comments by Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/
WP.191, at 3 (Aug. 4, 2015) (India).
93 Id. at 2–3.
94 Id. at 3.
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In other States that discussed using both processes, the legal
authority for them may differ and they may have different relation-
ships to court proceedings.  For example, Paraguay reported that
its legislation makes a clear distinction between mediation and con-
ciliation.  Mediation is a voluntary mechanism for conflict resolu-
tion, whereas conciliation is provided for in the Civil Procedure
Code and may be conducted only by judges.95  In the Republic of
Korea, there is a distinct court-annexed process called conciliation,
while parties can privately work out a compromise using either me-
diation or conciliation.96  There may also be distinctions in practice
based on the subject-matter of the dispute.  In Chile, the legal sys-
tem has incorporated mediation, especially in the areas of family
and labor law.  But it is distinct from conciliation, which may be
conducted under the Civil Procedure Code in any civil action in
which settlement is permissible.97
In the international realm, the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) is a notable example of an
institution that recognizes both mediation and conciliation, and dis-
tinguishes between them.  The ICSID Rules of Procedure for Con-
ciliation Proceedings specify conciliators’ functions.98  Their tasks
include clarifying the disputed issues, and to this end they are in-
structed to hear both parties and to try to obtain any information
that may further this goal.99  To promote an agreement between
the parties, conciliators may make recommendations to the parties.
These recommendations may include specific terms for settlement
or requests that during the conciliation the parties refrain from
specific acts that might aggravate the dispute, and conciliators are
directed to point out to the parties the arguments in favor of their
95 Compilation Add.2, supra note 59, at 8.
96 Compilation Add.1, supra note 59, at 10.
97 Compilation Add.3, supra note 59, at 4.
98 See ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules, Part E, R. 22 [hereinafter ICSID Rules],
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/basic-en.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2019). A parallel set of rules, the Conciliation (Additional Facility) Rules apply when one of the
parties is not an ICSID Member State or a national of an ICSID Member State and the parties
agree to their use. Proposed amendments would modify the rules slightly. See ICSID, Proposals
for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, Working Paper #3, at 92, 180 (Aug. 2019) (Conciliation
Rules for ICSID Convention Proceedings, R. 24 & Conciliation Rules for Additional Facility
Proceedings, R. 32), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/WP_3_VOLUME_1_ENGLISH
.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) [hereinafter ICSID Proposed Amendments].
99 ICSID Rules, supra note 98, R. 22(1). Conciliators may request explanations and docu-
ments from either party and seek evidence from third parties. With the consent of the concerned
party and with the parties’ participation, conciliators may visit sites connected to the dispute and
make inquires there. Id. R. 22(3).
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recommendation.100  ICSID has proposed rule amendments that
would create a separate set of mediation rules.  If approved as cur-
rently drafted, the mediation rules will describe the mediator’s role
as simply assisting the parties “in reaching a mutually acceptable
resolution” of their dispute.  They will also specify that the media-
tor does not have authority to impose a settlement and shall treat
the parties equally.101
Mentioning these domestic understandings of distinctions be-
tween mediation and conciliation and the separate ICSID rules is
part of a larger point: one of the challenges facing the field of dis-
pute resolution is a lack of consistent vocabulary.  Even within one
country, there can be long-standing disagreements about how dis-
pute resolution processes should be defined and identified.102  In
addition, the flexibility of dispute resolution processes has gener-
ated significant variations in the practices that are associated with a
single label,103 and an associated lack of predictability.  These fac-
tors mean that confusion about terms is often accompanied by con-
fusion about the nature of the processes.  This poor awareness can
interfere with parties’ ability to understand their options and to
make informed decisions in choosing a process.  Furthermore, the
greater variety of approaches at the international level only exacer-
bates the problem for trans-boundary disputes.  Using the same vo-
cabulary to signify a group of different processes, as UNCITRAL
has done in the Convention and Model Laws, does not help bring
clarity.
But using an umbrella term in the Convention and both Model
Laws does have multiple justifications.  The use of a single term
with a broad definition certainly makes for easier, less ponderous,
drafting.  It also has the significant advantage of including
processes other than mediation and conciliation.  Other processes
that can fall within the umbrella definition are neutral evaluation,
mini-trial, and, in general, consensual processes with third-party as-
100 Id. R. 22(2).
101 ICSID Proposed Amendments, supra note 98, at 218 (Rules for Mediation Proceedings,
R. 16).
102 See, e.g., Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 937 (1997); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The
Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator’s Role, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 949
(1997).
103 For example, does med-arb entail using the same third-party neutral as both the mediator
and arbitrator? Some assume yes, others emphatically say no. The answer, for some, is crucial in
deciding if the combined process is acceptable.
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1169
sistance.104  Thus, the umbrella approach also can accommodate
variations in processes, and in names, that are used in a variety of
legal systems.  Furthermore, there is merit in making the meaning
of “mediation” in the Convention as consistent as possible with the
Conciliation Model Law, which also used the umbrella approach.
This became especially important to avoid major discrepancies
once the decision was made to amend the Conciliation Model Law
as well as develop a Convention.105  Most fundamentally, however,
a defined umbrella term of art is consistent with its function in the
Singapore Convention and the Mediation Model Law.  With defini-
tions of processes that vary among countries, the purpose of the
term is not to define any process specifically, but to identify a
group of processes and distinguish them from arbitration and
negotiation.106
C. The Distinction from a Negotiated Settlement
UNCITRAL Working Group II decided at its first delibera-
tion session on the Convention that the instrument should cover
only settlement agreements reached in conciliation, broadly de-
fined.107  As an alternative, it considered addressing settlement
agreements in general, regardless of the process that the parties
employed to reach them.  This would have included negotiated set-
tlements that did not involve the assistance of a third-party.  The
idea did not receive support because it was felt that such a broad
approach would complicate an enforcement procedure.108  Instead,
the delegations supported limiting the scope of the instrument to
settlement agreements from processes involving a third party,
under the name “conciliation.”  There was a technical reason: the
limitation would be consistent with the mandate to the Working
Group from the Commission.109  There were also substantive rea-
sons to support a more limited scope.  In particular, it would pro-
mote mediation as an effective means of resolving disputes and
104 This aspect of the definition of “mediation” was drawn from the Conciliation Model Law.
See 64th Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2016), supra note 36, ¶¶ 116, 121; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note
14, ¶ 7.
105 See 65th Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2016), supra note 37, ¶ 47.
106 Cf. GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 14, ¶¶ 5–6.
107 63rd Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2015), supra note 33, ¶¶ 17–19.
108 Id. ¶ 18.
109 Id. ¶ 19.
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avoid ancillary disputes over whether a settlement agreement fell
within the scope of the instrument.110
Throughout the course of the deliberations, however, some
delegations repeatedly suggested expanding enforcement to in-
clude negotiated settlements.111  It is a fair question to ask why a
mediated settlement agreement should be treated more favorably
than a negotiated settlement agreement.112  The theoretical case
for a distinction is weak.  A mediator is supposed to be neutral, so
it is hard to argue that her presence should make a significant dif-
ference in terms of producing a settlement agreement that is suita-
ble for enforcement.  In line with this reasoning, the proponents of
expanding the scope to include negotiation argued that the goal
should be to promote alternative dispute resolution methods gen-
erally without singling out conciliation for favorable treatment.113
They also pointed out that the assistance of a third party can be
costly and burdensome and argued that eligibility for enforcement
procedures should not require these extra resources.114
Nonetheless, the initial decision to cover only settlements
reached in mediation was never changed.  For some delegations,
the requirement for a third party to be involved was important to
distinguish mediated settlements from ordinary contracts, as the
goal was not to provide every contract with a special route to en-
forcement.115  Moreover, if negotiated agreements were included,
an enforcing authority would need to determine that a negotiated
agreement was actually a settlement (i.e., resolved a dispute),
which would complicate the procedure.116  There was also a general
feeling that a more restrained instrument would garner more sup-
port from States and that a limited Convention could serve as a
building block, toward greater international acceptance of consen-
sual methods for resolving disputes.
The decision to cover only settlement agreements resulting
from mediation had effects on the content of other parts of the
instruments.  Most significantly, a party who seeks enforcement of
110 Id.
111 See, e.g., 64th Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2016), supra note 36, ¶ 115; 65th Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2016),
supra note 37, ¶¶ 40–41; see also Schnabel, supra note 1, at 18–19.
112 The question may be especially relevant if negotiating parties want to exercise their self-
determination to agree that the Convention or Model Law should apply. See 64th Sess. Rep.
(Feb. 2016), supra note 36, ¶ 115.
113 Id.
114 65th Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2016), supra note 37, ¶ 40.
115 Schnabel, supra note 1, at 19.
116 63rd Sess. Rep. (Sept. 2015), supra note 33, ¶ 18.
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a settlement agreement must demonstrate that the settlement
agreement resulted from mediation.  The Convention specifies a
list of evidence that will satisfy this requirement,117 including the
mediator’s signature on the settlement agreement, another docu-
ment signed by the mediator indicating that mediation was held, or
an institution’s attestation that it administered the mediation.118  If
none of these are available, other forms of evidence are
permissible.119
The decision that the instrument would cover only settlement
agreements resulting from mediation also led the Working Group
to consider a subsidiary question: whether the instruments should
allow individual States to broaden their scope to include other
processes.120  The decisions on this issue resulted in a difference
between the Convention and the Mediation Model Law.  Several
delegations supported granting States the flexibility to go beyond
the definition of “mediation,” and one could argue that the defini-
tion already includes so many processes that adding negotiation
would be harmless.  But there was disagreement as to whether an
option to expand the definition would be beneficial or would in-
stead defeat the purpose of the instruments and have negative con-
sequences for the effort to streamline enforcement.121  In the end,
the Working Group decided that the Convention would not include
a reservation allowing a State to declare that the instrument would
apply to negotiated settlement agreements, or any others that were
not reached through a “mediation” process.122  For the Model Law,
in contrast, the delegations decided to highlight the ability of States
to broaden their legislation to include agreements not reached in
mediation.  Section 3 on International settlement agreements in-
cludes the following footnote: “A State may consider enacting this
117 For more on this aspect of the Convention, see SING. REF. BK., Allan J. Stitt, The Singa-
pore Convention: When has a Mediation Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1173 (2019). This aspect of the Convention has proved controversial. See, e.g., F. Peter
Phillips, Concerns on the New Singapore Convention, BCM (Oct. 9, 2018), http://www.business
conflictmanagement.com/blog/2018/10/concerns-on-the-new-singapore-convention/ (criticizing
the requirement for a mediator’s signature as inconsistent with Western mediation practice).
118 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(b)(i)–(iii).
119 Id. art. 4(a)(b)(iv). The parallel provision in the Mediation Model Law, supra note 2, is
found in Article 18(1)(b).
120 See 67th Sess. Rep. (Oct. 2017), supra note 37, ¶¶ 68–72.
121 Id. ¶¶ 69–70. In addition, there were differing opinions as to the operation of a State’s
more favorable domestic regime for settlement agreement enforcement under Article 7 of the
Convention. Id. ¶¶ 70–71.
122 Id. ¶ 72; see also Schnabel, supra note 1, at 19 (maintaining that “[n]o good reason was
ever provided for not permitting states to extend the Convention via a declaration”).
1172CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1149
section to apply to agreements settling a dispute, irrespective of
whether they resulted from mediation.”123  It will be interesting to
see if States that enact the Mediation Model Law will accept this
invitation and include negotiated settlements within the scope of
the enforcement provisions.
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, let me return to the initial allusion to a rose and
its name.  In the case of the term “commercial,” a rose is still called
a rose.  But it has a different scent in the context of enforcement.
Perhaps it is a different cultivar.  The name for the concept “com-
mercial” is still “commercial,” but its significance in the Singapore
Convention (and the enforcement section of the Mediation Model
Law) is altered from its original use in the Conciliation Model Law.
This was not done directly by changing a definition, but by exclud-
ing settlement agreements that might otherwise be considered
“commercial” from coverage under the settlement provisions.
In contrast, with “mediation” we now have a rose by another
name.  UNCITRAL has changed its term from “conciliation” to
“mediation,” but the underlying concept and its scope remain the
same.  It also continues the problems associated with lumping sepa-
rate processes under a single name.  Nonetheless, I disagree with
Shakespeare that this newly named rose merely smells “as sweet.”
Because it is more widely used and understood, the term “media-
tion” is actually sweeter than “conciliation” for the purposes of the
Singapore Convention and the Mediation Model Law.
123 Mediation Model Law, supra note 2, at n.5; see also 68th Sess. Rep. (Feb. 2018), supra
note 72, ¶¶ 133–136.
THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION:
WHEN HAS A MEDIATION
TAKEN PLACE (ARTICLE 4)?
Allan J. Stitt*
I. OVERVIEW
As delegates to UNCITRAL Working Group II, our task was
to come up with a Convention that would facilitate enforcement of
mediated settlements by assisting the parties who are seeking en-
forcement while making it harder for those who try to renege on
their commitments.  This is an important lens through which to
view and understand the Convention drafted by the Working
Group.
In effect, we wanted to create a document that was a deter-
rent.  To use an analogy, one of the purposes of criminal law is to
dissuade criminals from committing criminal acts for fear of nega-
tive consequences.  Effective criminal laws would result in no
crimes because everyone would prefer to be law-abiding rather
than suffer the consequences of not.  As a result, effective criminal
laws would never need to be used.  Their measure of success would
be whether they encourage socially responsible  conduct.
Similarly, we wanted to create a convention that would never
be used.  If the Singapore Convention is effective, everyone partici-
pating in international mediations would know that agreements
they reached would be enforced.  Then, everyone would abide by
the agreements that they reach.  So the perfect convention is one
that is viewed as having few “outs.”  It would be easy to use and
hard to resist valid enforcements.  Defences to enforcement should
be only for egregious situations where enforcement of a consensual
agreement is not valid.  That would be a rare occurrence.  We
wanted to protect the rights of those seeking enforcement, not
those trying to evade their commitments.
* Canadian Delegate and President & CEO, ADR Chambers, Toronto, Canada.
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II. DIFFERENT MEDIATION EXPERIENCES
SHAPED THE DISCUSSION
One of the challenges faced by the Working Group with repre-
sentatives from countries all over the world was that our exper-
iences with mediation varied.  Also, many of the delegates were
representatives of their Governments without first-hand experi-
ence with mediation, while those few delegates with significant me-
diation experience brought with them primarily their particular
experience within their jurisdiction.
All of the delegates agreed that mediation, regardless of the
form, shared some common traits: mediation involved a third
party; the third party did not have  authority to impose a solution;
and the process is designed for the parties to determine whether a
settlement is better than continuing with their dispute.
Some delegates saw our debate as an opportunity to promote
the way that mediation was conducted in their countries, and to
attempt to impose that style of mediation as the “right” style.  They
wanted their style to be adopted by others if they wanted agree-
ments enforced.
Other delegates recognized that while mediation was con-
ducted differently in different parts of the world, none of the forms
of mediation was “wrong” and deals reached at any mediation
should be enforced, even if the process was not the same in every
country.  Those delegates with broad mediation experience were
adamant that there be flexibility in what was deemed a mediation.
They ultimately were successful in making sure that there were op-
tions in Article 4 to accommodate the different ways that media-
tion is evolving around the globe.
III. THE ARTICLE 4 DISCUSSION
A. Article 4: Generally
Article 4 sets out how parties can prove that the settlement
agreement was the result of a mediation, a threshold requirement
that must be met in order to seek enforcement under the Conven-
tion.  Some delegates expressed concern that parties would try to
enforce an agreement that they claimed was reached at mediation
when the agreement was not the product of a “real” mediation.
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We therefore set out to determine what the parties had to show a
court to satisfy the requirement that a mediation occurred.
It may be that this Article will never be used in practice as
there may never be a dispute about whether a mediation occurred.
If a party is trying to enforce a mediated settlement, it would seem
strange to claim that the agreement was reached, but not at what
one should properly consider a “mediation.”  But if there is a dis-
pute about whether there actually was a mediation, the Convention
deals with it.
B. Article 4.1(a) and 4.2
Article 4.1 provides that:
1. A party relying on a settlement agreement under this Con-
vention shall supply to the competent authority of the Party
to the Convention where relief is sought:
(a) The settlement agreement signed by the parties;
It is the norm in mediations for parties to a mediation who
reached an agreement to sign the settlement agreement.  As a re-
sult, there was consensus that there should be a requirement that
the agreement be signed.  Those who wanted this requirement
were concerned that parties may fraudulently create settlement
documents.  The signed requirement would make it harder to com-
mit fraud.
Article 4.2 on electronic communications, not reproduced
here, was necessary so that if a mediation were conducted online,
or if a settlement agreement were drafted where parties were not
physically in the same location, the parties could still meet the re-
quirement to “sign” the agreement if one of the options listed in
Article 4.2 were met.
C. Evidence of Mediation
Article 4.1(b) sets out what evidence is necessary to prove that
a mediation has occurred.  Disagreement among members of the
Working Group about the appropriate content of this section pro-
duced a lively debate.
Mediation practice has developed in a number of countries
where the mediator both drafts and signs the settlement agree-
ment.  For example, that is the norm in some European countries
1176CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1173
(though not in the U.K.) and in Israel.  Delegates from a number
of these countries, believing that their process was the best one,
argued that the mediator’s signature should be required as a condi-
tion for enforcement.
In North America and the U.K., on the other hand, mediators
are taught that there are dangers if the mediator drafts the agree-
ment.  For example, the drafting could be construed as legal work,
and if a mediator were a lawyer and provides legal work for two
parties, that lawyer would be required to make full disclosure to
both parties and not be entitled to keep any confidential informa-
tion from one party.  Then, the mediator would be required to dis-
close to the other side any information learned in confidence
during the mediation.  That requirement would eliminate key ben-
efits of private caucuses that are widely used in North America and
the U.K.
If the mediator were not a lawyer, the drafting of the settle-
ment agreement could be construed as the unauthorized practice of
law.
Also, if there were a dispute about the meaning of a word in
the settlement agreement, the mediator who drafted the agreement
may be called as a witness in a future proceeding to help interpret
the agreement.
As a result of these and other risks and problems, mediators in
North America are taught not to draft agreements, and they gener-
ally do not do so.  Similarly, mediators in North America are
taught not to sign the mediated settlement agreement and rarely
do so.  The mediator does not want to be viewed as either endors-
ing the agreement’s content nor attesting to its fairness.  They view
the settlement agreement as one between the parties.
While the Working Group was able to come to a consensus
that mediators should not be required to draft settlement agree-
ments, there was no consensus on whether the mediator should be
required to sign them.
The compromise solution that focuses on proving a mediation
is found in Article 4.1(b).  It states:
1. A party relying on a settlement agreement under this Con-
vention shall supply to the competent authority of the Party
to the Convention where relief is sought:
(b) Evidence that the settlement agreement resulted from
mediation, such as:
(i) The mediator’s signature on the settlement
agreement;
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(ii) A document signed by the mediator indicating that
the mediation was carried out;
(iii) An attestation by the institution that administered
the mediation; or
(iv) In the absence of (i), (ii) or (iii), any other evidence
acceptable to the competent authority.
While there does have to be some proof that the mediation
occurred, there are many ways it can be proven.  The first method,
the mediator’s signature on the document, meets the needs of
those jurisdictions where a mediator’s signature on a settlement
agreement is the norm.
A second method is a document signed by the mediator indi-
cating that the mediation has occurred.  That option could be met,
for example, by producing the Agreement to Mediate.  Some juris-
dictions require mediators to send in a form to the courts confirm-
ing that a mediation has occurred, and that document would
presumably suffice.  Alternatively, the mediator might supply a
note to the parties indicating that a mediation has occurred.
A third alternative is for the parties to get a letter from the
organization that administered the mediation (if there is such an
organization) stating that the mediation occurred.
But the fourth alternative was the most important for those of
us who wanted to make sure that this Article did not provide a way
for parties to avoid enforcement and  evade their obligations.  This
fourth alternative is a catch-all.  It allows a party to prove that a
mediation has taken place by producing any evidence that is ac-
ceptable to the court.  A party might submit an affidavit stating
that the mediation has occurred; a party might submit a copy of the
bill for the facilities indicating that it was used for the mediation; a
party might submit a letter from someone who happened to be at
the same facility when the mediation was occurring, confirming
that the mediation occurred.  There is no limit to the type of evi-
dence that one may put forward to prove that a mediation oc-
curred, so long as it is “acceptable to the competent authority.”
D. Article 4 Takeaway
In my view, there are two key takeaways from Article 4.  First,
parties should make sure that they sign the settlement agreement
(in person or electronically).
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Second, parties need to show a court evidence that a media-
tion took place.  In view of the multiple ways for doing so, proving
a mediation when one has occurred will be easy and rarely (if ever)
an issue.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS ON INTERPRETING ARTICLE 4
Lawyers are creative thinkers.  We can always find things to
argue about.  We can make arguments about issues that people
thought were resolved and find ambiguity in statements that peo-
ple thought were clear.  I hope the Singapore Convention doesn’t
get too “lawyered.”  It is a simple document with a simple premise.
Parties who reach an agreement at mediation should abide by their
commitments and should expect that if they do not, the other party
can enforce those commitments.
There are two distinct groups of people who mediate interna-
tional disputes: those who are familiar with and will satisfy the pro-
cedural requirements for enforcement under the Singapore
Convention, and those who are not familiar with the Convention,
or are familiar with it and forget to address the procedural
requirements.
No one is worried about the first group.  When parties who are
familiar with (and are thinking about) the provisions of the Singa-
pore Convention reach agreement at mediation, they will make
sure that they go through the steps necessary to ensure that the
agreement is enforceable.  They will, of course, ask each other
whether they want the agreement to be enforceable, but it is incon-
ceivable that someone would say that they would not.  No one will
reach an agreement if the other party does not want the agreement
to be enforceable.  Those of us who mediate know that never oc-
curs; and so the parties will take the steps necessary to make sure
their agreement is enforceable.
The only people we need to worry about are those who don’t
know about the Convention, or those who reach agreement at 2:00
a.m. and forget that they need to meet the Convention’s require-
ments for the agreement to be enforceable.  The question we need
to ask is: what should we deem their intent to be?  If they had
thought about it, would they have said that the agreement should
be enforced?
For me, the answer is obvious.  Parties who reach agreement
at mediation assume that both sides will fulfill their obligations and
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assume that their agreement is and will be enforceable.  So when
we interpret the provisions of the Convention, and when countries
decide issues such as whether they should make a Reservation (Ar-
ticle 8) that requires parties to specifically opt-in to the Convention
to make it applicable, we should remember that we are trying to
make agreements enforceable.  Courts should interpret agreements
in a way that supports parties who want to follow through on their
settlements, not those who want to renege.  We should assume that
people who don’t specifically address the requirements in the Con-
vention still want their agreements to be enforced, and not help
those who are trying to avoid their commitments.

RECOGNITION BY ANY OTHER NAME:
ARTICLE 3 OF THE SINGAPORE
CONVENTION ON MEDIATION
Timothy Schnabel*
I. INTRODUCTION
The heart of the Singapore Convention is contained in its third
article.1  Other parts of the treaty’s text, such as Article 1 (address-
ing the scope of the Convention), consumed more hours of the ne-
gotiations, and Article 5 (addressing grounds for refusal) will likely
be the focus of most of the eventual litigation regarding the Con-
vention’s application to particular disputes.2  Moreover, most of
the Convention’s fifteen other articles are longer and more de-
tailed than Article 3.  Yet only Article 3 imposes affirmative obliga-
tions on Parties to the Convention.  All other articles merely play
supporting roles, such as placing boundaries on the Convention’s
application, setting forth procedural rules or exceptions, and pro-
viding the mechanics for the Convention to operate as a treaty.  In
other words, all the other articles are used to determine whether
and how the Article 3 obligations apply, but only Article 3 itself
imposes substantive duties on states that join the Convention.
Nevertheless, despite the importance of Article 3, it may be
the most awkwardly drafted and confusing article in the Conven-
tion (particularly its second paragraph), and it hides its substantive
nature behind a vague title:
Article 3
General principles
1. Each Party to the Convention shall enforce a settlement
agreement in accordance with its rules of procedure and under
the conditions laid down in this Convention.
* Author served as head of the U.S. Delegation during the UNCITRAL negotiations and
presented the initial proposal to develop a convention. Anything in this chapter is his personal
opinion and not offered in his official capacity.
1 See G.A. Res. 73/198, U.N. Doc. A/Res/73/198, annex (Jan. 11, 2019) (providing the text of
the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Media-
tion [hereinafter Singapore Convention or the Convention]).
2 For discussion of the other parts of the Convention, see Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore
Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of
Mediated Settlements, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2019). Much of the analysis herein is also
drawn from that article.
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2. If a dispute arises concerning a matter that a party claims
was already resolved by a settlement agreement, a Party to the
Convention shall allow the party to invoke the settlement agree-
ment in accordance with its rules of procedure and under the
conditions laid down in this Convention, in order to prove that
the matter has already been resolved.3
This chapter will discuss the requirements of Article 3, the history
behind why it is not drafted in a more straightforward manner, its
interaction with other parts of the Convention, and why its pres-
ence is vital for the purposes of the Convention.
II. WHAT ARTICLE 3 REQUIRES
Article 3 contains two separate but related obligations: en-
forcement and recognition.
A. Enforcement
First, upon a request by a party to a mediated settlement
agreement covered by the Convention, a state that is a Party to the
Convention must enforce the agreement.4  This obligation, con-
tained in Article 3.1, provides for a state to affirmatively compel
compliance with a settlement agreement when one party to the set-
tlement agreement claims that the other party has breached its
obligations.5
In many cases, enforcement may consist of an order to pay an
amount of money provided in the settlement agreement, but the
Article 3.1 obligation is not limited to enforcement of monetary
obligations.  Such a limitation was considered during the negotia-
tions but rejected.6  Although in some cases, ordering compliance
with certain non-monetary obligations may be challenging for
3 Singapore Convention art. 3.
4 Id. art. 3(1). The use of “Party” (capitalized) or “Party to the Convention” should be
understood as referring to states or regional economic integration organizations who join the
Convention, whereas “party” (uncapitalized) should be understood as referring to a party to a
particular dispute. See also Schnabel, supra note 2, at 40 n.243.
5 See Schnabel, supra note 2, at 39–40.
6 See, e.g., intervention of Switzerland, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group
II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 62nd Session, Feb. 2, 2015, 15:00–18:00, https://icms.unov.org/
CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/b62a662a-2fa7-452b-9b04-9c4587c4e032; Schnabel,
supra note 2, at 12–13.
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courts—such as when a settlement agreement establishes or modi-
fies a long-term prospective business arrangement—restricting the
Convention to monetary obligations would have disincentivized
parties from searching for creative solutions in mediation, thus un-
dermining one of the most significant benefits of this form of dis-
pute resolution.7  Thus, as Article 3 does not include such a
restriction, a state that is a Party to the Convention has to order
compliance with all types of obligations that were undertaken in
the settlement agreement (subject, of course, to the exceptions pro-
vided in Article 5, which among other effects ensure that states are
not required to enforce elements of settlement agreements that
would be contrary to public policy).
The obligation to enforce settlement agreements does not re-
quire the use of any particular procedures, but merely requires that
enforcement occur.  Article 3.1 provides that a state can enforce
settlement agreements “in accordance with its rules of proce-
dure”—an approach that should make it easier for states to imple-
ment the Convention into their existing legal systems.8  Of course,
this freedom to use existing rules of procedure does not permit
states to impose requirements that would be inconsistent with the
Convention—e.g., requiring formalities (such as notarization of
settlement agreements) beyond those provided in Article 4 of the
Convention or providing grounds for refusal beyond those listed in
Article 5.9
The Convention’s agnosticism toward procedural approaches
extends to the topic of execution, which falls outside the Conven-
tion’s scope.10  The Convention does not require a state to alter its
rules on topics such as the attachment of specific assets to satisfy an
enforcement order.  States will likely take different approaches to
their implementation of Article 3.1 and how it interacts with their
existing procedures for enforcement and execution.  Some states
may choose to rely upon administrative officers such as bailiffs who
are used to following simple instructions rather than performing
7 See, e.g., intervention of South Africa, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group
II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 62nd Session, Feb. 3, 2015, 10:00–13:00, https://icms.unov.org/
CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/f7f8fc60-434c-4965-9b2d-79dee3f85403; intervention of
International Mediation Institute (IMI), in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Arbitration and Conciliation), 62nd Session, Feb. 2, 2015, 15:00–18:00, https://icms.unov.org/
CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/b62a662a-2fa7-452b-9b04-9c4587c4e032; Schnabel,
supra note 2, at 12–13.
8 Singapore Convention art. 3(1); see also Schnabel, supra note 2, at 39.
9 See, e.g., Schnabel, supra note 2, at 39–41.
10 Id.
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complex analyses, whereas other states may provide for a substan-
tial judicial role.11
In both respects—deferring to a state’s existing rules of proce-
dure, and remaining silent on issues regarding execution—the Con-
vention mirrors the approach taken in the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards.12  A similar variety in states’ methods of implementa-
tion is thus also to be expected.
The Article 3.1 enforcement obligation contains one addi-
tional qualification: enforcement is only required “under the condi-
tions laid down in this Convention.”13  This reference to
“conditions” encompasses the other articles of the Convention that
determine whether the Article 3.1 obligation applies.  In other
words, a settlement agreement must meet the scope and defini-
tional requirements of Articles 1 and 2, and relief must be sought
in accordance with Article 4, before the state will be obligated to
enforce the settlement agreement.  If an Article 5 exception is
found to apply (when raised by the party resisting relief, under Ar-
ticle 5.1, or by the court itself under Article 5.2), the state is also
not obligated to apply Article 3.1.14
B. Recognition
The second obligation contained in Article 3 corresponds to
the concept that would be understood in many states (including
generally in common law systems) as “recognition” of settlement
agreements, although the word “recognition” is not used.15  This
obligation, located in Article 3.2, is not set forth in the most elegant
drafting.  Its meaning, however, was clearly understood by the
delegations participating in the negotiations, as the intent behind
11 Id. See also intervention of Switzerland, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working
Group II (Dispute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept. 21, 2016, 9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/
CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/89138891-3434-4923-8b18-da2ef1003f27.
12 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. See also intervention of Switzerland,
supra note 11.
13 Singapore Convention art. 3(1).
14 See, e.g., Schnabel, supra note 2, at 39.
15 Singapore Convention art. 3(2). See also, e.g., intervention of Finland, in UNCITRAL
Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 67th Session, Oct. 2, 2017,
10:00–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/1ad3377d-7994-49a2-
8de4-d6a05cfd6e2a; Schnabel, supra note 2, at 38.
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1185
the provision was explained (without any disagreement being ex-
pressed) on multiple occasions.16
If one party to a settlement agreement seeks to reopen the
underlying dispute that was already settled through mediation
(e.g., that party attempts to litigate that dispute), the other party is
entitled to seek relief under Article 3.2.  That other party may in-
voke the settlement as a defense, and “by meeting all of the condi-
tions laid down in the [Convention], the party seeking relief is
thereby able to prove that the dispute has been settled.”17  (The
reference to “conditions” has the same implications in Article 3.2
as under Article 3.1, as does the reference to rules of procedure.)
In other words, the settlement agreement provides a complete de-
fense to claims based on the underlying dispute—essentially, “rec-
ognition” as it is understood in many legal systems.
Article 3 thus provides for the use of settlement agreements as
both a “sword” (the offensive use of a settlement agreement via a
request for enforcement, to compel compliance with the obliga-
tions in the settlement agreement) and as a “shield” (the ability to
use a settlement agreement as a complete defense).  This concept is
fairly straightforward; the contorted drafting of Article 3.2 will be
explained further below.
C. What Article 3 Does Not Cover
The limits of Article 3 are worth noting briefly.  Although the
Convention requires states to enable parties to use a settlement
agreement as both a “sword” and a “shield,” the Convention’s
rules do not have to be applied in all situations in which a court
may be called upon to examine a particular mediated settlement
agreement (even one that meets the Convention’s various require-
ments, such as that it resolved a dispute that was “commercial” and
“international”).
16 See intervention of the United States, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group
II (Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 7, 2017, 15:00–18:00, https://icms.unov.org/
CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/2332cbc3-282e-4473-8396-a949d51f011b; intervention of
the United States, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II, 67th Session, Oct. 3,
2017, 9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/62404311-9810-
4e93-a063-5864787a8b4c. See also Schnabel, supra note 2, at 40–42.
17 Intervention of the United States, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 7, 2017, 15:00–18:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/2332cbc3-282e-4473-8396-a949d51f011b.
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In particular, if a state’s non-Convention law permits parties
to use settlement agreements in ways beyond those contemplated
by Article 3, the state is not bound to apply the Convention’s
framework.  For example, to the extent that a state provides access
to its courts for the mere interpretation of agreements—even in
situations in which neither party is affirmatively seeking to have
the agreement enforced, nor seeking to rely on the agreement in
defense against a claim—then the proceeding falls outside the
scope of the Convention.18  In such a proceeding, the court would
not have to follow the procedural requirements of Article 4, nor
would the Convention’s other rules generally be relevant.
III. WHY THE PHRASING OF ARTICLE 3(2) IS CONVOLUTED
To those with an eye for the tragic, the phrasing of Article 3(2)
and the absence of the word “recognition” may evoke some
Shakespearean connotations:
What’s in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other word would smell as sweet.
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo called,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name,
And, for thy name, which is no part of thee,
Take all myself.19
As noted above, the common understanding of the delegations that
negotiated the Convention was that Article 3.2 would have an ef-
fect essentially equivalent to that implied by the term “recogni-
tion” in many legal systems.  So why does the Convention not
simply provide for the “recognition and enforcement” of settle-
18 See, e.g., interventions of Sweden and the Chair, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings:
Working Group II (Dispute Resolution), 67th Session, Oct. 4, 2017, 14:00–17:00, https://
icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/9fdfe98f-1382-4d45-833f-47b0b08bd961;
Schnabel, supra note 2, at 40.
19 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, Act 2, Sc. 2 (OUP Oxford 2008) (1599).
Such a reference seems particularly appropriate given that UNCITRAL’s Working Group II,
which developed the Convention, previously generated what seems to be the world’s first multi-
laterally-drafted sonnet, in the course of earlier treaty negotiations. See intervention of the
United States, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Arbitration and Concilia-
tion), 60th Session, Feb. 7, 2014, 10:00–13:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/
speakerslog/c228e59d-f1e1-42ed-a182-d6bd002524d0 (presenting “A Sonnet Most Favored,” co-
authored by the United States, Australia, Singapore, Canada, Israel, and—to the extent it re-
lated to portfolio investment instead of foreign direct investment, due to E.U. competence is-
sues—the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic).
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ment agreements in those words?  Why did the venerable concept
of recognition have to “doff [its] name” to be part of the
Convention?
For much of the negotiations, many delegations argued in
favor of a straightforward approach that would mirror the New
York Convention in terminology.20  These delegations pointed out
that in many legal systems, recognition is a prerequisite to enforce-
ment, and that the purposes of the Singapore Convention (as dis-
cussed below) would be undermined if the Convention did not
clearly provide parties with both a “sword” and a “shield.”21
Yet at the same time, other delegations argued that the Con-
vention should only provide for enforcement, not recognition.22
Some of these delegations argued that only acts of states, such as
court-issued judgments, could be the proper subjects of recognition
(even though the New York Convention requires the recognition
of arbitral awards and agreements to arbitrate).23 Others argued
that the inclusion of “recognition” of settlement agreements could
have consequences beyond those intended by its proponents: they
made the case that, in some legal systems, providing for “recogni-
tion” would, in some situations, prevent courts from even opening
a case and evaluating whether evidence outside the settlement
20 See, e.g., interventions of Colombia and Ecuador, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings:
Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 63rd Session, Sept. 9, 2015, 9:30–12:30, https://
icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/62da59e8-138e-4226-9753-0ea15c3b706f;
intervention of the United States, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Dis-
pute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept. 15, 2016, 9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/5b1bd013-83f3-4439-83b4-e9e7a676f37f; Schnabel, supra note 2, at
36–37.
21 See, e.g., intervention of Vietnam, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept. 22, 2016, 9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/2b7d9b79-b703-4ddf-ad34-b2d9101f794f; intervention of Australia, in
UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 63rd Session,
Sept. 9, 2015, 14:00–17:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/
c0ba5de5-130e-4672-9ab8-2f514121df77; intervention of Mexico, in UNCITRAL Audio Record-
ings: Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept. 15, 2016, 9:30–12:30, https://
icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/5b1bd013-83f3-4439-83b4-e9e7a676f37f;
Schnabel, supra note 2, at 36–37.
22 See, e.g., intervention of the European Union, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Work-
ing Group II (Dispute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept. 14, 2016, 9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov
.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/f5c9b0ea-5f54-4158-a198-d0ea83b3c9a3; Schnabel,
supra note 2, at 35–36.
23 See, e.g., interventions of Germany, Bulgaria, and the European Union, in UNCITRAL
Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 63rd Session, Sept. 9, 2015,
9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/62da59e8-138e-4226-
9753-0ea15c3b706f; Schnabel, supra note 2, at 35–36.
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agreement itself would affect the possible applicability of Article 5
defenses.24
One of these delegations explained that, in terms of the
“sword” and “shield” analogy, its legal system provided two types
of “shields”—one in which court acceptance of a document would
prevent the court from opening a case entirely, and another that
would treat the document as one piece of evidence (potentially
among many) that the court could consider in deciding a case.25
The term “recognition” was said to imply the first of those two
shields in that system.  Such an outcome was not desired by those
advocating for the inclusion of “recognition” in the Convention.
Instead, they argued that the Convention needed to take a third
approach, in between those two extremes—i.e., providing that a
settlement agreement would not merely be one piece of evidence
among others, but would be conclusive proof of a dispute being
resolved, while not preventing a court from opening a case to con-
sider defenses.26
Given that the term “recognition” evidently carried different
implications to delegations from different legal systems, the deci-
sion was made to seek a solution that did not use the term, but
instead functionally described the intended result.27  One approach
24 See, e.g., intervention of Denmark, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Arbitration and Conciliation), 63rd Session, Sept. 9, 2015, 14:00–17:00, https://icms.unov.org/
CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/c0ba5de5-130e-4672-9ab8-2f514121df77; intervention of
Denmark, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation),
64th Session, Feb. 4, 2016, 10:00–13:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/
speakerslog/c6fbafcc-d219-4d96-a5c0-b72884881b06; Schnabel, supra note 2, at 37.
25 See intervention of Denmark, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Dis-
pute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept. 20, 2016, 9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/0c295bca-1470-41cc-b71f-9fb9c672228c.
26 See, e.g., intervention of the United States, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: U.N.
Comm’n Int’l Trade Law, 50th Session, July 7, 2017, 14:00–17:00, https://icms.unov.org/
CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/015ae34e-320f-4d49-a0cd-b5d0cb0511e2; interventions
of Japan and the United States, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Dispute
Settlement), 67th Session, Oct. 3, 2017, 9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/un-
citral/speakerslog/62404311-9810-4e93-a063-5864787a8b4c. See also intervention of Switzerland,
in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept.
22, 2016, 9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/2b7d9b79-
b703-4ddf-ad34-b2d9101f794f; Schnabel, supra note 2, at 37.
27 See, e.g., intervention of Israel, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 8, 2017, 10:00–13:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/708ce97b-d27a-4c4b-9e9e-7b5a6ee13ee4; intervention of the United
States, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: U.N. Comm’n Int’l Trade Law, 50th Session, July 7,
2017, 14:00–17:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/015ae34e-320f-
4d49-a0cd-b5d0cb0511e2. See also intervention of Canada, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings:
Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 63rd Session, Sept. 9, 2015, 9:30–12:30, https://
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that was considered was obligating states to give settlement agree-
ments the same effect when raised as a defense that they would be
given in enforcement proceedings.  Although this approach might
have worked, it failed to attract sufficient support when a caveat
was attached to it—i.e., that the “same effect” rule would only ap-
ply to the extent that national law provided such a defense.  This
approach would have made the availability of this form of relief
depend on the choices made in each state’s domestic law.28  An-
other suggestion was to provide that states would be obliged to
treat settlement agreements as “binding.”29  This approach also
failed to build sufficient support, as the delegations that wanted the
Convention to cover “recognition” were not persuaded that treat-
ing settlement agreements as “binding” would give settlement
agreements greater effect than mere contracts, let alone that they
would be treated as definitive proof of a dispute being resolved.30
Ultimately, a breakthrough on this issue was made as part of a
package of compromises on five significant issues in the negotia-
tions.31  This set of compromises balanced the goals of the delega-
tions who sought an ambitious Convention with the concerns of
other delegations who advocated for a more cautious approach.
For those who were concerned about possible negative effects of
any overlap with the New York Convention and two Hague Con-
icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/62da59e8-138e-4226-9753-0ea15c3b706f;
intervention of Norway, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Arbitration and
Conciliation), 63rd Session, Sept. 9, 2015, 14:00–17:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/
uncitral/speakerslog/c0ba5de5-130e-4672-9ab8-2f514121df77; Schnabel, supra note 2, at 38.
28 See, e.g., intervention of the European Union, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Work-
ing Group II (Dispute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept. 20, 2016, 9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov
.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/0c295bca-1470-41cc-b71f-9fb9c672228c; Schnabel,
supra note 2, at 38.
29 See, e.g., interventions of the United States and the European Union, in UNCITRAL
Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept. 15, 2016,
9:30–12:30, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/5b1bd013-83f3-4439-
83b4-e9e7a676f37f; Schnabel, supra note 2, at 38–39.
30 See, e.g., interventions of Argentina and Switzerland, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings:
Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 65th Session, Sept. 19, 2016, 14:00–17:00, https://
icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/f61a25d9-fcc5-4f13-bea5-afc92f9660e7;
Schnabel, supra note 2, at 38–39.
31 See generally U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of Working Group II (Dispute
Settlement) on Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, ¶ 10 (2017), http://legal.un.org/
docs/?symbol=A/CN.9/901. See also intervention of Israel, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings:
Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 7, 2017, 15:00–18:00, https://
icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/2332cbc3-282e-4473-8396-a949d51f011b;
intervention of the Chair, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Dispute Settle-
ment), 66th Session, Feb. 10, 2017, 10:00–13:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/unci-
tral/speakerslog/f619271a-e928-400e-b6d0-08b213c54710; Schnabel, supra note 2, at 6–8.
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ference instruments, the text in Article 1.3 was added to minimize
such interactions between treaties.32  For those who were con-
cerned about mediator misbehavior, two grounds for refusal were
added in Article 5.1(e)–(f).33  In exchange, for those who sought an
ambitious approach, the Convention was bolstered in two key
ways.  The Convention would apply to covered settlement agree-
ments by default (rather than requiring parties to a settlement
agreement to opt in), although individual states could make decla-
rations altering this approach.34  Also, using the Article 3.2 lan-
guage, the Convention would provide for settlement agreements to
be used as a complete defense against claims, even though the
word “recognition” would not be used.35  The final element of the
package of compromises was the decision to develop a model law
text at the same time as the Convention, so that states who did not
yet feel ready to join a treaty could still choose a model law as a
step in the direction of reforming their laws to encourage
mediation.36
32 See, e.g., intervention of the European Union, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Work-
ing Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 64th Session, Feb. 2, 2016, 15:00–18:00, https://
icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/35633c76-b3fd-4a5e-acd6-c34f2783c6cb;
intervention of the European Union, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 8, 2017, 10:00–13:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/708ce97b-d27a-4c4b-9e9e-7b5a6ee13ee4; intervention of the Chair,
in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb.
8, 2017, 10:00–13:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/708ce97b-
d27a-4c4b-9e9e-7b5a6ee13ee4; intervention of the United States, in UNCITRAL Audio Record-
ings: Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 8, 2017, 15:00–18:00, https://
icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/d977fb46-494f-48c0-878e-225c68ee8745;
Schnabel, supra note 2, at 25–28.
33 See, e.g., intervention of Israel, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 7, 2017, 15:00–18:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/2332cbc3-282e-4473-8396-a949d51f011b; Schnabel, supra note 2, at
50.
34 See Singapore Convention art. 8(1)(b). See also intervention of Israel, in UNCITRAL
Audio Recordings: Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 7, 2017,
15:00–18:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/2332cbc3-282e-4473-
8396-a949d51f011b; Schnabel, supra note 2, at 57–59.
35 See, e.g., intervention of Israel, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 7, 2017, 15:00–18:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/2332cbc3-282e-4473-8396-a949d51f011b; intervention of the United
States, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: U.N. Comm’n Int’l Trade Law, 50th Session, July 7,
2017, 14:00–17:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/015ae34e-320f-
4d49-a0cd-b5d0cb0511e2; Schnabel, supra note 2, at 38–42.
36 See, e.g., intervention of Israel, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 7, 2017, 15:00–18:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/2332cbc3-282e-4473-8396-a949d51f011b; Schnabel, supra note 2, at
8–9.
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In terms of the Article 3.2 text, this compromise took a func-
tional approach, describing the aspects of recognition that needed
to be covered by the Convention, without using the term that cre-
ated concerns about unintended consequences in some legal sys-
tems.37  The resulting text, although not a model of clarity, was
discussed repeatedly in the negotiations without any sign that dele-
gations differed on their understanding of the agreed approach.
This understanding held up throughout the rest of the negotiations,
with only minor changes occurring subsequently.  (Even minor
drafting suggestions were resisted; a suggestion was later made that
Article 3.2 should be clarified by specifying that invoking the set-
tlement agreement would “conclusively” prove that the dispute
had been resolved, but such an addition was deemed unnecessary,
as it would not have changed the intended meaning of the
clause.)38
IV. SUBTLE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER ARTICLES
Because Article 3 is the core of the Convention, the choices
made with respect to that article rippled throughout the rest of the
text.  Some of these effects are less obvious than others.  For exam-
ple, because a long and complex clause was—for understandable
37 The phrasing that was eventually incorporated into the text drew on the model of drafting
suggestion made earlier by the European Union, though significant changes were made. See, e.g.,
intervention of the European Union, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings: Working Group II
(Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 6, 2017, 10:00–13:00, https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/
public/uncitral/speakerslog/7d3f064d-ed33-41e3-be7b-6d430a3bde44; Schnabel, supra note 2, at
41 n.245. For example, the E.U. proposed a drafting approach that would have referred to invok-
ing the mere “existence” of the settlement agreement (rather than the settlement agreement
itself). Moreover, instead of referring to a state’s rules of procedure (as in the New York Con-
vention), the E.U. drafting suggestion would have only allowed a party to invoke a settlement
agreement in accordance with “the law” of the state where relief was sought—reminiscent of the
earlier proposal to give settlement agreements the “same effect” when raised as a defense as in
the context of enforcement requests, but only to the extent permitted under each state’s law. The
intended implications of the E.U.-proffered language were never fully explored and were ques-
tioned by a number of delegations. See, e.g., interventions of Israel, Mexico, Honduras, Austra-
lia, the United States, the Russian Federation, and the Chair, in UNCITRAL Audio Recordings:
Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 66th Session, Feb. 6, 2017, 10:00–13:00, https://
icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/7d3f064d-ed33-41e3-be7b-6d430a3bde44.
In any event, the questions raised were in the end not relevant, as the E.U. drafting suggestion
was soon superseded by the compromise text.
38 See interventions of Spain, Israel, the United States, and Uganda, in UNCITRAL Audio
Recordings: Working Group II (Dispute Settlement), 67th Session, Oct. 3, 2017, 9:30–12:30,
https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/62404311-9810-4e93-a063-
5864787a8b4c.
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reasons—used in place of the term “recognition,” other parts of
the Convention could not as easily cross-reference the obligations
imposed under Article 3.  Thus, rather than having Article 4 refer
to the procedures for seeking recognition and enforcement of set-
tlement agreements and having Article 5 refer to grounds on which
recognition and enforcement could be refused, a more creative ap-
proach had to be employed.  Referring only to “enforcement” in
those other articles would not work, as it might have implied either
that the Convention applied only to enforcement (and not the de-
fensive use of settlement agreements) or that these other articles
did not apply to Article 3.2.  At the same time, paraphrasing Arti-
cle 3.2 in other articles or finding some other one-word term to
substitute for “recognition” in cross-references elsewhere was also
not feasible.  If a less convoluted way to describe the obligations in
Article 3.2 could have been identified while still satisfying inter-
ested delegations, that drafting approach would have been used in
Article 3 itself.
In the end, other articles were drafted simply to refer to the
two halves of Article 3 jointly as the “relief” that a party could seek
under the Convention.39  (As the Convention was being finalized, a
definition of “seeking relief” was considered but determined to be
unnecessary.)40
The decision to include the concept of recognition (if not the
term itself) also increases the relevance of Article 12.4, which ad-
dresses the interaction of the Convention with the internal rules of
regional economic integration organizations (“REIOs”), should
any of them (e.g., the European Union) ever join the Convention.
Article 12.4 provides two instances in which the internal rules
of a REIO can prevail over the Convention in the event of a con-
flict, including “as concerns the recognition or enforcement of
judgments” between member states of the REIO.41  If a REIO has
internal rules requiring a member state to recognize a judgment
from another member state, such an obligation can excuse the
member state from an obligation to provide relief under Article 3
of the Convention.  Thus, for example, if party 1 to a settlement
agreement commences litigation in REIO member state A, and
party 2 claims that the dispute was already resolved in the settle-
ment agreement, but the court in A declines to recognize the set-
39 See, e.g., Singapore Convention arts. 4(1), 4(3), 5(1), 5(2), 6, 12(4).
40 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-
first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, ¶ 24 (2018).
41 Singapore Convention art. 12(4).
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tlement agreement under Article 3.2 because it finds that the
public policy exception in Article 5.2(a) applies, that court may is-
sue a judgment that member state B is then obligated to recognize
due to the REIO’s internal rules.  In that instance, B could recog-
nize the judgment rather than the settlement agreement without
violating its Article 3.2 obligations (even if it did not share state
A’s public policy concerns regarding the settlement agreement)
thanks to Article 12.4.  However, if state B were not a member
state of the REIO, the mere existence of an inconsistent judgment
from another state would not, on its own, suffice as a reason to
deny relief under Article 3.
V. ARTICLE 3.2: ESSENTIAL FOR THE SUCCESS
OF THE CONVENTION
As noted at the outset, Article 3 may not jump out at the cas-
ual reader as the most vital part of the Convention, given its rela-
tive brevity and the convoluted phrasing of its second paragraph.
Moreover, given the controversy about whether to address the con-
cept of “recognition” (however phrased) within the Convention,
the inclusion of Article 3.2 was not a foregone conclusion.  Yet
without this key section, the main purposes of the Convention
would have been significantly undermined in at least two con-
nected ways.
First, in terms of the Convention’s practical effects, the ab-
sence of Article 3.2 would have hamstrung the Convention’s utility
to parties seeking to avoid needless litigation after entering into a
settlement agreement.  If the Convention merely obliged states to
enforce settlement agreements but not also to treat settlement
agreements as conclusive proof that a dispute had been resolved,
many parties would not have been able to rely on the Convention
to ensure that their settlement agreements would be given effect.
The Convention’s relevance would have depended on how a partic-
ular dispute developed.  A party that fulfilled its obligations under
the settlement agreement could not have been assured that it
would be able to avoid relitigating the dispute to secure compli-
ance by the other party.  Moreover, a party that later came to re-
gret entering into a settlement agreement could have sought to
avoid the Convention’s application by initiating litigation on the
underlying dispute, as the other party’s ability to raise the settle-
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ment agreement in defense would have depended on the domestic
law in that forum rather than the provisions in the Convention.42
Second, and even more significant than the above-described
effects on post-settlement litigation, the omission of Article 3.2
would have made it extremely unlikely that the Convention would
fulfill its primary purpose of encouraging the use of mediation for
the resolution of cross-border commercial disputes.  Although the
Convention was drafted so as to be practically usable  as an effi-
cient legal framework under which parties could rely on settlement
agreements in courts in various jurisdictions, a more important role
of the Convention will likely be its effect on a far greater number
of disputes that will hopefully never go to court.43
To the extent that the existence of the Convention encourages
parties to use mediation in the first place, many additional disputes
would be resolved through settlement agreements that the parties
would never breach (and thus would not need to take to court).
But this effect on the use of mediation is plausible primarily to the
extent that the Convention helps to reshape the perception of me-
diation in legal cultures where it is not yet accepted as a coequal
form of dispute resolution.  Establishing a cross-border regime for
mediation that is perceived as roughly equivalent to that which the
New York Convention provides for arbitration would be a neces-
sary part of such a cultural shift, or else mediation would likely not
be able to overcome the resistance it still faces in many corners.
Just as commercial parties trust the New York Convention as a
vital though imperfect tool that enables them to use arbitration
with confidence, the Singapore Convention must play the same
role for mediation—and it would not likely achieve such a status if
it were seen by litigators as providing merely a sword but no shield,
leaving the use of settlement agreements in defense against claims
to the vagaries of domestic contract law and procedure.  The Con-
vention would not have sufficiently altered litigators’ risk calculus
regarding whether engaging in mediation would be worth the
resources.
Only the passage of years will reveal the extent to which the
Convention will ultimately achieve the lofty goal of elevating medi-
ation’s accessibility and status for cross-border dispute resolution.
But without the “shield” in Article 3.2, such aspirations would
likely have been beyond reach from the outset.  Given that the ex-
istence of this inartfully-drafted provision keeps these hopes alive,
42 See, e.g., Schnabel, supra note 2, at 36.
43 See, e.g., id. at 2–4.
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what we would otherwise call recognition truly does still “smell as
sweet” even when its new name might be seen as a grammatical
tragedy.

SINGAPORE CONVENTION DEFENCES BASED
ON MEDIATOR’S MISCONDUCT:
ARTICLES 5.1(e) & (f)
Michel Kallipetis, QC, FCIArb*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the February 2019 ICC Mediation Competition in Paris,
Damien Cote from Canada and David Lewis from New York mod-
erated a “debate” on the Singapore Convention.1  One of the
panellists launched into a full-scale attack on the Convention, in
which he dismissed it on the basis that the “whole document re-
sembled the New York Convention and was redolent of arbitration
rather than mediation.”  The speaker focused on Article 5 and the
Grounds for Refusing Relief, and he was particularly critical of Ar-
ticles 5.1(e) and (f).  He expressed his view that these articles were
apposite to the setting aside of an arbitral award and therefore had
no relevance to mediation and ought not to be a  basis for a chal-
lenge to a consensual settlement of an international commercial
dispute.
At first blush, a cursory reading of the Convention might jus-
tify his observation.  It was apparent to the experienced mediators
who attended the Vienna and New York Working Group II discus-
sions that many of the delegates did not appear familiar with medi-
ation in practice and were approaching this project as if a mediator
were akin to an arbitrator.  This explains why a great deal of time
was spent discussing “traffic lights” disqualifications, bias, undue
influence, and all the fascinating issues with which the arbitration
world has become obsessed in recent years!  However, if that
panellist had considered the wording of the Convention, he may
well have appreciated that those drafting the Articles which
prompted his attack had chosen their words with care, and the
panellist may have realised that his initial judgment was hasty and
uninformed.
* Michel Kallipetis is a Distinguished Fellow and Vice President of the International Acad-
emy of Mediators (IAM). He represented IAM at Working Group II meetings.
1 See G.A. Res. 73/198, U.N. Doc. A/Res/73/198, annex, United Nations Convention on
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Jan. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Sin-
gapore Convention].
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The earlier Articles of the Convention are for others to deal
with and in any event had been mostly decided in the earlier ses-
sions before this author attended the Working Group’s meeting in
Vienna in September 2016.  This paper will deal solely with Arti-
cles 5.1(e) and (f) on mediator behaviour which provide for
Grounds for Refusing to Grant Relief, a section that I have per-
sonal knowledge of how it came together.
II. DISCUSSION
There was a fairly robust discussion in Vienna over whether
any mediator protections ought to be in the Convention.  The ex-
perienced mediators present pointed out that the Working Group
was dealing with international commercial mediations where the
disputants were invariably represented by teams of lawyers and ex-
perts so that there was no need for the special protections given to
individuals facing a large commercial organisation.  Furthermore,
once the delegates understood that the mediator’s role was not to
render a decision and that the parties themselves decided how they
wished to resolve their differences, some delegates thought that
there was no need to provide the familiar safeguards for protecting
a party from an overbearing judge or arbitrator.
Fuelling this particular debate was the explanation from the
experienced mediators among the delegates that large commercial
entities and their legal teams invariably made sure that the settle-
ment agreement provided for: 1) A mechanism for fulfilling the
parties’ respective obligations; 2) safeguards for transferring any
real or incorporeal property as part of the settlement with guaran-
tees, escrow accounts, or other mechanisms to avoid the possibility
of further litigation to enforce the settlement; and 3) an agreed ju-
risdiction, law, and dispute resolution process in the event of any
breakdown or non-fulfilment of the settlement terms.
The Vienna meeting ended with a grudging realisation that in
some quarters   safeguards, even though not needed, may be re-
quired if the Convention or Model Law was going to be approved.
The next meeting in February 2017 began for me with a sober-
ing stroll past N.Y.C.’s Trump Tower.  The agenda included the is-
sues which ultimately became enshrined in Articles 4 and 5.  There
was a wide range of views about the right of a party to resist at-
tempts to enforce a Settlement Agreement.  Experienced
mediators warned against pandering to “Settlors Remorse.”  There
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was a strongly argued suggestion that a Party seeking to set aside a
mediated settlement agreement should be able to reopen all the
issues in the mediation and advance all defences that would have
been available had the dispute gone to court.  On Wednesday of
that week the issues surrounding the wording of Articles 4,
5.1(c),(e), and (f) were the subject of fierce debate.  Then came the
snowstorm . . . .
New York pretty much closed down along with the U.N. for
the day.  Allan Stitt, one of the Canadian Government’s represent-
atives, and a Distinguished Fellow of the International Academy of
Mediators, persuaded a colleague to open his offices for as many
delegates as could be contacted.  We all gathered together in the
main boardroom and sitting round the table continued the discus-
sions.  What had been a confrontational negotiation became a me-
diation!  Sustained by New York deli sandwiches and other local
delicacies, thoughtfully provided by the Chair of the Secretariat,
we worked until the late afternoon and thrashed out the compro-
mise wording for Article 4 and the wording for Article 5.1(e) and
(f) on the Grounds for Refusing to Grant Relief.  The potentially
contentious provisions of Article 4.1(b) on the need for some form
of mediator certification are examined in another chapter by Allan
Stitt.2  This one will deal with Article 5.1(e) and (f).
The Report of the Working Group II on the progress in Vi-
enna in September 2016 summarises the conflicting views on the
question of relieving a party from its obligations on the basis of
misbehaviour or non-disclosure by the mediator.  Many of the ar-
guments advanced reflected the approach adopted internationally
in respect of arbitral awards where allegations of impropriety or
bias by the arbitrator called the validity of an award into question.
In Vienna it was decided to leave the question open to the next
session in New York, in February 2017.
At the end of the Wednesday afternoon session in New York,
I, as the IAM representative, put forward a draft for both (e) and
(f) which highlighted the essential differences between arbitration
and mediation, which some of the arguments being advanced had
failed to recognise.  The mediation community appreciates the fun-
damental distinction between an arbitrator deciding the issues be-
tween disputants and a mediator facilitating the disputants to
achieve their consensual solution.  Whereas bias, improper beha-
viour, or a non-disclosed personal interest might affect an arbitra-
2 See SING. REF. BK., Allan J. Stitt, The Singapore Convention: When has a Mediation
Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1173 (2019).
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tor’s decision to the detriment of one party, such behaviour by a
mediator can only be relevant if it vitiates a party’s consent to a
settlement.  Bearing in mind that the Convention is expressly de-
signed for international commercial disputes, in which the parties
are invariably represented by lawyers and experts, parties wishing
to resile from the agreement on the grounds that they were forced
to consent by the mediator should seek  redress against their law-
yer.  Their lawyer is there to protect their interests, guide their de-
cisions, and ensure that their consent to the settlement was
informed and genuine.
However, some delegates were under instructions from their
respective governments to ensure that any defences against en-
forcement included protection for individuals who are disadvan-
taged by an unfair, biased, or misbehaving mediator.  Some
accommodation had to be reached.
Gradually, sustained by the New York classic delicacies while
the snowstorm raged outside, the following principles were estab-
lished by all present: 1) Any alleged breach or failure had to be
material; and 2) materiality was to be judged objectively; and 3)
the party seeking relief had the burden of establishing that such
breach or failure vitiated their consent to the settlement agreement
from which they were seeking to resile.
III. ARTICLE 5.1(e) BACKGROUND
Article 5.1(e) states: “There was a serious breach by the medi-
ator of standards . . . without which breach that party would not
have entered into the . . . agreement.”
A. Standards
Every mediator who engages in international commercial me-
diation subscribes to a Code of Conduct or a Code of Ethics which
is likely identified in the Mediation Agreement under which the
parties and the mediator have agreed to operate.  Several codes
were recognized, and there are currently discussions to try and es-
tablish a uniform Code of Conduct for mediators.  However, this is
not without difficulty given the different approaches by some coun-
tries to defining the style of mediation, diverse constraints placed
upon mediators, and  cultural variations that exist, let alone the
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fact that mediation as a flexible process needs to adapted to the
needs of the parties.  Until an acceptable universal Code of Con-
duct or Ethics is established, mediators performing under the Sin-
gapore Convention should identify the applicable Code of Conduct
or Ethics in their mediation agreements.
B. Serious Breach
The agreement on the adjective was after much discussion
where views ranged from such tests as “any breach,” “egregious
breach,” “material breach,” and “unacceptable breach.”  The ad-
jective was needed to introduce an objective assessment of the
gravity of the alleged breach in order to avoid claims that are fanci-
ful, immaterial, and subjective.
C. Vitiation of Consent
“. . . [W]ithout which breach that party would not have en-
tered into the settlement agreement.”  These words encapsulate
the essential feature that the burden of causation is on the party
seeking to resile from a Settlement Agreement.
The requirements of Article 5.1(e) are cumulative.  If a party
can surmount the first two hurdles on standards and serious
breach, the party still must prove that in spite of being represented
and presumably advised by his lawyers and experts, the behaviour
of the mediator caused him to consent to a settlement against his
will.  Given that the Convention only applies to international com-
mercial disputes, the prospects of an international party success-
fully convincing a tribunal that a mediator’s behaviour brought
about their unwilling consent will  be extremely rare!
IV. ARTICLE 5.1(f) BACKGROUND
Article 5.1(f) states: “ . . . [F]ailure . . . to disclose . . . circum-
stances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s impartiality
or independence.”  “Justifiable” introduces an objective assess-
ment for the relevant tribunal to apply and places the burden of
satisfying that test on the party seeking to resile from a settlement
agreement.  Once again, the discussions had ranged from such tests
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as “any doubt,” “serious doubt,” and “significant doubt,” to “une-
quivocal doubt.”  “Justifiable” is a clever adjective because it im-
ports the concept of a judicial determination and rules out
arguments based on a subjective assessment by the party seeking to
raise it.
“ . . . [S]uch failure to disclose had a material impact or undue
influence on a party”: The second hurdle that the resiling party
needs to overcome is to prove to the tribunal that the failure to
disclose had a material impact or undue influence on him.  “Mate-
rial” requires a sufficient element of judicial determination to ele-
vate the complained effect above the trivial.  “Undue influence” is
a well-established legal concept to ensure an objective judicial
conclusion.
“ . . . [W]ithout which failure that party would not have en-
tered into the settlement agreement”: As with Article 5.1(e), the
cumulative effect of the requirements of Article 5.1(f) imposes a
further hurdle to overcome by the party seeking relief.  The party
needs to prove that the failure to disclose vitiated his consent to
the settlement agreement.  As with Article 5.1(e), given that the
Convention only applies to international commercial disputes, the
prospect of an international party successfully convincing a tribu-
nal that a mediator’s failure to make a relevant disclosure resulted
in both his lack of impartiality or independence and resulted in
unwilling consent will be rare!  One can imagine that a court might
conclude that the consent was not informed and grant relief only
where it is satisfied that the conduct complained of amounted to
undue influence or which had a material impact upon the parties
and presumably also the minds of their legal and professional
advisers.
The initial scepticism of many experienced mediators might be
assuaged once the key words and safeguards against abuse in Arti-
cles 5.1(e) and (f) are properly understood.  Certainly, the implica-
tions of these two sections should be recognised by lawyers
representing parties in a mediation.  Most experienced mediation
advocates already know to rebuff any attempt by an officious me-
diator to browbeat their client, undermine their clients’ reliance
upon their advisers’ counsel, and employ other ways to induce con-
sent.  Experienced mediation advocates will, as a matter of course,
satisfy themselves that their client understands the terms of any
settlement and that any consent is informed and genuine.  If en-
forcement of the settlement agreement is governed by the Singa-
pore Convention, these sound lawyer responsibilities will be all the
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more important, and will need attention by lawyers for all the par-
ties in order to minimise the possibility of challenges under either
Articles 5.1(e) and (f).
V. CONFIDENTIALITY
A key feature of mediation of course is the confidential nature
of the process that parties rely on in order to promote candour in
their discussions with the mediator and other parties.  Different ju-
risdictions throughout the world have established their own rules
for the conduct of commercial mediations and virtually all the rules
afford a degree of confidentiality/privilege.  There are however
wide differences which have a bearing upon applications seeking
relief under Article 5 of the Singapore Convention.  How is a party
going to establish for example the behaviour of a mediator which
the party complains is a serious breach of acceptable standards?
Establishing the applicable standards does not involve any exami-
nation of what transpired in the mediation, but an examination of
the alleged breach will.  How is a party in California, for instance,
going to be able to describe what happened in support of his appli-
cation given the strict provisions of the California Evidence Code?
There is a difference between the approach of the common
law jurisdictions and the civil law ones; and even the common law
jurisdictions do not have a universal approach towards mediation
confidentiality.  The common law countries, with which I am more
familiar, are divided in their approach.  There are two distinct
views: some jurisdictions consider that mediation is “no more than
assisted without prejudice negotiations” while others consider that
mediation has an entirely separate privilege of its own.  In the for-
mer case, the courts have regarded meditation privilege/confidenti-
ality as subject to all the usual challenges with which we are
familiar.  In the latter case of a separate mediation doctrine, some
jurisdictions regard the mediation privilege as absolute and will not
admit any evidence of what transpired in a mediation, while others
that recognize the privilege permit the courts to admit evidence “in
the interests of justice.”
This dichotomy in approach is troubling, not least because in
England and Wales, different courts have adopted different ap-
proaches.  I wonder sometimes whether judges really understand
the mediation process at all!  In the U.K., as in other jurisdictions,
judges receive mediation training, but, as with all skills, there is no
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substitute for actual experience.  As my great friend and mentor
Allan Stitt puts it: “in theory there is no difference in practice, but
in practice there always is!”
This is not the place for a treatise on mediation privilege, but if
the Singapore Convention is going to be useful, at some point the
question of mediation privilege/confidentiality will need to be ad-
dressed especially for when a party is seeking to rely upon media-
tor’s conduct to establish a defence under Article 5.  Given the
increasingly wide-spread use of mediation, the judicial encourage-
ment to mediate rather than litigate, and the statements in the Pre-
amble of the Singapore Convention, it is important that the
question of mediation confidentiality/privilege be reviewed.  Some
form of consensus in the common law countries, if not all jurisdic-
tions, need to be achieved in order for Article 5 to become practi-
cally operational.
A few examples from English jurisdiction will serve to demon-
strate the probable approach by the English Courts if the U.K.
Government decides to adopt the Convention.  From 2007, there
were a series of cases in which parties sought successfully to intro-
duce evidence of what had been done or said in mediation in sup-
port of a variety of applications.  Some sought to establish that an
agreement had been reached other than in the form prescribed in
the mediation agreement to which the parties had subscribed.
Others sought to set aside an agreement on the grounds of an al-
leged impropriety.  And, in one bizarre case, a party supported a
claim for the recovery of costs of a mediation on the grounds of the
other party’s unreasonable behaviour in the mediation.  The trend
has been to follow the “assisted without prejudice negotiations”
line and admit the evidence either where the parties have them-
selves waived their privilege, or where the court has been per-
suaded that the evidence was admissible under one of the
exceptions adumbrated by Walker, L.J. in Unilever PLC v. Procter
& Gamble.3
Of the exceptions listed by Walker, L.J., the only one which
might be appropriate for the purposes of relief under the Singa-
pore Convention is “Apart from any concluded contract or estop-
pel, one party may be allowed to give evidence of what the other
said or wrote without prejudice negotiations if the exclusion of the
evidence would act as a cloak for perjury, blackmail or other ‘un-
ambiguous impropriety.’  However, the court would only allow the
3 Unilever PLC v. Procter & Gamble Co. [2000] 1 WLR 2436 (Eng. & Wales).
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exception to be applied in the clearest cases of abuse of a privi-
leged situation.”4  In Forster, the behaviour was alleged blackmail.
There have been other cases in which the court has been asked
to waive privilege on the grounds of unambiguous impropriety.  Of
relevance to the issue of the Convention is the decision of Ramsey,
J. in Farm Assist Limited (in Liquidation) v. The Secretary of State
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (No. 2)5 where a party
applied to set aside the settlement agreement on the grounds that it
was entered into under economic duress, and other complaints in-
cluding oppression.  Apart from the highly unusual procedural cir-
cumstances surrounding the application itself, the bizarre nature of
the complaint is highlighted by the fact that at the mediation (some
six years previously!) both parties were represented by Queens
Counsel, solicitors, and each had experts to advise them.  The issue
before the court was an application by Farm Assist for a witness
summons requiring the mediator to give evidence about what had
occurred in the mediation.  Anathema to most jurisdictions, but
Ramsey decided that it was in the interests of justice to allow the
witness summons to stand.  The irony is that the parties resolved
their dispute before the matter came back to court, but the Judge
was persuaded to hand down his judgment nonetheless.
The decision was roundly criticised in mediation circles and
required a convoluted procedural change to the Civil Procedure
Rules.6  In Ferster v. Ferster,7 the Court of Appeal upheld the deci-
sion of Mrs. Justice Rose to allow one party to put in evidence in
his shareholder’s unfair prejudice petition an e-mail sent to the me-
diator by the other party for onward transmission to him, which in
the Judge’s opinion amounted to a blackmail threat.  Even though
normally such a communication was protected by mediation privi-
lege, the Judge thought its contents “fell within the ‘unambiguous
impropriety’ exception to that privilege.”8  It seems therefore that
if the U.K. Government decides to adopt the Singapore Conven-
tion, there will be no confidentiality obstacles to applying Article 5.
But in other jurisdictions, the result might be different.  The
decision of the California Supreme Court in Cassel v. Superior
Court9 approving the decision in Wimsatt v. Superior Court
4 Forster v. Friedland C.A. (Civil Division), Transcript No. 205 of 1993 (Eng. & Wales).
5 Farm Assist Ltd. (in liquidation) v. The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (No. 2) [2007] EWHC (TCC) 2870 (Eng. & Wales).
6 Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2011 (Eng. & Wales).
7 Ferster v. Ferster [2016] EWCA (Civ) 717 (Eng. & Wales).
8 Id. at para. 4 (Lord Justice Floyd).
9 Cassel v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 437 (2009).
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(Kausch)10 and, albeit reluctantly, made this remarkable statement:
“when clients, such as [the malpractice plaintiff in that case], par-
ticipate in mediation they are, in effect, relinquishing all claims for
new and independent torts arising from mediation, including legal
malpractice causes of action against their own counsel.”
With Chin, J. observing:
But I am not completely satisfied that the Legislature has fully
considered whether attorneys should be shielded from accounta-
bility in this way.  There may be better ways to balance the com-
peting interests than simply providing that an attorney’s
statements during mediation may never be disclosed.  For exam-
ple, it may be appropriate to provide that communications dur-
ing mediation may be used in a malpractice action between an
attorney and a client to the extent they are relevant to that ac-
tion, but they may not be used by anyone for any other purpose.
Such a provision might sufficiently protect other participants in
the mediation and also make attorneys accountable for their ac-
tions.  But this court cannot so hold in the guise of interpreting
statutes that contain no such provision.  As the majority notes,
the Legislature remains free to reconsider this question.  It may
well wish to do so.  This case does not present the question of
what happens if every participant in the mediation except the
attorney waives confidentiality.  Could the attorney even then
prevent disclosure so as to be immune from a malpractice ac-
tion?  I can imagine no valid policy reason for the Legislature to
shield attorneys even in that situation.  I doubt greatly that one
of the Legislature’s purposes in mandating confidentiality was to
permit attorneys to commit malpractice without accountability.
Interpreting the statute to require confidentiality even when
everyone but the attorney has waived it might well result in ab-
surd consequences that the Legislature did not intend.  That
question will have to await another case.  But the Legislature
might also want to consider this point.
These opinions suggest that if the Singapore Convention is
adopted by the U.S., California (in the U.S.) will need to revise the
Evidence Code.  An attempt to introduce a change to remove the
privilege of client/attorney mediation communication in an action
for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, or State Bar disciplinary
action was talked out.11
10 Wimsatt v. Superior Court (Kausch), 152 Cal. App. 4th 395 (2007).
11 Assembly Bill No. 2025 was introduced by Assembly Member Wagner on February 23,
2012.
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In Canada, the Supreme Court in Union Carbide Canada Inc.
and Dow Chemical v. Bombardier Inc. et al.12 adopted the same
approach as the English Court of Appeal in Unilever PLC v.
Procter & Gamble towards mediation privilege.  Although that
case was concerned with a dispute involving an oral agreement
reached in mediation, it is probable that the Canadian courts would
also have no qualms about waiving mediation privilege when deal-
ing with applications for relief under Article 5.1(e) and (f).  Other
common law jurisdictions have adopted a similar judicial approach,
and therefore is unlikely to have any difficulty waiving privilege.
On the face of it there is a potential difficulty for Europe in
that the provisions of Article 6 of the ADR Directive, which pro-
vide for the confidentiality of mediation, will need to be reconciled
with Article 5.1(e) and (f) of the Convention.
Due to these varying approaches to privilege/confidentiality,
the ability to prove claims not only under Article 5.1(e) and (f) but
the entire Article 5 will vary across jurisdictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the terms of Article 5.1(e) and (f) at first blush might
produce in the minds of international commercial mediators a simi-
lar alarming reaction as the ICC panellist expressed, a considered
understanding of the hurdles over which any applicant has to jump
should calm the nerves.  After fully understanding the two sections
and the privilege/confidentiality obstacles, mediators ought to real-
ise that the sections provide  adequate safeguards against abuse by
parties and as long as mediators perform professionally—indepen-
dently, fairly, courteously, and neutrally with all parties—they have
little to fear! 
12 Union Carbide Canada Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., 2014 SCC 35, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 800 (Can.).

THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION AND THE
METAMORPHOSIS OF CONTRACTUAL
LITIGATION
Jean-Christophe Boulet*
This article addresses the grounds provided for in Article 5 of
the Singapore Convention for the refusal of enforcement of a set-
tlement agreement or for the refusal of a settlement agreement as
evidence that the dispute has been resolved.1  It is divided into
three sections.  The first section briefly places these grounds in the
context of the Singapore Convention as a whole as well as the 1958
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards.  The second section is devoted to a more
detailed examination of the various grounds listed in Article 5 of
the Convention, except for 5.1(e) and (f) that are linked to the me-
diation process.  On the basis of the findings in the first two sec-
tions, the third and last section tries to assess to what extent the
Convention improves the situation of the party who wants to en-
force a settlement agreement.
* Belgium Delegate at UNCITRAL and Counsellor at the Federal Public Service Justice of
Belgium, Brussels. This article expresses the personal views of the author. The author would like
to thank Professor Hal Abramson, Touro Law Center, for all his precious comments, any re-
maining errors being attributable solely to the author.
1 The notion of “recognition” of settlement agreements was challenged by some delegations
in the Working Group of UNCITRAL which was in charge of the project and, instead of using
that word, it was eventually decided that the concrete legal effect which was sought through the
“recognition” of a settlement agreement would be stated, namely the possibility to invoke the
settlement agreement as a defence in court proceedings on the merits. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first session (25 June–13 July
2018), U.N. Doc. A/73/17 (2018) at Annex I [hereinafter Singapore Convention]; Singapore Con-
vention art. 3, para. 2. That effect appears to be similar to the one that may be understood under
the “recognition” of the arbitral awards under the New York Convention. See UNCITRAL,
UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE ON THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (NEW YORK, 1958) 10 (2016) [hereinafter UNCITRAL
SECRETARIAT GUIDE]. It also appears to be comparable with that of the “recognition” of the
arbitration agreement under Article II of the same Convention. See United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. II, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. For the sake of convenience, the word
“recognition” will be most often used in the rest of this article.
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I. ARTICLE 5 OF THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION IN CONTEXT
The grounds provided for in Article 5 of the Singapore Con-
vention are closely linked to some other aspects of the Convention.
So it seems useful to first identify some of these links in order to
grasp the exact ambit of these grounds.
It seems also useful to put Article 5 of the Singapore Conven-
tion in the context of the 1958 New York Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.  Indeed,
the New York Convention was seen by UNCITRAL, from the be-
ginning, as the model to be followed in order to encourage media-
tion in the same way that the New York Convention has fostered
the growth of arbitration by facilitating compliance with arbitral
awards.2
Let’s first recall that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Conciliation (2002)—which was amended dur-
ing the drafting process and renamed the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Mediation and International Settle-
ment Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018—had enshrined
since 2002 the fundamental principle that a settlement agreement
“is binding and enforceable” (Article 14).  It did so without specify-
ing the method by which any enforcement would take place.  This
open question is answered by the Singapore Convention and the
amendments to the Model Law.
These preliminary points highlight some parameters that cir-
cumscribe the defences to enforcement or recognition.
A. Nature of the Defences
One of the very first notes issued by the UNCITRAL Secreta-
riat on this project pointed out that:
The grounds for refusing enforcement of a settlement agreement
vary depending on the means chosen for enforcement.  They
would be similar to grounds for refusing enforcement of court
decisions when the settlement agreement is given the status of a
judgment, and would include, for example, public policy, a juris-
dictional test and lack of due process.  When contract law princi-
ples apply, the grounds for challenging the validity of a settlement
2 See, e.g., Note by the Secretariat, Proposal by the Government of the United States of
America: Future Work for Working Group II, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/822 (June 2, 2014).
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agreement would include, for example, consideration of the ca-
pacity of the parties, and whether the agreement was procured by
misrepresentation, duress or undue influence.3
Indeed, the nature of the grounds mirror the nature of the
instrument.
The Singapore Convention, which excludes in Article 1.3 set-
tlement agreements that are enforceable as judgments or as arbi-
tral awards, deals with contracts, and more specifically with a
particular kind of contract, the settlement agreement, which it de-
fines as “an agreement resulting from mediation and concluded in
writing by parties to resolve a commercial dispute.”  (See Article
1.1).
As the Convention deals with a contract “resulting from medi-
ation,” a question had to be considered: Could the grounds relate
to the process of mediation and its possible flaws or should they
focus on the contractual outcome of this process, namely the settle-
ment agreement itself?
The answer is clear: The choice was made to focus exclusively
on the settlement agreement.  Although two grounds concerning
the mediation process itself were initially considered by the Work-
ing Group, they were retained to the extent that any breach of the
grounds leads a party to enter into an agreement (See Art. 5.1(e)
and (f)).  These two mediation-related defences are examined in
another chapter in this book by Michel Kallipetis.
Thus, the subject-matter of the Convention is a contract and
all the grounds relate to the  contractual nature of a settlement
agreement.  This is why, as we will see under Section II, only the
defences of the New York Convention that are applicable in con-
tractual matters, foremost those related to an arbitration agree-
ment,4 have been included in the Singapore Convention.
B. Definition of “Settlement Agreements”
As mentioned above, the Singapore Convention set forth its
own definition of the contract it covers, namely the settlement
agreement, as being “an agreement resulting from mediation and
3 See UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes: enforceabil-
ity of settlement agreements resulting from international commercial conciliation/mediation, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187, para. 28 (Nov. 27, 2014).
4 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. II, para. 3, & art. V, para. 1, subparagraph a.
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concluded in writing by parties to resolve a commercial dispute”
(Art. 1.1).
This definition appears to be independent of the definition
that national laws may give to “settlements.”  A number of na-
tional laws include in their definition of a “settlement” the require-
ment of mutual concession between the parties,5 which is not the
case in Article 1.1 of the Convention.  Therefore, it seems that this
requirement would not qualify as a basis for invalidity of the settle-
ment agreement.6
Another difference with “national” settlements lies in the fact
that the settlement agreement under the Convention is defined as
an agreement “concluded in writing.”  There is no settlement
agreement without a written one.  This requirement appears once
again to differentiate a Singapore settlement from a “national”
one.
Of course, a last difference lies in the definition of the settle-
ment agreement under the Singapore Convention as a settlement
agreement resulting from mediation.  This feature is expanded in
Article 4.1(b) which specifies the means to prove that a settlement
agreement results from mediation, the first of those means being
the mediator’s signature on the settlement agreement.7  Unlike a
“national” settlement, a settlement agreement covered by the Sin-
gapore Convention cannot be an agreement concluded by the par-
ties outside a mediation process.8
5 See WILLIAM DROSS & BLANDINE MALLET-BRICOUT, LA TRANSACTION, PROPOSITIONS
EN VUE DE LA RE´FORME DU TITRE XV—LIVRE TROISIE`ME DU CODE CIVIL “DES TRANSAC-
TIONS” 295–416 (2014) (Fr.).
6 See Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5.1(b)(i) (defence). This result does not ex-
clude that the lack of mutual concession could lead to the invalidity of the settlement agreement
on the basis of requirements of the applicable law as to the validity of any contract in general,
since such requirements would not be specific to another contract than the one covered by the
Convention.
7 For further discussion, see SING. REF. BK., Allan J. Stitt, The Singapore Convention: When
has a Mediation Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1173 (2019).
8 A proposal to replace the words “resulting from mediation” with the words “after they
have engaged in mediation” in order to avoid a strict causality between the mediation process
and the resulting agreement was rejected by the Working Group. See UNCITRAL, Report of
Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-fifth session (Vienna, September
12–23, 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, para. 37 (Sept. 30, 2016).
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C. No Review Mechanism in the State of Origin
One last comment on an element omitted from the Conven-
tion.  It relates to a question initially considered by the Working
Group, namely whether to include as a precondition to enforce-
ment a process for reviewing a settlement agreement in the State
where it originated.
One opinion was that such review mechanism would allow
courts at the originating State to ascertain matters such as the va-
lidity of the settlement agreement so that grounds for refusing en-
forcement in other jurisdictions would be limited.9  However, that
review mechanism was seen as tantamount to double exequatur
and was not retained.
Thereafter, possible defences were considered based on the as-
sumption that a party to a settlement agreement would be able to
seek enforcement directly at the place of enforcement.10  This ap-
proach is similar to that adopted by the New York Convention with
one significant exception.  The UNCITRAL Working Group did
not adopt a proposal to incorporate a ground inspired by Article
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention,11 namely the setting aside
(or suspension) of the award by a competent authority of the coun-
try in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
II. EXAMINATION OF ARTICLE 5
Article 5 of the Singapore Convention follows the structure of
Article V of the New York Convention: the first paragraph is de-
voted to the various grounds that can only be considered at the
request of the opposing party, and the second paragraph is devoted
to two grounds that the competent authority, in principle a court,
can raise on its own motion (“ex officio”).
Likewise, the introductory sentences of the two paragraphs of
Article 5 reproduce the wording of Article V of the New York
Convention.  The wording implies that the grounds for refusal are
9 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-third session (Vienna, September 7–11, 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, para. 83 (Sept. 17,
2015).
10 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-fourth session (New York, February 1–5, 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, para. 147 (Feb.
10, 2016).
11 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 9, para. 84.
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exhaustive, that the party opposing recognition or enforcement
bears the burden of proving such grounds, and that national courts
can refuse enforcement of an award on those grounds but are not
obliged to do so.12
With regard to the wording of the grounds themselves, the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 5 (Article 5.2) almost replicates the word-
ing of Article V(2) of the New York Convention and was the
subject of a broad consensus in the Working Group.  In contrast,
the first paragraph of Article 5 (Article 5.1) diverges quite broadly
from Article V(1) of the New York Convention and was, for the
most part, the subject of intense discussion in the Working Group.
Although a consensus finally emerged on the substance of the
first paragraph, the Working Group, while agreeing on the neces-
sity of regrouping certain defences set out in the paragraph, was
unable to agree on the regroupings.  In particular, unsuccessful at-
tempts were made to clarify that the ground provided for in sub-
paragraph 5.1(b)(i) (“null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed . . .”) was of a generic nature and that the follow-
ing grounds under subparagraphs 5.1(b)(ii), (b)(iii), (c), and (d)
were illustrative of that first ground.13  The Working Group could
only express “a shared understanding that there might be overlap
among the grounds provided for in paragraph 1 and that compe-
tent authorities should take that aspect into account when inter-
preting the various grounds.”14
We will examine successively the different grounds set out in
Article 5.  This examination will provide us an opportunity to ob-
serve overlap between some of the grounds.  However, as men-
tioned earlier, the grounds mentioned under subparagraphs Article
5.1(e) and (f), which are linked to the mediation process, will be
dealt with in another chapter and therefore will not be considered
here.
12 UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE, supra note 1, at 125–29.
13 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
eighth session (New York, February 5–9, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, para. 62 (Feb. 19, 2018);
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first
session (25 June–13 July 2018), U.N. Doc. A/73/17, para. 31 (2018).
14 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 13, para. 65; U.N. Doc. A/73/17, supra note 13, para.
31.
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A. Article 5, Paragraph 1
1. Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (a): “A party to the settlement
agreement was under some incapacity”
This subparagraph is the only one under paragraph 1 that did
not spark discussion.  This ground, along with subparagraph (b)(i)
on null and void, are the only two grounds under paragraph 1
which are inspired by the New York Convention.  They reflect the
two grounds under the New York Convention for challenging an
arbitration agreement.
This subparagraph is inspired by the ground set forth in the
first part of Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention, except
that it does not include the reference to the applicable law.
The Working Group recalled that this reference to the applica-
ble law was omitted from the Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration (1985) “because it was viewed as providing an
incomplete and potentially misleading conflict-of-laws rule.”15
2. Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (b)
Subparagraph (b) sets forth three grounds related to the set-
tlement agreement:
(b)(i): The settlement agreement “is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed under the law to which the par-
ties have validly subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law deemed applicable by the competent authority of
the Party to the Convention where relief is sought under Article
4”
This ground adopts the wording of the second ground under
the New York Convention that applies to an arbitration agreement,
the one set forth in Article II(3), and supplements it with the refer-
ence to the applicable law set forth in Article V(1)(a).16  This
ground consists of three elements:
“Null and void”
On the one hand, it was agreed by the Working Group that
this “validity defence” should not allow the competent authority to
15 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 8, para. 85.
16 Under the New York Convention, the applicability to Article II (3) of the conflict-of-law
rule set out in Article V(1)(a) of that Convention is a controversial issue because of the different
timing for the application of these two provisions, which will not be the case under the Singapore
Convention.
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impose requirements in domestic law and it should not extend to
form requirements.17  On the other hand, it was also agreed that
this validity defence was sufficiently broad to encompass various
contract law defences like fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, du-
ress, or deceit.18  The combination of these two elements seems to
be  reminiscent of the so-called “maximum standard” approach of
Article II(3) of the New York Convention, which applies the
choice-of-law approach but leaves aside validity defences that are
not widely accepted by the international community.19
It should be added that the defences (that this chapter does
not cover) under subparagraphs (e) and (f) constitute additional
validity defences which are specific to a settlement agreement as
defined under the Singapore Convention.
“Inoperative”
This element was not discussed as such by the Working Group.
Under the New York Convention, it refers to cases where the arbi-
tration agreement is valid but has ceased to have effect for the fu-
ture by the time the competent authority is requested to refer the
parties to arbitration.20  This ground permits defences based on ter-
mination, waiver, and repudiation of the arbitration agreement,
changed circumstances, as well as novation or modification of the
arbitration agreement.21
17 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Dis-
putes, International Commercial Conciliation: Preparation of an Instrument on Enforcement of
International Commercial Settlement Agreements Resulting from Conciliation, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/WG.II/WP.202, para. 43 (July 14, 2017).
18 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 8, para. 100; U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 13,
para. 43. Other examples of this defence under the New York Convention include unconsciona-
bility or illegality, but also lack of capacity (which is dealt with here separately under subpara-
graph (a) as we have seen). See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE 117 (2012).
19 See R. Doak Bishop, Wade M. Coriell & Marcelo Medina Campos, The “Null and Void”
Provision of the New York Convention, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 275, 290–91
(Emmanuel Gaillard et al. eds., 2008).
20 Stefan Kro¨ll, The “Incapable of Being Performed” Exception in Article II(3) of the New
York Convention, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL AR-
BITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 323, 328 (Emmanuel Gaillard et
al. eds., 2008).
21 BORN, supra note 18, at 117; M. Ipek, Interpretation of Article II(3) of the New York
Convention, 23 MARMARA U¨NIVERSITESI HUKUK FAKU¨LTESI HUKUK ARAS¸TIRMALARI DERGISI
711–12 (2017) (Turk.).
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“Incapable of being performed”
Like the previous one, this defence was not discussed as such
by the Working Group.  Under the New York Convention, it refers
to cases where the arbitration cannot be set into motion22 but no
party has the right to terminate the contract (the exercise of such a
right would render the arbitration agreement “inoperative”23).
This ground covers, in particular, problems that do not result
from the behaviour of one party, such as “pathological arbitration
agreements” where inherent contradictions or vagueness of the
wording cannot be resolved by interpretation or other contractual
techniques, problems with the constitution of the tribunal stem-
ming, for example, from the non-availability of the preselected ar-
bitrator, or problems setting the arbitration into motion at the
agreed place of arbitration.24
(b)(ii): The settlement agreement “is not binding, or is not final,
according to its terms”
The same words appear in Article V(1)(e) of the New York
Convention (“The award has not yet become binding on the par-
ties”) and in Article 1(d) of the 1927 Geneva Convention on the
execution of foreign arbitral awards (“the award has become final
in the country in which it has been made”), where the provisions
are generally understood as referring to possible means of recourse
against the award.  Such an understanding is not applicable to the
Singapore Convention, which relates to a contract.
This ground, as well as that set out in subparagraph (b)(iii) on
“subsequently modified,” were originally conceived as parts of the
same category of defences pertaining to “the readiness or validity
of the settlement agreement to be enforced.”25  The example of a
draft agreement was given to illustrate a non-final settlement
agreement.26
It was pointed out that the “final” nature of a settlement
agreement was addressed by the requirement under paragraph
22 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview, in ENFORCE-
MENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 39, 39–68 (Emmanuel Gaillard et al. eds., 2008).
23 Kro¨ll, supra note 20, at 329.
24 Id. at 330–43.
25 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial dis-
putes, International commercial conciliation: enforceability of settlement agreements, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.195, para. 52 (Dec. 2, 2015).
26 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 8, para. 88.
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1(b)(iii) that the settlement agreement has not been “subsequently
modified” and also by the requirement under Article 4.1(a) to sup-
ply “the settlement signed by the parties.”27
So it was clear that there was a risk of overlap with subpara-
graph (b)(iii) and more generally with the definition of the settle-
ment agreement which ensures the binding nature of the
settlement agreement.
The current version of the provision emerged at the penulti-
mate session of the Working Group in the midst of an avalanche of
diverse proposals.  In an attempt to reduce the overlap and confu-
sion risks, the Working Group agreed to add the words “according
to its terms” to this subparagraph in order to restrict the scope of
this ground solely to the express statements in the settlement
agreement.28
(b)(iii): The settlement agreement “has been subsequently
modified”
As just explained, this provision is not clearly differentiated
from subparagraph (b)(ii).  At the penultimate session of the
Working Group, it was recalled that “the purpose of the clause was
to ensure that only the latest version of the settlement agreement
‘concluded by the parties’ should be enforced,”29 which seems to
express the finality requirement under (b)(ii).
At its last session, the Working Group rejected a proposal “to
add the word “substantially” after the word “subsequently” to clar-
ify that minor modifications should not be a ground for refusing
enforcement of the modified settlement agreement.”  The Group
found that “the word “substantially” would introduce a discretion-
ary or subjective assessment by the competent authority and was
therefore not desirable.”30  This rejected proposal seemed to be in
line with a previously expressed opinion that the provision “should
be clarified in order to avoid situations where enforcement of a
settlement agreement would be denied because the parties subse-
quently modified certain terms of that agreement.”31
27 See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its
sixty-seventh session (Vienna, October 2–6, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, para. 77 (Oct. 11,
2017).
28 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, supra note 27, paras. 82–93.
29 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, supra note 27, para. 86.
30 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 13, para. 45.
31 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, supra note 27, para. 94.
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Indeed, the addition of the word “substantially” would have
given subparagraph (b)(iii) a  different scope by potentially al-
lowing the recognition and enforcement of a new agreement con-
cluded by the parties after and outside the mediation process.  As
already noted under Section I of this chapter, this would have been
contrary to the definition of the settlement agreement as “resulting
from the mediation” and, even more so, with the means in Article
4.1(b) to prove that the settlement agreement results from media-
tion, the first of those means being the mediator’s signature on the
settlement agreement.
In this respect, it should be mentioned that a proposal to in-
clude in the scope of the Convention all settlement agreements ir-
respective of whether they resulted from mediation was repeatedly
rejected.  The Working Group reiterated its understanding that the
Convention should apply to settlement agreements that only re-
sulted from mediation.32
That being said, agreements could be concluded not only after
the termination of the mediation proceedings but also in other sim-
ilar contexts, for example after an arbitral award was made.
It should be noted that when the Convention was adopted,
UNCITRAL clarified the States’ obligation to enforce settlement
agreements under the Convention.  It covers not only the process
of issuing an enforceable title (a process to transform a private doc-
ument into an enforceable instrument) but also the actual enforce-
ment of that title once issued, although this last aspect is not
regulated by the Convention.33  A settlement concluded by the par-
ties after the mediation could be taken into account by the judge in
the context of the enforcement process of a settlement agreement
that has become an enforceable title (see next point).
3. Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (c)
Subparagraph (c) sets forth two grounds related to the obliga-
tions in the settlement agreement:
(c)(i) the obligations “have been performed”
This ground, which was present from the first draft text, was
never disputed by the Working Group.  Here again, it might be
observed that this situation is not specific to mediation agreements.
This defence could similarly arise when enforcing an arbitral award
32 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 10, para. 115.
33 U.N. Doc. A/73/17, supra note 13, para. 26.
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that has already been performed.  However, the New York Con-
vention does not provide for this defence.
Indeed, from a technical point of view, a defence linked to that
situation seems to fall under the rules governing the material en-
forcement of an enforceable title rather than under the rules gov-
erning the issuance of an enforceable title.  Those last rules are the
only rules harmonized by the Singapore Convention as well as the
New York Convention, and they deal with the transformation
(through the exequatur process) of the settlement agreement or
the arbitral award into a title capable of being enforced.
The dissociation between these two different legal processes
does not prevent defences technically linked to the material en-
forcement process from being raised during the process of issuing
an enforceable title.  On the contrary, it seems logical that the de-
fendant raises those defences as early as possible.  However, the
fact remains that those last defences are legally distinct, and that
they are not supposed to be harmonized by these two Conventions.
In this respect, it should be noted that the performance of ob-
ligations that are enshrined in an enforceable title is only one
ground among others that can extinguish the effectiveness of an
enforceable title under the law of the State where enforcement
takes place.  Other such grounds could include for instance a setoff,
or a settlement between the parties, as mentioned under the previ-
ous point, or the expiry of limitation periods relating to the en-
forceable title as such.  Once again, those grounds are supposed to
be regulated by national laws.
(c)(ii) the obligations “are not clear or comprehensible”
This ground came in the wake of two successive proposals
which were inspired by the need to ensure clarity of the settlement
terms so that the terms can be properly enforced by the competent
authority.
A first proposal required that the settlement agreement be in
a “single document” as distinct from a mere exchange of communi-
cation between the parties.34  This proposal was not adopted.35
34 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 10, para. 134.
35 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 8, paras. 177–85. Article 2(2) of the Convention even
seems to go quite in the opposite direction when it states that a settlement agreement is “in
writing” if “its content is recorded in any form.” Those words echo, at least in part, those of
Article 7(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, as
amended in 2006, which were designed to include agreements “entered into in any form (e.g.,
including orally) as long as the content of the agreement is recorded” (Explanatory note by the
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A second proposal intended to supplement the requirement
under Article 4.1(a) for a settlement agreement signed by the par-
ties, with a complementary requirement that “the settlement
agreement should set out in a clear and comprehensible manner its
enforceable content.”36  Instead, it was decided to move this re-
quirement to Article 5 as an additional defence.
In order to circumscribe the scope of the provision to what is
necessary for the enforcement of a settlement agreement, it also
was decided to focus the requirement of clarity and comprehensi-
bility on the obligations stemming from the settlement agreement
rather than on the settlement agreement as a whole.37
Thus, this ground reinforces the requirement that the settle-
ment agreement be “in writing” (Article 1.1) by requiring that this
writing be clear and comprehensible.  However, this additional re-
quirement applies only insofar as it is necessary for the proper en-
forcement (or recognition) of the obligations in the settlement
agreement.
Since this ground is closely related to the “in writing” require-
ment, one could wonder if it does not overlap, at least in part, with
the defence that the settlement agreement is “incapable of being
performed” under Article 5.1(b)(i), especially in the case of the so-
called “pathological agreements” (see above).
Finally, and once again, it can be noted that interpretation
problems are not specific to settlement agreements.  Difficulties
can arise with the interpretation of arbitral awards, too.
4. Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (d): “Granting relief would be
contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement”
When it adopted this provision, the Working Group confirmed
that “such wording was broad enough to encompass situations in
which the obligations in a settlement agreement would be condi-
tional or reciprocal, and their non-performance could be justified
for a variety of reasons,” and that “many different circumstances
UNCITRAL Secretariat). See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985: WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, para. 19 (2008).
However, this broad understanding of the “in writing” requirement seems to be contra-
dicted by the requirement under Article 4(1)(a) of the Convention that “the settlement agree-
ment” be “signed by the parties.”
It could also be noticed that even the idea of an exchange of communications seems, on the
other hand, difficult to reconcile with the requirement under Article 4(1)(b)(i) of the Conven-
tion that the settlement agreement be signed by the mediator.
36 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, supra note 27, para. 51.
37 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 13, para. 52.
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could affect the enforceability of obligations in settlement agree-
ments, in particular in complex contractual arrangements, and that
(this provision) should be broadly interpreted as covering a variety
of factual situations.”38
Examples of the defence that were cited included obligations
in a settlement agreement that cannot be relied upon independent
of other parts of the agreement, that have not yet arisen, and that
are conditional in that the obligations of the party against whom
relief is sought have not yet arisen.39
The wording and illustrations suggest that this defence is capa-
ble of covering a variety of cases where non-performance of the
settlement agreement by the party against whom enforcement or
recognition is sought can be justified on a contractual basis, espe-
cially in cases of conditional or reciprocal obligations.
Another cited illustration of the defence involved a settlement
agreement opting out of the Convention when the Contracting
State has not made a reservation under Article 8.1(b) to opt-out (in
case of such a reservation, the Convention would be applied only
to the extent that the parties to the settlement agreement have
agreed to apply the Convention (parties opted-in)).40
Finally, the reference to “the terms” of the settlement agree-
ment should have the same restrictive effect as in the case of sub-
paragraph Article 5.1(b)(ii) on the defence of not binding or final
on its terms.
B. Article 5, Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2 of Article 5 sets forth two grounds that allow the
competent authority of the State where relief is sought to refuse
enforcement or recognition of the settlement agreement of its own
motion when:
1. Subparagraph (a): It “would be contrary to the public policy
of that Party”
In the context of the New York Convention, it is generally ac-
cepted that a court seized with an application for recognition and
enforcement may not review the merits of the arbitral tribunal’s
38 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 13, para. 57.
39 Id.
40 U.N. Doc. A/73/17, supra note 13, paras. 38–39.
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decision, since the grounds for refusal under Article V are exhaus-
tive.41  It is also an accepted exception that the public policy
ground under Article V(2)(b) allows a court to consider the merits
of the award,42 within the strict limits of this ground.
The situation appears different in the context of the Singapore
Convention since, as we have seen, the grounds set out in its Arti-
cle 5, paragraph 1, and in particular the ground under Article
5.1(b)(i), broadly allows a court to examine the validity of a settle-
ment agreement.
In the context of the Singapore Convention, what differenti-
ates the public policy ground from the grounds set out in Article 5,
paragraph 1 is not so much the nature of the court’s examination as
the law under which it will occur: the public policy ground will be
applied under the law of the State of the court while the ground
under paragraph 5.1(b)(i) will be applied under the applicable law
as determined by that provision.
Otherwise, this defence, that was literally taken from the New
York Convention, is capable of receiving the same interpretation as
under that Convention.  For example, just as it is accepted that
public policy under the New York Convention extends both to sub-
stantive public policy and procedural public policy, the same is true
for the Singapore Convention.  The Working Group confirmed that
“public policy covered both substantive and procedural aspects.”43
However, this does not preclude some differences due to the
difference in nature between a mediation process and an arbitra-
tion procedure.  The Working Group noted that, because “the flex-
ible nature of conciliation could be easily used by parties to resist
enforcement using the procedural public policy defence,” “the en-
forcing authority would duly take into account the characteristics
of conciliation in assessing such defence.”44
Likewise, as to the assessment of the international or domestic
character of public policy under the New York Convention, it is
widely accepted that “a mere violation of domestic law is unlikely
to amount to a ground to refuse recognition or enforcement on the
basis of public policy.”45  The Working Group recognized that
there is an established trend in case law that interprets “public pol-
41 UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE, supra note 1, at 126–27.
42 Id. at 247.
43 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 8, para. 42.
44 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 10, para. 156.
45 UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE, supra note 1, at 243.
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icy” more narrowly when there is an element of extraneity.46  It
was, however, underlined that “it would be up to each Contracting
State to determine what constituted public policy” and that, for in-
stance, public policy could include issues relating to national secur-
ity or national interest.47
2. Subparagraph (b): “The subject matter of the dispute is not
capable of settlement by mediation under the law of
that Party”
Like Subparagraph (a), this defence also has been copied from
the New York Convention, and therefore, it should receive the
same restrictive interpretation as under that Convention.48
Likewise, under the Singapore Convention, whether the sub-
ject matter of the dispute is “not capable of settlement by media-
tion” could already have been considered under the broad Article
5.1(b)(i) defence and the law selected by the parties or otherwise
applicable.  But, under Article 5.2(b), this issue will be looked at
under the law of the State of the court.49
This ground was barely discussed within the Working Group.
III. “IS THE CONVENTION AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE
STATUS QUO?”50
From the examination under the previous section on the
defences for refusing enforcement or recognition of a settlement
agreement, it has become apparent that these grounds cover a
broad scope.  Indeed, we have seen that these grounds concern all
stages of the life of the settlement agreement as a contract, from
the time of its conclusion and the defects that may affect its validity
up to the time it ceases to have effect based on the various legal
grounds that can lead to the end of the contract.  Between these
two times, various defences to enforcement can arise, including
46 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 10, para. 157.
47 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 13, para. 67.
48 See UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE, supra note 1, at 230.
49 In this respect, it can be noted that, under the New York Convention, the ground based on
the matter being not capable of settlement by arbitration may sometimes coincide with that
based on public policy. See UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE, supra note 1, at 229.
50 This was the title of Panel 5 of the Symposium on “The Singapore Convention:
Compliance with Cross-Border Mediated Settlement Agreements” which was held on March 18,
2019 at Cardozo School of Law and which was jointly organized by the Cardozo Journal of
Conflict Resolution at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and the Touro Law Center.
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where non-performance of the settlement agreement can be justi-
fied on a contractual basis; for example, in case of conditional or
reciprocal obligations or due to modification of the contract, or in-
terpretation problems.
Faced with such broad defences against enforcement or recog-
nition, one might legitimately wonder whether the Singapore Con-
vention improves the current situation for a party seeking to
enforce a settlement agreement.  This is the question that will be
addressed in this last section, and it will lead us to reconsider Arti-
cle 5 defences in light of Article 3 general principles that are also
examined in-depth in the chapter on Article 3 by Tim Schnabel.51
Before attempting to answer the question, it should be noted
that this question is especially relevant to the enforcement of a set-
tlement agreement. Indeed, as will be explained, the possibility of
invoking the settlement agreement as a defence in court proceed-
ings on the merits is already widely recognized. The Convention
does not bring significant changes in this area. The situation is
quite different with regard to enforcement and therefore, the fol-
lowing comments will be primarily devoted to the enforcement of
the settlement agreements.
A. What is the “Status Quo?”
The first step in answering the question is to establish a bench-
mark: What is the present situation, the “status quo,” for a party
wanting to enforce a settlement agreement?  Before the start of
this project, UNCITRAL Secretariat suggested a benchmark when
in November 2014 it identified the legislative trends on enforce-
ment of international settlement agreements resulting from
mediation.52
That document found that legislative solutions regarding the
enforcement of settlements reached in mediation proceedings dif-
fer widely:
- “Some States have no special provisions on the enforceabil-
ity of such settlements, with the result that general contract
law applies.” (para. 21);
51 SING. REF. BK., Timothy Schnabel, Recognition by Any Other Name: Article 3 of the Sin-
gapore Convention on Mediation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1181 (2019).
52 UNCITRAL, Note by Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of
Settlement Agreements Resulting From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187, paras. 20–30 (Nov. 27, 2014).
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- “Other States provide for enforcement of settlement agree-
ments as court judgments, where a settlement agreement ap-
proved by a court is deemed an order of the relevant court and
may be enforced accordingly.” (para. 22);
- “The practice of requesting a notary public to notarize the settle-
ment agreement is adopted by a number of jurisdictions as a
means of enforcement.” (para. 24);
- “The law in certain jurisdictions empowers parties [. . .] to trans-
form their settlement agreement into an arbitral award for en-
forcement purposes.” (para. 26).
In short, two situations currently exist:
- either the settlement agreement must be enforced as a contract,
which implies the need for prior contractual litigation on the
merits;
- or the settlement agreement can be enforced as a judgment, as a
notarial act or as an arbitral award, which implies the need for
prior transformation of the settlement into one of these
instruments.
B. Article 3: A Radical Change!
In view of the current situation, Article 3, and in particular its
paragraph 1, introduces a fundamental change.  This provision
reads as follows:  “1. Each Party to the Convention shall enforce a
settlement agreement in accordance with its rules of procedure and
under the conditions laid down in this Convention.”
Under this provision, each State that becomes Party to the
Singapore Convention will allow the enforcement of settlement
agreements under the terms of the Convention, which means that:
- contractual litigation on the merits will no longer be required
before enforcement;
- transformation of the settlement agreement into a judgment, a
notarial act or an arbitral award will no longer be required
before enforcement.
In other words, instead of treating the settlement agreement as an
ordinary contract that must be enforced through normal litigation
under contract law—with all the difficulties, risks, and considerable
time that accompanies litigation, the Singapore Convention skips
this step.  Instead, it moves any relevant issues to the enforcement
court.
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As we will see, this is a radical change, the significance of
which cannot be overestimated.
C. The Resistance Against Article 3 Logically Failed to Defeat
that Article
As one can imagine, such a radical change did not occur with-
out hesitation and did only after much discussion.  There was
strong resistance within the UNCITRAL Working Group against
Article 3 and, through that article, against the Convention itself,
given the centrality of Article 3.  However, that resistance failed to
defeat Article 3.
This failure and the adoption of Article 3 appear logical.  The
arguments against Article 3 were not convincing.  Those arguments
can be summarized as follows: “Settlement agreements are mere
contracts without any res judicata.  Therefore, they should not be
‘recognized’ or ‘enforced.’”53
Here are two replies to this argument:
a.  First, as to the recognition of the settlement agreement, it is
correct that various international instruments refrain from enshrin-
ing the “recognition” of court settlements (or “judicial transac-
tions”) while still enshrining their enforcement.54  This
differentiation is generally explained by stating that “in some juris-
dictions, judicial settlements do not have the force of res judicata
and therefore they cannot be recognised in another State.”55
A distinction is then made between the treatment of a judicial
settlement as a procedural defence to a new claim, which would
53 It must be pointed out here that this resistance against Article 3 focused mainly on its
paragraph 2. As explained in footnote 1, this resistance against paragraph 2 led to the withdrawal
of the concept of “recognition” of the settlement agreement and its replacement by the state-
ment of its concrete meaning, namely the possibility to invoke the settlement agreement as a
defence (“a shield”) against court proceedings on the merits by which the dispute resolved by
the agreement would be re-litigated.
54 This is the case in the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements,
the EU regulation n° 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and the newly adopted Hague Con-
vention of 2 July 2019 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or com-
mercial matters.
55 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUDGMENTS CONVENTION: RE-
VISED DRAFT EXPLANATORY REPORT, TWENTY-SECOND SESSION RECOGNITION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS—18 JUNE–2 JULY 2019, THE HAGUE, DOC. NO 1 OF DECEMBER
2018, 344 (2018); similarly, see TREVOR HARTLEY & MASATO DOGAUCHI, EXPLANATORY RE-
PORT ON THE 2005 HAGUE CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION, 209 (2013).
1228CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1209
not be allowed under these instruments, and the treatment of a
judicial settlement as a contractual defence to the claim on the
merits, which would not be precluded by these instruments.56
However, asserting a settlement agreement as a defence (“a
shield”) in regard to matters already resolved in a settlement
agreement is commonly accepted in many jurisdictions.57  Accept-
ance of this defence is a prerequisite for supporting the use of me-
diation.  It would be pointless to resort to mediation if the resulting
settlement agreement was not recognized as a defence against
court proceedings on the merits.  Otherwise, the dispute resolved
by the settlement agreement would be re-litigated.  Acceptance of
a settlement agreement as a defence, whether a “procedural de-
fence” or a “contractual defence,” is indeed wide, if not universal.
Therefore, there was no valid reason to deny this reality.  This
is why paragraph 2 of Article 3, “in accordance with the rules of
procedure of the States” 58 and leaving aside the possible theoreti-
cal debates on the “recognition” of settlement agreements, en-
shrines this concrete legal effect of using the settlement agreement
to prove the matter has been resolved.
b.  Second, as to the enforcement of the settlement agreement,
there is no necessary link between res judicata and enforcement.
For example, notarial acts have no res judicata effect and yet they
are enforceable.  In the same way, international instruments allow
the enforcement of court settlements which have no res judicata
effect.  Therefore, the lack of res judicata of settlement agreements
is no reason to refuse in principle their enforcement.
Indeed, just as judgments (or arbitral awards), settlement
agreements put an end to a dispute.  While this similarity between
judgments (or arbitral awards) and settlement agreements is
largely recognized as to the defence (“shield”) effect, it is currently
not recognized as to the enforcement (“sword”) effect, as we saw
above (see point A, “What is the Status Quo”).  Yet, the dissocia-
tion between these two effects is not logical because they are both
sides of the same coin.  By enshrining the enforcement of the set-
tlement agreements, the Singapore Convention puts an end to this
illogicality.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., DROSS & MALLET-BRICOUT, supra note 5, at 295–416.
58 As pointed out above, the modalities for invoking this effect may vary across legal systems
and Article 3.2 of the Convention recognizes these possible differences by stating that a Party to
the Convention shall allow the party to invoke the settlement agreement “in accordance with its
rules of procedure.”
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1229
D. The Resistance Against Article 3 Logically Succeeded in
Expanding Defences Under Article 5
As we just saw, the resistance against Article 3 failed to defeat
that article.  But the resistance against Article 3 was not only fo-
cused on that article.  It also took another path, namely arguments
to expand the defences under Article 5.  This article offered an-
other way to resist Article 3, by containing the deployment of its
benefits.  As we saw under section II, that resistance effort against
Article 3 was successful, since Article 5 covers a broad scope of
defences against recognition or enforcement of settlement agree-
ments.  This success also appears logical.
Here are a few comments to further explain this logic:
a.  While the lack of res judicata59 of the settlement agreement
is not a valid reason to refuse its enforcement in principle or its use
as a defence against re-litigation of the settled dispute (see the pre-
vious point), the lack of res judicata appears to be a valid reason to
entitle the opposing party to raise a broad scope of contractual
defences against enforcement.
It should be recalled that Article 3 of the Convention radically
changes the current situation by authorizing the direct enforcement
of a settlement agreement without any prior proceedings on the
merits.  Empowering the enforcement judge to look sufficiently at
the contractual defences raised by the party opposing the enforce-
ment appears to be a logical consequence.
b.  This power for the enforcement judge is all the more neces-
sary since Article 5 of the Convention does not contain a defence
in connection with a decision on the merits by another court re-
lated to the settlement agreement.
Indeed, after having considered a possible defence in relation
to a settlement agreement contrary to a decision of another court,
which partially echoed Article V(1)(e) of the New York Conven-
tion and which was capable of covering, for instance, decisions on
the validity or the performance of the settlement agreement,60 the
UNCITRAL Working Group abandoned that defence.  It felt that
such a ground “would inadvertently complicate the enforcement
59 In this respect, it should be noted that the “binding” nature of the settlement agreement
(UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Settlement
Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018, art. 15) is legally distinct from the “binding” na-
ture of an arbitral award (New York Convention art. III) as having res judicata effect (UNCI-
TRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE, supra note 1, at 80–81), which cannot be the case of a contract.
60 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 10, para. 164.
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procedure, invite forum shopping by parties, and would generally
be covered through the defences already provided” in Article
5.1(b)(i) and Article 5.2(a).61
That decision was taken after the Working Group adopted a
mechanism of direct enforcement, that is to say without a prelimi-
nary review of the settlement agreement in the State where it was
originating from (see above, section I).  The decision is quite signif-
icant as it leads to an almost total disconnection62 of the enforce-
ment proceedings from the proceedings on the merits, contrary to
what is the case under the New York Convention.  Indeed, that
decision reveals the deliberate will of the Working Group to en-
trust the enforcement judge, in place of the judge on the merits,
with the examination of the defences relating to the contract.
In these circumstances, it appears that the broad scope of con-
tractual defences set forth in Article 5 is only a natural conse-
quence of this strategic choice.  Of course, it remains that any
examination of the contractual defences by the enforcement judge
is ultimately focused on the enforcement issue, not on the
substance.
c.  In recent rulings,63 the Court of Justice of the European
Union promoted a fairly similar approach in the enforcement of
notarial acts, even though these acts already were enforceable ti-
tles.  The cases concerned the recovery of unpaid debts against
consumers arising from mortgage loan agreements.  The Court was
faced with a disconnection under Spanish law between the pro-
ceedings on the merits and the enforcement proceedings.  The
court on the merits was not allowed to suspend enforcement pro-
ceedings based on an illegal notarial act, and the enforcement court
61 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 8, para. 118.
62 The last possible connection with the proceedings on the merits lies in Article 6 of the
Singapore Convention which is inspired by Article VI of the New York Convention.
However, Article VI has a clear link with Article V as it “may be regarded as “a corollary”
to Article V(1)(e) and as closing a “temporal gap” that exists when an action to set aside the award
is pending before a competent authority.” See UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE, supra note 1,
at 265.
On the contrary, Article 6 has no link with Article 5 and, in those circumstances, this last
possible connection of the enforcement proceedings with the proceedings on the merits seems to
be very weak, not to say non-existent.
63 Joined Cases C-537/12, Banco Popular Espan˜ol SA v. M.T. Rivas Quichimboand, & C-
116/13, Banco de Valencia SA v. J. Valldeperas Tortosa, 14 November 2013,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:759 [hereinafter Joined Cases C-537/12 & C-116/13]; Case C-169/14, J. C.
Sa´nchez Morcillo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, 17 July 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099;
Case C-415/11, M. Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa),
14 March 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:164.
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was not allowed to assess the validity of that act or to grant interim
relief capable of staying or terminating the enforcement
proceedings.
The court decided that one of these two courts, and if neces-
sary, the court responsible for enforcement, must be able to assess
the validity of the contract recorded in the notarial act which con-
stitutes the basis for enforcement and to refuse enforcement on the
basis of this assessment, or grant interim relief capable of staying
or terminating the enforcement proceedings.64
We find here, like in the Singapore Convention, the same idea
of empowering the enforcement court to look to a certain extent at
the merits of the case.  In the rulings of the EU Court of Justice,
this idea is implemented in the context of a notarial act which, be-
ing an enforceable title, entitles the creditor to immediately initiate
enforcement proceedings without any preliminary assessment on
the merits.  In the Singapore Convention, this idea is implemented
in the context of provisions that allow the direct enforcement of a
settlement agreement without any preliminary proceedings on the
merits.
Once again, this idea is stated in the EU cases in spite of the
fact that notarial acts already are enforceable titles.  Settlement
agreements are not enforceable titles.  Therefore, the idea of em-
powering the enforcement judge to look at the merits of the case
seems all the more justified in the context of settlement
agreements.
E. Article 5 Provides Safeguards with Respect to its Broad
Defences
As explained under the previous point, the broad defences of-
fered by Article 5 to the party opposing enforcement of the settle-
ment agreement compensate for the direct enforcement procedure
put in place by Article 3. But Article 5 is not intended exclusively
to protect the party opposing enforcement. Article 5 also provides
safeguards to protect the interests of the party seeking enforce-
ment of the settlement agreement.
We have already encountered these safeguards under section
II, and they will be briefly recalled here.  There are mainly two
kinds.
64 Joined Cases C-537/12 & C-116/13, supra note 63, at n° 55.
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a.  Each of the defences set forth in Article 5 includes its own
limits.  These limits are found in the wording of the defences.  For
example, we have seen that the words not binding or final “accord-
ing to its terms” in Article 5.1(1)(b)(ii) are designed to restrict the
scope of this defence to the express statements of the settlement
agreement.
These limits can also flow from the interpretations given to the
same defences under the New York Convention.  For example, we
have seen that under the New York Convention, the public policy
defence is not satisfied by a mere violation of domestic law.  That
interpretation should be true for the same defence under the Sin-
gapore Convention.
b.  We also can infer limitations based on Article 5’s introduc-
tory sentences that reproduce the language of the New York Con-
vention, Article V.  That language implies:
- the grounds for refusal are exhaustive;
- the party opposing recognition or enforcement bears the burden
of proving such grounds;
- national courts have the possibility to refuse enforcement on
those grounds but are not obliged to do so.
Thus, the requesting party should enjoy the same privileged
status as under the New York Convention.  After a party supplies
the documents under Article 4 to demonstrate a settlement agree-
ment that resulted from mediation, there will be a presumption of
enforceability of the settlement agreement, and the opposing party
will bear the burden of proving that the conditions of one of the
grounds for refusal under Article 5 are met.65
IV. CONCLUSION
Article 5 of the Singapore Convention provides for broad
defences against the enforcement of a settlement agreement or its
use as evidence that the dispute has already been resolved.  These
defences are a direct consequence of a radical change resulting
from adopting Article 3 of the Convention on enforcing settlement
agreements.  Article 3 provides for direct enforcement of a settle-
ment agreement without any need for prior contractual litigation
on the merits or prior transformation of the settlement agreement
into a judgment, a notarial act or an arbitral award.
65 UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE, supra note 1, at 99.
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Due to these two articles, the current default procedure of
contract litigation for enforcing a settlement agreement will meta-
morphose into a fast-track procedure for enforcement that ensures
appropriate observance of the defendant’s rights.
In doing so, the Singapore Convention gives mediation the en-
forcement status that it deserves as an alternative to judicial pro-
ceedings or arbitration to settle a dispute.  A settlement agreement
is not a contract like any other.  It is a contract that terminates a
dispute, like a judgment or an arbitral award.  This special subject
matter of the settlement agreement justifies that it benefits from an
appropriate status for its enforcement.  This is precisely the change
brought by the Singapore Convention.  This change could be deci-
sive for fostering the use of mediation globally as a useful alterna-
tive to judicial proceedings or arbitration.  It is hoped that States
will seize this opportunity.

GROUNDS TO REFUSE THE ENFORCEMENT
OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS UNDER THE
SINGAPORE CONVENTION ON MEDIATION:
PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND THEIR IMPORTANCE
FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE CONVENTION
He´ctor Flores Sentı´es*
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2019, during its sixty-eighth session, Working
Group II (“the Working Group”) of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) approved two
instruments focused on the enforcement of settlement agreements
reached through mediation: (i) the United Nations Convention on
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation
(“Singapore Convention”)1; and (ii) a Model Law on International
Commercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreements
Resulting from Mediation (“Model Law”).2
The most important result of the Singapore Convention is em-
bedded in Article 3.1 and 3.2: a court from a State party must en-
force a settlement agreement that fulfills the requirements of
Article 1.  It is also obligated to allow a party to invoke the settle-
ment agreement when a dispute arises concerning a matter that the
party alleges was resolved by the agreement (Article 3.2).
Thus, after a party furnishes proof that a settlement agreement
is signed by the parties and resulted from mediation (Article 4),
there are two ways to seek relief under the Singapore Convention:
a party can seek enforcement of the settlement agreement (sword)
or use the settlement agreement as a defense (shield) against a
claim related to the settled dispute.  These two modalities are
jointly referred to throughout the Singapore Convention as “reli-
ance on settlement agreements.”
The court’s obligation to grant relief is not an absolute one; it
is subject to exceptions.  These exceptions have been identified in
* He´ctor Flores Sentı´es was the UNCITRAL delegate for Mexico during the negotiation and
preparation of the Singapore Convention on Mediation. Partner at Abascal, Flores y Segovia
(www.abascalsegovia.com) in Mexico City.
1 Also referred to as the “Singapore Convention on Mediation.”
2 An amendment to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation
of 2002.
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Article 5 of the Singapore Convention as “grounds for refusing re-
lief,” and refer to the reasons that may be brought up by the party
resisting the relief sought under the settlement agreement (en-
forcement or reliance on the settlement agreement as a defense).
This article focuses on these exceptions.3  We will attempt to:
(i) explain the purpose behind the drafting of the grounds to refuse
enforcement; (ii) describe the scope of these defenses, based on the
deliberations of the Working Group that drafted the Singapore
Convention; and finally, (iii) briefly comment on the relationship
between the scope of the defenses and the likelihood of the success
of the Singapore Convention.
II. THE PURPOSES BEHIND THE DRAFTING
In drafting the defenses regime of the Singapore Convention,
the Working Group attempted to achieve at least these purposes:
(i) replicate, when appropriate, the approach taken by the New
York Convention with respect to arbitral awards; (ii) be sensitive
towards the particular issues that arise when attempting to enforce
a contract, as opposed to an arbitral award; (iii) be as restrictive
and narrow as possible to avoid unwarranted litigation and undue
interference by courts, while providing essential defenses to parties
subject to enforcement; and (iv) avoid the use of local require-
ments as a defense against the enforcement of the settlement
agreement and instead to rely on international elements shared by
most, if not all, jurisdictions.
A. The New York Convention as an Inspiration
At the outset of their task, the approach undertaken by the
Working Group was guided by the Notes prepared by the Secreta-
riat of UNCITRAL and distributed on July 13, 2015.4  These Notes
were based on the deliberations and decisions taken by the Com-
3 The purpose of this article is not to provide a thorough commentary on all the issues
arising from Article 5 of the Singapore Convention. Only the most representative features of this
provision shall be emphasized.
4 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes, International
Commercial Conciliation: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/
WP.190 (July 13, 2015).
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mission at its forty-eighth session, as a response to a proposal
presented by the United States.
The United States originally proposed developing a multina-
tional convention on the enforceability of international commercial
settlement agreements reached through mediation.  Albeit not
stated explicitly, the proposal was largely based on some studies
that purportedly showed that the lack of a uniform regime to en-
force settlement agreements at an international level was one of
the main reasons why mediation was not used as much as it other-
wise would have been.  The explicit goal, as framed in their propo-
sal, was to encourage the use of mediation in the same manner in
which the United Nations Convention for the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”)
had served as an engine to increase the use of arbitration.5
The UNCITRAL Secretariat pointed out that the grounds for
refusing enforcement were necessarily linked to the means chosen
for enforcement.  For instance, in those jurisdictions in which set-
tlement agreements were given the status of a judgment, grounds
to refuse typically include public policy, a jurisdictional test, and
lack of due process.6
Drawn from the fact that some jurisdictions provided for the
enforcement of “conciliated settlement agreements” as if they were
arbitral awards, the United States’ proposal attempted to mirror
several concepts of the New York Convention.  For example, the
“exceptions” upon which a defendant would be able to resist en-
forcement of a settlement agreement were similar to the system
created by Article V of the New York Convention.  It must be em-
phasized, however, that this same proposal recognized that some
defenses under the New York Convention could not be imported
into the regime of settlement agreements; and conversely, there
was also a need to provide for additional defenses that would be
inappropriate for arbitral awards.7
In the early discussions, it became clear that several of the de-
fenses that the delegations wanted to consider were related to the
validity and efficacy of the settlement agreement.  Therefore, it was
deemed convenient and appropriate to use and adapt Article II.3
5 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Planned and possible future work—Part III, Propo-
sal by the Government of the United States of America: future work for Working Group II, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/822, at 3 (June 2, 2014).
6 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability
of Settlement Agreements Resulting From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187, at para. 28 (Nov. 27, 2014).
7 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/822, supra note 5, at 4.
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of the New York Convention, pursuant to which an arbitral agree-
ment would not be enforced if it is “null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.”8
B. Distinctions Between Settlement Agreements and
Arbitral Awards
The differences between an arbitral award and a settlement
agreement are significant.  Although it may sound obvious, the dis-
tinctions had to be noted during the Working Group’s delibera-
tions when conceiving and drafting the grounds to refuse
enforcement of a settlement agreement.9  Two examples will illus-
trate this point: 1) the manner in which the dispute is settled, and
2) who resolves the dispute?
In spite of its private nature, an arbitral award closely resem-
bles a judicial judgment in the way it resolves a dispute: Based on a
reconstruction of past events, a third party objectively decides who
prevails in light of the evidence, the law, and principles agreed
upon by the parties.  From this perspective, the solution is not de-
pendent on the possible outcomes and future scenarios; it adjudi-
cates and assigns rights and obligations based on something that
has already happened.  In contrast, a settlement agreement may
not necessarily refer to the past events. At least in some jurisdic-
tions, the settlement agreement may not only resolve an existing
dispute, but also prevent disputes that have not yet come to pass.
Furthermore, a settlement agreement may solve the dispute
through the creation of new, complex, conditional, interrelated, or
long-term obligations between the parties, which means that the
solution to the dispute depends on future performance of the par-
ties in light of a new contract.
Who resolves the dispute?  Whereas an arbitration is ended
upon the decision of an independent third party, a settlement
agreement is freely executed by the parties themselves.  Moreover,
8 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-third session (Vienna, September 7–11, 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, para. 92 (Sept. 17,
2015).
9 Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-sec-
ond session (New York, 2–6 February 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, paras. 29, 35 (Feb. 22,
2015); U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 96; UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II
(Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-fourth session (New York, February 1–5,
2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, para. 149 (Feb. 10, 2016).
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we cannot classify the result as a settlement agreement if a third
party imposes the solution on the parties.
These distinctions demanded a substantive departure from the
arbitration regime when it came to the grounds for refusing en-
forcement.  The first distinction underscores the need to address
situations in which the enforcement cannot proceed because, for
instance, certain obligations were not met by the party seeking re-
lief, the obligations allegedly breached were not yet due, the par-
ties limited the enforcement of the settlement agreement to certain
jurisdictions, consideration of arbitral and forum clauses within the
settlement agreement, etc.10  From this perspective, the grounds for
refusal will inevitably be more complex than those we find in arbi-
tration, especially if one takes into consideration that the enforce-
ment of a settlement agreement may result in non-monetary
relief.11
The second distinction shows that the grounds to refuse en-
forcement of an award that are based on the arbitrator’s duties to
follow a certain procedure12 and respect due process require-
ments13 cannot be entertained to the same extent when what is be-
ing enforced is the will of the parties, expressed through a contract
freely executed by them, regardless of the characteristics of the
process that led them to it.  In other words, what is being executed
is the parties’ own choices, instead of a decision imposed by an
arbitrator who is required to follow the agreed arbitration
procedure.14
In furtherance of the contractual nature of the settlement
agreement, the Working Group was asked, from the very begin-
ning,15 to consider issues relating to the consent of the parties,16 as
well as matters that are particularly applicable to contracts, such as
purpose, cause, validity, and formalities.  This forced the Working
Group to discuss the law under which these issues would be de-
cided and the extent of judicial review of settlement agreements.
Should the courts, for instance, be allowed to review the merits of
10 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, supra note 9, para. 34.
11 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, supra note 9, paras. 40–41.
12 New York Convention art. V(1)(d).
13 New York Convention art. V(1)(b).
14 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 90.
15 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.190, supra note 4, at 11.
16 Including questions of duress, unconscionability, undue influence, misrepresentation, mis-
take, and fraud. We have included all these concepts into the notion of “consent,” to the extent
that their presence makes it difficult to conclude that a party has in fact agreed to be bound by
the terms of the agreement.
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the agreements, or be limited to reviewing the legality of the
agreements?
The sole exceptions that received unequivocal support to be
included as defenses were fraud, violation of public policy, and
whether the dispute was not susceptible of being resolved through
mediation.  The rest of the issues were hard to tackle due to diverg-
ing views within the Working Group.17
Attention was also drawn to the strictly contractual nature of
the settlement agreement.  In so doing, the Working Group recog-
nized it needed to fashion defenses that took account for a party
that had already complied with its obligations, that the settlement
agreement was not a final resolution of a dispute, or that the agree-
ment had been subsequently modified by the parties.
C. Restrictive and Uniform Approach to Avoid Unwarranted
Litigation
To a great degree, the New York Convention owes its success
to the narrowness and “drafting cleanness” of its Article V and that
the grounds to reject enforcement of an arbitral award are exhaus-
tive.  That combination has, with exceptions, led to court decisions
that do not intrude on the merits of the dispute and the arbitrator’s
discretionary powers, and that favor enforcement as the general
rule.
The drafting of the New York Convention occurred with a
clear self-awareness of how parochial or local criteria could hinder
the success of the enforcement regime for arbitral awards at an
international level.  That goal would not have been achieved had
the treaty resorted to complicated or vague expressions, instead of
using simple, descriptive, and uniform language.
The Working Group set the same goal with respect to the
grounds to refuse enforcement of a settlement agreement under
the Singapore Convention: exhaustiveness, narrowness, clarity,
simplicity, and efficiency.18  Notwithstanding the common goals,
this proved to be a significant challenge for the Singapore Conven-
17 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 88.
18 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 93; U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 9, para.
147.
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tion considering the divergent agendas and positions of the delega-
tions that worked on the text.19
At some point in the Working Group’s discussions,20 it became
clear that there were two colliding forces: On one hand, (i) the
need to reflect the perspectives and needs of practitioners, which
usually translated into avoiding detailed and ambiguous provisions
that could lead the courts to question several issues at the enforce-
ment stage, unduly providing numerous tools for a party seeking to
circumvent an agreement; and, on the other hand, (ii) the need to
reflect the concerns of the states aiming at becoming a party to this
instrument.21  Therefore, emphasis was placed on the need to find a
balance between both.
The success or failure of the Working Group to achieve this
balance will ultimately be determined by the State courts, based on
their interpretations of Article 5 of the Singapore Convention.
This realization was present throughout the discussions of the
Working Group.
Below are some examples of the efforts to simplify and limit
the scope of the defenses against enforcement under the Singapore
Convention.  We will focus on the early discussions, for it was then
when the original purpose behind the provisions were outlined,
whereas in later discussions, the exercise became more centered on
“cleaning up” the language.
• Some delegations were interested in creating defenses that re-
lated to the principles governing mediation, as well as formal
requirements (such as a homologation process) that needed to
be met by the settlement agreement in order to be enforced.
These proposals were rejected, for it was shown that the inclu-
sion of these types of distinctions would run contrary to the
purpose of creating a truly international and uniform enforce-
ment regime.22
19 For examples of proposals that constituted “push backs” in this respect, see U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 95.
20 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
seventh session (Vienna, October 2–6, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, para. 81 (Oct. 11, 2017).
21 For instance, some States were weary of creating an efficient enforcement regime for set-
tlements reached through “informal” or “non-structured” mediation, let alone non-mediated set-
tlement agreements. Concerns were also expressed about applying this instrument in States that
were not sufficiently familiarized with the use of mediation. Some States even quoted “policy”
reasons to approve or reject suggestions, without actually explicating those reasons.
22 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 89.
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• There were proposals to incorporate provisions that would re-
quire a preliminary review of the settlement agreement in the
state of origin, which would allow for a better understanding of
the mediation process.  These proposals were rejected based on
the difficulties to assess the origin of the settlement agree-
ment.23  On that note, settlement agreements lack the clarity
that is given by the arbitration laws to the origin of arbitral
awards, as soon as the seat of arbitration is determined.24
• Further complications were brought up due to the difficulty in
determining the place of mediation and the origin of the settle-
ment agreement, as well as the distinctions between the law ap-
plicable to the dispute that was settled, and the law applicable
to the settlement agreement per se.  These complications led
the Working Group to ultimately ignore the issues of applicable
law to assess the scope of the defenses.  It was noted that in
absence of a given applicable law, the enforcing court would
generally apply conflict of law rules in the place of enforce-
ment, which would also allow that court to take into account
the law chosen by the parties in the settlement agreement.25
The sole reference to the applicable law is limited to determin-
ing whether the settlement agreement is null and void, inopera-
tive, or incapable of being performed.  This provision allows the
court to determine the applicable law failing any indication
thereon by the parties (Article 5.1(b)(i)).26
• At one point, language was proposed to add the “invalidity of
the agreement” to the notion of “null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.”27  Here it was noted that “inva-
lidity” of the settlement agreement as a defense would danger-
ously open the door for domestic legislation requirements that
could be too broad and include formal requirements that could
lead to uncertainty.  The Working Group responded by elimi-
nating the term “not valid” from the defenses.28  It also moved
forward with the understanding that consideration of validity
23 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 98.
24 See New York Convention art. V(1)(a) in fine, and particularly, UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration art. 31.3.
25 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 102.
26 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
fifth session (Vienna, September 12–23, 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, para. 101 (Sept. 30, 2016).
27 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial dis-
putes, International commercial conciliation: enforceability of settlement agreements, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.195, para. 56 (Dec. 2, 2015).
28 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 9, para. 161.
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would not extend to form requirements, to the extent that these
form requirements were already addressed elsewhere in the
Singapore Convention.29
• Albeit no one really questioned the need to include coercion
and fraud as defenses, it was pointed out that these and other
similar issues would already be covered by the more general
provision that referred to the nullity of the agreement.30  Ulti-
mately, fraud and coercion bar a party from truly “agreeing” to
something, thus disallowing a court to conclude that a party
consented to the settlement agreement.
• Also, in connection with Article 5.1(b)(i), some delegations
proposed to add the word “voidable” to the provision referring
to the “null” settlement agreement in order to put it beyond
doubt that this general provision covered fraud, mistake, mis-
representation, duress, and deceit.  However, the Working
Group insisted and finally determined that Article 5.1(b)(i) was
sufficiently broad and clear in this respect.31
• Early drafts of the Singapore Convention provided that relief
could be denied if the settlement agreement contained obliga-
tions that were “conditional or reciprocal.”32  This language was
problematic.  The Working Group pointed out that these  terms
have substantive legal connotations and were susceptible of di-
verging interpretations.33  Therefore, the Working Group at-
tempted to find descriptive, unambiguous language that would
capture the idea behind the early drafts: Enforcement should
be denied if the conditions stipulated in the agreement had not
been met or the obligations provided therein had not been
performed.
• Some delegations proposed, in connection with the defense
provided in Article 5.1(b)(iii) (modification of the agreement),
that a party prove that the settlement agreement had been
“substantially” modified.  The Working Group rejected this
change because the term “substantial” would introduce a sub-
29 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 9, para. 160.
30 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 9, paras. 153, 159.
31 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
eighth session (New York, February 5–9, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, para. 43 (Feb. 19, 2018).
32 See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commer-
cial disputes, International commercial conciliation: preparation of an instrument on enforcement
of international commercial settlement agreements resulting from conciliation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
WG.II/WP.198, para. 35 (June 30, 2016).
33 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 26, para. 91.
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jective standard that could provide the basis  for unwarranted
litigation and undue court’s discretion.34
III. BRIEF COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 5 OF THE SINGAPORE
CONVENTION
A. The Approved, Definitive Text
Article 5 of the Singapore Convention is transcribed below:
Article 5 Grounds for refusing to grant relief:
1. The competent authority of the Party to the Convention
where relief is sought under article 4 may refuse to grant relief
at the request of the party against whom the relief is sought only
if that party furnishes to the competent authority proof that:
(a) A party to the settlement agreement was under some
incapacity;
(b) The settlement agreement sought to be relied upon:
(i) Is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
formed under the law to which the parties have validly sub-
jected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law
deemed applicable by the competent authority of the Party
to the Convention where relief is sought under article 4;
(ii) Is not binding, or is not final, according to its terms; or
(iii) Has been subsequently modified;
(c) The obligations in the settlement agreement:
(i) Have been performed; or
(ii) Are not clear or comprehensible;
(d) Granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the settle-
ment agreement;
(e) There was a serious breach by the mediator of standards ap-
plicable to the mediator or the mediation without which breach
that party would not have entered into the settlement agree-
ment; or
(f) There was a failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties
circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s
impartiality or independence and such failure to disclose had a
material impact or undue influence on a party without which
failure that party would not have entered into the settlement
agreement.
2. The competent authority of the Party to the Convention
where relief is sought under article 4 may also refuse to grant
relief if it finds that:
34 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 31, para. 45.
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(a) Granting relief would be contrary to the public policy of that
Party; or
(b) The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settle-
ment by mediation under the law of that Party.
Article 5 has two main sections that comprise eleven defenses.
Like the New York Convention, Section 1 of the new Convention
includes the defenses that must be alleged by the party challenging
the enforcement, while Section 2 provides for the grounds that can
also be invoked by the courts ex officio.
Article 5.1 includes five topics comprising of nine defenses:
• Incapacity of the parties to execute the settlement agreement.
• Three defenses that “qualify” the settlement agreement: (i) nul-
lity, inoperativeness, and incapability of being performed; (ii)
absence of binding force and finality of the settlement agree-
ment; and (iii) modification of the agreement.
• Two of the defenses refer to obligations contained in the settle-
ment agreement: (i) party against whom enforcement is sought
has already complied with its obligations; and (ii) the obliga-
tions cannot be enforced because they are incomprehensible.
• Generic defense that refers to the incompatibility between the
relief sought under the Singapore Convention and the terms of
the settlement agreement.
• Two defenses relate to the conduct of the mediator and the me-
diation process.35
Article 5.2 includes the two remaining defenses that pertain to
public policy and whether the dispute is capable of settlement.
B. Incapacity of the Parties
The defense under Article 5.1(a) had been considered early by
the Working Group.  It was drawn from Article V.1(a) of the New
York Convention; there was no intent whatsoever to modify the
consequences of its drafting.  The incapacity of the parties pertains
to the parties’ execution of the settlement agreement, not to the
mediation process.
35 The analysis of the grounds to refuse enforcement based on the conduct of the mediation
and the mediator are covered by the chapter written by Michel Kallipetis. See SING. REF. BK.,
Michel Kallipetis, Singapore Convention Defences Based on Mediator’s Misconduct: Articles
5.1(e) & (f), 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1197 (2019).
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C. Null, Inoperative, or Incapable of Being Performed
The defense under Article 5.1(b)(i) is aimed at the validity and
efficacy of the settlement agreement.  Building upon its contractual
nature, the Working Group mirrored the requirements in the New
York Convention for enforcing an arbitration agreement.  There-
fore, the meaning ascribed to the key words “null,” “inoperative,”
and “incapable of being performed” is not different to what multi-
ple courts have interpreted over the years under Article III.3 of the
New York Convention.
As stated above, there are a number of issues conceived as
defenses from the outset, but that are not expressly reflected in the
text of the Singapore Convention.  The broadness of Article
5.1(b)(i) clearly encompasses them: duress, unconscionability, un-
due influence, misrepresentation, mistake, deceit, and fraud.  The
presence of one of these claims may directly affect the consent of a
party to the settlement agreement and result in the agreement’s
nullity.
D. Binding and Final Settlement Agreement
The defense under Article 5.1(b)(ii) refers to the binding na-
ture of the settlement agreement and that it finally settled a dis-
pute.  These two requirements typically apply to arbitral awards,
and the “binding” requirement is also present in the New York
Convention (Article V.1.e).36
The proposal to include a “final” and “binding” settlement
agreement was present since the early discussions and, at the be-
ginning, was somehow intertwined with the validity of the settle-
ment agreement.37  Later, it was associated with “reciprocal or
conditional obligations” that were not yet due or had been
breached.38
36 It should be reminded that the Geneva Convention on the enforcement of arbitral awards
included the claimant’s need to show that the award was final, which in practice meant there was
no recourse that could be filed against the award. Since under the Geneva Convention the bur-
den of proof was the claimant’s, this led to the well-known and now extinct double-exequatur.
After substantive deliberations, the New York Convention got rid of the “final” requirement,
and substituted in the term “binding” to qualify the award.
37 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 97.
38 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 9, para. 88.
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This defense was initially proposed in light of questions raised
by some delegates concerning scenarios in which the dispute had
not been finally settled or, unusual as it may sound, if a party sub-
mitted a draft instead of an executed agreement.39  One delegation
used these concerns as a basis for proposing to address these two
requirements as a defense against enforcement.  Underscoring
(perhaps inadvertently) the redundancy in this defense, another
delegation believed that these requirements could be included as
part of the definition of settlement agreements that fall within the
scope of the Singapore Convention.40
Despite that these requirements are present in the final text, it
should be noted that some delegations pointed out41 that this de-
fense was superfluous (redundant), as it was already covered by
other articles of the Singapore Convention.  Furthermore, if a
court entertains a claim to have a settlement agreement enforced,
it necessarily means that the threshold provided by Article 1 (scope
of application) and Article 4 (requirements for reliance on settle-
ment agreements) have been met.  In other words, a court would
not grant relief upon a settlement agreement that has been modi-
fied, nullified, or for whatever reason did not definitively settle a
dispute.  We believe this is not something that needed to be said.
In interpreting this provision, the courts should bear in mind
the intent behind the wording.  The Working Group’s intention was
solely to establish a defense to cover scenarios in which what is
being requested to be enforced, for whatever reason, is not the de-
finitive resolution of the dispute.
E. The Agreement was Modified
The defense provided in Article 5.1(b)(iii) is clear and
straightforward.  Its aim is an obvious one: the settlement agree-
ment sought to be enforced must be filed in its latest form.  If an
original settlement agreement was subject to subsequent modifica-
tion by the parties, the court should obviously take into considera-
tion those modifications, and refuse to grant relief based on a
version that has been superseded.  It should also be noted that the
defense would only prevail to the extent that the modifications
touch upon the relief sought.
39 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 26, para. 162.
40 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, supra note 8, para. 91.
41 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, supra note 20, para. 77.
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F. The Obligations Have Already Been Performed
The defense provided in Article 5.1(c)(i) is also clear and
straightforward.  If the defendant shows that it already performed
or paid that which is being demanded before the court, the request
for relief should not be granted.
G. Not Clear or Comprehensible
At a relatively late stage in the discussions, one delegation
proposed to include the lack of clarity and comprehensibility of the
settlement agreement as a defense.  The proposal was framed as an
example of the incapability of enforcing a settlement agreement.42
The purpose behind this was to ensure that the settlement agree-
ments covered by the Singapore Convention are limited to those
containing enforceable obligations that are clearly set out.43
Some delegations objected to the inclusion of this ground.
The reasons for their objections were twofold: (i) the terms “clear”
and “comprehensible” introduce ambiguity and gave substantive
discretionary power to the courts; and (ii) the defense is redundant,
for if a settlement agreement overly confuses and is incomprehen-
sible, it goes without saying that it will be impossible to enforce.44
The objections were followed by several efforts to improve the
language and narrow the scope of the defense, but since none of
the proposals provided sufficient guidance, they were rejected.45
The sole adjustment to the proposal adopted was to refer to the
adjectives qualifying the obligations contained in the settlement
agreement, instead of the agreement in general.
From the discussions, it seems that although the intent behind
the provision was obvious and narrow, the Working Group recog-
nized that Article 5.1(c)(ii) included ambiguous and subjective
standards.  However, those states that proposed and supported
them insisted in their inclusion, framing it as a policy issue.  The
potential negative effects of this outcome can only be limited by
the courts following the intention behind this provision, while re-
42 Furthermore, the original drafting proposal was “the settlement agreement is not clear or
comprehensible rendering it not capable of being enforced,” or alternatively, “the settlement
agreement is not capable of being enforced.” See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, supra note 20, para. 88.
43 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, supra note 20, para. 51.
44 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, supra note 20, para. 88.
45 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 31, para. 47.
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jecting unwarranted arguments by respondents who seek to cir-
cumvent their obligations.
H. Granting Relief Would be Contrary to the Terms of the
Settlement Agreement
The defense provided in Article 5.1(d) was proposed at the
early stages of the discussions by the United States46 and was never
really questioned or substantively commented on until the 65th ses-
sion.  The idea behind this provision, as explained by its proponent,
was to give priority to party autonomy, which would require a
court to deny enforcement if granting relief would run contrary to
a condition set forth by the parties in the settlement agreement,
including a dispute resolution clause.47
However, some delegations objected to an enforcement court
deferring to a dispute resolution clause in the settlement agree-
ment, considering that the object of such a clause would be to ad-
dress matters pertaining to the performance of obligations in the
settlement agreement, not its enforcement.48
This criticism to the proposal is, in our view, unfounded.  In
the end, in light of the scope of the defenses provided in Article 5,
it seems to us that the enforcing court could be inevitably faced
with the need of determining, for instance, if an obligation had
been met, or if the relief sought is still subject to some unfulfilled
condition.  In that scenario, the court’s decision to grant or refuse
enforcement would have had to deal with matters pertaining to the
performance of obligations, which, as pointed out by some dele-
gates, would be the object of a dispute resolution clause within the
settlement agreement.
Therefore, courts should interpret this provision to include dis-
pute resolution clauses and arbitration agreements as part of the
“terms of the settlement agreement” that may condition the relief
sought upon the agreement.  For instance, if the settlement agree-
ment contains an arbitration clause, the defendant would be able to
46 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial dis-
putes: Enforceability of settlement agreements (Comments by Israel and the United States of
America), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.192, para. 17 (Aug. 3, 2015). The first attempt to draft
this defense is found in U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.195, supra note 27, para. 56.
47 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 26, para. 92.
48 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 26, paras. 94, 95.
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invoke Article 5.1(d)49 and request the enforcement court to refer
the parties to arbitration.  This defense would also be upheld if the
settlement agreement limits or bars the application of the Singa-
pore Convention, or if the parties agreed that enforcement there-
under could be carried out in only one or a few defined
jurisdictions.
Despite the issues raised during the discussions, this language
was considered generally acceptable to the Working Group.  Nev-
ertheless, the group insisted on being clear and emphatic on the
meaning of this provision to avoid inadvertent introductions of un-
wanted defenses.50
I. Incapability of Being Settled and Public Policy
The defenses in Article 5.1(2) are the functional equivalent of
Article V(2) of the New York Convention,51 including the possibil-
ity of these issues being raised by the court ex officio.52  This pro-
posal was made at the very beginning,53 and was never really
questioned or objected by the Working Group.  It was almost a
given that the Singapore Convention would provide that a settle-
ment agreement would not be enforced if the matter of the settle-
ment agreement was not capable of settlement, or if it violated
public policy in the enforcement state.
Based on court experiences with the interpretation of Article
V(2)(2) of the New York Convention, some delegations proposed
to narrow this defense by expressly referring to “international”
public policy, with the understanding that  “international public
policy” was more restrictive language than the “public policy of
each country.”  Notwithstanding, the Working Group decided to
not include the term “international” in Article 5.2(a) for three
main reasons:
• By preserving the same language of the New York Convention,
the relatively consistent case law developed by multiple courts
would support a notion of “public policy” that is more narrowly
interpreted when a foreign element was present.54
49 And naturally, article II of the New York Convention or its equivalent is relevant.
50 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 26, para. 98, in fine.
51 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.192, supra note 46, para. 17.
52 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 9, paras. 154, 155.
53 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, supra note 9, paras. 23, 31.
54 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 9, para. 157.
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• Since international public policy could be interpreted as a no-
tion of fundamental justice shared by many states, the resulting
threshold would make it more difficult for states to adopt the
Singapore Convention.55
• Some delegations explicitly stated that they preferred local
courts to determine what constituted public policy in their re-
spective countries.56
With the purpose of narrowing the notion of public policy fur-
ther, a proposal was made to add the requirement that the enforce-
ment settlement agreement had to be “manifestly” contrary to the
public policy in order for the defense to proceed.  Similar reasons
were provided by the Working Group to reject this suggestion.
Namely, that a departure from a uniform and internationally rec-
ognized language (Article V.1.2 of the New York Convention)
would raise further confusion before the courts.57
Little was said with respect to the subject matter’s “incapabil-
ity of being settled” (Article V.2(b).  Some delegations proposed to
discuss whether the Working Group should consider changing the
law according to which this defense was to be interpreted.  Those
delegations alleged that it was more proper for the court to con-
sider the law chosen by the parties and not the law of its forum.
However, that proposal did not receive meaningful support, and
the Working Group decided to mirror the same approach taken by
the New York Convention: both public policy and the subject mat-
ter’s capability of being settled are to be determined pursuant to
the law of the country in which enforcement is sought.58
J. The Overlap Between Defenses
At the end of the drafting efforts, there were two realizations
broadly shared within the Working Group: (i) no delegation was
completely satisfied with the way in which Article 5 had been de-
finitively structured and drafted; and (ii) the defenses foreseen in
Article 5 were somewhat redundant.  This “unsatisfaction” led to
further efforts to redraft, restructure, and revise Article 5.  In doing
so, the Working Group had to face the fact that Article 5 had been
55 Id.
56 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 31, para. 67.
57 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, supra note 9, para. 157.
58 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, supra note 20, para. 100.
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the result of a long, complex, and enormous effort to accommodate
widely divergent views.59
In the end, the Working Group was aware that Article
5.1(b)(i) was broad and that the other grounds in Article 5.1(b),
Article 5.1(c), and even 5.1(d) and 5.1(e)60 were really illustrative
of the more generic provision.61  Unfortunately, the Working
Group failed in its efforts to the language, but at least it got suffi-
ciently far along to recognize the need to be explicit about this re-
dundancy in the travaux preparatoires.62
In this respect, one of the proposals put forth during the dis-
cussion is worth reproducing:63
The competent authority, in interpreting and applying the vari-
ous grounds for refusing requested relief under paragraph 1,
may take into account that the grounds for such refusal identi-
fied under paragraph 1(b) may overlap with other grounds for
refusal in paragraph 1.
We think this proposal is worth quoting because not only does
it underscore the overlap between the defenses, but it also gives
practical guidance on how a court should interpret Article 5.1 on
defenses.
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEFENSES AGAINST
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE SUCCESS (OR FAILURE) OF
THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION
To conclude these commentaries on Article 5 of the Singapore
Convention, we will briefly reflect on how the regime of defenses
against the enforcement of settlement agreements may influence
the success of the treaty.
59 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 31, para. 62.
60 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
sixth session (New York, February 6–10, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, para. 82 (Feb. 16, 2017).
61 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 31, para. 62.
62 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 31, para. 65.
63 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, supra note 31, para. 63.
2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1253
A. The Meaning of Success for the Singapore Convention
How will we know if the Singapore Convention was a success?
The answer must necessarily consider its purpose.  The Resolution
adopted by the General Assembly64 stated the following:
. . . Recognizing the value of mediation as a method of amicably
settling disputes arising in the context of international commer-
cial relations, . . .
Convinced that the adoption of a convention on international
settlement agreements resulting from mediation that is accept-
able to States with different legal, social and economic systems
would complement the existing legal framework on interna-
tional mediation and contribute to the development of harmoni-
ous international economic relations, . . .
In our view, as drafted, success for the Singapore Convention
means that the enforcement of international mediated settlement
agreements will be subject to a uniform, clear, and efficient regime,
in a fashion that is similar to how the New York Convention regu-
lates the enforcement of arbitral awards.  We may also add that the
existence of this regime will foster the use of mediation, to the ex-
tent that the Singapore Convention will become a well-known in-
strument that gives parties greater confidence in the execution of
settlement agreements.
If any of these do not come to pass, we believe the treaty has
failed in its primary purposes.
B. The Success of the Singapore Convention Cannot be Borne
by Article 5 as a Stand-alone Provision
To state the obvious, the extent to which a respondent may
unduly avoid the enforcement of a settlement agreement is a useful
parameter against which to assess the success of the Singapore
Convention.  However, it is practically impossible to isolate the de-
fenses regime of Article 5 as an independent basis for assessing the
treaty’s potential success or failure.  There are several other fea-
tures of the Singapore Convention, apart from Article 5, that will
play important roles in its future.
Albeit not drafted nor originally thought of  as “defenses” per
se, a defendant may invoke provisions outside of Article 5 to suc-
64 U.N. Doc. A/RES/73/198 (Jan. 11, 2019).
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cessfully challenge enforcement under the Singapore Convention.
Ironically, the existence of these “hidden defenses” was explicitly
recognized by the Working Group during the discussions.65
A court may refuse to grant relief under the Singapore Con-
vention, for instance, if the thresholds created by Articles 1 and 4
(principally, but not exclusively) are not met.  In our view, this is a
clear indication that the more conditions set by the Working
Group, the narrower the scope of the Singapore Convention is,
and, perhaps unfortunately, more “defenses” against the enforce-
ment have been created.
To illustrate this “hidden defenses” regime, we noted how the
Working Group decided to limit the scope of the Singapore Con-
vention to settlement agreements that had been achieved through a
mediation process.  This inevitably forced the Working Group to
embark on complex and burdensome discussions that naturally re-
sulted in several provisions that would have otherwise been unnec-
essary.  For instance:
• It became more complex to define the “international”
component of the settlement agreement, for the Working
Group had to deal with scenarios in which an international
mediation could have given birth to a national settlement
agreement, and vice versa (Article 1).
• The threshold became more difficult for claimants, for they
have the burden of proving that a mediation actually took
place.  Discharging such a burden may sometimes prove to
be a troublesome requisite.  For instance, the Singapore
Convention establishes the mediator’s signature or an at-
testation by the administrating institution as the preferred
means to discharge the burden of proof.  This raises two
inconveniences.  The mediator’s signature is not only un-
common but may be seen as inadequate in some jurisdic-
tions.  Moreover, a mediator’s signature does not prove, by
itself, that a mediation actually occurred, and may even be
used to defraud the convention’s purpose of limiting its
scope to mediated settlement agreements (Article
4.1(b)).66
65 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/896, supra note 26, paras. 113–14.
66 For a more detailed analysis of this provision, see SING. REF. BK., Allan J. Stitt, The Singa-
pore Convention: When has a Mediation Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1173 (2019).
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• Respondents may invoke new defenses that, in principle,
are independent from the settlement agreement:67 (i) fail-
ure to meet standards applicable to the mediator or media-
tion (Article 5.1(e)); and (ii) failure to disclose
circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the
mediator’s impartiality and independence (Article
5.1(f)).68
Even though the Working Group decided to limit the scope of
the Singapore Convention to “international” mediated settlement
agreements, we believe it would have been more useful to deal
with cross-border enforcement of settlement agreements, regard-
less of whether they are domestic or international.  However, by
choosing to build the scope around the concept of “international-
ity,” there are at least two inconveniences to face, and that were
raised during the discussions69: (i) there is an inevitable detrimental
effect for countries to have different regimes to deal with settle-
ment agreements, depending on whether they are international or
domestic; and (ii) it provides respondents with an additional
ground to resist or hinder the enforcement, that is, to argue before
the competent court that the settlement agreement does not meet
the criteria of Article 1.  These foregoing points may be seen in
other examples of  “hidden defenses” against enforcement under
the Singapore Convention.
C. States Not Being Expected to Adopt the Singapore
Convention
It was hard to assess the real willingness of all the states to
adopt an instrument that was being drafted as a convention during
the discussions within the Working Group.  The desire of (proba-
bly) the majority of delegations to develop and finalize a conven-
tion made it necessary to adopt a peculiar approach in order to
advance in the discussions and fulfill the Commission’s mandate.
The “peculiar approach” consisted in adopting the following
resolution upon the publication of the Singapore Convention:
67 The Working Group managed to provide that the party resisting enforcement has to prove
that it would not have entered into the settlement agreement but for the breach committed by
the mediator.
68 For a more detailed analysis of this provision, see SING. REF. BK., Michel Kallipetis, Singa-
pore Convention Defences Based on Mediator’s Misconduct: Articles 5.1(e) & (f), 20 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 1197 (2019).
69 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, supra note 9, para. 29.
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Noting that the decision of the Commission to concurrently pre-
pare a convention on international settlement agreements re-
sulting from mediation and an amendment to the Model Law on
International Commercial Conciliation was intended to accom-
modate the different levels of experience with mediation in dif-
ferent jurisdictions and to provide States with consistent
standards on the cross-border enforcement of international set-
tlement agreements resulting from mediation, without creating
any expectation that interested States may adopt either
instrument.
This resolution did serve as a compromise that enabled several
sceptic states to move forward in the discussions in a positive way.
We fully understood the need for this approach in order to gain a
consensus.  However, we fear it could also mean that the signature
and adoption of the Singapore Convention will be harder.
D. A Regret
One can judge the success of the Singapore Convention from a
different perspective.  Despite the almost isolated but continuous
protests of the Mexican delegation throughout the discussions,70
the Working Group decided to limit the scope of the treaty to set-
tlement agreements that had been achieved through a mediation
process.  No clear, legal reason was provided to justify leaving out
negotiated settlement agreements, regardless of their quality and
sophistication.  No evidence was provided to demonstrate that a
mediated settlement agreement guarantees a better product.  It is
difficult to deny that mediation enjoyed a somewhat directed sup-
port, in detriment to other methods of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, and in particular, over direct negotiations.  Furthermore, even
though negotiations may currently enjoy broader use than media-
tion and is undeniably cheaper, negotiated settlement agreements
were not covered by the Singapore Convention.  We do note, how-
ever, that while revising the Model Law in parallel to the drafting
of the Singapore Convention, the Working Group explicitly ac-
knowledged the possibility of allowing the same enforcement re-
gime for negotiated settlements.
70 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832, supra note 9, para. 42.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Singapore Convention creates a regime by which settle-
ment agreements are enforced for what they are, without the need
to have them notarized, recognized before a court, or otherwise
formalized.  Relief may be sought directly from the settlement
agreement (Article 3).  That may be seen as the paramount feature
of this instrument that is currently lacking at the international
level.
We do have regrets, for the instrument could have been much
simpler and akin to the mediation practice at the international
commercial arena.  Indeed, in our view, UNCITRAL missed an
opportunity to refer to commercial settlement agreements in gen-
eral when it limited the scope to mediated solutions and unduly
“discriminated” against negotiated settlements.  The scope was also
narrowed by deciding to deal with settlement agreements that are
“international” and by excluding some types of mediated settle-
ment agreements (non-commercial ones and those which are also
enforceable as a judgment or an award).  We point to these exam-
ples as additional “hidden” grounds that may potentially be raised
by respondents (along with Article 5) to resist enforcement.  Ironi-
cally, the narrowness of the instrument’s scope (as defined by Arti-
cles 1 and 4) offers indirectly broad defenses to respondents under
the Singapore Convention.
Having stated the above, we find that the Singapore Conven-
tion has a great potential to foster the use of mediation, which in
itself is an aspiration we all share.  Moreover, despite the inconve-
niences described above, we do believe that the Singapore Conven-
tion provides mediation practitioners with an instrument with the
potential of creating a uniform regime for the enforcement of in-
ternational settlement agreements.
We could undertake a comparative law analysis and point out
how each jurisdiction decides to address the issue of enforcement
of settlement agreements.  By doing so, we may compare and de-
cide what the best solution is, and even compare these regimes
with the one created by the Singapore Convention.  In so doing, we
may further conclude that this treaty has failed to create an effi-
cient regime, when comparing it to “x” jurisdiction.  But we may
very well conclude precisely the opposite if the comparative back-
ground changes.  In this respect, it may be useful to have Article 7
of the Singapore Convention, which allows a party to resort to an
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alternative regime if available (and possibly a better, more efficient
one) to the Convention.
What we don’t have yet is a universal, uniform approach to
enforcement.  That is a gap we don’t find in arbitration (which is
due, to a great extent, to the New York Convention).  The Singa-
pore Convention aims at filling in that gap for mediated settlement
agreements.
If it gains reasonable support by States, the Singapore Con-
vention will become a universal reference for parties and practi-
tioners, who will perhaps find it easier and will have more
confidence in using mediation, knowing that the protections af-
forded by this treaty exist.  If this becomes a reality, the mediation
world will have achieved something that is currently lacking in
many jurisdictions.  That, in itself, at least from a long-term per-
spective, provides enough reasons to support this instrument.
THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION:
REFLECTIONS ON ARTICLES 1.3 ON SCOPE,
8.1(b) ON RESERVATIONS, AND 12 ON
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
ORGANIZATIONS
Norel Rosner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted on 20
December 2018 the United Nations Convention on International
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the “Conven-
tion”).1  The Convention opened for signature in Singapore in Au-
gust 2019.  The UN adoption marks the culmination of a process
that started in 2014 at the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), first with discussions on the
proposal to take up this project and then, as of September 2015, on
the actual principles, form, and text of the instruments to be
drafted.  The Convention was drafted in conjunction with a Model
Law that contains parallel provisions.
In this intervention, I intent to shed some light on three provi-
sions of the Convention: Articles 1.3, 8.1(b), and 12.  Article 1.3
limits the scope of the Convention.  Article 8(1)(b) contains a dec-
laration mechanism in which a Party (state) can declare that it will
apply the Convention only to the extent that the parties to the set-
tlement agreement have agreed to its application.  Finally, Article
12 deals with the specific arrangements needed in case of accession
to the Convention by a regional economic integration organisation.
* Norel Rosner works in the Directorate General Justice and Consumers of the European
Commission. He was involved in the UNCITRAL project on the enforceability of international
commercial settlement agreements as negotiator on behalf of the European Union. This article
does not present in any way the opinions and/or positions of the European Commission nor of
the European Union. Any views expressed herein are the authors’ only.
1 G.A. Res. 73/198, United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements
Resulting from Mediation (Dec. 20, 2018).
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II. ARTICLE 1.3 ON SCOPE
This provision generated intense discussions.  The main ques-
tion in the Working Group was whether the future instrument
should also apply to judicial settlements and arbitral consent
awards, or only to purely private settlement agreements.
Those who argued for a broad scope of application cited the
utility of the future instrument as well as the argument that parties
should have a choice between several international instruments
when enforcing a settlement agreement.  On the other hand, those
who wanted a more restrictive scope of application cited the fact
that judicial settlements are covered by other international instru-
ments such as the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
(2005) (the “Choice of Court Convention”) or will likely be cov-
ered by the convention under preparation at the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law (the “Hague Judgments
Convention”).  The different nature of judicial settlements was also
cited as an argument justifying a different treatment.  Furthermore,
arbitral consent awards are covered by the Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York,
1958) (the “New York Convention”).
After discussion, the Working Group chose to exclude judicial
settlements and arbitral consent awards from the scope of applica-
tion of the Convention.  The main objective behind this policy
choice was to avoid possible overlaps or gaps with existing and fu-
ture conventions.2
Article 1.3 reads as follows:
This Convention does not apply to:
(a) Settlement agreements:
(i) That have been approved by a court or con-
cluded in the course of   proceedings before a court; and
(ii) That are enforceable as a judgment in the State
of that court;
(b) Settlement agreements that have been recorded and are
enforceable as an arbitral award.
2 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
sixth session (New York, February 6–10, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901, para. 26 (Feb. 16, 2017).
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A. The Exclusion of Judicial Settlements
Article 1.3 of the Convention is fully aligned with the text of
the Choice of Court Convention3 and with the Hague Judgments
Convention.4  This means that, in principle, no overlap or gap is
possible between these instruments, so that parties seeking to en-
force a judicial settlement in another country will have open only
the path made available by the latter instruments.  This is consis-
tent with the view expressed during the discussions that the Con-
vention should not open the door to the possibility of using two
enforcement paths and thereby create an opportunity for abuse by
the parties.5  Such a situation could have arisen, for instance, if ju-
dicial settlements would have been included under the scope of the
Convention and a party seeking to enforce a settlement agreement
could then have had “two bites of the cherry.”  This would have
meant that, under the Convention, if unsuccessful in its attempt to
enforce the private settlement agreement, a party would have had
the option of trying to enforce the agreement as a judicial settle-
ment.  This exclusion prevents such duplicative strategy.
In practice, the competent authority before which a settlement
agreement is brought for enforcement or raised as a defence would
have to assess either ex officio or at the request of one of the par-
ties (in this case most probably the party resisting enforcement)
whether that settlement agreement falls under the scope of the
Convention.  When it comes to assessing whether the settlement
agreement is a judicial settlement and falls outside the scope, the
competent authority would have to look at whether it has been
approved by a foreign court or concluded in the course of proceed-
ings before such a foreign court.  If so, then the competent author-
3 Choice of Court Convention art. 12 reads as follows:
Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) which a court of a Contracting State
designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement has approved, or which have
been concluded before that court in the course of proceedings, and which are en-
forceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin, shall be enforced
under this Convention in the same manner as a judgment.
4 2019 Hague Judgments Convention art. 11 reads as follows:
Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) which a court of a Contracting State has
approved, or which have been concluded in the course of proceedings before a court
of a Contracting State, and which are enforceable in the same manner as a judgment
in the State of origin, shall be enforced under this Convention in the same manner as
a judgment.
5 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-fourth session (New York, February 1–5, 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/867, para. 123 (Feb.
10, 2016).
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ity would have to look at a second cumulative condition, namely
that the settlement agreement in question is enforceable as a judg-
ment in the State where that court sits.  Admittedly, it would not
be easy for the competent authority to assess this latter condition,
as this requires an expert look at the procedural law of the State of
the foreign court.  The competent authority could base its assess-
ment for instance on expert evidence submitted before it, either at
its request or by the party resisting enforcement, or could simply
ask the parties to provide documentation/proof, as to the enforce-
ability of the settlement agreement as a judgment in that State.
Article 4.4 of the Convention allows the competent authority to
ask for “any necessary documents” it may need in this process to
help the court determine whether the requirements of the Conven-
tion have been complied with.
B. The Exclusion of Arbitral Consent Awards
In this situation too, the Working Group decided that the best
way to achieve the objective of avoiding overlap with the New
York Convention, a widely ratified international instrument,6 was
to exclude arbitral consent awards from the new convention.
In order to be excluded, the settlement agreement needs to be
recorded as an arbitral award and be enforceable.  Unlike judicial
settlements, the text does not specify where the award should be
enforceable.  After discussions7 on the best criteria to be used
when assessing the enforceability of an arbitral consent award, the
Working Group was of the opinion that this matter should be left
to be decided by the competent authority before which a settle-
ment agreement is brought for enforcement.
In practice, the competent authority would have to assess
whether the settlement agreement falls under the scope of the
Convention either ex officio or at the request of one of the parties
(in this case too most probably the party resisting enforcement).  If
the settlement agreement is recorded as an arbitral award, then the
competent authority would assess whether it could be enforceable
in that State, for instance based on the New York Convention.  If
6 Ratified by 159 States. See UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_
texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (consulted on Mar. 4, 2019).
7 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
seventh session (Vienna, October 2–6, 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/929, paras. 25–26 (Oct. 11,
2017).
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so, then that settlement agreement would be excluded from the
scope of application of this Convention.  However, if it is not en-
forceable via another path, then the Convention would apply.
III. ARTICLE 8(1)(b)—THE OPT-IN MECHANISM UNDER
RESERVATIONS
The possible optional character of the future instrument was
also the subject of intense discussions.  This translated into a pro-
posed opt-in/opt-out mechanism whereby the parties to the settle-
ment agreement would have to expressly choose the future
instrument to apply to their settlement agreement (opt-in) or to
exclude its application (opt-out).  Those who supported such a
mechanism argued that since party autonomy is paramount to me-
diation and to agreeing to a settlement agreement, parties should
therefore also have the choice of whether this instrument would
apply in their case.  Those who argued against considered that it is
unusual for an international instrument to contain such a possibil-
ity which might affect its effectiveness in practice.
After discussions, the Working Group agreed that a Party that
so wishes may enter a declaration that it shall apply the Conven-
tion only where the parties to the settlement agreement agreed to
its application.
Article 8(1)(b) reads as follows:
1. A Party to the Convention may declare that:
(. . .)
(b) It shall apply this Convention only to the extent that the
parties to the settlement agreement have agreed to the applica-
tion of the Convention.
In practice, a Party to the Convention may enter a declaration
at any time, specifying that it shall enforce settlement agreements
or allow parties to raise a settlement agreement as a defence only
where the parties to the settlement agreement have expressly
agreed to the application of the Convention.  When a State Party
enters such a reservation, failure by the parties to a settlement
agreement to agree to the application of the Convention means
that a competent authority in that State Party will not apply the
Convention to the settlement agreement.
Contrary to an opt-out mechanism, the adopted opt-in mecha-
nism under Reservations requires an action from the parties to the
settlement agreement in order for the Convention to apply.
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Whereas for an opt-out, the silence of the parties would have
meant that the Convention applies; in the opt-in scenario, the si-
lence of the parties means that the Convention does not apply.
Even though the text of the Convention omits a provision on
how to opt-in, it is safe to conclude that the agreement of the par-
ties would need to comply with the same formal requirements as
the settlement agreement, namely that it should be in writing and
signed by the parties.
Finally, separate from the opt-in mechanism, it should be
noted that the Working Group shared the understanding8 that even
without an express provision, the parties to a settlement agreement
can always exclude the application of the Convention.  In that case,
a competent authority should refuse to grant relief under the Con-
vention as the settlement agreement would not comply with Article
5(1)(d) (“Granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the set-
tlement agreement”).
IV. ARTICLE 12—REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
ORGANISATIONS
Article 12 regulates the situation where regional economic in-
tegration organisations9 (“REIO”) would become Parties to the
Convention.  This is a standard provision to be found in different
UN conventions10 which aims to facilitate accession in situations
where a REIO has competence over matters governed by the
Convention.
Article 12 reads as follows:
1. A regional economic integration organization that is consti-
tuted by sovereign States and has competence over certain mat-
ters governed by this Convention may similarly sign, ratify,
accept, approve or accede to this Convention.  The regional eco-
nomic integration organization shall in that case have the rights
and obligations of a Party to the Convention, to the extent that
that organization has competence over matters governed by this
Convention.  Where the number of Parties to the Convention is
relevant in this Convention, the regional economic integration
8 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
eighth session (New York, February 5–9, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, para. 78 (Feb. 19, 2018);
U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-first ses-
sion, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, paras. 38–39 (2018).
9 A good example of such an organisation is the European Union.
10 See, e.g., UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 44.
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organization shall not count as a Party to the Convention in ad-
dition to its member States that are Parties to the Convention.
2. The regional economic integration organization shall, at the
time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession,
make a declaration to the depositary specifying the matters gov-
erned by this Convention in respect of which competence has
been transferred to that organization by its member States.  The
regional economic integration organization shall promptly no-
tify the depositary of any changes to the distribution of compe-
tence, including new transfers of competence, specified in the
declaration under this paragraph.
3. Any reference to a “Party to the Convention”, “Parties to the
Convention”, a “State” or “States” in this Convention applies
equally to a regional economic integration organization where
the context so requires.
4. This Convention shall not prevail over conflicting rules of a
regional economic integration organization, whether such rules
were adopted or entered into force before or after this Conven-
tion: (a) if, under article 4, relief is sought in a State that is mem-
ber of such an organization and all the States relevant under
article 1, paragraph 1, are members of such an organization; or
(b) as concerns the recognition or enforcement of judgments be-
tween member States of such an organization.
The first two paragraphs of this provision contain a so-called
accession clause, regulating different aspects of an accession by a
REIO, from the method of counting the Parties to the Convention
(for instance, for the purpose of entry into force based on Article
14.1) to the declarations to be made on the competence of the
REIO in the matters covered by the Convention.
Paragraph 3 defines terms relevant to this article, namely that
references to Party/Parties and State/States should be interpreted
as a reference to REIOs.
Finally, paragraph 4 contains a so-called disconnection clause.
This provision regulates the interface between the Convention, on
one hand, and the internal rules of the REIOs, on the other hand.
Accordingly, in a situation of conflict between the Convention and
the internal rules of a REIO, whether already in force or which will
be adopted in the future, the latter will prevail in two distinct
situations:
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• Where the competent authority is in a member State of a
REIO and all the States relevant for the purpose of Article
1.1 are member States of a REIO; or
• Where the conflict concerns the recognition or enforce-
ment of judgments within the REIO.
The first situation above is rather factual and needs little ex-
planation.  Where elements such as the place of business of the
parties to the settlement agreement are found on the territory of
the REIO then the conflicting internal rules will prevail.  The latter
one is, however, more complicated but can be exemplified with the
following situation: If party A wants to enforce a settlement agree-
ment under the Convention in State X (a member State of a
REIO) but fails, if the REIO has internal rules on the recognition
and enforcement of judgments, like the European Union, then
under paragraph 4 of Article 12 a judgment from State X refusing
to enforce a settlement agreement will be recognised throughout
the REIO and party A is bound to fail to enforce the same settle-
ment agreement under the Convention elsewhere in the REIO.11
Indeed, as far as the European Union is concerned, for the pur-
poses of recognition and enforcement of intra-EU judgments, it
can be considered as one territory, so parties wanting to enforce a
settlement agreement in the EU would have to carefully choose
their port of entry.
V. REFLECTIONS
This chapter was designed to shed some light on the history
and purposes of three unrelated and significant sections: Articles
1.3 on Scope, 8.1(b) on Reservations, and 12 on Regional Eco-
nomic Integration Organizations.
11 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
eighth session (New York, February 5–9, 2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, para. 97 (Feb. 19, 2018).
RESERVATIONS IN THE SINGAPORE
CONVENTION—HELPING TO MAKE THE
“NEW YORK DREAM” COME TRUE
Itai Apter* & Coral Henig Muchnik**
I. INTRODUCTION
On a wintery day in New York City, in the conference room of
the United Nations General Assembly, history was made with the
unanimous adoption of the text of the Convention on International
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, also known as
the “Singapore Convention.”1  A few months earlier, and a few
blocks up the road in an event held in the offices of a prominent
New York law firm, one of the members of the Canadian delega-
tion to the negotiations expressed his dream that the Convention
would do for international mediation what the New York Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (1958)2 (the “New York Convention”) did for international
arbitration.3
The reservation mechanisms included in Article 8 of the Singa-
pore Convention, and discussed in this article, were designed to
* LL.B., University of Haifa (2006); International Legal Studies LL.M., New York University
(2008); Director, International Civil Affairs, a member of Israel’s delegation to the negotiation
of the Singapore Convention.
** L.L.B., Haifa University (2018), Law Clerk.
Both authors served at the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (International Law) at
the Israel Ministry of Justice at the time this article was written.
This article was presented during the New Singapore Mediation Convention Symposium,
organized by Cardozo School of Law and Touro Law Center held on March 18, 2019 in New
York City. The authors thank Dr. Roy Schondorf, Yael Weiner, Cedric Yehuda Sabbah, and Noa
Bar-Shalev for their support and assistance in everything related to work on the Singapore Con-
vention and this article, and to the Symposium participants for their helpful comments on the
presentation.
1 G.A. Res. 73/198, United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements
Resulting from Mediation (Dec. 20, 2018).
2 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. As of today, the Convention was adopted by 159 State Members.
3 Allan J. Stitt, Remarks at NYIAC Talks: A Look into the Singapore Convention on Medi-
ation and UNCITRAL’s Working Group II—Where do we go from here? (Feb. 6, 2019) [herein-
after NYIAC] (an event sponsored by Davis Polk in New York City). A similar sentiment was
expressed by one of the authors, noting his hope that at least half of the number of state parties
to the New York Convention join the Singapore Convention in 60 years’ time, in the context of
the special event held to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the New York Convention dur-
ing the 2018 UNCITRAL Commission meeting held on June 28, 2018.
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help make the Canadian delegate’s dream come true. These reser-
vations will become crucial to enabling a broad adoption of the
Convention.4 A first sign of this could be evident by the fact that at
the very first opportunity, 46 States signed the Singapore Conven-
tion with two of them including reservations.5
Following a brief introduction of the Singapore Convention,
this article discusses the concept of reservations in international
law and the importance of such mechanisms for facilitating adher-
ence to multilateral treaties.  It then focuses on two elements of the
reservation mechanism including their drafting history, purposes,
and consequences.  In the final section of the article, we explain
how these reservations will likely constitute a key component to
the success of the Singapore Convention.
4 United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Me-
diation [hereinafter Singapore Convention], art. 8, available at UNCITRAL Report for its 51st
Sess. (25 June–13 July 2018), U.N. Doc. A/73/17 (2018); U.N. GAOR, 73rd Sess., No. 17, Annex
I, at 50 (2018):
1. “A Party to the Convention may declare that: (a) It shall not apply this Conven-
tion to settlement agreements to which it is a party, or to which any governmental
agencies or any person acting on behalf of a governmental agency is a party, to the
extent specified in the declaration; (b) It shall apply this Convention only to the
extent that the parties to the settlement agreement have agreed to the application of
the Convention.
2. No reservations are permitted except those expressly authorized in this article.
3. Reservations may be made by a Party to the Convention at any time. Reservations
made at the time of signature shall be subject to confirmation upon ratification, ac-
ceptance or approval. Such reservations shall take effect simultaneously with the en-
try into force of this Convention in respect of the Party to the Convention concerned.
Reservations made at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Conven-
tion or accession thereto, or at the time of making a declaration under article 13 shall
take effect simultaneously with the entry into force of this Convention in respect of
the Party to the Convention concerned. Reservations deposited after the entry into
force of the Convention for that Party to the Convention shall take effect six months
after the date of the deposit.
4. Reservations and their confirmations shall be deposited with the depositary.
5. Any Party to the Convention that makes a reservation under this Convention may
withdraw it at any time. Such withdrawals are to be deposited with the depositary,
and shall take effect six months after deposit.
5 The signatory states include, inter alia, Israel, China, and the U.S. While only Belarus and
Iran included reservations at this stage, it is arguably the case that the flexibility in allowing for
reservations (at any time) provided a comfort level for states allowing such a large number of
initial signatories. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-4&chapter=22&clang=_en (last visited Sept. 7,
2019).
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II. THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION IN BRIEF
The origins of the Singapore Convention can be traced to a
2014 U.S. proposal to UNCITRAL (the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law) to establish a new instrument,
modelled on the New York Convention,6 to promote the use of
mediation to resolve cross-border disputes.7  The proposal was ac-
cepted and negotiations took place in the framework of UNCI-
TRAL Working Group II until June 2018 when the text of the
Convention was finalized at the UNCITRAL’s annual Commission
meeting.8
Mainly, the Singapore Convention aims to elevate the status
of a settlement agreement, from that of a contract between parties
which can only be enforced according to the traditional rules of
private international law,9 to that of an enforceable instrument.
Under the Convention, a settlement agreement can also be given
effect as a part of defense.10
The Singapore Convention obliges states to recognize and en-
force mediated settlement agreements that were concluded in writ-
ing between parties to a dispute when such parties have their
places of businesses in different States.11  The Convention solely
applies to commercial disputes, explicitly excluding any family, em-
ployment, or related matters,12 while at the same time making clear
that it does not apply to settlement agreements which obtained the
status of a judgment or an arbitral award.13  The obligation to rec-
6 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
7 Proposal by the Government of the United States of America: Future Work for Working
Group II (7–18 July 2014), at 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/822 (June 2, 2014).
8 U.N. Doc. A/73/17, supra note 4.
9 Edna Sussman, The Singapore Convention: Promoting the Enforcement and Recognition of
International Mediated Settlement Agreements, ICC DISP. RESOL. BULL., Nov. 2018, at 42, 46
(2018).
10 Singapore Convention, supra note 4, art. 3(2).
11 Singapore Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1, 3.
12 Singapore Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1–2. For an elaborate analysis of the scope of
the Convention, see Eunice Chua, The Singapore Convention on Mediation—A Brighter Future
for Asian Dispute Resolution, ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2019).
13 Singapore Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(3). For further elaboration on the scope of the
Convention, see SING. REF. BK., Ellen E. Deason, What’s in a Name? The Terms “Commercial”
and “Mediation” in the Singapore Convention on Mediation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
1149 (2019).
1270CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1267
ognize and enforce such agreements is subject to a relatively nar-
row set of exceptions.14
III. RESERVATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The term “reservation” is very familiar to those with regular
international law experience although may be less familiar to wider
audiences and future users of the Singapore Convention.  So, it
may be helpful to begin the analysis in this section with the defini-
tion of a reservation as set forth in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (1969).15  Article 2(1)(d)states that:
“Reservation” means a unilateral statement, however phrased
or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting,
approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to ex-
clude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
treaty in their application to that State;
Reservations allow states to limit the application of certain ob-
ligations in a multilateral treaty, an option that provides states with
a degree of flexibility.  This mechanism affords states the possibility
of joining the international community in adhering to a set of
agreed-upon obligations, while excluding particular provisions that
it wishes to opt out for one reason or another.  Multilateral treaties
are the result of multiparty negotiations16 that can include states
from diverse geographical regions, with different cultural sensitivi-
ties and legal traditions.  Allowing reservations can become a key
factor for reaching a consensus.17  Of course, states cannot make
14 See SING. REF. BK., Jean-Christophe Boulet, The Singapore Convention and the Metamor-
phosis of Contractual Litigation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1209 (2019); see also SING.
REF. BK., He´ctor Flores Sentı´es, Grounds to Refuse the Enforcement of Settlement Agreements
Under the Singapore Convention on Mediation: Purpose, Scope, and Their Importance for the
Success of the Convention, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1235 (2019).
15 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention], https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-
18232-english.pdf.
16 This was the case for the Singapore Convention; see, e.g., Hal Abramson, Introductory
Panel Remarks at Cardozo School of Law, Symposium on the Singapore Convention (Mar. 18,
2019); see also SING. REF. BK., Hal Abramson, The New Singapore Mediation Convention: The
Process and Key Choices, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1037 (2019).
17 The principal of Consensus in treaty-making is one which is especially characteristic of
discussions in UNCITRAL as part of what is termed as the “Vienna Spirit” (UNCITRAL con-
ducts its work at U.N. headquarters in Vienna and New York, but the UNCITRAL Secretariat is
based in Vienna). The “Vienna Spirit” is celebrated by many in the international community as
characteristic of international negotiations. See, e.g., Josephine Teo, Second Minister for Man-
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reservations that conflict with the object and purpose of a treaty,18
as this would negate the very basis for the treaty.19  Still, reserva-
tions, even on seemingly ancillary matters, can remain crucial to
the negotiation and broad adoption of a multilateral treaty.
There are no preset rules on the design of reservations in mul-
tilateral treaties, as practices range from provisions that completely
bar reservations to provisions detailing specific matters that can be
the subject of reservations.  The Singapore Convention drafters
have opted for the latter approach.20  Reservations are submitted
to the depositary named in the relevant convention, and in the case
where the depositary is the UN Secretary-General,21 they are made
public.22
IV. ARTICLE 8.1(a)—OPT-OUT FOR SETTLEMENTS INVOLVING
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES
A. Drafting History
Article 8.1(a) of the Singapore Convention states:
1. A Party to the Convention may declare that: (a) It shall not
apply this Convention to settlement agreements to which it is a
party, or to which any governmental agencies or any person act-
ing on behalf of a governmental agency is a party, to the extent
specified in the declaration; . . .
power and Second Minister for Home Affairs, National Statement of Singapore to the Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs (March 12, 2018), para. 22, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Overseas-Mission/
Geneva/Mission-Updates/2018/03/press_20180314.
18 Vienna Convention, supra note 15, art. 18:
“A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
a treaty when:
(a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty sub-
ject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear
not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into
force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed”.
19 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 821–22 (5th ed. 2003).
20 U.N. Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-
General As Depository of Multilateral Treaties, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.l, U.N. Sales No.
E.94.V.15 (1999) [hereinafter Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General].
21 This is the case for the Singapore Convention. See Singapore Convention, supra note 4,
art. 10.
22 See Depositary Notifications (CNs) by the Secretary-General, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/CNs.aspx?cnTab=tab2&clang=_en (last visited Aug. 3,
2019).
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At its 63rd session, UNCITRAL Working Group II (the
“Working Group”) considered whether to exclude settlement
agreements involving government entities from the application of
the Convention.  At the time, it was undecided whether the instru-
ment would be drafted as a convention or a model law.23
Preparing for an eventuality of a convention format,24 two al-
ternatives were considered—a positive formulation: “A Party to
this Convention may declare that it shall apply this Convention
. . .”, and a negative one: “A Party to this Convention may declare
that it shall not apply this Convention . . . .”25  After a short delib-
eration, the latter was favored in order to reinforce the understand-
ing that exclusion of governments (and related actors) would be
the exception rather than the rule.26  It is noteworthy that the idea
of allowing a government as party exclusion, albeit in a somewhat
different setting, was also adopted by the drafters of the 2019
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “2019 Hague
Judgments Convention”).27
23 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes International
Commercial Conciliation: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements (7–11 Sept. 2015), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.190, paras. 48–58 (July 13, 2015).
24 In case of a model law, such declarations would be unnecessary as when adopting the
model law states could freely make a choice of whether to exclude the application of the law to
settlement agreements involving governments or not.
25 UNCITRAL WG II, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes, Interna-
tional commercial conciliation: enforceability of settlement agreements, Sixty-fourth Sess. (1–5
February 2016), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.195, paras. 19–21 (Dec. 2, 2015). See also Draft
Convention at UNCITRAL WG II, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes
International commercial conciliation: preparation of an instrument on enforcement of interna-
tional commercial settlement agreements resulting from conciliation, 67th Sess. (2–6 October
2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.202/Add.1, para. 5 (2017); UNCITRAL WG II, Note by
the Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes International commercial conciliation: prepara-
tion of an instrument on enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements resulting
from conciliation, 67th Sess. (2–6 October 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.202, para. 54
(2017).
26 UNCITRAL Rep. of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its 68th Sess.
(New York, 5–9 February 2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/934, para. 77 (Feb. 19, 2018).
27 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or
Commercial Matters, July 2, 2019, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter Hague Judgments Conven-
tion], art. 19, which reads as follows:
1. A State may declare that it shall not apply this Convention to judgments arising
from proceedings to which any of the following is a party—(a) that State, or a natural
person acting for that State; or (b) a government agency of that State, or a natural
person acting for such a government agency.
The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration is no broader
than necessary and that the exclusion from scope is clearly and precisely defined. The
declaration shall not distinguish between judgments where the State, a government
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B. Discussion
Article 8.1(a), as cited earlier, constituted a departure from
the drafting of the New York Convention, around which the Singa-
pore Convention was modeled.28  There is no such opportunity for
an exclusion in the New York Convention.
The reasons behind this reservation were several.  In some ju-
risdictions, government entities are not authorized to conclude me-
diated settlements.29  In addition, governments might become
involved in disputes in which the subject matter is particularly sen-
sitive (e.g. national security), or with foreign policy implications.
These dilemmas are partially addressed by an explicit reference to
sovereign immunity in the context of enforcement of awards result-
ing from investor-state dispute arbitration.30  However, some states
felt that greater flexibility was needed for states to exclude these
matters entirely from the scope  of the Convention.  For some
agency of that State or a natural person acting for either of them is a defendant or
claimant in the proceedings before the court of origin.
2. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a State that made a
declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 may be refused if the judgment arose from pro-
ceedings to which either the State that made the declaration or the requested State,
one of their government agencies or a natural person acting for either of them is a
party, to the same extent as specified in the declaration.
One of the authors was a member of the Israeli delegation to the negotiations of the Hague
Convention. It is noteworthy that the discussions of this provision in the context of judgments
proved out to be much more controversial than with respect to mediated settlements, but in the
end it too was agreed by consensus (notes on file with authors).
28 There are various instances where the drafters of the Singapore Convention chose to di-
vert from the New York Convention. See, for example, Article 5(1)(e)–(f) to the Singapore
Convention that grant refusal for enforcement of a mediation settlement agreement in case there
was a serious breach by the mediator or if the mediator failed to disclose circumstances that
might raise doubts regarding the mediator’s impartiality or independence. Article 5 to the New
York Convention does not include a similar provision regarding the arbitrator’s behavior. An-
other example is the emphasis given to the parties’ places of business in the application of the
Singapore Convention. While the New York Convention limits its application to non-domestic
arbitral awards concluded in another State’s territory (Article 1), without considering the par-
ties’ places of origin or places of business, the Singapore Convention considers the parties’ places
of business as the key criteria for the international character of the agreement and thus for the
Convention application to it.
29 UNCITRAL Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its
63rd Sess. (7–11 September 2015), 49th Sess., A/CN.9/861, para. 44 (2015).
30 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, arts. 54–55  (the ICSID Convention), Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. See also
INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIREC-
TORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES
AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 47–48 (1965), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/
REPORT-OF-THE-EXECUTIVE-DIRECTORS-ON-THE-ICSID-CONVENTION.aspx.
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states, this could be an important factor in deciding whether to join
the Convention.31
Addressing the issue through a reservation appeared to be
preferable to a blanket exclusion of government-related mediated
settlements.  Despite the concerns noted above, some government
entities engaged in commercial activities may still wish to utilize
the Singapore Convention to enforce mediated settlements in
which they are a party.32  Article 8.1 fine-tunes the balance be-
tween these competing concerns by encouraging states that want to
make a reservation to limit it to subject matters that are strictly
necessary.
However, the Article 8.1(a) reservation could deter private
parties from entering into international mediated settlement agree-
ments with states.  This could have a negative impact on the spread
of the use of mediation in the international context as states today
are integral actors in the global commercial community (in contrac-
tual and investment contexts).
At the same time, it is also crucial to acknowledge that unlike
in the past, global dispute resolution between foreign commercial
actors and states is no longer considered by everyone as the most
appropriate tool to promote global growth and development, even
if it is clear that states should abide by their commitments.33  UN-
CITRAL has been working to reform investor-state dispute settle-
31 Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-
Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 43
(2019).
32 Additionally, blanket exclusion would have negatively impacted third parties’ interests
and expectations. See UNCITRAL Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on
the work of its sixty-third session (7–11 September 2015), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861, para. 46
(2015); Chua, supra note 12, at 8–9.
33 Australia has recently deliberated whether to continue to include ISDS provisions in its
agreements. AUSTRALIA GOV’T, PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, TRADE & ASSISTANCE REVIEW
2013–14, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT SERIES 77–81 (2015), https://www.pc
.gov.au/research/ongoing/trade-assistance/2013-14/trade-assistance-review-2013-14.pdf. In 2015,
the Commission recommended not to include such a provision in Australia’s bilateral agree-
ments. AUSTRALIA GOV’T, PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, TRADE & ASSISTANCE REVIEW 2014–15,
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT SERIES 49 (2016).  Ecuador has denounced the
ICSID Convention. See Joshua M. Robbins, Ecuador withdraws from ICSID Convention, THOM-
SON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW, Aug. 12, 2009, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-422-
1266?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1.
See PLC Arbitration, Venezuela withdraws from ICSID, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW,
Jan. 31, 2012, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-517-5244?originationContext=know
How&transitionType=KnowHowItem&contextData=%28sc.Default%29&comp=pluk.
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ment for the past few years, with the aim of reforming current
deficiencies.34
This state of affairs raises the concern that some states will be
required to choose between rejecting the Singapore Convention or
acceding to it in order to support the use of mediated settlements
in international disputes and, as a result, exposing themselves to
expedited enforcement procedures.  It is admittedly difficult to
know what choice states will make, even for states which view the
use of mediation as a valuable alternative to courts or international
arbitration.
Allowing the reservation in Article 8.1 makes such a choice
unnecessary, which might be determinative to the success of the
Convention. As there is no reciprocal impact for the reservation on
other states (a somewhat unusual practice),35 the Convention ap-
plies only to the competent authorities in the state which made the
reservation and not to courts for other Parties to the Convention.
The absence of a “traditional” reciprocity provision can be ex-
plained by the lack of a “state of origin” in the Convention, as it
might be difficult to designate the state where the mediation pro-
cess took place.36  In the absence of an explicit reciprocity provi-
sion (which is included, for example, in the parallel provision of the
2019 Hague Judgments Convention37), other state members of the
Singapore Convention might not decline applying the Convention
to enforcement of settlement agreements in which governments
are involved in originating from a declaring state (or such agree-
ments to which the declaring state is party to).
Accordingly, despite its limiting effect, the Article 8.1(a) reser-
vation may be crucial to promoting wider participation of states in
the Convention, which in turn will benefit users of the Convention
as they seek legal status and enforcement of their international me-
diated settlements around the globe.
34 Please see the work of Working Group III of UNCITRAL at https://uncitral.un.org/en/
working_groups/3/investor-state. See also ICSID SECRETARIAT, PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT
OF THE ICSID RULES—WORKING PAPER, Vol. 3, 415, 857, 915 (2018), https://icsid.worldbank
.org/en/Documents/Amendments_Vol_3_Complete_WP+Schedules.pdf; EUROPEAN UNION,
SUBMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES TO UNCITRAL WORKING
GROUP III (2019), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157632.pdf.
35 See, e.g., Hague Judgements Convention, supra note 27, art. 18(2)(b).
36 Schnabel, supra note 31, at 45.
37 Hague Judgments Convention, supra note 27.
1276CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1267
V. ARTICLE 8.1(b)—RESERVATION ON OPT-IN BY PARTIES TO
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
A. Drafting History
Article 8.1(b) of the Singapore Convention states: “1. A Party
to the Convention may declare that: (b) It shall apply this Conven-
tion only to the extent that the parties to the settlement agreement
have agreed to the application of the Convention.”
Drafting this provision was not an easy task, as it raised funda-
mental, almost “ideological” differences between delegations as to
the  core elements of mediation.  Drafters expressed various views,
ranging from automatic application of the better enforcement pro-
cess in the Convention as was done with the New York Convention
regime, to supporting party autonomy by authorizing private par-
ties to decide whether they want the Convention to apply.38  It was
also proposed to allow states to enforce settlement agreements
without the parties’ consent, and even in cases where the parties
explicitly opted-out.39
The debate on this issue was often heated and intense al-
though always cordial and friendly,40 as each of the “camps” waited
for others to “see the light.”41  Finally, as part of the overall “five
step” compromise,42 it was decided to resolve this discussion in a
reservation mechanism.43
38 UNCITRAL Rep. of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its 66th Sess.
(6–10 February 2017), U.N. Doc, A/CN.9/90, paras. 36–37 (2017).
39 A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.202, supra note 25, at 56; UNCITRAL Working Group II, Note by the
Secretariat, Settlement of commercial disputes, International commercial mediation: preparation
of instruments on enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements resulting from
mediation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.205, para. 30 (Nov. 23, 2017).
40 The cordial atmosphere of the debate was largely due to the skillful and elegant conduct
of the deliberations by the chair of the working group, Natalie Morris-Sharma (internal notes on
the Singapore Convention negotiations, on file with authors).
41 The delegation of Israel to the negotiations repeatedly made statements, during the nego-
tiations, expressing its hope that other delegations realize that this is an impasse which can only
be overcome with a compromise to accommodate proponents of both approaches (statements on
file with authors).
42 UNCITRAL Rep. of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its 66th
session (6–10 February 2017), U.N. Doc, A/CN.9/90, paras. 39–40, 51–52 (2017).
43 Schnabel, supra note 31, at 43–44.
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B. Discussion
One of the most prominent features of a mediated settlement
agreement is that the terms are based on the consent of the par-
ties.44  Requiring double consent by parties, to both the settlement
terms and the application of the Convention, might seem overly
burdensome and unnecessary, considering that the Convention al-
ready includes protections for parties in the form of defenses
against enforcement.45  Also, by agreeing to the settlement terms
(to be contrasted with arbitration terms that are imposed), the par-
ties to the dispute might have implicitly agreed to enforcement
around the world, wherever they have assets.46
These arguments seemingly render the Article 8.1(b) state opt-
out reservation with opt-in for disputing parties unnecessary.
However, as indicated by the responses of the various states to the
UNCITRAL questionnaire distributed prior to the commencement
of the negotiations, enforcement of settlement agreements
originating in foreign jurisdictions was almost unknown in most
states.47  While this state of affairs did not deter many states from
supporting  the Singapore Convention, as evidenced by its adop-
tion by consensus in the United Nations General Assembly, it did
raise the potential for disputing parties to be unaware of the possi-
bility of enforcement outside the jurisdiction where the settlement
agreement was made.  Whether parties are aware of and consent to
the consequences of signing a settlement agreement can be impor-
tant factors when courts are considering enforcement.48  Enabling
44 See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Consent in Mediation, 14 DISP. RESOL. MAG., 2007, at 4–5.
45 Singapore Convention, supra note 4, art. 5. For more information on defenses, see SING.
REF. BK., Michel Kallipetis, Singapore Convention Defences Based On Mediator’s Misconduct:
Articles 5.1(e) & (f), 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1197 (2019); SING. REF. BK., Jean-Chris-
tophe Boulet, The Singapore Convention and the Metamorphosis of Contractual Litigation, 20
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1209 (2019); SING. REF. BK., He´ctor Flores Sentı´es, Grounds to
Refuse the Enforcement of Settlement Agreements Under the Singapore Convention on Mediation:
Purpose, Scope, and Their Importance for the Success of the Convention, 20 CARDOZO J. CON-
FLICT RESOL. 1235 (2019); see also SING. REF. BK., Timothy Schnabel, Recognition by Any Other
Name: Article 3 of the Singapore Convention on Mediation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
1181 (2019).
46 Schnabel, supra note 31, at 45.
47 UNCITRAL, Note by the Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes, Enforcement of
Settlement Agreements Resulting From International Commercial Conciliation/mediation, Compi-
lation of Comments by Governments, 63rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/846, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
846.Add.1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/846.Add.2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/846.Add.3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
846.Add.4 and U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/846.Add.5 (29 June–16 July 2015).
48 In mediation, party autonomy and flexibility are important elements, but States that see
the need to provide detailed frameworks for the conduct of mediation reflect the need to pre-
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states to require explicit party consent in order for the Singapore
Convention to apply reflects this concern.
Delegates opposing the disputing parties’ opt-in requirement
expressed concerns that parties could not be expected to include a
Convention opt-in provision at the last stage of the mediation pro-
cess, especially when any discussion of the additional provision
could result in further disputes.  This is again a serious concern
which was shared by mediators and practitioners.
Some observers also contended that the 8.1(b) reservation was
not needed if the Working Group thought that the new convention
offered an improved enforcement mechanism over the status quo.
Without the convention, parties can rely on the default enforce-
ment process in cross-border litigation, and that can occur without
making an informed choice to do so.  The argument was made that
the aim of the exercise was to draft an improved process to replace
the default one.  It was further noted that if successful in achieving
this aim, this reservation is unnecessary because the improved en-
forcement process should become the default one that automati-
cally applies.  If parties do not like the improved process, they can
always opt-out.
Considering the innovative nature of the Singapore Conven-
tion, and that in the past UNCITRAL has adopted mechanisms for
parties to exclude commercial law treaties,49 the state opt-out and
party opt-in mechanism adopted in the new Convention ultimately
embodied an effort to balance the different views.
Further objections to the 8.1(b) reservation mechanisms re-
lated to the potential lack of awareness by lawyers and mediators
to the fact that the state where enforcement is envisioned (i.e.
where assets are located) made a reservation requiring party opt-in
consent to the application of the Singapore Convention.  The rela-
tively easy answer to this question is that mediators and lawyers
representing parties to a settlement agreement should always in-
clude an opt-in clause to avoid any potential issues.50  In a similar
vain, as is the case for other conventions,51 the UNCITRAL secre-
serve key due process rights in the process. See, e.g., Israeli Courts Regulations (Mediation),
5753–1993 (Isr.) (providing such a framework, including a proposed mediation agreement).
49 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 6, Apr.
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
50 Following the advice of Allan Stitt, made during this presentation at the NYIAC event.
See NYIAC, supra note 3.
51 See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx?clang=_en (last visited Aug.
3, 2019) (which includes publications on reservations and declarations).
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tariat will likely indicate reservations on the status page of the Sin-
gapore Convention, which will be public and easily accessible.
Moreover, states making such a reservation will have an interest in
raising awareness of this requirement in order  to encourage for-
eign parties to conclude settlement agreements with their
nationals.
In contrast with the Article 8.1(a) reservation, the 8.1(b) reser-
vation was much more controversial as it might impose a require-
ment on the mediation process which did not exist prior to the
adoption of the Singapore Convention.  At the same time, includ-
ing the reservation in the Convention not only paved the way to
bypass a difficult obstacle to the successful completion of the nego-
tiations, but also might provide the necessary comfort level for
states that view explicit informed consent as key to supporting and
ratifying the Convention.
VI. THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR RESERVATIONS UNDER
THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION
Both reservations, and in particular the Article 8.1(b) reserva-
tion, led commentators to express the view that if states pursue
them, it will harm the effectiveness of the Convention, including
undermining its main purpose to bring certainty and promote the
use of mediation as a dispute settlement mechanism globally.52  As
is evident from the analysis in the previous sections, this chapter
argues that this will not likely be the result.
Alongside the various considerations already presented,
mainly that the reservation mechanism will encourage wider ratifi-
cation of the Convention (without which there would be no point
in its adoption), the overall framework for reservations provides
for additional  safeguards that support the utility of the reservation
mechanisms for increased adherence  accession.53
First, no other reservations apart from those contained in Arti-
cle 8.1 are allowed.54  This is a provision which is not always in-
52 Timothy Schnabel, Implementation of the Singapore Convention: Federalism, Self-Execu-
tion, and Private Law Treaties, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2019).
53 See, for example, art. 8(3) to the Convention which allows States to not only reserve, but
also to withdraw from reservations at any time.
54 Singapore Convention, supra note 4, art. 8(2). See also Vienna Convention, supra note 15,
arts. 19–20 (which stipulates what reservations are permitted under the Vienna Convention).
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cluded in treaties,55 reflecting the need to limit the flexibility of
states to modify their obligations to the Singapore Convention in
light of the potential difficulties associated with allowing large
carve-outs.56
Second, as a relatively unique exception to the international
law practice of permitting reservations only at the time of signing,
ratification, or accession to a treaty,57 the Singapore Convention
permits reservations and withdrawals at any time.58  This allows for
flexibility, as states can also have the option not to decide to in-
clude reservations at the point of joining the Convention, but can
do so later if a need arises.  The option to withdraw reservations
serves an opposite and similar function.  States can make reserva-
tions and subsequently withdraw them, according to practices de-
veloped over the years.59
Third, the Singapore Convention provides that the reserva-
tions submitted after a state joins the Convention will take effect
after six months from the date of their deposit,60 and that the reser-
vation will apply only to international mediated settlement agree-
ments concluded after the Convention is in force.61  This
mechanism is meant to limit the uncertainty embodied in the reser-
vation mechanism, as well as to prevent abuse by states of the flexi-
ble nature of the reservations, particularly in respect of the Article
8.1(a) opt-out reservations relating to settlement agreements in
which states are a party.  This anti-abuse provision will prevent
“strategic” use of this reservation by states to avoid the obligation
to enforce a settlement agreement in which they are a party.
This overall framework might not address all the concerns as-
sociated with the reservation regime under the Singapore Conven-
tion.  But the framework could go a long way in providing more
leeway for states when debating whether to join the Convention,
while at the same time providing more certainty for parties to an
international mediated settlement agreement seeking global
compliance.
55 Sean D. Murphy, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on Crimes Against Humanity, Int’l
Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/704, para. 312 (Jan. 23, 2017). Such a provision is not included,
for example, in the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention.
56 A/CN.9/934, supra note 25, paras. 86–88.
57 Vienna Convention, supra note 15; Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General, supra
note 20, at 61; A/CN.9/934, supra note 25, paras. 81–85.
58 Singapore Convention, supra note 4, art. 8(3).
59 Chua, supra note 12, at 9.
60 Singapore Convention, supra note 4, arts. 8(3) & (5).
61 Id. art. 9.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Only time will tell whether the reservation mechanism in the
Singapore Convention will indeed make the “New York dream”
for international mediated settlements come true.
As argued throughout this article, the inclusion of this mecha-
nism was one of the reasons for the successful adoption of the Con-
vention in relatively record time for negotiations of international
instruments (three years).62  Similarly, allowing both reservations
could also be the very reason for the Convention’s overall success
in promoting the use of mediation for cross-border disputes world-
wide.  If it is indeed the case that the Convention would rarely be
used in practice as parties would comply with the settlement terms
in order to avoid the risk of enforcement,63 then even if the reser-
vations did “water down the Convention,”64 significant global buy-
in to the Convention would be success in itself.
Whatever the case may be, it is imperative that all relevant
stakeholders be aware of the reservation mechanism and its im-
pacts.  States hesitating to join the Singapore Convention should
consider whether exercising the reservation option dispels impedi-
ments in domestic law and policy.  Parties (and their representa-
tives) should be aware that a reservation might be applicable to
their settlement agreement and should plan  accordingly.  Hope-
fully, this chapter  will facilitate this plea to be aware of the reser-
vation mechanism and the opportunities it holds for flexibility, as
the Singapore Convention makes its first steps into the almost ex-
clusive New York Convention territory of cross-border dispute
resolution.
62 For example, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 2006 was
adopted by the General Assembly on December 2006, five years after the mandate to consider
such Convention was given to the Ad Hoc Committee. See G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. GAOR, 61st
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006).
63 This was said, for example, by Allan Stitt in the NYIAC event. See NYIAC, supra note 3.
64 Chua, supra note 12, at 9.
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